US Policy for Libya Shifts from No-Fly Zone to No-Drive Zone

It is called a revolution because after a few 180s you find yourself going in circles.

The prospect of a deadly siege of the rebel stronghold in Benghazi, Libya, has produced a striking shift in tone from the Obama administration, which is now pushing for the United Nations to authorize aerial bombing of Libyan tanks and heavy artillery to try to halt the advance of forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.

The administration, which remains deeply reluctant to be drawn into an armed conflict in yet another Muslim country, is nevertheless backing a resolution in the Security Council that would give countries a broad range of options for aiding the Libyan rebels, including military steps that go well beyond a no-flight zone.

Administration officials — who have been debating a no-flight zone for weeks — concluded that such a step now would be “too little, too late” for rebels who have been pushed back to Benghazi. That suggests more aggressive measures, which some military analysts have called a no-drive zone, to prevent Colonel Qaddafi from moving tanks and artillery into Benghazi.

This is what policy making looks like when a nation has political leadership that is unable to make difficult decisions. Whether or not you agree that the US should intervene in Libya, and I don't think we should, what really frustrates me is how the Obama administration appears to have no guiding principles in foreign policy to utilize in decision making. This is strikingly obvious because the Obama administration clearly has guiding principles in domestic policy that are continuously utilized in decision making.

This situation reminds me of something Chuck Horner was quoted saying in the Washington Post earlier this week.

Retired Air Force Gen. Charles A. Horner said the administration should ask itself why it wants to intervene, and what it expects to achieve, rather than how it plans to intervene. Horner said those basic questions have yet to be clearly answered.

"The air power that he's using now has some impact on the rebels, but what they are dying from is artillery," Horner said. "Next step, you say let's start bombing the artillery. The next step would be to take out his tanks. The next step would be targeting his ground forces. And then you've sided with the rebels in an all-out war. But what is the cost and what are our interests?"

Horner said NATO can effectively strike even very low-flying helicopters. But with each expansion of the kind of targets that can be hit, he said, the complexity and lethality of the operation increases.

Has the US answered the questions Scott Eblin discussed last week?

What's the goal? - What are we really trying to do here? Why does that matter? To whom does it matter?

What's in scope and out of scope? - What would we always do in this situation? What would we never do? What are the grey zones? What limits are we placing on ourselves?

What are the required steps? - If we start with the end goal and reverse engineer our way back from that, what are all the steps that are going to be required to do this? Can we do all of that in the desired time frame?

What are the true costs? - What are the dollar costs for all of those steps we just outlined? What are the opportunity costs in shifting resources from an existing priority to this new priority? What else are we not going to be able to do if we choose to do this?

What are the pros and cons? - As we consider all of the stakeholders in this decision, what are the pros and cons for each? Do we weight all of the stakeholder groups equally or do some have more sway than others? Which ones? How does all of that roll up to our overall take on costs and benefits?

What are the possible side effects? - What kinds of ripple effects might this course of action have a month from now? A year from now? Five years from now? Where should we expect to see side effects? What could go wrong that we haven't talked about yet? What could we do to prevent that?

I am left with the impression these questions do not and never did have good answers, and that is why US policy for Libya has been a moving target. The inability of this administration to articulate US policy as it relates to a potential new theater of war in Libya is why I am 100% in agreement with Senator Lugar, and in disagreement with CDR Salamander. If US military assets are used for anything other that supporting European nations, I firmly believe Congress needs to have the debate so the Libya policy by the Obama administration can be articulated and questioned.

On foreign policy issues the Obama administration has proven to be different than the Bush administration, not better or worse than the Bush administration. Executive use of military power has been running wild in the 21st century. Perhaps this time it would be wise to use the Constitution as a guide towards crafting policy as opposed to simply trusting another President to involve the US in yet another crisis - a policy that so far has no economic or strategic interest that has been articulated by those who are crafting policy. Why is it exactly that the Obama administration has been unable to make a policy decision regarding Libya until the crisis reached a definitive tipping point, and what about this tipping point prompts action now that didn't matter just a few days ago?

Nothing but questions, and no answers to be found.