When the Costs are all Financial, We Aren't Really Thinking

I just don't know that I am finding much value in these quick print Policy Briefs from K-Street. I was quick to point out the silliness of a recent Policy Brief by CSBA, and I will also point out the silliness of this policy brief by CNAS (PDF). What really annoys me about this brief is how it describes opportunity costs as if they are all financial.

But the military operations in Libya are also incurring opportunity costs. As the United States once again intervenes militarily, competing spending priorities, both foreign and domestic, are ignored. Such operations shift the U.S. focus away from countries like Iraq and Afghanistan (which still include over 130,000 U.S. troops), South and East Asia, and other strategically and economically critical regions. This leaves many to question why the United States and its allies are devoting resources to a country of relatively low strategic importance in North Africa. Though the Department of Defense allocates money in its budget for contingencies, operations in Libya will likely erase whatever cuts in domestic spending have been made by the U.S. Congress in 2011.

The problem I'm having here is that there is no analysis at all regarding the opportunity costs had the US done nothing. Yeah, I do have high expectations, because I for one will publicly demand better analysis from the Think Tanks I believe matter.

It was recently suggested to me, from folks in another think tank that like CNAS mostly opposes action in Libya, that the US could have legitimately suffered a significant strategic defeat in Libya by doing nothing, potentially the biggest set back for the United States in the GWOT to date. The Arab League called on the international community to act on behalf of Libyan citizens, and the Libyan citizens themselves were pleading for the United States to help. Had the US done nothing, and Al Jazeera covered a massacre in Libya and a stream of refuges into Egypt, what would the value of American values be on the Arab street in that context? How big a set back would it have been for the US to do nothing and allow Al Jazeera to frame the narrative of US inaction to the Arab street?

Given how much attention CNAS has given the GWOT, shouldn't that question at least enter into their thinking? CNAS was hard core behind the recent surge in Afghanistan, and they don't believe opening a 3rd military front in the Muslim world might have strategic effects in the region that influence existing theaters? Come on, think tanks can never afford to treat each campaign in isolation.

By taking action, the US took control of the communications and narrative, and while there may be little the US can do to influence the narrative inside Libya (there is no such thing as hearts and minds with airpower alone), if the target audience is the rest of the Middle East - limited US military action in Libya carries with it the potential to take a strategic defeat by doing nothing and turn it into a strategic victory over the narrative of al-Qaeda and other extremist challengers who cannot overcome the Al Jazeera coverage that shows the US as a partner, rather than an oppressor.

Some might suggest that the US still faces problems with protests in other places. That may be true, but it still requires significant steps to become similar to Libya. Should, for example, the Arab League side unanimously with a rebel movement in another country, that will be the first threshold by which to expect US action - but given our better relationships with many in the region, military action may not be necessary at all to exert a great deal of power and influence.

The CNAS paper makes the claim that resources devoted to Libya is drawing away "proper US attention" from other movements across the Middle East. Uhm... can anyone name one such example? Is the Arab League calling for action in Syria, Yemen, or Bahrain? Is the USS Florida (SSGN 728) shooting cruise missiles into Libya that should be used somewhere else? Jeez, you can get snarky with this CNAS analysis no matter how you feel about US policy in Libya.

CNAS has done a fantastic job with their deep analysis papers highlighting the importance of communications in US policy in the Middle East. This paper seems to have forgotten that aspect of their previous analysis. I find myself struggling to fit the Presidents Libya policy into the context of the big picture. For me, this CNAS Policy Brief contributes nothing to some of the most important strategic and policy questions that have been raised elsewhere, and to be real honest - doesn't explain what the US policy of regime change accomplishes in any strategic context towards advancing US interests.