Ever since the Naval Institute meeting Friday morning I've had a hard time focusing because something happened I could not quite make sense of at the time. Someone lied for 1 million dollars.
Several months ago I recruited a post command CDR to join the US Naval Institute, before the mission statement change became an issue. The CDR had written articles for my blog and was actively engaged as a writer in other places online, so I kept encouraging him to engage with the Naval Institute. Since joining last year he has been one of several officers who has consulted with several USNI staff offering ideas towards helping facilitate outreach and participation among more of the younger officers in the Navy that folks inside USNI have long recognized they have had a problem reaching.
During the Q&A period of the meeting, this post command CDR held what is best described as a Captains Mast during the meeting with the Board of Directors. He asked a relatively open but specific question:
Was there ever any discussion or money spent towards divesting the US Naval Institute of the Naval Institute Press. He phrased the question multiple ways and asked multiple times. It was the first time I had ever attended a Captain's Mast.
Steve Waters said no, and in Captain's Mast style, the CDR pointed and asked several folks around the room including legal counsel and other Board of Directors present. All of them replied they have never even discussed nor looked at nor funded any effort to divest USNI of the Press. Then CEO Tom Wilkerson chimed in saying that Tom had gone out and raised $1 million from investors towards protecting the Naval Institute Press, with donors including 2 Secretary of the Navy's and Tom Clancy.
I have heard rumors and have seen emails from members stating that the Naval Institute Press was indeed being looked at by the Board of Directors as being outsourced or otherwise sold off. I called Tom later on Friday to confirm exactly what the $1 million was for, and asked him if at any point he told any of these people donating money that the Naval Institute Press was under threat by the Board of Directors while raising money. Tom replied he had done exactly that.
So here is the problem USNI faces. Either Tom Wilkerson has lied to 2 Secretary's of the Navy and important past contributors to USNI like Tom Clancy in an effort to raise 1 million dollars to protect the Naval Institute Press from a threat that never existed, or Steve Waters, legal counsel, Nancy Brown, and Don Brennan all lied to the CDR holding Captain's Mast on the member meeting floor in front of all of the members present when they said they had never even discussed it at any time.
Who is telling a 1 million dollar lie, because this is a serious problem.
I feel very disturbed by this. Someone at the very top of USNI leadership is telling a lie worth a million dollars. It troubled me when I heard the question and actually distracted me badly standing in line waiting to ask my question and quite frankly, I haven't been able to think about much else sense.
I called Tom Wilkerson on Friday with this concern, and he provided me proof that he was being honest about the threat by the Board of Directors to the Naval Institute Press and he was honest with the donors. I'm not going to be his attorney though nor speak for him, so I'll let other members learn the truth and ask for evidence themselves. The important point I will make is simple: Tom feels very comfortable that he is on the right side of this issue.
After this weekend, I will be scaling back my working relationship with USNI considerably, as most of it is volunteer work anyway. I honestly believe Steve Waters, John Morgan, Nancy Brown, and the other Board of Director members are dishonest and potentially deceitful, and I have been provided enough evidence to convince myself that legal counsel flat out lied to the membership today and to the face during a direct question from of one of the very few Naval Officers in attendance at the annual meeting. Until those people are no longer running the organization as members of the Board of Directors, I see no reason to volunteer my time supporting that organization, because USNI isn't going anywhere anyway.
In hindsight I can't recall a single shred of empirical data offered in the meeting to support the claims by Steve Waters on any issue, and now I have evidence he and his legal counsel was being dishonest to members. Without any evidence provided, membership is being asked to trust what Steve Waters is saying about USNI despite evidence a million dollar lie involving former Secretary's of the Navy and important authors like Tom Clancy was told out in the open during the members meeting.
Something is very wrong at USNI. How much money is USNI paying legal counsel to lie to the membership? Some of the other BoD members may want to look into that.
Saturday, April 30, 2024
Friday, April 29, 2024
CDR Turk's Link Library
Det. Ryan: [about Turk 182] There are two theories. The first is that this is an organized conspiracy. The other more bizarre theory is that this is the work of one man - Superman, apparently!This post is multipurpose. First, knowing I will be in a meeting Friday morning, this post is for the CDR Turks in the room so they can pull links quickly and as necessary should it be required to correct the record.
For those of you who plan to be in the room today, unless you are walking in with a plan, I ask that you please insure the officers in uniform get their round with the Chairman. That will be must see TV for those watching on the webcast.
Roberts Rules of Order (PDF)First Announcements Over Email
Important information regarding the 2011 USNI Member ballot - March 2, 2024USNI Blog Announcements
March 2011 Naval Institute News - Web | Mobile - March 3, 2024
U.S. Naval Institute 2011 Member Ballot Announcement - February 25, 2024Information Dissemination
Independence, Systems and the Enlisted Voice - February 28, 2024
U.S. Naval Institute 2011 Ballot Update - March 2, 2024
A Statement from the U.S. Naval Institute Editorial Board: USNI independence - not USNI independence and advocacy - March 7, 2024
A Letter from Stephen M. Waters, U.S. Naval Institute Board of Directors - March 14, 2024
USNI Board Minority Report: Don’t Mess with the Naval Institute’s “DNA”! - March 15, 2024
U.S. Naval Institute Board of Directors Member Ballot Update - March 18, 2024
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution — The Fleet Speaks - March 27, 2024
‘You Are Cordially Invited’ - March 31, 2024
A Statement from John F. Lehman, Honorary Chairman of the U.S. Naval Institute Board of Directors - April 18, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter From Norman Polmar - February 24, 2024Ironic, in hindsight, how among all of these posts on this topic - the only items expressing my opinion on the actual issue are the March 9 and April 22 additions.
US Naval Institute Official Announcement on Mission Change - February 25, 2024
The Mission of the U.S. Naval Institute by Rear Admiral Tom Marfiak (ret) - February 26, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter From VADM Bob Dunn - February 28, 2024
US Naval Institute Mails Bad Ballots to Members - February 28, 2024
Open Letter From Dr. Jack London, Member US Naval Institute Board of Directors - March 1, 2024
The United States Naval Institute and "Advocacy" - March 2, 2024
US Naval Institute: The Genesis of Hostile Takeover - March 2, 2024
A Communication Demonstrating Failure to Communicate - March 2, 2024
Open Letter to the Board of the United States Naval Institute by John Byron- March 3, 2024
US Naval Institute: Communicating Cart Before the Horse - March 3, 2024
United States Naval Institute: Some Thoughts by Dr. Richard Kohn - March 4, 2024
United States Naval Institute: The Living Words of Luce - March 6, 2024
US Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Captain Victor Addison, U.S. Navy (Ret.) - March 7, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Henry J. (Jerry) Hendrix II, Captain, U.S. Navy - March 8, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Norman Polmar - March 8, 2024
My Thoughts and Concerns Regarding USNI Election Drama - March 9, 2024
US Naval Institute: CDR Turk's Facebook Insurgency - March 10, 2024
United States Naval Institute: New Mission Statement Branding - March 14, 2024
US Naval Institute: Navy Times Article - March 17, 2024
US Naval Institute: Open Letter by Norman Polmar - April 6, 2024
US Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Dr. Steve Kime- April 19, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Raymond Pritchett - April 22, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter Michael Junge, Commander, US Navy - April 26, 2024
CDR Salamander
USNI Editorial Board - Nay - March 8, 2024Tom Ricks
USNI by the Numbers - April 4, 2024
The crazy plan to change the longtime mission of the U.S. Naval Institute - February 28, 2024SteelJaw Scribe
Proceedings editorial board takes on Naval Institute board over their mission - March 9, 2024
USNI: A Change In Mission Statement? - February 24th 2011
When Does Advocacy Become Lobbying… - February 25th 2011
USNI Ballot: Incompetence is One Thing — Deceit is Another - March 1st 2011
USNI: Getting It Right - March 1st 2011
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution - 7 Mar Update - March 6, 2024
USNI Update: Taking Back Our Institution — The Board of Directors Responds (15 Mar Update) - March 14, 2024
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution - Mission Change “Delayed” - March 19, 2024
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution — Guest Post (CDR Turk) - March 23, 2024
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution - Reprise and RSVP - April 24, 2024
Thursday, April 28, 2024
Sea Denial in Libya
With little more than 1960’s-era technology, Gadaffi’s forces have effectively disrupted the use of a key port to the opposition and their NATO allies. Misrata represents the rebels’ primary strong hold in Western Libya and holds a strategic position in relation to Tripoli. With regime forces solidly lodged in the airport and roads feeding out of the city blocked, Misrata’s SPOD provides the only point of access for humanitarian relief shipping, refugee and casualty outflow, and resupply of munitions and rebel fighters from Benghazi. 
On 14 and 15 April, multiple salvos of rockets targeted the Nakl al Theqeel road leading to the port. On 26 April, several Grad rockets hit the port forcing an International Organisation for Migration ship, Red Star I, to remain offshore. The same ship was delayed leaving by additional attacks until 28 April when she evacuated 1,000 migrant workers and 25 wounded.
Gadaffi’s indirect fire, consisting of Grad multiple launched rockets and probably some amount of mobile artillery, is extremely difficult to counter. Mobile launchers can be rapidly relocated, concealed by terrain (urban or otherwise), and hidden among the population. Counter-battery - from the sea or air - is difficult given these circumstances.
Outside of a full blown ground assault, the best counter to this threat is multiple lines of armed ISR. The first US Predator strike in Libya appears to have been focused on this target set. If we are still involved in this operation several months from now (if not sooner), I’d expect to see more armed Preds shifted from Iraq as the drawdown there continues.
The lessons learned here aren’t new. First, sea denial (or A2AD for you CSBA folks), doesn’t require high end ASCMs or ASBMs. Low tech/low cost options such as IDF, mines, or swarming FIAC can be equally effective in denying the use of a port. These threats can't be taken lightly. We should remember that during Desert Storm, we were merely a CEP away from a major disaster involving USS Tarawa and a pier full of ammunition at Al-Jubail.
Secondly, our amphibious lift and expeditionary forces are as relevant as ever. The strategic flexibility to land and sustain forces where the enemy isn’t using tools like JLOTS is just as important as the ability to engage the enemy. Coincidentally, AFRICOM's annual North African JLOTS Exercise, AFRICAN LION, is underway. (and for you conspiracy theorist, this exercise has been scheduled for some time and isn’t a dress rehearsal).
Finally, the demand for persistent, armed ISR will continue to grow and the Navy should invest heavily in this area to complement our strike capabilities.
UPDATE: This war could get a lot more naval, very quickly. Here is the best open source reporting I've seen on the mine layers. If the regime were to similiarly close Benghazi's port with mines, that could be all she wrote for the opposition.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
On 14 and 15 April, multiple salvos of rockets targeted the Nakl al Theqeel road leading to the port. On 26 April, several Grad rockets hit the port forcing an International Organisation for Migration ship, Red Star I, to remain offshore. The same ship was delayed leaving by additional attacks until 28 April when she evacuated 1,000 migrant workers and 25 wounded.
Gadaffi’s indirect fire, consisting of Grad multiple launched rockets and probably some amount of mobile artillery, is extremely difficult to counter. Mobile launchers can be rapidly relocated, concealed by terrain (urban or otherwise), and hidden among the population. Counter-battery - from the sea or air - is difficult given these circumstances.
Outside of a full blown ground assault, the best counter to this threat is multiple lines of armed ISR. The first US Predator strike in Libya appears to have been focused on this target set. If we are still involved in this operation several months from now (if not sooner), I’d expect to see more armed Preds shifted from Iraq as the drawdown there continues.
The lessons learned here aren’t new. First, sea denial (or A2AD for you CSBA folks), doesn’t require high end ASCMs or ASBMs. Low tech/low cost options such as IDF, mines, or swarming FIAC can be equally effective in denying the use of a port. These threats can't be taken lightly. We should remember that during Desert Storm, we were merely a CEP away from a major disaster involving USS Tarawa and a pier full of ammunition at Al-Jubail.
Secondly, our amphibious lift and expeditionary forces are as relevant as ever. The strategic flexibility to land and sustain forces where the enemy isn’t using tools like JLOTS is just as important as the ability to engage the enemy. Coincidentally, AFRICOM's annual North African JLOTS Exercise, AFRICAN LION, is underway. (and for you conspiracy theorist, this exercise has been scheduled for some time and isn’t a dress rehearsal).
Finally, the demand for persistent, armed ISR will continue to grow and the Navy should invest heavily in this area to complement our strike capabilities.
UPDATE: This war could get a lot more naval, very quickly. Here is the best open source reporting I've seen on the mine layers. If the regime were to similiarly close Benghazi's port with mines, that could be all she wrote for the opposition.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
United States Naval Institute: Letter to the Board of Directors by Raymond Pritchett
Russians don't take a dump without a plan. And senior captains don't start something this dangerous without having thought the matter through.The following letter was sent today to the United States Naval Institute Board of Directors.
- Admiral Josh Painter, The Hunt for Red October
To the Board of Directors of the United States Naval Institute.
As members of the United States Naval Institute, we feel obligated to highlight that Article VIII, Section 4 of the US Naval Institute Constitution that governs Nominations and Elections; Annual and Special Meetings has been violated by this most recent election.
Article VIII, Section 4 reads:
Section 4. Elections shall be held annually. A ballot shall be sent to each member entitled to vote at least sixty days before the date set for the Annual Meeting. The ballot may include any question that requires approval of the membership or with respect to which the Board of Directors considers it advisable to have the views of the members. To be valid, the ballot shall be signed by the member. The nine candidates for Director and the nine candidates for the Editorial Board receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared elected at the Annual Meeting, assume the duties of their respective offices from that date, and hold office until their successors are elected and qualify.The official physical ballots were not sent to each member entitled to vote at least sixty days before the day of the Annual Meeting. While it is possible to argue that the online ballot system which became available on February 25 was available 60 days prior, the first announcement by the United States Naval Institute of the election to members came in an email dated March 2, 2011. The only ballots mailed prior to 60 days of the annual members meeting were the ballots mailed out with Naval History magazine, all of which were judged invalid for lacking the mission statement issue within.
We also believe the online ballot vote is invalid because...
The online ballot used does not contain a signature as required by the Constitution of the United States Naval Institute. Voting using the online ballot never required any piece of data unique to a member to represent as a signature. The online ballot used requested only a member’s ID number beginning with a C. The fatal flaw in this approach is that this system of verification was unsecured and subject to tampering and forgery. Indeed, the online ballot as delivered to members was demonstrated unprotected and subject to forgery early in the online voting process to USNI, proven to be unprotected to and by USNI employees, and never addressed. This acknowledgment of the problem with the online ballot by USNI employees has been documented and those documents can be made available at the members meeting if required.
Basic electronic security requires two-factor identification, something you have (member ID) and something else that only the user and the institution readily knows, such as a name, email address, or telephone number, for example. Absent that second authenticator, spoofing was indeed possible by simply guessing an ID number, and in fact guessing member accounts was proven by officers of the United States Navy and USNI staff, and the United States Naval Institute CEO was alerted to this ballot problem.
The United States Naval Institute and the Board of Directors never took action to secure the online ballot nor to deal with the absence of a signature as required, thus the requirement for a signature that is clearly stated in Article VIII, Section 4 of the US Naval Institute Constitution has been ignored.
It is our belief that all of the online ballots are invalid due to lack of proper procedure to secure the mechanism in some way as to carry the authority of authenticity a signature would normally represent. It is further our belief that because the legitimate ballots used to tally all votes were mailed late, indeed mailed too late to be 60 days from the annual meeting, the entire vote including the election of all officers is invalid.
We formally request that at the US Naval Institute annual members meeting, legal counsel weigh in on these ballot issues prior to allowing anyone elected by these ballots - all of which appear to be invalid based on Article VIII, Section 4 of the US Naval Institute Constitution - to assume the duties of their respective offices.
Finally, while we believe all of the ballots for the recent election are invalid, we would like to add that we strongly protest the actions by Board of Directors to remove an initiative from a "legitimate" ballot during any election of the US Naval Institute. We strongly urge legal counsel to address at the annual members meeting the issue related to the Board of Directors authority to recall any measure that is already being voted upon by members.
Very Respectfully,
Raymond A. Pritchett III
Proud Member of the United States Naval Institute
What's China Doing?
This is a very interesting read discussing the RUMINT of China's latest 5 year plan.
Wednesday, April 27, 2024
Patterson Summer Reading
This year's Patterson School summer reading list has been released:
What do policymakers have to read in order to be "informed" on international affairs -- or just to be thought of as informed? The question, which Daniel Drezner posed yesterday, is more than just a theoretical exercise, as every summer the Patterson School assigns a list of seven or eight books on international affairs to its new and returning students. Summer reading lists are not uncommon in academia, in both graduate and undergraduate programs. Many universities assign one or more books to give faculty and new students a common intellectual foundation. The Patterson list has a twofold purpose. The first is to familiarize students with many of the most important issues in international affairs. The second is to ground students in the most important and relevant recent books on international politics. Thus, there is an effort to provide both objective and subjective expertise: what's happening in international affairs as well as what the most influential observers are saying about what's happening in international affairs. As would be expected, there can be some tension between these two objectives, as on the rare occasions when what the most influential people are saying makes little sense.
I'm an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky.
Bataan ARG Sails in the Wake of History
As told by Kennedy Hickman here.In 1804, during the fourth year of the First Barbary War, the former American consul to Tunis, William Eaton returned to the Mediterranean. Titled "Naval Agent to the Barbary States," Eaton had received support from the US government for a plan to overthrow the pasha of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli. After meeting with the commander of US naval forces in the area, Commodore Samuel Barron, Eaton traveled to Alexandria, Egypt with $20,000 to seek out Yusuf's brother Hamet. The former pasha of Tripoli, Hamet had been deposed in 1793, and then exiled by his brother in 1795.I find it appropriate that on this day, April 27, the 206th anniversary of the first major battle conducted overseas by the United States of America, the Bataan ARG and Marines of the 22nd MEU take station off the shores of Tripoli.
After contacting Hamet, Eaton explained that he wished to raise a mercenary army to help the former pasha regain his throne. Eager to retake power, Hamet agreed and work began to build a small army. Eaton was aided in this process by First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon and eight US Marines, as well as Midshipman Pascal Peck. Assembling a ragtag group of around 500 men, mostly Arab, Greek, and Levantine mercenaries, Eaton and O'Bannon set off across the desert to capture the Tripolitan port of Derna.
Departing Alexandria on March 8, 1805, the column moved along the coast pausing at El Alamein and Tobruk. Their march was supported from the sea by the warships USS Argus, USS Hornet, and USS Nautilus under the command of Master Commandant Isaac Hull. Shortly after the march began, Eaton, now referring to himself as General Eaton, was forced to deal with a growing rift between the Christian and Muslim elements in his army. This was made worse by the fact that his $20,000 had been used and money to fund the expedition was growing scarce.
On at least two occasions, Eaton was forced to contend with near mutinies. The first involved his Arab cavalry and was put down at bayonet-point by O'Bannon's Marines. A second occurred when the column lost contact with Argus and food became scarce. Convincing his men to eat a pack camel, Eaton was able to stall until the ships reappeared. Pressing on through heat and sand storms, Eaton's force arrived near Derna on April 25 and was resupplied by Hull. After his demand for the city's surrender was refused, Eaton maneuvered for two days before initiating his attack.
Dividing his force in two, he sent Hamet southwest to severe the road to Tripoli and then attack the western side of the city. Moving forward with the Marines and the other mercenaries, Eaton planned to assault the harbor fortress. Attacking on the afternoon of April 27, Eaton's force, supported by naval gunfire, met determined resistance as the city's commander, Hassan Bey, had reinforced the harbor defenses. This permitted Hamet to sweep into the western side of the city and capture the governor's palace.
Grabbing a musket, Eaton personally led his men forward and was wounded in the wrist as they drove the defenders back. By the end of the day, the city had been secured and O'Bannon hoisted the US flag over the harbor defenses. It was the first time the flag had flown over a foreign battlefield. In Tripoli, Yusuf had been aware of the approach of Eaton's column and had dispatched reinforcements to Derna. Arriving after Eaton had taken the city, they briefly laid siege before assaulting it on May 13. Though they pushed Eaton's men back, the attack was defeated by fire from the harbor batteries and Hull's ships.
The United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps have been in these waters before, and just like 206 years ago the maritime services find themselves fighting a tyrant in Tripoli while supporting an insurgency movement across Libya. One wonders if the outcome in 2011 will be similar to 1805.
Aftermath:Is it possible in 2011 that landing Marines ashore is the next step towards pushing Libya towards a negotiated settlement? In 1805, it was the presence of an Army near Tripoli, not the use of an Army in Tripoli, that let to a negotiated solution. It is sad how our political leaders no longer think of military power in the context of limited objectives, rather only in context of limited use - the distinction being very important.
The Battle of Derna cost Eaton a total of fourteen dead and several wounded. Of his force of Marines, two were killed and two wounded. O'Bannon and his Marines' role has been commemorated by the line "to the shores of Tripoli" in the Marine Corps Hymn as well as the adoption of the Mamaluke sword by the Corps. Following the battle, Eaton began planning a second march with the goal of taking Tripoli. Concerned about Eaton's success, Yusuf began suing for peace. Much to Eaton's displeasure, Consul Tobias Lear concluded a peace treaty with Yusuf on June 4, 1805, which ended the conflict. As a result, Hamet was sent back to Egypt, while Eaton and O'Bannon returned to the United States as heroes.
The Rest of the Story
In 1815, Stephen Decatur delivered swift and decisive blows against Algiers that forced a settlement with all three Barbary states and the United States. Algiers backed out of the treaty the day after it was signed, but with no American hostages held the United States observed the activities of Algiers without involvement.
It wasn't until August of 1816 that a combined British and Dutch fleet crushed Algiers and finally removed the piracy threat represented by the Barbary states. Algiers and Tunis became protectorates of France, while Tripoli fell under the domain of the Ottoman Empire until September of 1911, when Italy declared war on Tripoli and later assumed control of the colony.
In January of 1943, Tripoli was conquered once again by the British under Montgomery with allied support from New Zealand. Tripoli was administrated under British rule until declaring independence in 1951.
Tuesday, April 26, 2024
Fairly Obvious What He Meant By "Conditions"
I am not nor would ever claim to be an expert on Bahrain and the issues involved with the protests that are taking place there, but I think like most Americans, I understand the US response (or non-response) is based entirely on the presence of the 5th Fleet in Bahrain. I, like most Americans, am also fully aware that Saudi Arabia and UAE have sent in military and police capabilities into Bahrain to break up the protests.Where protests in North Africa began as struggles for the rights of civilian and citizen, it has been my impression that Bahrain from the beginning has been a sectarian struggle first with a civil rights argument layered on top. I have no idea if that is true, but Iranian influence in Bahrain has been cited by many people including US government officials.
Progressive Realist has a post by Shayan Ghajar of InsideIRAN worth reading on the tensions between Iran and Bahrain. The entire article is important, but you don't need to be a rocket scientist to understand what this is saying.
One day earlier, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, commander of the Basij militia, issued a belligerent call for more direct action towards Bahrain. Criticizing the political divisions plaguing Iran-perhaps a reference to the infighting between president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader over the Minister of Intelligence-Naqdi urged Iranians to unite against the brutal suppression of protesters in Bahrain:What is the "condition" that needs to change in order to facilitate direct involvement by Iran?
“If the current conditions do not allow us to get directly involved in the battlefield, we should change the conditions and play a direct role on this scene,” Naqdi declared, according to Fars News, which is affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The brigadier general did not clarify precisely how “conditions” might be changed to facilitate direct involvement in Bahrain; however, recent events indicate there may be growing pressure within Iran to do precisely that.
You don't have to be an expert to know the answer is neutralize the United States presence in Bahrain, indeed as I said earlier, everyone knows that the presence of 5th fleet is why we have done nothing in Bahrain to date.
Many weeks ago when discussing the events across the Middle East with several folks, one comment in particular stood out. Someone I know and consider a very serious person told me that before the Arab wave is over, the US will be lucky if Bahrain doesn't lead to a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. At the time I discussed this possibility with a few people, like Rob and Bryan for example, but I just didn't see it.
But I don't like the comments by Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi any. In fact, it is difficult to read his comments as anything other than a threat against United States presence and interests in Bahrain.
Fire Scout Scoring High Praise
I have been neutral on this system, but I'm now changing my position to positive.Northrop Grumman Corp. announced on April 12 that its MQ-8B Fire Scout vertical takeoff and landing tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) marked a new single-day flight record of 18 hours.I'm ready for the Navy to give arm the bird up and see what it can do. It may be that the Navy is ready to do exactly that, because three MQ-8Bs are on their way to Afghanistan for a bit of real world trial by fire.
U.S. Navy operators achieved the record using a single aircraft in a series of endurance flights Feb. 25 from the USS Halyburton (FFG 40). The composites-intensive Fire Scout is providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data to support anti-piracy missions while deployed on the ship for the Navy's 5th Fleet.
In the FY2012 defense budget, the Navy increased the number of MQ-8Bs being purchased over the FYDP from 31 to 57. In the field the system appears to be demonstrating that was a good decision.
What Did He Just Say?
So I am reading this article by David Axe recently published in Warships International Fleet Review about the murders of the Americans off the coast of Somalia earlier this year. I don't see the US doing anything in response to those murders that hasn't already been done, and I believe that means we can expect the same thing to happen again.But what caught my attention is this video David Axe took while apparently on a VBSS mission from USS Donald Cook (DDG 75). I believe that video was taken during a trip David Axe went on earlier last year when USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) was part of NATO counter piracy.
Watch the video.
Did you watch it? Ugly, right?
The problem in Somalia is the lack of jobs, and even though there are no jobs, we can't find anyone in Somalia who speaks English that would work as an interpreter for our VBSS missions? We could probably find plenty of Somali+English speaking interpreters in Yemen currently living there as refuges in a UN tent city. If they really wanted to tell the USN folks something, would the USN folks even understand? Didn't look like it.
I get it that there are other potential languages, but no more than 2-3 possibilities.
Also, it might be worth it, every now and again, to ask to buy fish from folks we know are legitimate fisherman. Just saying.
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter Michael Junge, Commander, US Navy
Responsibility and accountabilityHyman Rickover, the father of our nuclear Navy and probably the singular force who has left the greatest impact on the modern Navy’s culture and operations, had this to say about responsibility: "Responsibility is a unique concept. It can only reside and inhere in a single individual. You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you. You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it. Even if you do not recognize it or admit its presence, you cannot escape it. If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion or ignorance or passing the blame can pass the burden to someone else. Unless you can point your finger at the man responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible."
The famous Wall Street Journal article (“Hobson’s Choice”) phrased it thusly: "On the sea there is a tradition older even than the traditions of the country itself and wiser in its age than this new custom. It is the tradition that with responsibility goes authority and with them accountability. ...for men will not long trust leaders who feel themselves beyond accountability for what they do. And when men lose confidence and trust in those who lead, order disintegrates into chaos and purposeful ships into uncontrollable derelicts."
These two ideas and thoughts are much in the minds of members of the Institute - especially among those who have had or aspire to command. The rumors and stories swirling about the belayed balloting over the Board’s proposal to change the mission of the Institute are legion but all devolved down to a few facts: The initiative was put forward without fanfare, included the firing of the Institute’s CEO, has not been publicly supported by a single member of the Board, and worst of all - had only a tepid letter of support and a fetid announcement that the ballot measure would be held in abeyance. The discussion is also rife with rumors that the mission change and press for advocacy was the inspiration of one individual and was orchestrated to secure that man a position as CEO after General Wilkerson’s departure.
The mission of the Institute has remained constant for over a hundred years, yet the individuals charged with leading the Institute sought to solve a myriad of woes with a change to the overall mission - said change not addressing one of the purported woes listed by the Chairman. For that reason - and the inability of the members of the board to openly speak for, support, and discuss their desired mission change, I say that I have lost confidence in the leadership of the members of the board who supported this initiative - either vocally, or silently - and call on them them to take responsibility for their actions and show the accountability demanded in the Naval service and resign from their positions before the annual meeting. Doing so, resigning honorably, would allow the members in convocation at the Annual Meeting to choose new board members interested in advancing the mission of the Institute rather than changing that mission to suit personal whims and desires.
CDR Micahel Junge is a surface warfare officer who previously commanded USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41).
Please Vote Navy
Yes. I have heard all the punchlines and jokes regarding what a contest on the internet is... but I am going to ask anyway.Please, hit this link and vote in is this little popularity contest going on at the milbloggers website. You can do it for me, or for yourself if you want, but to be honest...
We need to do it for the folks in the Navy. It has been suggested I need to recommend you vote for the USNI Blog. I would recommend exactly that, but honestly, and I say this as a writer for the USNI blog - it isn't important whether USNI Blog wins or not.
What really matters here is that the Navy category gets an enormous number of votes, and the only way that happens in this tiny field of blogs is if this community goes all in. These are the choices, and based on frequency I think USNI Blog wins going away, but to each their own.
Navy Live - The official Navy blog. I read it because I know many of you don't. Yeah, one would think that an organization with a budget the size of the US Navy - never mind an organization with its own media shop - could produce something interesting more than 2-3 times a week.OK so clearly milbloggers is a military.com Army centric community focused on people centric content and issues. Nothing wrong with that. If 100 of the minimum 15,000 people who will visit this blog this week even knew about milbloggers having a voting contest like this before I discuss it in this post - I'd be shocked. That community just isn't this audience.
The Sand Docs - The story of a Navy Forward Surgical Team in Afghanistan. I never even knew that blog existed before today.
Surfing Surgeon Stuck in the Sand - I'm guessing the name implies the context? Again, first time I saw this blog was today. Clearly Navy Medicine needs their own private blog directory.
US Fleet Forces Command Blog - Ready Fleet...Global Reach. Now we are talking, Admiral Harvey's Blog is fantastic. I've still never met Admiral Harvey, and he is one of only two Admirals in the Navy I believe I would really enjoy meeting (Pandolfe being #2).
USNI Blog - of the blogs mentioned, this one is updated most frequently and when I'm not busy fighting the Board of Directors - I like to think I contribute useful content there.
But that is why we, the little immature corner of the internet focused on Navy issues, needs you to vote. Eventually we are going to have to drag that bunch towards a more mature position of military affairs if the milblogging brand is ever going to mature into something relevant, and the only way I think we can do it is by representing ourselves.
So yes, you sitting at the desk at CSBA or CNA or RAND or staffer on Capital Hill or in the Pentagon or deployed overseas or in San Diego or Norfolk or Newport or Mayport or wherever you might come to ID from today - please hit this link and vote in this little popularity contest knowing it really is for a greater good.
Only you can turn the Navy category into one with enough size those Army dudes who run that show over there take note, because on Saturday when they have the milblogger conference - if the Navy has put out enough votes - it is going to help my friend at CHINFO Captain David Werner (also known as @NavyNews) inform the audience of Army nerds at the Milblogger conference on Saturday how the broad official and unofficial Navy social media community has left them and the rest of the military services in the dust.
Why? Simple, because we are more interesting, and we are more relevant. Unless you write for BlackFive or the Small Wars Journal, don't even think about suggesting otherwise.
Monday, April 25, 2024
Stand Up and Be Counted
The retired Captain is speaking with big medicine to US Naval Institute members.
Coast Guard Responds to GAO, "What Floor? You're Standing On it!"
John Sutton is a smart guy, and in the GAO report COAST GUARD Observations on Acquisition Management and Efforts to Reassess the Deepwater Program Statement of John P. Hutton, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, he did a remarkable job withholding any sign of emotion when covering this topic.Coast Guard Has Not Completed a Comprehensive Trade-off Analysis for the Deepwater AssetsThe Coast Guard is convinced that the existing Deepwater plans represents the absolute floor for what is required, and is basically not tolerating any suggestions they can drop below current plans. It is quite smart actually, because when asked to conduct analysis of alternatives, every analysis was apparently a study to see what the USCG could do with more money, not less.
To support its role as systems integrator, the Coast Guard planned to complete a fleet mix analysis in July 2009 to eliminate uncertainty surrounding future mission performance and to produce a baseline for the Deepwater acquisition. We previously reported that the Coast Guard expected this analysis to serve as one tool, among many, in making future capability requirements determinations, including future fleet mix decisions.14 The analysis, which began in October 2008 and is now termed fleet mix analysis phase 1, was led by the Coast Guard directorate responsible for identifying and providing capabilities. In July 2010, we reported that while the Coast Guard had not yet released the results, officials told us that the analysis considered the 2007 Deepwater baseline to be the “floor” for asset capabilities and quantities and did not impose financial constraints on the outcome.15 The Coast Guard initiated a second phase of the analysis to impose cost constraints. We recommended in our July 2010 report that since the 2007 DHS-approved baseline of $24.2 billion was no longer feasible because of cost growth, the Coast Guard should conduct a comprehensive review of Deepwater cost, schedule, quantities, and mix of assets needed to meet mission needs, identify trade-offs given fiscal constraints, and report the results to Congress.16 The Coast Guard’s efforts to date have not addressed this recommendation.
We recently obtained and analyzed the phase 1 fleet mix analysis. We found that to conduct this analysis, the Coast Guard assessed asset capabilities and mission demands to identify a fleet mix—referred to as the objective fleet mix—that would meet long-term strategic goals. Given the significant increase in the number of assets needed for this objective fleet mix from the approved Deepwater program of record—the $24.2 billion baseline—the Coast Guard developed, based on risk metrics, incremental fleet mixes to bridge the two.17 Table 1 shows the quantities of assets for each incremental mix, according to the Coast Guard’s analysis.
Phase 1 also analyzed the performance of these fleet mixes to gain insight into mission performance gaps. However, the analysis was not cost constrained, as noted above. For instance, the Coast Guard estimated that the costs associated with the objective fleet mix could be as much as $65 billion. This is approximately $40 billion higher than the DHS-approved $24.2 billion baseline. As a result, as we reported last year, Coast Guard officials stated that they do not consider the results to be feasible because of cost and do not plan to use them to provide recommendations on a baseline for fleet mix decisions.
In May 2010, the Coast Guard undertook phase 2, a cost-constrained fleet mix analysis. Officials responsible for the analysis explained that it will primarily assess the rate at which the Coast Guard could acquire the Deepwater program of record within a high and low bound of annual acquisition cost constraints. They told us that the lower- and upper- bound constraints are, respectively, $1.2 billion and $1.7 billion annually; however, the basis for selecting these cost constraints is not documented. Based on our review of recent budget data, this upper bound for Deepwater is more than Congress has appropriated for the Coast Guard’s entire acquisition portfolio in recent years. Moreover, the Coast Guard officials stated that this analysis will not reassess whether the current program of record is the appropriate mix of assets to pursue and will not assess any mixes smaller than the current program of record. Alternative fleet mixes will be assessed, but these mixes are based on purchasing additional assets after the program of record is acquired, if funding remains within the yearly cost constraints. Coast Guard officials stated that they are only analyzing the program of record or a larger fleet mix because they found that the first phase of the analysis validated pursuing, at the minimum, the program of record. The Coast Guard expects to complete its phase 2 analysis in the summer of 2011. Because fleet mix analysis phase 2 will not assess options lower than the program of record, it will not prepare the Coast Guard to make the trade-offs that will likely be needed in the current fiscal climate.
As a result there will never be official analysis by the Coast Guard that says anything other than existing force structure plans in Deepwater is the bare minimum force necessary for the Coast Guard. It also makes clear anyone who says otherwise has no supporting facts - none. The material condition of the US Coast Guard is not good by any standard, so the Coast Guard has solid footing in taking a stand with Deepwater.
Just how bad is it? As of August of last year the US Coast Guard operated 250 cutters 65' or more, and the average age of those cutters was 41 years old. I doubt things have changed much in ~9 months.
Naval History Monday
From the NAWCAD Commander's Blog we find history of the USS Hornet (CV 8) by Rear Adm. Randy Mahr, commander, Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division and assistant commander for Research and Engineering, Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md.
Over at the Small Wars Journal we find A Ketch Named Mastico: North Africa Maritime Security Operations by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong. This article is a standalone expansion of his article “The Most Daring Act of the Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare,” published in the Autumn, 2010 issue of The Naval War College Review.
Great stuff.
Over at the Small Wars Journal we find A Ketch Named Mastico: North Africa Maritime Security Operations by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong. This article is a standalone expansion of his article “The Most Daring Act of the Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare,” published in the Autumn, 2010 issue of The Naval War College Review.
Great stuff.
Zero Tolerence During Peace and War
For Stout: Vice Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., commander, C6F,...
Of the ships operating in the Mediterranean Seas off the shores of Egypt and Libya during recent events, 50% of US Navy destroyer COs and 50% US Navy amphibious ship COs have been relieved of command.
relieved Cmdr. Nathan Borchers, Stout's commanding officer, due to loss of confidence in his ability to command.For Ponce: Vice Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., commander, C6F,...
Harris also relieved Stout's command master chief, Master Chief Susan Bruce-Ross, due to loss of confidence in Bruce-Ross' ability to effectively lead and serve as command master chief aboard Stout.
The relief of Borchers occurred due to a loss of confidence in his ability to address a pervasive pattern of unprofessional behavior in overseas ports and a substandard command climate on board following an investigation into multiple allegations of crew misconduct.
"We hold our leaders to a high standard. Our nation expects no less, and our Sailors deserve no less," said Harris.
relieved Cmdr. Etta Jones, Ponce's commanding officer, due to demonstrated poor leadership, and failure to appropriately investigate, report, and hold accountable Sailors found involved in hazing incidents. Additionally, she failed to properly handle a loaded weapon during a security alert which endangered some of her crew.We should also note that Commander of Naval Activities Spain and Commanding Officer of Naval Station Rota was relieved of command April 18.
The relief of the executive officer, Lt. Cmdr. Kurt Boenisch, was due to his failure to provide support to the command and commanding officer.
"Leaders who fail to set proper examples or fail to uphold proper standards, fail to serve our Sailors, our Navy and, ultimately, our nation," said Harris.
Of the ships operating in the Mediterranean Seas off the shores of Egypt and Libya during recent events, 50% of US Navy destroyer COs and 50% US Navy amphibious ship COs have been relieved of command.
Friday, April 22, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Raymond Pritchett
The Board’s intent in proposing that we revise the Mission Statement is to take the first important step in a strategic plan that will move the Institute to a stronger, more relevant future with increased financial stability.On February 25, 2024 Major General Thomas L. Wilkerson, USMC (Ret.) announced on the United States Naval Institute blog that "the Board of Directors has recommended an historic change to the Mission of the Naval Institute to 'advocating the necessity of global seapower.'" Nearly three weeks later a letter from Steve Waters, Chairman of the United States Naval Institute Board of Directors, was posted to the Naval Institute blog with the intent to address the criticism and concerns being expressed by USNI membership. In his letter explaining the mission statement change, Chairman Steve Waters highlighted three specific challenges facing USNI that included financial instability, decline in membership, and a trending loss of relevance. The emphasis by Steve Waters in all conversations has been on the first issue, financial instability, but I personally believe the second and third issues are far more serious problems. Let us examine all three.
- Steve Waters, Chairman, United States Naval Institute Board of Directors
Financial Instability
The Board’s work regarding this Statement began in late 2009 and culminated in unanimous Board approvals at our meetings in July and October 2010 and again, with one dissent, in February 2011. The Board voted so because it believes that the Institute needs to gain financial stability and to be as relevant as possible to the Sea Services, to our members, to our donors, to our employees, and to the Nation itself, especially in these difficult times. We think it is possible both to be an independent forum which speaks “truth to power” and to advocate the importance of seapower.I respect and understand that as a man of finance and as Chairman of the Board of Directors, Steve Waters is focused on money. Money is important, but the pursuit of money is the wrong motivation for a membership organization like the United States Naval Institute. When I recall 2008-2009, I recall difficult economic times for virtually every non-profit organization in Washington, DC, so I am not completely sure why hardships that were equally shared by almost every non-profit organization would form a foundation for "historic change" for an organization like USNI that has 137 years of history, legacy, and hopefully long term longevity built into the business model. Furthermore, I am very skeptical anytime I see proposals for major changes to any business plan that is grounded on the argument that "there are no guarantees."
You will recall that economic events of 2008-2009 were difficult for the Institute. Advertising revenues declined, donations shrank, and our endowment lost almost a third of its value. The Institute, led by our senior management team, became cash break-even in 2009 due to dramatic cost controls that remain in effect today. However, the reality is that print media business lines are not growing. The Naval Institute Foundation has enjoyed increases in major donor support and both corporate and foundation sponsorships in the last two years. But, there is no guarantee that these increases will continue, nor that past operational deficits will not reappear.
- Steve Waters, Chairman, United States Naval Institute Board of Directors
But my biggest concern is the obvious disconnect between the words of the Chairman and the information reflected on the audited 2010 financial statement. Many of you may not be aware, but the USNI Financial Statement for 2010 was published on the USNI website, in fact, CDR Salamander discussed the subject on this blog.
In the State of the Institute statement published in the April 2011 issue of Proceedings, the financial situation of USNI is discussed in a context very different from that of Steve Waters:
Fortunately for the Institute, with thanks to the USNI team and you, our members, the Naval Institute had its strongest financial performance in more than 20 years. In 2010 we continued and expanded the significant financial and operational successes of 2009.So in the same year "the Naval Institute had its strongest financial performance in more than 20 years," the Board voted for the Mission Statement change "because it believes that the Institute needs to gain financial stability and to be as relevant as possible to the Sea Services, to our members, to our donors, to our employees, and to the Nation itself, especially in these difficult times."
The Institute met or exceeded every financial goal for 2010 and reported a positive net operating margin of $613K. Our traditional business lines—membership, periodicals, books, and conferences—showed positive operating margins. The Foundation raised $2.3M, due in no small measure to almost 5,000 member gifts and pledges, including some that were quite large.
The Naval Institute Foundation portfolio gained an additional 15 percent over the 29 percent growth of 2009. The combined impact for USNI was a positive consolidated margin of $1.8M with a net positive cash flow of $522K.
Stephen M. Waters, Chairman of the Board
Thomas L. Wilkerson, Major General, USMC (Ret), Chief Executive Officer
How can Steve Waters claim USNI had its strongest financial performance in more than 2 decades in the annual State of the Institute while Steve Waters claims in his personal statement that these are difficult financial times for the institute? The financial facts do not support the statements, arguments, and activities of at least one Steve Waters.
Decline in Membership
The decline in membership for the Naval Institute is a serious problem, and I applaud the Board of Directors being committed to dealing with this problem. During the members meeting April 29th, I look forward to hearing what the Board of Directors has done to address this issue. I have observed that over the last decade a generational gap has developed within the membership of the Naval Institute, and only within the last few years has USNI been addressing this issue.
A lot more can be done. Steve Waters wrote in his letter that the Board of Directors has a "strategic plan that will move the Institute to a stronger, more relevant future." Because he later mentions decline in membership specifically in his article, I presume he will be presenting how the Naval Institute intends to address that problem, and how USNI members can help.
No worries, if the Board of Directors does not actually have a plan, I have three simple suggestions that are so easy and obvious it will be impossible to find a single person in the room who disagrees. The generation gap at USNI is real, and it exists in part because the Board of Directors has spent the past year discussing 20th century solutions to 21st century problems.
Loss of Relevance
Of equal (if not greater) concern is that our membership, like many other nonprofit military associations, has declined significantly in the last two decades. These demographics speak directly to the relevance challenge that the Institute is facing and must be reversed if we are to survive. Our membership decline has provided another imperative for the Board to revitalize our mission statement. We must be relevant both to our traditional supporters and to prospective new ones.That last paragraph isn't just poorly written; it is offensive in its patronization. Does any member of the US Naval Institute find confidence in the fact that Board of Directors of the United States Naval Institute formed a "mission committee" to determine whether "the Sea Services are critical to our national defense?" That is stupid beyond words. It would be like the American Medical Association (AMA) forming a "mission committee" to determine whether a physician is relevant to human health.
The Board’s Mission Committee, led by VADM John Morgan, and including VADM Nancy Brown, VADM Norman Ray, and Mr. Donald Brennan, undertook to ask how the Institute can be most effective at a time when our military budgets will decline due to the United States’ federal deficits, just as external threats are increasing around the world. The Board agreed with the Mission Committee that the Sea Services are critical to our national defense, to American foreign policy and to protect maritime commerce and hence our economy.
- Steve Waters, Chairman, United States Naval Institute Board of Directors
Relevance is a very complicated concept requiring context for a serious conversation, so lets approach this discussion in stages. Is USNI relevant to the maritime services? Yes and no. Congress reads Proceedings, so the organization is still relevant to the leaders of the maritime services. Leaders in the maritime services still write in Proceedings, so that too is part of how the organization finds relevance. If the question is whether the Naval Institute is relevant to the maritime services as a whole, I believe the answer is no. The demography issue discussed by Steve Waters is real, and USNI has lost touch with the mid-grade and junior officer communities, and virtually the entire enlisted community. What has the Board of Directors done to address this challenge? Lack of relevance among the vast majority of people in the maritime services must be a problem addressed immediately, and I believe there are a lot of very good ideas floating around for how USNI can address this challenge.
Relevance in the context of national defense and foreign policy appears to be the context being discussed by Steve Waters. I look forward to seeing what ideas are presented to the membership, if any. What has the Board of Directors done to date to address this challenge? What are the metrics that will be used to evaluate and demonstrate for fund-raising purposes the relevance of USNI? Who is USNI trying to be relevant too, and by what metric does USNI use to determine relevancy in national defense and foreign policy?
At present, USNI is an organization that publishes content, but not an organization that pays staff to produce content. In the modern communication environment, as modern content publishing non-profit organization USNI is essentially the network and not the data on a network. Do the Board of Directors recognize that distinction, understand what that means in the communication age where information is often free, and do they have a vision for how to best position the Naval Institute in the modern information environment for purposes of relevance?
What is the definition of relevance to the Board of Directors, and is that definition the same definition for relevance the membership believes best applies to the organization? I believe the answer is yes, but because many see the current struggle at USNI as a zero sum game, I might be in the minority.
Looking Ahead
There is going to be content published over the next few days leading up to the members meeting next week. Some points made in these articles I agree with, some I do not.
It is still unclear who will be presenting for USNI at the annual members meeting. I have heard that John Morgan is unable to make the meeting due to medical reasons. Let us all hope his medical condition isn't serious enough that it prevents him from attending online. This is a historic time for the Naval Institute, and to be very honest I have serious concerns regarding the quality of leadership on the Board of Directors when so many members of the Board of Directors are hiding from membership following what I see as one of the most embarrassing episodes in the 137 year history of the organization.
I get it that Board of Director members are busy people and may be out of town on business, but is it really too difficult for any Board of Director member who can't be present to get the phone or participate through the webcast? All I hear about from the Board of Directors are 20th century solutions to 21st century problems, and now they want to use 20th century excuses in the 21st century too?
Let me get this straight. I'm on a conference call yesterday discussing ideas with Fred Schultz, Paul Merzlak, Scott Gureck, Bill Miller, and Mary Ripley over at USNI on how we can reach more junior officers to produce more content for USNI and within a current context. One of the guys on the phone with us is Capt. Alexander Martin, who led the US Marines who took back The Magellan Star from pirates, and then wrote an article about his experience on the Naval Institute blog 24 hours later. I spent time with Alex earlier this year when I was in San Diego, and I asked him why he wrote the article, he said "Because I wanted my guys to be recognized, and I really do care about this stuff."
So on one hand, folks inside USNI are working hard and beating the bushes looking for ways to encourage Junior Officers to share their experiences at a pace greater than the rhythm of the monthly issue of Proceedings, but on the other hand the leaders of USNI on the Board of Directors can't find a way to make a members meeting planned months in advance following one of the challenging debates in the organizations 137 year history? The disconnect that exists between the leadership on the Board of Directors of USNI and the people who actually work inside USNI is depressing.
If you are a member of the US Naval Institute and live in the Washington, DC area, you need to attend next Friday. I'll be there. I look forward to listening to the concerns of other members, and learning the answers to a great number of questions that must have legitimate, honest answers. Some folks are attending because they want accountability, but my motivation for attending is that I want to see what the future looks like.
For those who do not understand what is at stake next week, listen carefully to this warning because it is very much legitimate based on my extensive homework on the issues recognized by the Board of Directors at USNI. If Friday becomes a bullshit show by the Board of Directors, the Naval Institute will lose the future with the younger generations of officers in the maritime services. The organization does not have time to wait even one more year for action to be taken on these issues; the window of opportunity for certain opportunities that have everything to do with the future is closing.
If you do not realize that fact, you are wildly out of touch with the people in the maritime services today and need to do your homework. If you require more information, you need to start asking serious questions. We live in an era of abundant choices, and right now according to data I have collected in relative comparisons of various alternatives and Proceedings - the folks in maritime services are choosing somewhere besides the Naval Institute to contribute their ideas.
Next Friday we fix that.
No Room For Mistakes
This story is still unfolding, so lets deal with what is reported so far.
Surface ship maintenance is a hot topic with the CNO adding about $600 million into the budget over the FYDP. Even with a $600 million increase, the Navy still has a funding shortfall in surface maintenance though, which means the burden shifts towards perfect execution.
That requirement for execution excellence for all surface maintenance suggests this swift and harsh reaction towards Norfolk Ship Support Activity is a way for leadership to set an example for everyone else. When budgets are tight, perfect execution is a requirement.
The Navy has suspended the oversight authority of the local command responsible for supervising ship repairs done by private contractors.How do we rate the way the Navy, specifically NAVSEA, has jumped into this issue? The investigation was first reported in the news on April 15, and already we are seeing some fairly strong steps towards self-correction. Noteworthy, we are talking about strict enforcement of procedures and documentation in this case, and not the quality of work.
The command, called Norfolk Ship Support Activity, has headquarters at Norfolk Naval Station. Staffed by both sailors and civilians, it oversees all maintenance work done by private companies on Navy surface ships in the mid-Atlantic region.
By suspending the command's oversight authority - formally known as its "technical warrant" - the Navy essentially is saying it no longer trusts Norfolk Ship Support Activity to make sure work by contractors is being done properly.
The decision follows the discovery of what the Navy has described as serious problems with reports submitted by the contractor who repaired the engines on the Norfolk-based ship San Antonio, which has suffered a string of major defects. The San Antonio was commissioned less than six years ago and already its engines have been overhauled.
The Virginian-Pilot reported last week that the Navy had launched a new investigation into the San Antonio's repairs after recent audits uncovered the problems with documents related to the overhaul.
Surface ship maintenance is a hot topic with the CNO adding about $600 million into the budget over the FYDP. Even with a $600 million increase, the Navy still has a funding shortfall in surface maintenance though, which means the burden shifts towards perfect execution.
That requirement for execution excellence for all surface maintenance suggests this swift and harsh reaction towards Norfolk Ship Support Activity is a way for leadership to set an example for everyone else. When budgets are tight, perfect execution is a requirement.
Square Peg, Round Hole Problem for Shipbuilding - Updated
Tim Colton has some very interesting thoughts today.
Update: I have received several email this morning related to Tim Colton's comment. Good. It's an important issue and I think ADM Roughead did a good thing raising the issue.
Tim Colton's point isn't really about performance though, if the criteria for determining necessity is money (a poor measurement for such important decisions, obviously), then it is true that Newport News is more important than Electric Boat - because Newport News is the only shipyard capable of building nuclear aircraft carriers.
The bottom line is we pay more for ships/subs because we buy fewer - and our shipyards have a far greater collective capacity than what is on the books for the future fleet. We keep shipyards open for strategic purposes instead of business efficiency, and that's OK.
It has been that way since the founding of the Navy when we built 6 frigates in 6 shipyards. The problem only exists if suddenly it is no longer OK. The best way to fix the problem is for the Navy needs to make the case for more ships, and if it was me, I'd start by advocating for more amphibious ships.
ROUGHEAD DOESN'T GET ITElectric Boat is a strategic asset, so there is an argument there, but as far as capacity goes Tim Colton makes an interesting point.
Bloomberg News reports that the CNO bled all over the TV cameras this morning over the "fragile" state of the shipbuilding industrial base. Read the story here. He's talking about the so-called "Big Six", of course: the rest of the industry is doing just fine. But this problem is not difficult for most of us to understand. The Reagan Administration drove the number of large shipyards down to six, when the goal was a 600-ship Navy. The goal now is a 300-ship Navy, plus or minus, with an increasing proportion of mid-sized ships that don't have to be built in big shipyards. So why would we need six big shipyards? We don't, of course: we only need three, but I'll settle for four, at least for the time being. We need Newport News, but we don't need Electric Boat. We really don't need both Bath and Ingalls, but we should probably keep them both, if only to give us some flexibility. And we certainly don't need Avondale, because NASSCO is several orders of magnitude better. Admiral Roughead, the Navy is not exempt from the pain. Bite the bullet! Show some leadership, for crying out loud, or head for the golf course. April 21, 2011.
Update: I have received several email this morning related to Tim Colton's comment. Good. It's an important issue and I think ADM Roughead did a good thing raising the issue.
Tim Colton's point isn't really about performance though, if the criteria for determining necessity is money (a poor measurement for such important decisions, obviously), then it is true that Newport News is more important than Electric Boat - because Newport News is the only shipyard capable of building nuclear aircraft carriers.
The bottom line is we pay more for ships/subs because we buy fewer - and our shipyards have a far greater collective capacity than what is on the books for the future fleet. We keep shipyards open for strategic purposes instead of business efficiency, and that's OK.
It has been that way since the founding of the Navy when we built 6 frigates in 6 shipyards. The problem only exists if suddenly it is no longer OK. The best way to fix the problem is for the Navy needs to make the case for more ships, and if it was me, I'd start by advocating for more amphibious ships.
Thursday, April 21, 2024
Selling Sea Power to Africa
African nations face an extremely complex and challenging maritime environment: terrorist facilitation at sea, narcotics, human, and weapons trafficking, and of course, piracy. Yet when it comes to investing in land power or sea power, most African countries with coastlines choose to skew their limited defense budgets towards their armies. This week, I had an interesting discussion with a gentleman from the National Defense University whose job it was to sell African leaders on the imperative to invest in maritime security. This executive-level policy dialogue complements the operational and tactical level engagements of Naval Forces Africa.
Why do these leaders yearn for T-72 tanks rather than offshore patrol vessels? Cultural and historical factors may play a part. Our own neglect and self-imposed obstacles for navy to navy (or to Coast Guard or marine police) are certainly another contributor to this land-bias. Naval force structure is only one aspect of sea power that needs to be addressed in Africa; other areas such as fisheries law and border control measures should be included in any security assistance strategies. Given growing interest in humanitarian, security, economic, and natural resource demand issues in Africa, it would behoove us to shift additional engagement away from our fiscally well off and tactically competent European partners towards these nascent navies. The counter-argument is that we need to maintain strong relations with our European partners so that we will be interoperable with them in during combined operations. The irony of this position is that lately, most of these combined operations have occurred because the African nations involved don't have the capacity to deal with these issues themselves.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Why do these leaders yearn for T-72 tanks rather than offshore patrol vessels? Cultural and historical factors may play a part. Our own neglect and self-imposed obstacles for navy to navy (or to Coast Guard or marine police) are certainly another contributor to this land-bias. Naval force structure is only one aspect of sea power that needs to be addressed in Africa; other areas such as fisheries law and border control measures should be included in any security assistance strategies. Given growing interest in humanitarian, security, economic, and natural resource demand issues in Africa, it would behoove us to shift additional engagement away from our fiscally well off and tactically competent European partners towards these nascent navies. The counter-argument is that we need to maintain strong relations with our European partners so that we will be interoperable with them in during combined operations. The irony of this position is that lately, most of these combined operations have occurred because the African nations involved don't have the capacity to deal with these issues themselves.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Still Thinking About the Swarm
Tonight I took a break from reading and did a bit of surfing on YouTube, something I almost never do anymore. Somehow or another I found myself watching videos on Iranian swarming boats, and picked out these two among the several I watched.
The two types of boats being shown are the Serag class Rocket Fast Speed Boats that shoot 107mm rockets, to good effect too btw; and the Zulfiqar class Missile Fast Speed Boats that I believe shoot an Iranian produced of the C-701 ASMs.
I do not know how many of these boats have been built, but I remember reading a PRESSTV news transcript that said Iran intended to build 300 Serag class Rocket Fast Speed Boats.
That ~1200 ton target the boats are shooting at ended up taking at least 18 hits (don't ask me how I know, I just do). It's easier to hit a bigger ship with unguided rockets, particularly a taller ship like both versions the Littoral Combat Ship. An even worse thought though is what 107mm rockets would do to the composite structure of the DDG-1000.
The Littoral Combat Ship is supposed to be optimally designed to fight that specific small boat swarm threat. Here is my problem though. Both versions of the Littoral Combat Ship have the Mk110 57mm multi-purpose, small caliber gun that can fire salvos up to 220 rounds per minute, and has a range of 9 miles (~15 km). Unfortunately the MK110 57mm only has 400 rounds in the turret and two ready service magazines with 240 rounds each. I just don't like the idea that if you shoot for only 2 seconds 30 times, you have consumed 60% of your turret ammo and have to begin thinking about reloading magazines in the middle of a fire fight.
The two types of boats being shown are the Serag class Rocket Fast Speed Boats that shoot 107mm rockets, to good effect too btw; and the Zulfiqar class Missile Fast Speed Boats that I believe shoot an Iranian produced of the C-701 ASMs.
I do not know how many of these boats have been built, but I remember reading a PRESSTV news transcript that said Iran intended to build 300 Serag class Rocket Fast Speed Boats.
That ~1200 ton target the boats are shooting at ended up taking at least 18 hits (don't ask me how I know, I just do). It's easier to hit a bigger ship with unguided rockets, particularly a taller ship like both versions the Littoral Combat Ship. An even worse thought though is what 107mm rockets would do to the composite structure of the DDG-1000.
The Littoral Combat Ship is supposed to be optimally designed to fight that specific small boat swarm threat. Here is my problem though. Both versions of the Littoral Combat Ship have the Mk110 57mm multi-purpose, small caliber gun that can fire salvos up to 220 rounds per minute, and has a range of 9 miles (~15 km). Unfortunately the MK110 57mm only has 400 rounds in the turret and two ready service magazines with 240 rounds each. I just don't like the idea that if you shoot for only 2 seconds 30 times, you have consumed 60% of your turret ammo and have to begin thinking about reloading magazines in the middle of a fire fight.
Wednesday, April 20, 2024
Links
A few links in lieu of anything substantive:
- It appear that HMS Caroline may be saved. Caroline is the last survivor of the Battle of Jutland, and was in some jeopardy earlier this year.
- Russia hopes to deliver Gorshkov/Vikramaditya to India by the end of 2012. Indian crew is already training in Russia.
- Nigel MacCartan-Ward argues that the RN could have done Libya cheaper than the RAF. Lotta comments on that one...
- My column this week at WPR is on early lessons learned from the Libya intervention.
I'm an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky.
Latest Selected Acquisition Reports
The Department of Defense has released details on major defense acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance changes since the September 2010 reporting period. This information is based on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted to the Congress for the December 2010 reporting period.
A news release by the DoD is available here, and the Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Dollars in Millions) as of December 31, 2024 is available here (PDF).
A few thoughts.
A news release by the DoD is available here, and the Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Dollars in Millions) as of December 31, 2024 is available here (PDF).
A few thoughts.
- LCS is very high. That enormous cost needs to be explained. I would like to see the numbers broken up so we can see how much to date for the first 24 in the multi-year contract vs how much the costs are down the road. I ask because I am curious if the budget numbers include design block modification costs for the remaining 31 LCS expected to be purchased, or if the LCS budget estimates are pigeon holed on the existing LCS designs.
- Joint Strike Fighter is an acquisition tragedy. The estimate for the per unit F-35 is only $25 million more than the F-22, and that is before a single F-35 is operational. This program is also part of Secretary Gates legacy, and it isn't pretty.
- Why was a 3rd LHA-6 added, and why did building another LHA-6 suddenly cost $4.5 billion, which is much higher than the first two? What is the rest of the story with this program that no one knows about?
DDG 51 - Program costs increased $8,008.9 million (+9.7 percent) from $80,407.7 million to $88,416.6 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 4 ships from 71 to 75 ships (+$4,376.1 million) and associated schedule, engineering, and estimating allocations* (+$2,585.8 million), and related outfitting and post delivery for the revised quantity (+$265.8 million). There are also increases in engineering costs for Advanced Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) integration plans for Flight III (+$646.7 million), additional Flight III/AMDR requirements in fiscal 2016 and fiscal 2017 (+$1,558.0 million), and the application of revised escalation indices (+$363.8 million). These increases are partially offset by decreased estimates for ship construction and government furnished equipment associated with multi-year procurement, program efficiencies, and inflation impacts on future ships (-$1,670.3 million).For the record, the success of naval aviation procurement in controlling costs (except JSF, which is everyone's problem) is a quiet good news story.
F/A-18 E/F - Program costs increased $2,888.8 million (+6.0 percent) from $48,091.4 million to $50,980.2 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 41 aircraft from 515 to 556 aircraft (+$3,105.4 million) and associated schedule, engineering, and estimating allocations* (+$208.6 million), the application of revised escalation indices (+$392.2 million), and an increase in initial spares for the additional 41 aircraft (+$94.1 million). These increases are partially offset by a reduction due to multi-year procurement contract award (-$390.4 million), adjustments for current and prior escalation (-$397.8 million), and decreases in other support costs (-$56.5 million).
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) Block 4 - Program costs increased $126.7 million (+17.2 percent) from $736.5 million to $863.2 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 24 ALQ 214 systems from 166 to 190 systems (+$51.2 million), additional funding for ALQ 214 software/firmware improvements (+$63.3 million), and increases in other support costs and initial spares (+$12.2 million).
Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle - Program costs increased $4,614.9 million (+12.7 percent) from $36,291.6 million to $40,906.5 million, due primarily to a net quantity increase of 3,670 vehicles from 22,882 to 26,552 vehicles (+$2,266.3 million) and associated initial spares and other support (+$2,325.0 million).
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) - Procurement and construction cost estimates for LCS have been incorporated into the SAR following approval of Milestone B (entry into Engineering and Manufacturing Development) on April 8, 2011. Previous reports were limited to development costs in accordance with section 2432 of title 10, United States Code. Since the December 2009 SAR, development costs increased $1,080.4 million (+3.0 percent) from $36,358.4 million to $37,438.8 million, due primarily to fully funding the required planning and execution of the post-Milestone B program, to include the requirements for developmental/operational testing and live fire test and evaluation (+$822.0 million). There are also increases to complete shipboard trainers (+$189.3 million) and post delivery efforts for LCS-1 and LCS-2 (+$60.9 million).
LHA 6 America Class - Program costs increased $4,498.5 million (+65.9 percent) from $6,826.8 million to $11,325.3 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of one ship from two to three ships.
Trident II Missile - Program costs increased $1,087.3 million (+2.8 percent) from $39,546.0 million to $40,633.3 million, due primarily to the addition of the Joint Warhead Fuze Life Extension Program, which will conduct a one-time refurbishment of the Mk5 Reentry Body during a planned W88/Mk5 Arming, Fuzing and Firing Limited Life Component Replacement (+$668.0 million). Costs also increased due to the addition of the Explosive Handling Wharf #2 project to rebalance the Trident fleet between the east and west coasts (+$700.6 million) and the D5 Life Extension Program restructure (+$93.9 million). These increases are partially offset by the realignment of funding from procurement to operating and support for the replacement of rocket motors for the previously delivered missiles (-$363.2 million).
Sinking Aircraft Carriers
How would you sink the Shi Lang? The question led to quite a few comments. My answer to this question is simple - we will sink an aircraft carrier the same way we have always sank aircraft carriers.The United States Navy has a history of sinking aircraft carriers. The following history guides suggests how the United States Navy would attack and sink aircraft carriers.
Japanese Aircraft Carriers sunk in WWII:
- Akagi - Scuttled on 5th June 1942 after taking heavy damage from US bombers at Midway.
- Kaga - Sunk on 4th June 1942 after taking heavy damage from US bombers at Midway.
- Ryujo - Sunk at the battle of the east Solomon Seas by aircraft from the USS Saratoga and USS Enterprise on the 24th of August 1942.
- Soryu - Sunk on 4th June 1942 at Midway after US bombs caused fires which reached her fuel tanks.
- Hiryu - Scuttled on 5th June 1942 after taking heavy damage from US bombs at Midway.
- Shokaku - Survived Coral Sea and Santa Cruz battles but was torpedoed and sunk on 19th June 1944 by the sub USS Cavalla.
- Zuikaku - Sunk on 25th October 1944 by US bombers in the Leyte Gulf operations.
- Hiyo - Sunk on 20th June 1944 by torpedo from US aircraft in Philippine Sea.
- Chitose - Sunk on 25th October 1944 in Leyte Gulf actions.
- Chiyoda - Sunk on 25th October 1944 in Leyte Gulf actions.
- Unryu - Sunk on 19th December 1944 by the sub USS Redfish.
- Amagi - Sunk on 24th July 1945 by US bombers.
- Taiho - Sunk on 16th June 1944 after a torpedo from the sub USS Albacore.
- Shinano - Sunk on 29th November 1944 by the sub USS Archerfish.
- Taiyo - Sunk on 18th August 1944 by torpedoes from the sub USS Rasher.
- Unyo - Sunk on 16th September 1944 by torpedoes from the sub USS Barb.
- Chuyo - Sunk on 4th December 1943 by torpedoes from the sub USS Sailfish.
And just like in WWII, the surface fleet protects the high value assets from air and sub threats, conducts littoral operations near the shore in support of operations on land, and commits to combat with other ships when required.
So has anything changed? It is very much unclear. There has been tremendous investment towards the capability of ships to defend the fleet, but no one is sure how effective this capability would be in war. The defensive capability of the surface fleet actually reflects history in WWII. As Wayne Hughes highlights in his great book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, towards the end of WWII the number of guns combined with more effective radar on surface ships became a remarkably lethal and effective combination against attacking aircraft, including Kamikaze attacks.
That raises the question regarding the extent to which fleet defenses must be rolled back to defeat an aircraft carrier. This question does not have an answer derived from combat, so we really do not know whether quantity or quality will be the decisive factor in defending an aircraft carrier. What we do know, however, is that for offense - quantity is generally preferred.
Tuesday, April 19, 2024
US Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Dr. Steve Kime
Members of the Board:
I write as a former elected member of the Naval Institute Board of Control and of the Editorial Board (1986-89). I am a Life Member and a lifelong student of Naval and Military Affairs.
First, let me acknowledge the caliber of the current Board and the serious circumstances faced by the Institute. I sincerely appreciate the motivation to be practical, business-like and realistic in dealing with these circumstances, and I understand that the Board is not unsympathetic to or unaware of the desire of writers, thinkers and readers to maintain an unrestrained academic and intellectual Naval Institute environment.
I think changing the Institute's mission statement is a mistake. I see this attempt as part of a decline that began years ago with the move toward "Corporate" leadership of our Institute. I am convinced that straying away from the concept that the Naval Institute was a free forum for ideas and discussion by Naval Officers, led by Naval Officers for Naval Officers, is a major reason that our membership has declined by 50% since I was a Director. We became about big money, big contributors, and "business" considerations rather than about tens of thousands of small, contributing, members interested in seeing the issues aired in their wardrooms and in their libraries.
Sure, the internet changes the game. We face tough circumstances. Young people do not read the same way they used to read, and print media is in trouble everywhere. But I believe that we have something very special in our target audience and the context in which that audience faced the issues. We could have bucked the adverse trends to a major degree, and we could have adjusted to those trends as well. We failed to continue to appeal to our audience of individual professional officers and got sidetracked into a "corporate board" mode of thinking. The forum became a "market," and we focused more on new markets rather than on new ideas.
We needed to preserve the great insight that the Founders had in 1873 that Naval Officers are a special, intellectual, group that will sustain a forum for the free exchange of ideas. I hope it is not too late to recover their vision.
The change you propose is important only because it is out of synch with our history. It won't make those wanting to advocate for Naval power give more or give more often. It won't make contributors to the journal stronger advocates of seapower than they already are. The change is symbolic, and symbolically wrong. Its major impact will to reduce the enthusiasm and imagination of officers who have traditionally been the lifeblood of the Institute.
Dr. Steve Kime
Captain, USN (RET)
I write as a former elected member of the Naval Institute Board of Control and of the Editorial Board (1986-89). I am a Life Member and a lifelong student of Naval and Military Affairs.
First, let me acknowledge the caliber of the current Board and the serious circumstances faced by the Institute. I sincerely appreciate the motivation to be practical, business-like and realistic in dealing with these circumstances, and I understand that the Board is not unsympathetic to or unaware of the desire of writers, thinkers and readers to maintain an unrestrained academic and intellectual Naval Institute environment.
I think changing the Institute's mission statement is a mistake. I see this attempt as part of a decline that began years ago with the move toward "Corporate" leadership of our Institute. I am convinced that straying away from the concept that the Naval Institute was a free forum for ideas and discussion by Naval Officers, led by Naval Officers for Naval Officers, is a major reason that our membership has declined by 50% since I was a Director. We became about big money, big contributors, and "business" considerations rather than about tens of thousands of small, contributing, members interested in seeing the issues aired in their wardrooms and in their libraries.
Sure, the internet changes the game. We face tough circumstances. Young people do not read the same way they used to read, and print media is in trouble everywhere. But I believe that we have something very special in our target audience and the context in which that audience faced the issues. We could have bucked the adverse trends to a major degree, and we could have adjusted to those trends as well. We failed to continue to appeal to our audience of individual professional officers and got sidetracked into a "corporate board" mode of thinking. The forum became a "market," and we focused more on new markets rather than on new ideas.
We needed to preserve the great insight that the Founders had in 1873 that Naval Officers are a special, intellectual, group that will sustain a forum for the free exchange of ideas. I hope it is not too late to recover their vision.
The change you propose is important only because it is out of synch with our history. It won't make those wanting to advocate for Naval power give more or give more often. It won't make contributors to the journal stronger advocates of seapower than they already are. The change is symbolic, and symbolically wrong. Its major impact will to reduce the enthusiasm and imagination of officers who have traditionally been the lifeblood of the Institute.
Dr. Steve Kime
Captain, USN (RET)
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