Defending Iraq’s OPLATs - End of an Era

The final British patrol has departed Iraq’s Khawr Al Amaya and Al Basrah Oil Terminals (KAAOT and ABOT) in the North Arabian Gulf. American Sailors are still engaged but will join the Brits later this year as the Iraq withdrawal progresses. From the time of their initial capture by NSW operators in March 2003, to the rapid hand off of security to USMC FAST, USCG Port Security Units, and the establishment of a long term presence by (then) Naval Coastal Warfare and MESF forces, thousands of active and reserve American and British Sailors, Marines, and Coasties have played a key role in defending the lifeblood of the Iraqi economy. A few even gave their lives.

Some observations on this mission:

- MSO is an enduring sort of mission - once started, it’s hard to stop. Aside from the oplats, a significant portion of the NECC’s security forces have been tied down since 911 protecting SPODs and friendly shipping in CENTCOM. Even as some of these missions draw-down, these capabilities should remain intact, as they are versatile and difficult to reconstitute in the event of a crisis. MESF is an economy of force capability, and with a little imagination, the squadrons bring utility outside of force protection such as support to HADR operations and FID.

- A related lesson is that cutting the umbilical and turning over operations (completely) to a foreign partner can be challenging. The complete withdrawal from the OPLAT has been delayed several times. It's time for the Iraqis to sink or swim.

- Although numerous CRUDES and Gators supported the defense of the OPLATs and the Sailors on them, the work horses of this mission were the USN PCs and USCG WPBs. The OPLATs are situated amidst a complex environment of shoal water, heavy small boat traffic, and international sea boundaries. Some missions were made for smaller, more nimble, shallow draft vessels, and putting a multi-billion dollar capital vessel at risk is a misuse of assets at best. The PCs have been rode hard and put away wet, and are beyond the end of their service lives. A replacement is nowhere to be found in USN acquisition plans.

- ISR over-watch is a critical component of MSO. For a variety of reasons, UAVs were chosen for this mission in the NAG. However, other systems should be considered to maintain persistent surveillance over ports and offshore platforms, including fixed aerostats, like those made by this company or this one. These tactical aerostats (unlike those currently in use for base protection in Afghanistan) are affordable for smaller navies.

- At the strategic level - putting all of one’s eggs in the same critical infrastructure basket is a recipe for disaster. The Iraqis (and consequently the US) were very lucky that there was only one viable attack attempted on the platforms over the past 8 years. Systems disruption attacks, especially against oil infrastructure, have become widely understood by insurgents and terrorists globally as a low risk/high return tactic. Given growing global offshore oil infrastructure, it’s likely the US Navy will find itself involved in MSO again sometime in the future, whether in a lead or supporting (train/equip/advise) role.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.