Sea Denial in Libya

With little more than 1960’s-era technology, Gadaffi’s forces have effectively disrupted the use of a key port to the opposition and their NATO allies. Misrata represents the rebels’ primary strong hold in Western Libya and holds a strategic position in relation to Tripoli. With regime forces solidly lodged in the airport and roads feeding out of the city blocked, Misrata’s SPOD provides the only point of access for humanitarian relief shipping, refugee and casualty outflow, and resupply of munitions and rebel fighters from Benghazi.

On 14 and 15 April, multiple salvos of rockets targeted the Nakl al Theqeel road leading to the port. On 26 April, several Grad rockets hit the port forcing an International Organisation for Migration ship, Red Star I, to remain offshore. The same ship was delayed leaving by additional attacks until 28 April when she evacuated 1,000 migrant workers and 25 wounded.

Gadaffi’s indirect fire, consisting of Grad multiple launched rockets and probably some amount of mobile artillery, is extremely difficult to counter. Mobile launchers can be rapidly relocated, concealed by terrain (urban or otherwise), and hidden among the population. Counter-battery - from the sea or air - is difficult given these circumstances.

Outside of a full blown ground assault, the best counter to this threat is multiple lines of armed ISR. The first US Predator strike in Libya appears to have been focused on this target set. If we are still involved in this operation several months from now (if not sooner), I’d expect to see more armed Preds shifted from Iraq as the drawdown there continues.

The lessons learned here aren’t new. First, sea denial (or A2AD for you CSBA folks), doesn’t require high end ASCMs or ASBMs. Low tech/low cost options such as IDF, mines, or swarming FIAC can be equally effective in denying the use of a port. These threats can't be taken lightly. We should remember that during Desert Storm, we were merely a CEP away from a major disaster involving USS Tarawa and a pier full of ammunition at Al-Jubail.

Secondly, our amphibious lift and expeditionary forces are as relevant as ever. The strategic flexibility to land and sustain forces where the enemy isn’t using tools like JLOTS is just as important as the ability to engage the enemy. Coincidentally, AFRICOM's annual North African JLOTS Exercise, AFRICAN LION, is underway. (and for you conspiracy theorist, this exercise has been scheduled for some time and isn’t a dress rehearsal).

Finally, the demand for persistent, armed ISR will continue to grow and the Navy should invest heavily in this area to complement our strike capabilities.

UPDATE: This war could get a lot more naval, very quickly. Here is the best open source reporting I've seen on the mine layers. If the regime were to similiarly close Benghazi's port with mines, that could be all she wrote for the opposition.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.