In Search of the 2011 DoD Report on China's Military

The following is available here in PDF format.

Dear Secretary Gates:

As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Armed Services Committee, charged with providing oversight of the Department of Defense, and as founded and co-Chair of the Congressional China Caucus, I am concerned with the Department of Defense's continued disregard for the legal submittal deadline for the required Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China. Pursuant to Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, you shall submit not later than March 1 each year, a report on the current and future military strategy of the People's Republic of China. To date, no such report has been submitted to the specified congressional committees for the Fiscal Year 2011.

Last year, this report was submitted to Congress six months after its required legal deadline, a deadline that was set so as to provide vital information on China's intentions and capabilities to Congress as it begins the national defense authorization process each spring. This year, once again, Congress is beginning its discussion of the National Defense Authorization Act without this tool to understand the Department of Defense's perspective on China.

Since the delayed submission of last year's report, China has made considerable advancements in military capability. In late 2010, China began the process of deploying an anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, capable of targeting U.S. aircraft carriers within one thousand miles of the Chinese coast. The DF-21D event was followed by the January test of China's J-20, the nation's first stealth jet-fighter. Then, in March and April we learned that China has neared completion of its first aircraft carrier and is developing the new J-15 jet-fighter designed for carrier development. Considered separately, each of these advancements has enormous implications for U.S. military planning. In the aggregate, they mark an unprecedented era of Chinese military modernization. Yet Congress is left without guidance from the Department of Defense on such advancements as it considers the preparedness of our forces to respond.

Since this report was first produced in 2002, it has been routinely submitted to Congress months after the legal deadline. The most recent precedent set by last year's delay of six months is unacceptable. As my colleagues and I begin considering a range of proposals within the NDAA, we do so without the Department of Defense's analysis of the significant developments in China's military capability over the last six months. By failing to meet the report's legally required deadline, the Department of Defense is not meeting its obligation to properly inform Congress of readiness needs and emerging challenges in the Western Pacific.

As the head of the Department of Defense, you are responsible for ensuring that this matter receives top-down attention. I, like you, share the goal of a strong, efficient and effective national defense that protects our nation from current threats and deters the threats of the future. For Congress to support our Armed Forces in that goal, it is imperative that the Department of Defense provide timely reports on the nature of those threats. I look forward to continuing to work with you in this regard.

J. Randy Forbes
Member of Congress

The China report has a hit and miss record, and by that I note that it is often what it does not say that is most telling. The DoD is trying to fit China into their narrative, and that narrative is political. The facts as they are known always leak through, but rarely do the reports demonstrate any consistency with which any Congressman should base a budget on them. I will say the China military report has been getting better the last two years, but the ONI China report on the PLA Navy is usually better than the DoD report on the PLA Navy. I don't know the reason for that.

Here is a list of items the China Military Report will hopefully cover that will raise eyebrows.

DF-21D goes IOC. I honestly wonder if the DoD Military Report on China this year will be as comprehensive as this article from Andrew Erickson on the DF-21D. I doubt it.

Shi Lang Sea Trials. We are only a few months, or several weeks depending upon how you look at it, from the first sea trials of the Chinese aircraft carrier Shi Lang. A lot of people are worked up over this, but of the things China is doing this one doesn't really bother me. This carrier is a bridge, the USS Langley of China.

New Aircraft Carriers. All signs in the open source now point to China building at least one aircraft carrier at the Jiangnan Changxing Shipyard. The question is whether there are signs a second aircraft carrier preparing to be built there, or at Dalian shipyard. Only the DoD report can tell us if the second carrier is under construction. This matters, because it is the difference between China having 3 aircraft carriers at sea by 2020, or five aircraft carriers at sea by 2020.

Since I intend to still be writing in 2020, I'll go ahead and say it. My impression is, based on the upgrades to the shipyards and the way 5-year plans have worked out over the last ten years, China is building 2 carriers in each five year plan - meaning 4 indigenous design aircraft carriers built and at sea by 2020. When the first aircraft carrier is at sea in 2013 and the second visibly under construction at that time, I'll be sure and let you know I told you so.

China's New Aircraft. The J-15 and J-20 are getting a lot of headlines, but did you see the blurry photos of the Y-7 AWACS? The J-15 and J-20 are important, but what the Y-7 tells us is much more critical towards our planning metrics in the budget. Will the DoD report discuss the Y-7 and what it represents for the future? It damn well better, or Congress isn't getting their money's worth from the DoD.

Shipbuilding Outpaces DoD Report. Have you read Ronald O’Rourke's April 22, 2024 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (PDF) Congressional Research Service Report? In several places in the report Ronald O'Rourke borrows from the most recent DoD China military report the estimates for Chinese shipbuilding. Page 22, for example, shows China will build 1 Yuan class in 2010 and 0 Yuan class in 2011 for a total of 3 by 2011. There is a problem though, it looks like at least 5 and maybe 6 Yuan class submarines are in the water based on photos from the shipyards. Page 34 shows a Janes chart with the PLA Navy fielding eight Type 054As by 2012. One problem though, Feng highlighted last week that the eleventh Type 054A is about to launch from HP shipyard (the 6th built there alone). The same is true for virtually every platform, and explains why the DoD added 40 Type 022s to last years report to catch up to the actual number of Type 022s that had already been fielded.

What is Congress going to do when the President cuts $400 billion in October while the DoD decides to add a dozen extra PLA Navy destroyers and frigates the following April just to catch up with the amount of construction that was previously not disclosed? That transparency thing... it matters.

China White Paper 2010. For China, the 2010 Whitepaper is about as transparent as it gets. It has a long way to go, but the DoD report must add context to the following (from the whitepaper):

A few notable goals and tasks of China’s national defense in the new era are defined as follows:

• Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development. China’s national defense is tasked to guard against and resist aggression, defend the security of China’s lands, inland waters, territorial waters and airspace, safeguard its maritime rights and interests, and maintain its security interests in space, electromagnetic space and cyber space.
• Maintaining social harmony and stability. … They organize preparations for military operations other than war (MOOTW) in a scientific way, work out pre-designed strategic programs against non-traditional security threats, reinforce the building of specialized forces for emergency response, and enhance capabilities in counter-terrorism and stability maintenance, emergency rescue, and the protection of security.
• Accelerating the modernization of national defense and the armed forces. …[The PLA] intensifies theoretical studies on joint operations under conditions of informationization, advances the development of high-tech weaponry and equipment, develops new types of combat forces, strives to establish joint operation systems in conditions of informationization, accelerates the transition from military training under conditions of mechanization to military training in conditions of informationization, presses ahead with implementation of the strategic project for talented people, invests greater efforts in building a modern logistics capability, and enhances its capabilities in accomplishing diversified military tasks in order to win local wars under the conditions of informationization, so as to accomplish its historical missions at the new stage in the new century.
• Maintaining world peace and stability. … China adheres to the concepts of openness, pragmatism and cooperation, expands its participation in international security cooperation, strengthens strategic coordination and consultation with major powers and neighboring countries, enhances military exchanges and cooperation with developing countries, and takes part in UN peace-keeping operations, maritime escort, international counter-terrorism cooperation, and disaster relief operations.

Massive Coastal Security Services Expansion. China has several types of maritime security agencies, all of which are expanding rapidly with bigger and more numerous ships. It is difficult to imagine the DoD can ignore the rapidly expanding Chinese Coast Guard and other maritime security agency vessels, particularly as some of these vessels are as large or larger than the Littoral Combat Ship. At the current rate China will build at least 30 vessels similar to US Coast Guard patrol cutters in the current 5 year plan. Ironic, considering the US Coast Guard is having its budget slashed even though the average age of the US Coast Guard cutter fleet is somewhere north of 39 years old.

I am not a China Hawk. I do not ever want to see the United States go to war with China, because I believe that war will go nuclear. With that said, the lack of transparency by China combined with the military expansion by China is remarkable, and the speed is intimidating.

Since 2005, the DoD report has consistently underestimated the growth of the PLA Navy and China has consistently grown their military budget by double digit percentages every year over the last several years. China's internal security budget alone is now estimated over $115 billion by some estimates, which is easily the largest police state in history and that total is not included in the estimates for China's defense budget - even though it is very much defense type spending.

Until there is more transparency and realism in the Chinese military discussion, it is only prudent to be concerned - as there is no information offered by either the DoD or China to take any other responsible position.