Lowering the Domestic Costs

Last month, Curtis Bradley of Lawfare had some observations regarding the implications of drones and stand off weapons for reducing the legal and political barriers to US intervention:

In the past, one of the central obstacles to greater U.S. participation in humanitarian intervention has been the domestic political cost. The American public appears to have little enthusiasm for suffering casualties in support of operations that have no direct connection to U.S. security, something illustrated by the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia following the Black Hawk Down episode in 1993.

Bypassing Congress, and using technology that substantially lowers the risk of U.S. casualties, may make it substantially easier for the United States to use force abroad for humanitarian purposes. It is not surprising, therefore, that supporters of this type of intervention have shifted their positions somewhat, now that they have a presidential administration that shares their view of the proper use of military force...

Nevertheless, I want to suggest that, even for proponents of humanitarian intervention, there are reasons to question whether lowering the domestic political cost of the use of force for humanitarian purposes is an unequivocally good development. Most significantly, a shift in this direction requires a substantial faith in the wisdom and motivations of the Executive Branch.

See also Jack Goldsmith on the argument that the intervention in Libya is insufficiently aggressive to trigger the War Powers Resolution. Two observations:

1. I'm not actually convinced that technology has substantially reduced the political and legal bar for intervention; an argument could be made that technological advances have substantially increased casualty aversion, leaving the political situation effectively a wash. I don't know either way; we'd need more research.
2. As for whether we should welcome such a development, my answer is "no." The argument for seems to be that by limiting casualties, technological essentially makes the public indifferent to decisions about intervention. This allows policy elites to determine when and where to intervene based on both robust understanding of US interests, and a sophisticated appreciation of America's place in the world. This seems to me to be mildly insane; it's fair to say that the number of people who would substantially agree with all of the intervention decisions of the last three Presidential administrations is quite low. Even if the cost is limited, the public ought to be consulted (if only in informal terms) regarding the wisdom of international military intervention.