Utility and Symbolism

My contribution to the Great Carrier Debate of '11 isn't so much to offer an answer to the question as to try to frame it in productive ways:

A third method of interpreting weapons acquisition -- and naval aviation -- is through a combination of the utilitarian and symbolic logics. In this framing, the symbolic has utilitarian import, while the utilitarian has symbolic effect. That the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers is viewed as the fundamental arbiters of world naval power is relevant for perceptions of U.S. power, and consequently for U.S. policy. If the America-class amphibious assault carrier has less -- or different -- symbolic resonance, then policymakers need to take that into account when making procurement decisions. Similarly, for Chinese policymakers, creating the impression that China is a serious player is an important policy goal, and should affect decisions about where weapons acquisition funds should go. If the United Kingdom wants to continue to be consulted about major intervention decisions, and if the differences in perception of the F-35B and the F-35C affect whether that will happen, then it makes sense to take advantage of symbolic politics.

Of course, the respective importance of utility and symbolism can be misleading or subject to the vagaries of chance. The Pearl Harbor raid and the destruction of the battleships Repulse and Prince of Wales off Malaya in December 1941 helped hasten the symbolic demise of the battleship, even if the vessels themselves retained utility for many years. Similarly, the Southeast Asian tsunami helped put the amphibious warship on the symbolic map by developing a perception of its utility. So the first time a supercarrier is sunk by a diesel electric submarine or by a ballistic missile may very well be the last moment in which such vessels carry symbolic weight, despite their utility.