The Afghanistan Focus on Fear and Consequences

I will admit it. When the Lexington Institute blog first started, I wasn't a fan, but I am now willing to admit that I read it every day. Daniel Goure and Loren Thompson have an uncanny ability of getting me to think about something in most of their posts - sometimes about something mentioned on the margins rather than the main idea they are discussing. Either way, sparking an idea should be the point of writing at all - and in that effort I find them successful.

That blog really deserves more credit than it gets, and has come a long way in demonstrating how a think tank can contribute to the daily narrative of ideas floating around the National Security discussion.

Naturally, I am giving the Early Warning Blog credit in the same post I am going to disagree with something said, because you know - that's how bloggers roll sometimes. A recent piece by Daniel Goure is beneath the quality I have come to enjoy from him. This blog post comes from June 22nd, before the announcement by the President regarding the troop drawdown, is what has been tumbling around in my head.

The President is expected to propose a time-phased withdrawal of the troops sent as part of the surge, possibly modified by the situation on the ground at the time. But what about the other 70,000 U.S. personnel and those from allied countries? If he does not make the case for a longer-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan he places the entire enterprise at risk. Without a compelling rationale for our presence in that country, in Southwest Asia and globally, any future economic shocks could see the collapse of the Afghan experiment, the defense budget and America’s global military position.

When Britain pulled out of Asia and the Middle East the United States was prepared and able to take its place. So the power vacuum in the world was temporary in duration and limited in scope. If the United States withdraws from either the Middle East or Asia, the world will be left with a yawning security chasm.

My problem with this argument, and many other articles written since the announcement by the President that it is time to draw down troops in Afghanistan is that there appears to be some link made between Afghanistan and the United States global commitment in Asia and the Middle East - as if pulling out of Afghanistan means retreating back to the Texas border with Mexico. Where does this presumed cause and effect rationale come from?

The US pulled out of Vietnam and the US didn't pull out of Asia, so why does pulling out of Afghanistan mean the US will retreat out of Asia or the Middle East?

Why is maintaining the "Afghan experiment" associated with "the defense budget and America’s global military position?" A set back in the "Afghan experiment" does not even necessarily mean a setback for US interests in the Middle East in the fight against radical extremism, and it is a real stretch to make the argument that withdrawing from a land war in Asia is somehow going to set back Americas global military position.

Look, I don't believe we need to pull out of Afghanistan 100%. I do believe we could scale down to a very small force and achieve the strategic objective of keeping America safe from attacks that originate from Afghanistan. Keeping America safe is only a subset of the much broader strategic objective we have embarked on in Afghanistan though, and I think the broad objective is part of the problem - not the solution.

Another example - enter Bob Kagan with this nonsense that I do not believe at all, because it would represent one of the most disturbing truths I have heard in years.

Make no mistake, however. The entire military leadership believes the president’s decision is a mistake, and especially the decision to withdraw the remainder of the surge forces by September 2012. They will soldier on and do their best, but as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, put it, in characteristic understatement, they believe the decision will increase the risk to the troops and increase the chance that the mission will not succeed. It bears repeating that the deadline imposed by the president has nothing to do with military or strategic calculation. It has everything to do with an electoral calculation. President Obama wants those troops out two months before Americans go to the voting booth.

The entire military leadership? If Bob Kagan is to be believed, the entire military leadership of the United States believes that only 1 strategy and 1 tactical application of that strategy exists in addressing strategic objectives in Afghanistan. If that is true, that would be the most disturbing thing I have ever read about the military in the 21st century - that the entire military leadership of the United States is fixated on only one way for the US to prevail strategically and tactically in Afghanistan.

Seriously? If what Bob Kagan is saying is true, then American decline is past the point of no return. We are left with two choices when considering what Bob Kagan is saying, either Bob Kagan is 1) completely full of crap or 2) we need to a wholesale clearance in military leadership to get rid of the group think. I'm thinking the correct answer is #1, and we are living in a national nightmare if I am wrong.

Fear Consequences

I have grown very weary of the fear approach towards Afghanistan policy. Why is it that for very smart and credible people to make a case for Afghanistan, the argument must be first and foremost the certainty that bad consequences will happen with any change in direction, whether tactically or strategically. Is there any more obvious sign the United States is currently following bad policy when fear and uncertainly of possible consequences is the only convincing argument offered in support of existing policy.

Whenever a policy cannot be articulated in the context of positives, and is reliant on the context that focuses on negatives; the policy is the problem. Read Daniel Goure's piece again and read Bob Kagan's piece again; and find for me what is gained - not lost - in Afghanistan under the policy we have been following under the surge. Both of their arguments suffer the same problem most arguments in favor of staying the course in Afghanistan suffer - there is nothing noteworthy to be gained even if we ever do reach the end of the COIN rainbow.