A Fleet Of No New Ideas

The article by Chris Cavas at Defense News discussing the revised 30-year shipbuilding plan - a plan I have not seen - has some interesting details. You can read the whole article by following the link above, and below are my thoughts on some of the details discussed.

Extending the lives of the Command Ship replacements to 2039 is a paper pushing exercise also known as punting a problem. I think it is noteworthy the Navy is going to allow the LPD-17 hull gap from FY12 with the last LPD-17 and FY17 with the first LSD(X), and in a time of sky high defense budgets, not to mention out of control federal spending on jobs programs, neither Congress nor the Navy ever found a way to fill the workload gap on the Gulf Coast with Hospital Ships or Command Ships. It may be that more than anything else, that will be the legacy of the LPD-17 problems that were ignored over the last decade, and we should appropriately hold accountable every Navy leader who ignored the problem before ADM Harvey. Looks like some of those who punted the problem down the road may continue to be rewarded instead.

NASSCO is going to stay busy. 3 MLPs followed by a very long run of oilers beginning in FY14. The 4th MLP reportedly remains in the plan, but also will reportedly be canceled. I'm hoping it will not be canceled, because the more I have learned about the MLP the more I am very excited about this platform. It isn't perfect, but it is smarter than people think and the details matter. More on that later.

The discussed plan related to surface combatants is not credible, and hardly believable. That reason alone is why I like it. Look, there will never be a Flight IV Burke built in 2032, commissioned in 2037, and retired in 2077. In order for this plan to be realistic, then we would have to believe the Great White Fleet deployed by President Roosevelt in 1907 would still be credible combat power at sea today.

Put simply, Congress is asking the Navy to look into their crystal ball and determine what the 21st century looks like, and the Navy rightfully answers they have no idea. The Navy is simply extending current plans out 30 years while intentionally avoiding any technology innovations that will take place between now and then, and presumes nothing will change. It's smart. If Congress desires an annual dog and pony show with the 30 year plan, the Navy is smart to give them one.

Realistically, Congress should be focused on 5 year, 10 year, and 15 year plans so that more realistic examinations can be made regarding the incorporation and fielding of new technologies, because after about 15 years it becomes impossible to see how technology may evolve. If one focuses on the first 15 years of the new 30 year plan then one can make the following observation:

• The MLP for FY13 remains in the Navy plan, even if Congress is not excited about it.
• The Navy never found a way to replace the Command Ships or the Hospital Ships.
• The Navy does not have any new ideas regarding the surface force, amphibious force, carrier force, and submarine force.
• The Littoral Combat Ship is the Navy's answer to quantity questions.

Finally, the SSBN(X) impact to force structure is significant, and is the only apparent reason for a serious lack of innovation everywhere else in force structure. The uncertainty combined with the requirement is driving the choice for the the Navy to stay with safe options everywhere else. Congress needs to get on top of the broad impact the SSBN(X) is having on the rest of Navy force structure sooner rather than later, because lack of Congressional action now is stunting what is otherwise a long term action in shipbuilding as the Navy tries to plan the future.

It takes 15 or more years to design, build, and field a quality ship on cost. The most important detail we learn from the current 30 year shipbuilding plan is that the SSBN(X) has apparently stunted any possible force structure development or evolution for at least 2 decades because of the SSBN(X) programs hold on the SCN budget. Strategically the timing couldn't be worse as almost all of our allies are downsizing their naval forces while at the same time every single major competitor or potential competitor except North Korea is substantially increasing the size, reach, and capability of their naval power.