
The answer is yes and no. AirSea Battle doctrine is rarely discussed anymore in public by the Navy because the Navy is backing off AirSea Battle, and some would call it backpedaling with speed. AirSea Battle is a warfighting doctrine developed towards dividing roles and responsibilities of military forces in combat from the sea, and is intended to provide guidance towards cutting redundancy and insuring all mission requirements are clearly understood by the services. The development includes a great deal more detail, but that's the general overview. That guidance would inform the services where overlap exists, and in theory inform services where cuts need to be made and where renewed focus on capabilities needs to be emphasized.
As it turns out, many have been looking at AirSea Battle as a way to promote and emphasize the prominent role of big deck aircraft carriers in the 21st century. In the past it had been suggested that Vice Admiral Bruce Clingan was appointed N3/N5 specifically for the purpose of insuring aircraft carriers were prominently featured in AirSea Battle doctrine being developed. I have previously dismissed this criticism of VADM Clingan, but I am no longer so sure, and there may be a hint of truth there.
As of late AirSea Battle has not unfolded in the way many in the Navy believed it should. Studies and wargames associated with AirSea Battle doctrine development began consistently suggesting that aircraft carriers do not play the prominent role in future military operations from the sea as originally envisioned by the Navy, indeed the findings that divide roles and missions have pushed the Navy away from using big deck aircraft carriers as the sustained strike platform, and instead push the Navy towards more of a long range precision munitions regime primarily conducted by submarines and surface combatants. These findings suggests that the Air Force becomes the primary lead in conventional strike airpower while the Navy leverages their unique capabilities for infiltration and rolling back enemy defense networks. Essentially the Navy's role becomes kicking the doors down in support of the Air Force and preventing enemy to leverage the sea against allied infrastructure, but sustained combat air operations are conducted primarily by the Air Force in the AirSea Battle doctrine that is currently being developed.
None of this is decided, indeed nothing is decided at all, but what has happened during the development of AirSea Battle doctrine is that the Navy has realized they had lost control of the AirSea Battle narrative. The Navy narrative placed the aircraft carrier at the center of AirSea Battle doctrine, and the Air Force's role was supposed to be in support of seapower and filling in gaps not covered by the Navy. As the new narrative emerged with AirSea Battle doctrine development, the Navy saw it as a threat to the institutionalized prominence of big deck aircraft carriers.
It was at that point folks like VADM Clingan and ADM Willard withdrew support for AirSea Battle doctrine as it was being developed, and OPNAV supported their withdraw seeing further development of AirSea Battle doctrine at this time as a budget threat to aircraft carriers.
So AirSea Battle doctrine development is dead, right? Not really.
Timeout

AirSea Battle doctrine development has helped clarify threats and challenges facing naval forces, and it has revealed how the Navy must evolve existing forces in order to manage the 21st century threat environment. US Navy leadership believes the American way of war at sea is over and under the ocean, and Navy leaders firmly believe that at no time has any weapon system or capability made obsolete the big deck aircraft carrier and submarine as the superior capabilities required in naval warfare. To those in the Navy opposed to the vision of AirSea Battle that has been winning the arguments, the challenges revealed in AirSea Battle doctrine development are a guide towards developing new capabilities that extend the relevance of aircraft carriers and submarines in the face of emerging threats, even in the face of difficult budgets that threaten both aircraft carriers and submarines due to their very high costs.
AirSea Battle doctrine development has informed the Navy that new unmanned technologies like unmanned underwater vehicles and unmanned combat air systems are desperately needed. These new technologies are seen as highly cost effective and capable ways the Navy can leverage their existing global network, plug into their highly sophisticated existing AEGIS network, and by adding new defensive capabilities to AEGIS for protection against ballistic missile threats - the Navy can add ranged, highly mobile, sustained, long range strike capacity supported by robust ISR back into the fleet with numerous less expensive unmanned combat air systems flying off big deck aircraft carriers.
If you go back and look at plans discussed in the media 5-6 years ago, you will find the Navy was starting to move that direction in the middle of last decade, but those plans got sidetracked.
Two problems occurred. First, unmanned aircraft development for the Navy in particular got sidetracked when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began wearing down F-18s faster than the Navy expected, and due to political pressure from Congress, not to mention practical problems with rapidly aging airframes, the Navy ended up having to spend a great deal of the aviation budget on replacing F-18 Hornets instead of innovating new unmanned aircraft. Second, the Littoral Combat Ship mission modules that focused on unmanned vehicles ran into serious development problems that have led to a complete restructuring of the mission module programs. Many of those technologies could not meet requirements, and as a result Navy leadership spends a great deal of time in public speeches emphasizing the necessity for mission power capacity to support new technologies like unmanned underwater vehicles.
Navy leaders always discuss in public speeches what the focus is, and by not discussing AirSea Battle the Navy is basically signaling they are not ready yet. Secretary Gates has long been considered the point man on AirSea Battle, but his days are numbered. Leon Panetta is unlikely to come out quickly for AirSea Battle, indeed he may not know much about it at all coming from CIA. That means the Navy has time to allow AirSea Battle to sit on the shelf for awhile as the Navy develops new capabilities to support the aircraft carrier and submarine forces.
In other words, AirSea Battle isn't alive because the Navy is sitting on it, but it isn't dead either because the Navy is actively engaged in addressing the shortcomings revealed by the doctrine development. Basically, AirSea Battle is in stasis until such a time the Navy is better positioned with actual technologies instead of PowerPoint possibilities to argue more effectively their vision for what a Navy strike regime looks like in the 21st century - a strike regime the Navy believes is far more effective and survivable against a peer competitor than the Air Force alternative currently winning the argument in the AirSea Battle doctrine development discussions.
What's the next move? It is still unclear, because no one is quite sure how ADM Greenert intends to leave his mark as CNO. The common assumption is that ADM Greenert will be a continuation of the direction ADM Roughead has taken the Navy over the past four years, and that the appointment represents a move towards consistency. The alternative is that ADM Greenert will put his own stamp on the Navy, which history shows to be what usually happens with a new CNO. The prominence of big deck aircraft carriers is the primary operating guideline for the Navy today, and it is also the biggest target in a period where budget pressures are threatening the big ticket capabilities like aircraft carriers. It seems very unlikely that as CNO ADM Greenert would challenge the prominence of aircraft carriers as an opening move. However, that doesn't mean ADM Greenert doesn't have his own plans though, so we will just have to wait and see what his vision is.
Assumptions Challenged

AirSea Battle doctrine development began to show what some have recently began advocating more vocally, that the precision missile regime supported by CRUDES and submarines has replaced the aircraft carrier as the most capable strike regime from the sea in the future. It is suggested aircraft carriers are no longer affordable and investment in greater quantities of CRUDES and submarine power would allow the Navy to extend the strike power of the fleet considerably, and shift the role of aviation towards more of an ISR and support element rather than as the primary strike element. In other words, the argument is that precision missile advancements that would be realized with investments in next generation Harpoon and Tomahawk replacements - not to mention advanced gun technologies like rail guns - would change the paradigm, and the aircraft carriers role in naval warfare would change to support the surface 'strike' force, not the surface force supporting the big deck aircraft carrier 'strike' wing as has been the model since WWII. Along with new gun and missile systems for strike, laser systems like FEL would be incorporated into the surface fleet changing the paradigm in other ways for fleet defense as well.
This future surface force would then move the Navy towards a future with a common hull design that emphasized capacity instead of capability in requirements. The emphasis on capacity would leverage IPS to provide maximum power for open architecture systems in supporting AEGIS networks for offense and defense while deployable systems (UAVs, UUVs, USVs, MH60s, RHIBs, etc) are leveraged to extend the network of every surface combatant. Smaller aircraft carriers would over time replace the large deck aircraft carriers to provide critical naval airpower capabilities in support of the fleet. Built in large quantities, these surface combatants in conjunction with an expanded submarine force would form a networked precision guided weapon regime that is distributed for total battle network survivability.
This is ultimately a distributed model of naval force that emphasizes the quantity of platforms and systems dispersed in overlapping, integrated networks that when combined with the Air Force to provides the United States the maximum combat capability against challenges posed by enemy forces. This model of naval forces would not emphasize a handful of primary concentrations of firepower (the limited number of big deck aircraft carriers) that the enemy could focus on to disrupt the overall capabilities of the naval network, indeed it is believed a larger number of smaller carriers providing advanced aviation capabilities would be sufficient to meet requirements in supporting a new distributed naval force structure.
That emerging theory is... just theory.
The Navy still believes that the big deck aircraft carrier and highly sophisticated nuclear submarine remain the kings of the maritime battle field. The theory goes that concentrations of firepower like big deck aircraft carriers can be better protected from future threats by expanding the roles and capabilities of submarines. It remains the argued position of the Navy that military operations involving air systems can be sustained longer when continuously deployed from large deck aircraft carriers, and further it is believed that with unmanned systems that have longer range and endurance, even greater sustainable operational rates are achievable in the future. The surface force would still be a precision firepower regime, but would be focused on defending the concentrated long range strike capabilities provided by aircraft carriers rather than being a distributed strike capability itself. This model is the existing model of US naval power with a few tweaks, and primary emphasis of Navy development would include an evolution in submarine roles and missions expansion and longer range unmanned aircraft carrier systems (like UCAS) that would primarily bolster the weaknesses being highlighted in the development of AirSea Battle doctrine.
The Navy believes that as the gaps in capability of aircraft carriers and submarines revealed by AirSea Battle doctrine development are addressed over the next decade, the Navy will be in a far superior position to make the argument for AirSea Battle doctrine more along the lines of the way the Navy originally intended. It should be noted that as the Air Force moves towards Prompt Global Strike, which at a very high cost has limited value in AirSea Battle doctrine due to it primarily being an investment towards a quality capability rather than a quantity capability, Air Force investment is also moving towards a position in the future where naval strike capabilities from big deck aircraft carriers will be as relatively effective but presumably more survivable than Air Force alternatives - thus both services are on a path towards an AirSea Battle doctrine developed 5-10 years from now that would presumably allow the Navy argument to be far stronger then than the Air Force argument is today.
The problem with all of this is that in the meantime, the budget pressures still exist and the enemy always has a vote. Will UUV development advance as ADM Roughead hopes (PDF) and meet the requirements to allow the submarine force to get into the enemy's OODA loop thus disrupt and add defense to concentrations of naval forces centered around big deck aircraft carriers? Is the era of precision missiles drawing closer to a conclusion as ADM Roughead has stated in the past? Is the unmanned approach to warfare against sophisticated adversaries even reasonable given the reliance on satellite communications availability during high end combat operations? Should naval forces be organized differently, IE, be organized around a different strategic objective than the existing organizing motivation towards fighting the big one?
Furthermore, will the force hollow under near term budget cuts while the Navy is focused on meeting gaps in existing forces and organizational doctrine? Would the Navy truly find stability by cutting excess under an optimized Joint model, or simply hollow the force in a different way? How can the Navy bet on any single future when the technologies for all possible futures are still yet to be realized?
The one sure bet that everyone seems to understand is that AirSea Battle will require a culture change, requiring both the Navy and the Air Force to concede traditional capabilities to the other and optimize on a Joint capability theory for warfare. Without the service leaders out front talking about the necessity for change, there will be no culture change - only resistance in institutionalized defense of each respective services capabilities. It must be stated that the existing naval force model Navy leaders are dedicated to protecting is based on lessons learned painfully during and since WWII, and all alternatives are based primarily on theories and very limited combat experience involving technological capabilities developed since then.
But it's always been that way... Prior to WWII ships of the line and later battleships derived from the big gun dreadnaughts were always thought to be the superior combat capability at sea, because they always had been. It wasn't until Pearl Harbor that very smart people realized technology had advanced with submarines and aircraft carriers, and roles for naval forces had already changed. If precision weapons launched from warships and submarines ever reaches a point of superiority over aircraft, and submarines or surface combatants are heavily armed with those precision weapons, would Navy leaders recognize the transition towards quantities of surface combatants being superior to big deck aircraft carriers had taken place, or would Navy leaders repeat the same error often cited to the WWII era Battleship Admirals?
Will you be able to tell the difference? Would I be able to? There were many signs before WWII that the aircraft carrier had emerged as the dominant capability of that age, but we also know for certain the battleship never at any point became obsolete in WWII - indeed the Iowa class battleships that served in WWII participated in the 1991 Gulf War.
There are arguments that signs are evident today regarding the precision weapon regime deployed from submarines and surface combatants may have already overtaken the aircraft carrier as the dominant combat capability of the modern battlefield. It is not at all uncommon to read that the big deck aircraft carrier is obsolete, even in the pages of Proceedings. What if it is obsolete? What if it isn't obsolete, but we begin to believe it is? Perhaps with the hindsight of history we are right to criticize those Battleship Admirals for failing to recognize the rise to prominence of the aircraft carrier, or perhaps more realistically - modern Navy leaders, analysts, and politicians could easily make the same mistake today by holding strong to their faith in the dominate weapon system of our time as proven by history as we know it - the big deck aircraft carrier.
The Path Decided

The selection of ADM Greenert suggests a future towards continuing the Navy on a path that focuses on the concentrated strike power of aircraft carriers and enhancing the infiltration and disruption capabilities of submarines, at least that was the impression I got with the announcement of his nomination as CNO. This vision is assumed and has never been stated publicly, indeed the way the Navy communicates often leaves most observers guessing as to which direction the Navy is going - particularly the last few years where change is more common than consistency. Navy leadership discusses the future in the context of technologies rather than strategic objectives achieved through a vision, which basically describes a Navy story in the context of industry rather than a story of service to the nation. A statesman like Hyman Rickover is unlikely to pop up to describe the merits of a global nuclear submarine force providing credible deterrence against threats to American freedom, and President Obama is very unlikely to channel his inner Theodore Roosevelt and advocate seapower as a way to promote global influence with naval power. Everything today is focused almost entirely on budget, and little discussed by Navy leaders is strategic, much less strategic vision or communication. It isn't that the Navy doesn't have a credible story to tell, it is simply that the Navy doesn't know how to tell a credible story. On some topics the Navy has so little credibility left that they are unable to tell a believable story at all.
The credibility challenge and inability to articulate the future is starting to create serious problems with the Navy, because without an articulated strategic concept - Navy leadership has failed to inform political leaders regarding the future in a way that helps guide political choices in difficult budgets. Indeed, the absence of Navy credibility that is often built on consistency has become a huge problem for the Navy, because it leaves them open to having the future shaped for them, rather than by them.
Consider for a moment that the Navy is not telling a story because perhaps the Navy is taking a wise approach towards waiting to see what is real, and what isn't real. For example, the future of naval aviation - whether the discussion is F-35C or unmanned combat aviation systems - is still very unclear. The Navy doesn't have a Hornet replacement of any type ready to field today, and while a lot of investment in both the Joint Strike Fighter and the UCAS offers possibilities; these systems lack a narrative that overrides the uncertainty surrounding the programs. What will be the capabilities and limitations of both platforms, and will they compliment each other effectively has hoped? What does future ISR look like when surface combatants and submarines field unmanned systems, and what does the Littoral Combat Ship bring to the total battle network? Will these complicated emerging networks of systems be both reliable and credible, or will the network requirements be too vulnerable to stress and disruption in the future warfare environment to make many of these technologies useful?
How much of a capability increase will unmanned underwater vehicles offer the a smaller submarine force, and will those new technologies legitimately close the gap that exists with fewer submarines? Are there additional requirements that aren't well understood yet in terms of communications, and can the power requirements for unmanned underwater vehicle endurance, speed, and combat capability be met in time to meet the need? How much risk is assumed if the technologies are unable to be developed in the time frame desired, and if too much risk exists - what other options does the Navy have?
What happens if lasers and rail guns and advanced missile technologies all pan out, and other nations begin fielding these technologies before the US Navy does? What happens if the power requirements for fielding many of these technologies exceed the available power of the main surface fleet - or even the projected surface fleet of the Burke Flight IIIs? How quickly can the Navy design and field a new surface combatant with these technologies? One thing that goes unmentioned, these advanced technologies on the surface combatant force are unlike other technologies being discussed, because they are not dependent upon robust communication networks that could potentially be seriously compromised by the enemy.
What if the Navy is quietly handling these known unknowns and allowing the technologies prove themselves to determine the future without predetermining that future based on bets in specific technologies? Would anyone even know, because that isn't anywhere near the story that is being told. AirSea Battle doctrine development takes a hard look at the known knowns and the known unknowns. In the meantime, the rest of us are left with the unknown unknowns because the future of the Navy isn't articulated, and partial visions come out in various articles in Proceedings that get plenty of discussion - by everyone but the Navy.
The absence of a credible story by Navy leadership allows others to shape the future for the Navy. Last week, the Senate cut funding for the rail gun and the free electron laser (FEL). It was reported today by the always brilliant Janes reporter Sam LaGrone that the Navy apparently didn't see the cuts coming.
If the Navy didn't see those cuts coming, then who would influence the Senate to make these cuts when these technologies are among a group of technologies that are competing for the future of the Navy - indeed potentially central to the competition for the future of the US Navy that compares the capability of the surface fleet with the capability of the big deck aircraft carrier. Without rail guns and FEL, there is no debate regarding future technologies the Burke can't support due to lack of mission power requirements, and there is no threat to the prominence of aircraft carriers, because surface combatants will lack the specific technologies to do anything other than launch missiles. Therefore if one cuts rail guns and FEL, one shapes the future towards specific choices.
Does the Senate even realize that those industry interests who have lobbied them for these cuts are potentially making enormous strategic decisions regarding the future of the Navy? These cuts are attacking the primary technologies that are in direct competition for how Navy forces could organize and operate in the future if the various competing visions of AirSea Battle doctrine development are to believed as legitimate. Cut rail guns and lasers and one would protect aircraft carriers and the prominence of AEGIS missile defense - technology interests that many in industry will and apparently are working overtime to protect.
The Navy lost the narrative on AirSea Battle because the Air Force has a more credible story to tell today, and with several years of battlefield testing the unmanned capabilities of the US Air Force future are a reality today vs the Navy's research and limited deployment of similar systems. In a few years, there could be a different story to tell, but the Navy is still working on the technologies that will determine what that future story will be. In the meantime, the absence of Navy leaders offering a vision - or even multiple competing visions - of what the future may be is avoided for the sake of protecting the present fleet from budget cuts. The absence of an articulated vision to guide budget cut choices has allowed others to step in and take the narrative for themselves.
I don't know what ADM Greenert plans to do as CNO, but it is my hope he does things ADM Roughead was never very good at doing - dare to offer folks a vision of the Navy worth believing in. It doesn't have to be right, it simply needs to align with investments and offer enough imagination with detail that people are inspired by the future of the Navy. These stories are important, and without a credible strategic concept the Navy is not guiding choices of decision makers. That dream and inspiration that inspires imagination on behalf of the Navy, and most critically the strategic vision from Navy leadership doesn't exist today - and that is why the Navy is losing the narratives battle to others, be it industry or the Air Force, and allowing others the potential to make strategic choices for the Navy.
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