It appears that the PLA did not just buy an ex-Soviet era aircraft carrier but, more significantly, it has bought into a Soviet era vision of a rising world power requiring a blue water Navy. In the process, the Soviet Union wasted enormous resources creating naval forces that were virtually irrelevant both politically and militarily. China, like the Soviet Union/Russia is a continental power. Even with a growing economy Beijing will not have the resources to build both effective land and air force and a blue water navy.
Moreover, deploying an aircraft carrier even with a complement of strike aircraft is not the same thing as having an operationally effective carrier strike group. The PLA Navy will have to develop the capability to provide 360 degree air and missile defense, fleet ASW, underway replenishment and air/sea coordination. Where is the Chinese navy’s equivalent of the Aegis air/missile defense system, E-2D airborne surveillance and C2 or the Los Angeles class SSN?
The reality is that the U.S. Navy should welcome the Chinese effort to create its own blue water navy. The U.S. Navy has a seventy year history of being able to engage and destroy hostile surface fleets. The name Shi Lang could also be translated as “big fat target.”
Not all continental powers are the same. The People's Republic of China is now, and for the foreseeable future will remain, deeply dependent on maritime trade. Exports accounted for 27% of the PRC's GDP in 2009, even as global exports were severely depressed by the financial crisis. 28% of Russia's GDP was accounted for by exports, but a very large percentage of this was energy delivered through land and sea pipelines. China is also far more dependent on seaborne energy imports than Russia. China's container port traffic amounts to roughly 10 times that of Russia.
Long story short, China is dependent on the sea in a way that the Russia is not, and the Soviet Union never was. This is something we have to take account of when interpreting Chinese naval development. The economic growth of modern China, and consequently the legitimacy of the CCP, is largely (although not entirely; see Yasheng Huang's Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics) built on a foundation of maritime security provided by the United States Navy. Whether the USN continues to provide this security or not, China's continued economic development requires maritime engagement.
China's geographic position is also, obviously, far more amenable to maritime projection than either Russia or the Soviet Union (or Germany, for that matter). China possesses warm water ports that lie astride major global trade routes. Because of the difficult geography of SE Asia, China's neighbors are difficult to intimidate through the use of land power. They are, however, susceptible to naval influence. At the same time, in the absence of a powerful, expansionist Russia the PRC faces no meaningful threats along its land borders. Its littoral is very vulnerable, however, to superior naval force.
What this means is that while there's probably some logic to the argument that the Russian aircraft carrier program should be thought of largely in symbolic terms, the same argument does not apply to China. China has a strong interest in developing a powerful, effective blue water navy. Shi Lang should be interpreted along these lines. With due respect to our host, "How to kill Shi Lang" is a fun question to ask, but it's one of the least illuminating possible approaches to thinking about the growth of Chinese naval aviation.
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