First, I disagree with your assumption on a 'common environment'. No two units are exactly alike, have the same operational context, have as capable commanders and troops etc, even in the same area of operations. Thus, the lack of variation in the dependent variable neither proves nor disproves top down or bottom up. And paraphrasing Einstein's blackboard; not all that counts can be counted, and not all that can be counted counts. Perhaps less metrics and more tacit knowledge from the field will help illuminate this issue.
I think that this is rather my point; there's considerable variation in what we would call independent variables, which most definitely include operational context, capability of commanders and troops, and area of operations. What we don't have is variation on the dependent variable; in spite of these differences, all of the brigade teams that Russell studies seem to learn the same things at roughly the same pace. That's fine and well, and indeed ideal from a practical, operational point of view, but it doesn't necessarily support the bottom-up explanation that Russell is positing. If best COIN practice is spread by networks of officers and NCOs sharing information in formal and informal settings, you'd expect factors specific to each unit (including commander experience and capability, area of operations, etc.) to affect the learning process. But Russell doesn't present much evidence of that; his evidence, rather, is pretty consistent with a top-down explanation of the spread of best practices. It might have helped if Russell had sought out examples of units (whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, or some other war) that failed to adapt to best practices, and try to figure out why.
Incidentally, I wrote my dissertation on the spread of tacit knowledge through networks of officers, which I realize is rather like saying I wrote my thesis on life experience...
Second, understanding "the precise nature through which doctrine changes" solves the wrong problem. It is a mistake to think doctrine is the anti-dote to fluid dynamics. Is it any wonder that the old cliche of 'generals fighting the last war' has such staying power. What's meaningful is an open network of information sharing and dissemination in real time where emergent, and bottom up, processes and techniques change as rapidly as an adaptable enemy. The tacit is personal and non-linear and always defies articulation.
Two thoughts. First, the development of an open network of information sharing and dissemination in real time et al isn't something that's disconnected from the top-down/bottom-up debate; I think there's a fair amount of evidence that some military organizations fail utterly at developing that kind of network, even when they're generally moving towards the right kind of response to whatever war they're fighting. One way to phrase this is that senior officers need to be comfortable with the bottom-up process of information sharing and development of "best practices;" some command environments facilitate such developments, and some don't. In that sense, command functions best when it "gets out of the way," and deserves credit for making itself absent. That's a mostly, but not entirely, bottom up account of doctrinal development during wartime.
But I don't think that's the whole story. Open networks of practice dissemination have to be aimed in the right direction, and need to have a baseline grounding. We can radically overstate the impact of FM 3-24, but we can also understate it; the work taking place in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 in terms of development and sharing of best practices was certainly informed by the general lines of thought emerging around the Counter-Insurgency manual. There are, after all, multiple strategies available to the counter-insurgent. It's not all that surprising that the techniques and best practices developed and employed in Iraq were generally consistent with the precepts of FM 3-24. This might not entirely be a top-down explanation, but it's not really bottom-up, either.
Much of the question here revolves around the role that senior command plays in institutionalizing an environment in which best practices can be developed and disseminated. There's surely an element of "get out of the way," and not just in COIN; we have the examples of German infantry and armor tactics in both wars, US submarine tactics in World War II, etc. But I think it's also important to point the organization in the right direction. It's fine and good to say "here's the job, surprise me with your ingenuity," but I think that a lot goes into how the "job" is chosen, defined, and then described to the people who are tasked with execution.
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