No, I’m not talking about strategic communications. I’m referring to the exponentially growing requirements for rapidly processing, disseminating and analyzing vast quantities of networked information and intelligence. National Defense has an enlightening article on the coming Navy ship-wreck in bandwidth, linked sensors, and networks.
VADM Cebrowski may have been the conceptual father of network-centric warfare, but MG Flynn and GEN Stan McChrystal operationalized the theory on the battlefield. Maximizing the leverage of interagency capabilities and authorities, counter-terrorism has recently evolved into a highly refined art form. Frankly, very few naval folks working outside the special operations community understand the impact of this new war-fighting paradigm. The limitations of the current naval environment are quite evident when one considers that a couple of SOF guys can carry around more bandwidth in a suitcase in the middle of a desert than 200-something Sailors share on the newest DDG. Broadly speaking, the decentralized, adaptive, and highly-networked style of warfare pioneered by counter-terrorism forces in Iraq and Afghanistan will become the American military’s competitive edge over future adversaries. As networking technology and precision-guided weapons proliferate to both state and non-state actors, only the integration of these capabilities into coherent fighting architectures combined with US logistics, creativity, and freedom of thought will enable us maintain a combat advantage.
Viewed in a naval context, network-centric warfare is the difference between a singular combatant such as an LCS (or even much smaller vessels) being able to find, fix, and engage targets within a few miles of the ship and the same platform being a node in a widely-distributed strike force able to destroy targets identified by non-organic sensors and national intelligence systems while calling in fires from over the horizon on locally-identified targets.
As the NDIA article notes, the proliferation of sensors and bandwidth-hogging data such as full motion video (from both manned and unmanned platforms) is an unstoppable trend. The vulnerability of these networks to jamming and disruption is an issue, but redundancy and robust designs can overcome those challenges. Contrary to some of the opinions expressed in the article, multiple networks add resiliency and any consolidation should be approached thoughtfully. (If you’ve used NMCI the past several years, you know exactly what I mean). Processing and analyzing data is as critical moving this data over the network. Off-board analysis, reach-back support, and automation are good ways to handle this issue, but embarked analysts closer to the fight can increase the speed and quality of decisions. Despite advances in automation, onboard intelligence analysis and operational C2 afloat is manpower intensive. Consequently, trends in minimal manning and designing ships with inadequate surge berthing must stop.
The Navy prides itself among the services on the independence of commanders at sea, but the reality is that much of this independence disappeared with the advent of radio. Rather than fighting the trend, we need to embrace networked warfare and exploit it to our advantage. This doesn’t mean micromanaging commanders in the field, the air, or afloat; quite the opposite is true. Flattened C2 allows individual units to contribute to the fight at the operational level while increasing the speed and quality of decisions across organizations and from the tactical to the strategic level. Furthermore, agility and speed of decision making are two of the most important principles to fighting irregular enemies who are not handicapped by a large bureaucracies and cumbersome chains of command.
Getting this networking and bandwidth problem right over the next few years is just as important for the Navy as formulating and executing an achievable shipbuilding plan. Moreover, properly networking naval forces will enable lower end (read more numerous and affordable) ships and aircraft to realize operational synergies and combat power way beyond what individual units are capable of achieving.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
No comments:
Post a Comment