Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Maritime Implications

Stewart Patrick at CFR does a pretty good job here of an overall assessment of the new White House Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). Below are some possibly contrarian viewpoints on the maritime aspects of this strategy.

First, and most obvious, threat prioritization is important. This problem is complex, global, and will never be defeated totally. Therefore, the nation's sea services must prioritize deployments in a resource-constrained environment. This means less naval support to the long running, but largely ineffective counter-narcotics efforts in our own hemisphere, and more emphasis on dismantling smuggling routes that facilitate terrorist groups. A shift in CN patrols from the Eastern Pacific to the Eastern Atlantic would be a good start. But aren't these drugs from Latin America killing our children, creating violence on the border, etc? Of course, but four decades of interdicting the transit zone hasn't changed those dynamics, especially when most of those drugs enter the US across the land border anyway. Meanwhile, networks of illicit traffickers on the other side of the world -- mostly motivated by money, but indifferent to whom they support -- move people, drugs, weapons, bulk cash, etc. at the behest of extremist groups who whose motives are ideologically driven towards the wholesale destruction of our way of life, not to mention our energy supplies. These are the maritime facilitators who warrant more of our limited Navy/Marine/USCG resources.

Second, although we tend to put more time and money into figuring out how to defeat high end enemy naval capabilities, disrupting these shadow networks at sea is just as challenging (if not more so) than denying it to another navy. Denying SLOCS to illicit transnational actors is a complex three dimensional problem, requiring coordination between air, surface, and subsurface and ground forces, with the cooperation of other agencies and commerical organizations. Identifying a singular fishing vessel smuggling foreign fighters over hundreds of miles of coast or the proper container containing weapons on a 10,000 TEU ship, then arraying the proper assets for an interdiction is not a trivial matter. However, once fixed, boarding or sinking an illicit trafficker at sea is fairly straight forward.

In addition to resource allocation, the problem set requires unique arrangements of command and control, improved legislation, and shifts in rules of engagement and use of military force policy. Along these lines, the preemptive use of deadly force must be considered as a viable option against the most dangerous at sea facilitation targets, in the same way we lethally interdict enemy supply lines on the battle field and used to interdict them on the high seas. Boarding an illicit shipment has advantages in many cases: the ability to gain prosecutorial evidence, exploit intelligence, etc.; but in others, the first choice should be disrupting the threat violently and encouraging illicit mariners to find another line of business. The viability of lethal versus legal approaches to terrorism has been debated ad nauseum and now should be (re)introduced to the maritime realm.

Another reality is that in order to execute this strategy, we will need to learn to work with non-state maritime surrogates to counter illicit maritime facilitation, especially when traditional nation state partners are complicit in these activities. This engagement requires interagency cooperation and a serious relook at arcane legislation and regulations against DOD involvement in local capacity building. To wit, an example from the TOC Strategy:

“The recent re-appointment of U.S. Treasury-designated drug kingpin Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto as Naval Chief of Staff is likely to further entrench drug cartels in the permissive operating conditions prevailing in Guinea-Bissau. In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime criminals operate in areas of weak governance, kidnapping oil workers, stealing oil from pipelines, and causing environmental damage that harms the citizenry. The United States will work with African governments, European partners, and multilateral institutions to counter this threat to development, democratic processes, and the rule of law in the region.”

Those conventionally-oriented recommendations are fine, but in most cases, networks of local surrogates can provide the best intelligence, and a wider variety of options for disrupting illicit networks.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.