The Navy Did ?!?!? Over Libya?

I actually downloaded a blogger android app onto my phone just to post this... sorry if it turns out looking like crap.

But this USNI blog post hits hard and must be linked.

If it's true the Navy has been shooting down scud missiles over Libya from sea, and for whatever reason Navy information never reported this, it's time to cut the Navy Information budget by 75%.

If we are looking at a failure to represent the contribution of unique capabilities provided by naval forces in war during this fiscal environment, people should be asking legitimate questions whether the contribution of the Navy News service rises to a value matched by its budget.

Salamander has this exactly right. Folks in and around the Navy who are frustrated because the Navy doesn't tell their story are sitting on a one-legged stool when we learn AEGIS is providing effective ballistic missile defense over Libya and somehow that remarkably important operational note fails to get disseminated publicly except as a footnote in a Daily Beast article.

Lets hope the facts come to light, because it's important. In my world, when the Navy shoots down a ballistic missile - even an old Scud - I'm making sure that information goes up in red on Drudge - because I want everyone in China and Taiwan to hear about it.

The Navy's Multi-tool

The US Navy’s rotary wing community is truly the Gerber multi-tool of the aviation world. Navy helos deployed globally on all types of ships routinely conduct a wide variety of missions including maritime security operations, logistics, ISR, to SOF support, and when required can rapidly switch to sea control missions such as ASW and ASUW. As BJ Armstrong writes concerning his Det's recent operations, "The MH-60S Block III Armed Helo’s that now deploy with amphibious assault ships like BATAAN come in the gunship variant. These aircraft have a wide range of armament options that make it a highly capable platform. You can buy nearly a squadron of them for the cost of one Joint Strike Fighter."

The other thing I like about BJ's post and others like it is that it provides a knowledgeable, passionate, first hand perspective on the action, rather than the watered down version of events we usually get from the Navy’s PAO community.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Evolution of PLAAF doctrine/training

This is the part 4 in the series of reviewing the content of the recent book that I read. I will be looking at the evolution of PLAAF training and doctrine. This is one area that is hard to write about, because we simply don't have many English based sources and the Chinese sources often seem like propaganda pieces. The recent book by CMSI really did a good job on this topic and I hope that this piece will provide even more for PLAAF watchers.

In October of 1949, USSR sent 878 experts to China to build a flight academy and supply 434 training aircraft. Eventually, 6 fighter academy and 2 bomber academies were built. Due to Korean War, they rushed 350 pilots through the first academy in one year and did not even train in night combat or complex weather conditions. By May 1951, PLAAF had 17 aircraft divisions and 34 regiments. They served mostly in secondary role to Soviet Air Force in confrontation against USAF. As USSR was withdrawing from its former base in Lushun to return to China, it provided valuable training to 105 PLAAF pilots from 1954 to 1955. Soviet instructors provided PLAAF pilots with night training, advanced combat maneuvers and training in adverse weather conditions. In a defensive cooperation agreement signed in 1957, USSR agreed to increase cooperation in aerospace tactics training and theater level exercises. By that year, PLAAF had developed its first flight training manual based on the Soviet training manual plus experiences from Korean war and past training. From this point until 1964, PLAAF pilots regularly had about 122 hours of training a year, which matches Warsaw Pact standard. Even though PLAAF can see the importance of training, the ideological types in PRC leadership thought it was capitalistic to train. PLA has historically adopted a "people army" motto that relies on the large Chinese population and land mass and the ideological types wanted PLA to go back to that and to spend more time on communism ideology. Once the Cultural Revolution started, the ideological types won out in PLAAF's development. By 1966, PLAAF pilots were averaging less than 24 hours of training a year. From 1968 to 1971, they only averaged 37 hours 16 min a year. Most J-6 pilots in charge of night missions had never fired out of aircraft gun let alone launched an AAM. Due to high accident rate from low training hours, the training program became more and more simple. Even the pilot selection program for PLAAF changed from selection based on performance to based on their obedience of Mao's communist ideologies. Mao even gave orders to compress flight school program from 2 years and 4 months to 1 year. Much of the flight training and aircraft related manuals were destroyed as part of the Cultural Revolution, because that's what happened to anything book or cultural related at that period. A a result of thse changes, new pilots had to return to flight school starting from 1973, because they couldn't handle the PLAAF training. Only 6.2% of PLAAF could operate at night time and only 1% could operate during adverse weather conditions during night time.

The training programs and flight school recovered after Cultural Revolution and was back to normal by 1983. However, PLAAF doctrine, tactics and training did not change from 1964 to 1983. Even in early 90s, a visiting Russian Air Marshall commented that PLAAF doctrine and training had not changed much since the Korean War. Although PLAAF was a separate air force on paper, but it was just a tactical support for the army. Organizationally, PLAAF's military regions are the same as that of the army, because they were originally formed to support the army through air denial and CAS missions. PLAAF did not contain any kind organizational structure like long range aviation or Frontal aviation of VVS to carry out strategic tasks or offensive tasks independent of the army. In all of PLA's conflict since its formation, PLAAF has never attacked or defended on its own. The most number of sorties it had per day was only a few hundreds and done mostly during daytime. In the conflict against Vietnam in 1979, PLAAF never even provided CAP for its ground troops. This ground supportive mentality was not just a function of equipment limitations, but also part of the general doctrine/mindset within PLA.

Back in 1992, PLAAF was stuck with 1950s era training procedure of spending 160 hours on basic trainer before switching to jet trainer compared to 60 hours for Soviet AF. China still did not have even one AF training research book. When they first received Su-27s from Russia, PLAAF had many problems using this new aircraft even though the first converts had over 1000 hours of flight experience on J-6/7s. Russian flight instructor found that PLAAF was treating Su-27 like Mig-21 and were not utilizing all of the potential of Su-27. During 3rd division's training in Russia, they were found to be overly nervous in flight training and afraid of crashing their planes. PLAAF faced a dilemma of developing training that strikes balance between maintaining safety while increasing difficulty level. At the same time, PLAAF also did not have modern tactics to utilize Su-27. This was shown in exercises involving J-7 and Su-27, where a J-7E squadron was able to penetrate Su-27 defense on over 90% of confrontations. In the cat & mouse game between ROCAF and PLAAF, Su-27s faced strong EM pressure from Taiwanese ground based and aerial based ECM equipments. In fact, Taiwanese EW was able to cut off communication between PLAAF aircraft and ground base. ROCAF reconnaissance aircraft, ECM aircraft posed great risk to the UHF radio communication system of Su-27. Even with relatively weaker radiation, ROCAF fighter jets can seriously disrupt PLA communication when its comes within short distance of PLA units. Clearly, PLAAF needed to learn to operate 4th generation aircraft with new tactics under heavy EM pressure.

On top of the backwardness in doctrine and training, PLAAF also proved to be woefully inadequate in large scale exercises. In 1996 Taiwan exercises, PLAAF could not find a ground command that can direct different aircraft types, because PLAAF rarely had integrated training at that point. In most cases, a PLAAF command post can direct at most 12 aircraft n the air space around airport. When AF and naval aviation have exercises, AF controller is only in charge with giving instructions to AF and does not even know the movement or the goal of the navy. PLAAF was simply not capable of having large scale or joint operations prior to this decade.

Even with USAF's overwhelming display of power in the Operation Desert Storm and Kosovo, some members of PLA brass still did not understand the importance of a modern air force. When PLAAF was first showing off Su-27s to PLA brass, they were not showcasing its maneuverability or its ability to conduct BVR strikes. Rather, they were using Su-27s to launch rockets and dumb bombs. The Russians and most oversea China watchers have often wondered why Su-27s were used in this manner in PLAAF exercise when it was not designed for ground strikes (until later upgrades). It seemed that PLAAF impressed the heads of PLA with by the sheer large payload of Su-27s and its capability to destroy ground targets. Previous PLAAF aircraft like J-7/8 and Q-5 simply did not have the capacity to carry this much ground ammunition. I think that's also why PLAAF bought Su-30MKK. They wanted a platform that could show PLA that the air force could be used to launch large quantity precision strikes on targets far away from its base. I think Su-27/30 was used to transform the mindset of PLA so that PLAAF can become a more independent force that can conduct offensive operations by itself. Flankers were chosen over Fulcrum series because fulcrum did not have the payload and range to transform the role of PLAAF in PLA.

As early as 1987, PLA Daily had an article about a new flight center in Northern China that simulated an invading force. That flight test center is the FTTC base at CangZhou. It currently has three aggressor regiments (J-10, Su-30MKK and J-7E). They are tasked with developing combat tactics, flight techniques, training programs for new aircraft and conducting certification of new equipments. They are also tasked with defending Beijing. After the establishment of FTTC, the best pilots were sent here to conduct flight testing of new aircraft and equipments, while developing new techniques and tactics. In the 90s, FTTC spent more time on tactics training than trying out new flying techniques due to its lack of experience in modern tactics. Starting from 1988, FTTC received Project Grindstone to create blue army to simulate invader. This squadron simulated Soviet AF prior to 1990 and ROCAF/USAF afterward. Interestingly enough, they started off by simulating F-16s using Su-27s. FTTC also a had a cooperation agreement with Lipetsk Air Base in Russia to send their best pilots and controller to improve training and tactics. For example, FTTC pilots and 3rd division pilots were sent to train with Lipetsk's red flag Composite Training and Research Unit. The Russians found that FTTC and 2nd division pilots to be the most well trained pilots in PLAAF.

Chinese Flight Test Establishment (CFTE) has a flight test center in Xian-Yanling and a weapons integration testing (AAM, SAM & AGM) at DingXin. The next important part to the transformation of PLAAF was the establishment of a new air force test training test base in Dingxin that was built in June of 1999. As USAF shows every year in its red flag exercises and subsequent successes in conflicts, realistic arial war games are important for improving combat capability. Dingxin would be used to test out the tactics and flight techniques developed at FTTC. Since its establishment, the number of aircraft and the complexity of simulated war scenarios have increased every year. The simulations have really showed the disparity in the training level and intensity of different forces around the country. These exercises also showed which part of PLAAF's tactics and training manual are out dated and need to be changed. They have also given PLAAF a much clearer viewing of which regiments are better trained than others. The better trained regiments are also often rewarded with newer aircraft. Using new tactics from FTTC and simulations at CFTE, PLAAF have learnt to better utilize Su-27s and conduct different aerial combat missions.

Since 1999, Dingxin has also undergone three large scale expansion to double its size and allow the training for an entire aviation corp. Back in 1999, this base could only handle up to 20 aircraft performing test flight and training of a single tactics. Due to its small size, only pilots and command/controllers from elite units were allowed to come to train. After US's demonstration of its air power in Iraq n December of 2003, 3 different test training base and center combined to form the current AF test & training base. This is the only large scale aviation & air defense integrate training base in the country. It has a command and control center, air and ground tactical ranges, SAM base, AA positions, radars, simulated enemy command posts, a mockup of a Taiwanese air base, ammunition depots and oil depots. PLA also established China's first integrated EW training ground in Dingxin. This base was also the first to get a fiber-optic network and thousands of measuring/monitoring equipments (including telemetry, EO) to provide information for one of PLA's most digitized command posts. This allows for real time quantitative assessment of ECM pressure faced by different units. Over the past few years, over 95% of PLAAF and most of SAM units have come to Dingxin for simulated realistic training under intensive EM environment. Training in such environment has allowed PLAAF to gain the upper hand in its cat & mouse game with ROCAF. Many aircraft (including old aircraft like J-8 and Q-5) have received modern ECM pods and have increased confidence to operate over the Taiwan theater. In 2008, PLAAF made over 1700 flights to but not past the middle line of the Taiwan straits. RF-16 used to occasionally go past middle line to get more intelligence on PLA installations, but is now getting locked on before even getting there. In some cases, PLAAF takes off in response before RF-16 even does so. It shows improved reaction time and professionalism in PLAAF. Taiwanese air defense is now under very heavy pressure facing ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and air launched anti-radiation missiles from PLAAF and the Second Artillery.

Since 2005, PLAAF has been doing red sword/blue sword integrated tactics exercises to copy USAF's red flag/blue flag. Red Sword includes interdiction, CAS, SEAD, C3ISR, OCA (offensive counter air) training whereas Blue Sword is mainly revolved around air combat. It starts in January or March of every year and lasts several months to over half a year. By Red Sword 2008, exercises at Dingxin had progressed to complex division level or even military region level confrontations. Over 100+ aircraft of different types, radar units, communication units and ECM units were involved in these exercises. As one can see, PLAAF is training and developing tactics as a whole rather than just within individual military region. In this exercise, Su-30MKK, JH-7 and H-6 performed long range strikes with KD-88, KH-59ME, KH-31P and penetration of layers of opposing defense and launched bunker buster KAB-1500 and LGB-250. In fact, PLAAF fired more Russian A2G missiles in this exercise than Russia did in its 2008 Georgia conflict. This shows that PLAAF's role has changed from just serving for ground units to being able to operate independently to carry out attacks. The induction of AWACS also allows PLAAF to command & control over 100 aircraft. PLAAF can now send 30 aircraft of different types to South China Sea with aerial tankers and AWACS in possible disputes with Vietnam. PLAAF aims to form several AF strike group under the direction of Beijing MR for offensive missions. Each individual military region will simply exist for training and logistics.

PLAAF watchers, such as myself, have often fallen victim to being overly focused on the modernization of its hardware, because it is far easier to concentrate on new fighter projects or UAV projects. However, PLAAF tactics and training have also been undergoing a rapid transformation. The exercises over Dingxin are now frequently shown on CCTV7, China's military channel. This shows increased confidence in PLAAF over its improving training conditions. At the same time, a recent article talks about an experimental flight school programs that will shorten the pilot training including academic study and combat training to 5 to 7 years. If this move succeeds, it will put PLAAF roughly inline with US training programs. PLAAF is actively trying to learn better training programs and flight school programs from the West. It has increased training with other air forces in the recent years. In Peace Mission 2007, a JH-7A regiment performed better than a Russian Su-25 in a ground attack exercise. During the past year, PLAAF has held exercises with Turkey and Pakistan. According to rumours online, PLAAF actually did pretty badly in its exercise with Turkish Air Force, but learnt some lessons in the process. These are all growing pains it must experience to become a modern air force. So instead of just focusing on J-20 and J-15, we should spend more time on the evolution in PLAAF training programs. For naval followers out there, PLAN is also undergoing a similar transformation. Although, it seems like PLAN's training hasn't evolved as much as PLAAF training.

Sea Denial vs. Sea Control

Galrahn is out for a few days fighting the war against Irene, so I’ll stand in for another post or two.

Good piece here from Hugh White on “Sea Denial” versus “Sea Control” in relation to China. One disagreement here: “But only aircraft carriers offer the round-the-clock protection for other ships needed to achieve sea control.” This was true before the advent of aegis and when we still had robust ASW aircraft on carriers, but now that protection role has reversed with CRUDES ships providing the protection for others. He writes: “The central fact of modern naval warfare - which the Chinese grasp as well as anyone - is that sea denial is relatively easy to achieve, but control is extremely hard. We seem to be entering an era in which many countries can achieve sea denial where it matters to them most, but none can achieve sea control against any serious adversary.” Are sea denial and sea control mutually exclusive? Or are they dynamic terms that can vary in time and space and pass fluidly between combatants? Also, I’d hasten to add from an irregular warfare perspective that this dynamic applies to a number of non-state actors, too.

Along those lines, witness this little noticed incident in the Gulf of Aden. Well done to Yemen's Navy, who has their hands full trying to contain AQAP's maritime ambitions.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Libya Lessons: Supremacy of the SOF-Airpower Team… Or, why do We Still Need a Huge Army?

A number of interesting learning points have arisen from the Libyan conflict. Foremost among them for me is the need to massively downsize the United States Army. More about that heresy in a minute… Galrahn and Robert Farley have discussed the merits and shortcomings of airpower in relation to the US/NATO/various third-party countries' campaign against the Gadhafi regime. They both make some interesting points. However, what the Libya campaign best demonstrates, or more appropriately, reiterates, is the utility of the special ops-airpower team. And by airpower, I’m referring to service-agnostic airpower in all its’ forms, although biased towards the flexibility sea-based aircraft provide.

This lesson was best demonstrated in 2001 in Afghanistan, when relatively small numbers of US Special Forces combined with guerilla fighters and precisely applied airpower over-ran the Taliban. A similar unconventional warfare campaign was executed in Northern Iraq in 2003 when conventional US Army forces were prohibited from gaining access there via Turkey. Instead, Army Special Forces working in conjunction with Kurdish Pesh Merga fighters deftly defeated Saddam’s ground forces, including mechanized armor formations.

No US military boots deployed on the ground during Libya, but other nations’ SOF are reported to have participated, including those of the Gulf States, which by the way, have worked and trained extensively with US SOF the past several years. The rag-tag TNC rebels, supported by (primarily) US ISR, multi-national strike sorties, and foreign SOF - which came to the party somewhat late - were able to defeat a rather heavily armed force. Needless to say, had US SOF been involved, the game would have been over for Gadhafi many months ago.

So what is the role of the Navy in this construct? First, SOF’s capabilities are amplified when they are inserted, supported, and sustained from the sea (see Sep. 2005 Proceedings for elaboration), and Navy-SOF interoperability is as critical now as ever. Second, and more importantly, is that the United States has designed and nearly perfected a capability to defeat large conventional armies without employing our own conventional ground forces has huge budgetary implications that can be seen as favorable to the Navy (and Air Force).

Look at the range of expected combat missions over the next few decades:
-Overthrowing a dictatorial regime? Use SOF married to an indigenous force of irregulars supported by naval forces and air power.
-Want to defeat a large conventional army? SOF and ISR will target enemy ground formations for destruction by air power and naval fires.
-Need to counter an irregular threat? Apply SOF, naval, and air power. Rinse. Repeat.
-Steady state shaping operations? SOF excels at these, and the navy's forward deployed forces are always positioned to respond to emerging crises.

What’s missing from the above scenarios? The conventional army. In other words, there is little role for a large standing army in supporting the national security of the United States once we have pulled out of our manpower-intensive counterinsurgency fights. What does an armored force give us against an opposing armored force when air dominance allows us to slice and dice enemy armored divisions? (And if we didn’t have air supremacy, we wouldn’t commit large numbers of conventional ground troops to be slaughtered by an opposing air force anyway). How often do we use artillery to suppress threats in a collateral damage adverse world now that we have on call ISR over-watch and precision guided munitions? And why on earth would we deploy a large conventional infantry force for constabulary duty in another protracted ground war given the lessons (relearned) in Iraq and Afghanistan?

What about Iraq, you say? The routing of Saddam's army took over 100,000 US troops and GEN Shinseki said we should have used several hundred thousand more. Yes, but with a little more patience, a few battalions of US Special Forces supported from the air could have deposed Saddam's regime through an unconventional warfare campaign. This sort of effort probably wouldn't have destroyed Iraq's infrastructure and army to the point of bringing the complete disarray to the country that our "shock and awe" campaign required. But that sort of operation wouldn't have been appreciated by the conventional army generals running the war, would it?

Naturally, there are drawbacks to instituting major cuts to the army's force structure. Primary among these are the secondary effects on USASOC, which recruits the majority of its special operators from the conventional army. But unlike platform-intensive air and naval forces, or mature and highly trained special operations forces, conventional army formations can be reconstituted rather rapidly. And admittedly, there are times when a US ground force is necessary to conduct a larger unilateral raid or punitive expedition ashore than SOF alone could execute. Fortunately though, there is a magnificently self-sufficient, expeditionary, and flexible group of warriors known as US Marines, who are well-equipped and forward deployed to handle these sorts of operations; again, supported by naval and air power.

I realize the above concepts are controversial, but I also know that the US became a secure and strong nation and will remain powerful because of sea power, not land power. And a globally deployed Navy/Marine Corps team, combined with a robust range of airpower and special operators is the force we need to defeat just about any conceivable future threat. So why shouldn't the Army take a disproportionate share of the impending DOD budget cuts?

UPDATE: To save readers from going through 80+ postings and provide some clarity: what do I mean by "massive" cuts to USA force structure? How about at least 25% of active duty force structure? Honestly, I won't venture to put out an exact number, but I do know that 5% cuts applied to all services across the board is a disservice to national security. Designing a future force for "most likely" scenarios, as well as black swans doesn't mandate that we do things the way we always (or at least recently) have done them. And while 25% may not seem like a large number, when you put it in dollars and manpower, it's pretty "massive."

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

China/Russia military cooperation

This is the part 3 in the series of reviewing the content of the recent book that I read. In the past, I have often been harsh toward the recent China/Russia military cooperation. I have frequently stated that the Russians have limited military technology that it can interest China with. I have also read many cases of bad quality and servicing & support of export Russian weapons. However, it is important to state clearly that China would not be where it is today without its military cooperation with Russia. In fact, this article will look at all of the areas that USSR and Russia have assisted in China military industrial complex. Although sometimes unwillingly, USSR/Russia has assisted China's military industry than any other nation. In fact, I would say that this military relationship has yielded more benefit for China than any other military relationship has yielded for any nation.

Back when PRC first founded, Chinese leaders went to their big brother in Soviet Union to learn everything it can from USSR. At that time, China was a very backward society ravaged by a century of war. China had not gone through the industrial revolution and had very few industries. In the 1950s, USSR provided China $300 million loan and used this to provide technical aid in 156 industries (including many militarily related ones) to China. I can't think of another example in the history where one country provided that much assistance in the industrialization of another country.

During the civil war, the communist side could not produce weapons on its own and had to rely on capturing equipments from the nationalist to be replenished. Clearly, this could not be sustained after the civil war was over. PLA received 60 divisions of equipment from USSR and formed its first motorized divisions with T-34, T-54 and IS-2 tanks. During Korean War, General Peng, the leader of PLA forces, saw the power of modern military technology and air power from the Americans. He realized that China could not win in modern battlefield with just ground troops. With limited resources after the war, he indicated to USSR that China only wants to buy high tech equipments like Mig-17/19, S-75 SAM and some AAA equipments. In 1949, USSR helped China build 6 flight academies, sold China 434 training aircraft and provided many experts to teach those flight academies. With the help of Soviet Union, PLAAF had expanded to 17 divisions and 34 regiments by May of 1951. USSR also provided China with complete blueprints, materials, production equipment and manuals on many of its latest aircraft and their subsystems like engines and missiles. In fact, USSR provided China with so much help, that PRC leadership mistakenly believed that it was easy to develop modern combat aircraft. It did not realize the amount of time and resources required to develop an aircraft until years of failed efforts by the Chinese aerospace industry. By the time of China-Soviet split in 1962, the Chinese aerospace industry could independently produce many aircraft as a result of Soviet assistance.

Even so, the Chinese aerospace industry was still very much in its infancy and had to deal with unrealistic expectations from PRC leaders. They did not know the amount of testing and work that Mikoyan had to before they arrived at the final certified design, so they gave very unrealistic timelines to Chinese aerospace industry to develop aircraft with really high requirements (like the failed J-9, J-12 and J-13 projects). The Chinese aerospace industry did not have the technology, resource or the experience to carry out those projects. Even after China received kits, parts and most documentations for Mig-21 prior to its split with the Soviet Union in 1962, it was not able to master the technology to mass produce it until the 80s. Through the turbulent days of Cultural Revolution and the budget cuts of the 80s, the only project that got completed was J-8. Even though it was a more conservative design than the abandoned projects, China still could not develop the avionics, missiles and engines to match the requirements until this century. In the late 70s and 80s, the Chinese aerospace industry did have some improvements from cooperation projects with the West (including the famous Peace Pearl project), but still did not have a successful indigenous design. After military embargoes were imposed in 1989, the future looked quite bleak for Chinese military aviation and PLAAF. J-8II aircraft still did not have BVR capability after the Peace Pearl project was canceled. The J-10 project was still years from completion and did not have an adequate engine choice. Worse still, Operation Desert Storm really showed China how far it was behind World leading air powers. PLAAF was so weak at that time that a Soviet backfire could've flown into China without escort, bombed Beijing and flown back without been threatened by J-8s. Without more aircraft, PLAAF was simply incapable of handling threats from USSR or Taiwan straits.

Even as China was enjoying a period of honeymoon with America in the 1980s, its relationship with the much hated USSR was also improving. By 1983, USSR approved export to China for parts to Mig and Illyushin aircraft. By 1986, China and Soviet relationship recovered to such a point that USSR was willing to sell Mig-23MLD and MIg-29. USSR understood from past experiences that China was looking to improve its domestic military industry rather than just buy some aircraft. They were even willing to offer licensed production of Mig-29 and RD-33s in China. I think only the Peace Pearl project prevented China from fully jumping on board with it. In most aspect, the Peace Pearl project was a complete failure, but it did allow Chinese aerospace technicians to interact with Americans. This experience gave China a more updated view of modern air warfare and aerospace development path. After it was canceled, China was left to turn back to Soviet Union. Although many had expected China to go for Mig-29, PLAAF started to inquire about the more powerful and expensive Su-27. At that time, USSR was already starting to reduce its military size under Gorbachev, so Sukhoi was really looking to get export order from China to replace the reduced domestic order. Given the history between the two countries, USSR's decision to allow the export of Su-27 to China (first non-CIS country to receive flankers) is quite astonishing.

The dissolution of USSR put the entire order in jeopardy. The new Russian government led by Yeltsin was enjoying a honeymoon period with the West. The reformist group of Andrey Kozyrev, Yegor Gaidar, Pyotr Aven and Alexander Shokhin was very keen on carrying out the Western model and did not want much to do with China. Not only was China in danger of not receiving Su-27, it had also received numerous reports that Russia was offering Su-27s to Taiwan. Here is where Chinese diplomats really went to work to try to get its relationship with Russia back on order. Sukhoi and the rest of the Russian military industrial complex were really hurting from a total collapse in orders. At the same time, Yegor Gaidar's shock therapy resulted in runaway inflation and much economic hardship in Russia. Russia was also not receiving the help it expected from the West for its economy. In my opinion, it is not surprising that loans from the IMF and World Bank did not help out Russia when one looks at their performance in the 97 Asian economic crisis. All of these weakened the influence that the pro-West group of Kozyrev and Gaidar had on Yeltsin, whereas more conservative members like Yevgeny Primakov pushed for more engagements with China. All of these factors led Yeltsin to not only allow the original Su-27 order to be carried out but also permit further military cooperation between the 2 countries. Yeltsin believed that Russia can stay ahead of China in aerospace, so did not worry about such cooperation with China. I think Yeltsin also saw the benefits of having a more balanced foreign policy from its trade deals with China in 1992. He was also intrigued by the success of China's economic reforms when similar Russian reforms were experiencing much pain. That will be a topic left for another day.

At this point, there were still internal disagreements on whether China should be purchasing technology from Russia/Ukraine or try to buy technology from the West or ignore what happened in the Gulf War. It's at this point that Liu Huaqing and others pushed to go the Russian route. Prime Minister Li Peng believed that China had a once in a lifetime opportunity to purchase technology and recruit scientists/engineers from Russia/Ukraine. Throughout all of its year of cooperation with the West, China had found that Western companies guarded its secrets much more closely. In projects like the Peace Pearl project and the MD-90 project, Chinese aerospace companies really were disappointed at how little transfer of technology they had received from the West. In comparison, it was truly amazing what the Russians were offering. China pushed for and signed on a deal for licensed production of 200 Su-27s along with transfer of technology. Although it did not receive ToT and license production to AL-31, it did receive high level of technology transfer, documentation, tooling and machinery for maintenance and repairs on AL-31F. China was able to build the largest AL-31F MRO facility and perform all of the maintenance and repairs on AL-31F by itself. You guys might have read the recent news that China was able to extend the life of AL-31 from 900 to 1500 hours. China also received a lot of cooperations from the Russians on its own aerospace projects. Yeltsin gave China permission to send aerospace engineers to Mikoyan and the famous TsAGI in Russia to study. They were even allowed to look through highly secretive projects. In the F-8IIM project, China participated in the co-development of Zhuk-8II with NIIR, which allowed its engineers to be involved in the development, testing and certification stage. The Russians also participated in the J-10 project and the Super-7 project with CAC. China was also able to leverage Ukraine and Belarus defense firms to receive help from them in missile technology, Su-27 upgrade/overhaul, carrier project and other things. And even though I have often been critical of Su-30MKK, it was always over MKK's avionics performance and weapon package. Having seen the advancement in Chinese avionics and weaponry, I think PLAAF made the right decision to pursue a platform that had improved payload and range compared the original Su-27. MKK is already quite an advanced 4th generation airframe in terms of its range and multirole potential. Any future fighter bomber from SAC should draw a lot of inspiration from MKK.

In the 20 years since the collapse of USSR, PLAAF and the Chinese aerospace industry have both transformed. Although a large part of Chinese aerospace industry's advancement have resulted from its own R&D; and cooperation with the West, China's military aviation industry would not be where it is today without the high level of technology transfer between China and Russia. When all of this started 20 years ago, China was looking for cutting edge space, aviation, material, communication, electronics and weapons technology from Russia. Even though Russia was not the world leader in many of those areas, China was able to obtain those technology more easily and cheaply than from any other countries. That is not to say Russia got ripped off in the process. Chinese orders allowed Russian military industrial complex to survive through its darkest times. From all of the stories I read, it really did sound like many Russian military companies would not have survived without Chinese orders. And even with the reduced military cooperation between the two sides, Russia still stands to gain from all of the aircraft and subsystems that it sold to China. Even on the J-11 deal, I think it only backfired on the Russians because most people could not have predicted how fast the Chinese aerospace industry was going to be able to completely absorb its technology and create its own version with much better avionics and weaponry. Russia signed the deal with the expectation that they would be able to stay far ahead of China, but the combination of their stagnation + Chinese advancement have leveled the playing field. So as I look back on things, the Russians/Soviets really came to help China in two very critical point in its history. The first was when it first helped China to establish an aerospace industry after its founding and the second was when China faced military embargo from the West. It's hard to imagine Western countries offering the same level of assistance to China that Russia/USSR did.

I will also explore in a later blog entry on how China and India approached military cooperation with Russia. I will look at the differences and why I think the Chinese approach have worked out better.

Hurricane Irene Tours US East Coast

The US Navy has been busy preparing for Hurricane Irene. Below is a list of ships that were already underway, sortied from Hampton Roads, and moved around in port to insure their safety.

Ships already underway (Aug. 25, 2011): 11
(1) Submarine
(2) Submarine
(3) USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
(4) USS Donald Cook (DDG 75)
(5) USS Bulkeley (DDG 84)
(6) USS Nitze (DDG 94)
(7) USS James E. Williams (DDG 95)
(8) USS New York (LPD 21)
(9) USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44)
(10) USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55)
(11) USS Laboon (DDG 58)

Ships sortied from Hampton Roads (Aug. 25): 27
(1) Submarine
(2) Submarine
(3) Submarine
(4) USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69)
(5) USS Cole (DDG 67)
(6) USS McFaul (DDG 74)
(7) USS Porter (DDG 78)
(8) USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109)
(9) USS Nicholas (FFG 47)
(10) USNS Arctic (T-AOE 8)
(11) USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51)
(12) USS Gonzalez (DDG 66)
(13)USS John L. Hall (FFG 32)
(14) USS Taylor (FFG 50)
(15) USS San Jacinto (CG 56)
(16) USS Mahan (DDG 72)
(17) USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
(18) USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
(19) USS Mason (DDG 87)
(20) USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
(21) USS Elrod (FFG 45)
(22) USS Kauffman (FFG 59)
(23) USNS Kanawha (T-AO 196)
(24) USS Wasp (LHD 1)
(25) USS Ponce (LPD 15)
(26) USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
(27) USS Oak Hill (LSD 51)

Safe haven ships: 28
(1) USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75)
(2) USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
(3) USS Kearsarge (LHD 3)
(4) USS Ashland (LSD 48)
(5) USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
(6) USS Barry (DDG 52)
(7) USS Stout (DDG 55)
(8) USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98)
(9) USS Gravely (DDG 104)
(10) USNS Patuxent (T-AO 201)
(11) Submarine
(12) USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
(13) USS Squall (PC 7)
(14) USS Thunderbolt (PC 12)
(15) Submarine
(16) USS Enterprise (CVN 65)
(17) USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43)
(18) USS Normandy (CG 60)
(19) USS Ross (DDG 71)
(20) USS Hurricane (PC 3)
(21) USS Monsoon (PC 4)
(22) USS Tempest (PC 2)
(23) USCGC Shamal (WPC 13)
(24) USCGC Tornado (WPC 14)
(25) USCGC Zephyr (WPC 8)
(26) MV Prevail
(27) MV Hugo
(28) MV Hunter

Credit CDR Elissa Smith of 2nd Fleet for the list. CDR Phil Rosi of COMAIRNAVLANT also passed on that "all mission capable aircraft that could evacuate, did." In 72 hours the Navy moved or prepared hurricane conditions for 66 ships and a very large number of aircraft. It will be interesting to see how well the family preparation activities went in conjunction with these necessary operational activities, because if that went well too the job done here by the Navy is simply incredible.

One thing I note watching all of this, aren't there something like 190,000 employees at Newport News? I've seen few stories on how they did preparing for the storm.

Anyway... once ships went to sea, the mission changed.

"Our ships have safely maneuvered out of the way of Hurricane Irene, to avoid the destructive winds and seas," said Vice Adm. Daniel Holloway, commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet. "We are now in position to respond if called upon to meet emergent needs and provide support to efforts along the east coast of the United States with a variety of capabilities from the sea including search and rescue, medical support and aviation lift."

USS Wasp (LHD 1), USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44), USS New York (LPD 21), USS San Antonio (LPD 17), USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) and USS Ponce (LPD 15) are available to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard with search and rescue efforts and medical evacuation if requested.

Wasp and other amphibious and support ships have helicopters available that can provide heavy and medium lift from a sea based staging area, provide surface/air ship-to-shore movement, search and rescue and trauma response capabilities and are ready to render assistance if called upon.

Navy P-3 Orion aircraft are poised to provide full motion video capability after Hurricane Irene passes in order to provide the government the ability to see what ground conditions are like in the aftermath of the storm.

Additional heavy and medium lift helicopters are being made available to support from the land as well. Other units are making preparations to support if required and include: a mobile dive salvage unit, a naval mobile construction battalion air detachment, an underwater construction team and an expeditionary command element naval mobile construction battalion.

The Department of Defense is planning at the broader level as well.

Fort Bragg, N.C.; Joint Base McGuire - Dix - Lakehurst, N.J.; and Westover Air Reserve Base, Mass., have all been designated as FEMA Incident Support Bases (ISB). As such, we have already prepositioned 225 non-DoD trucks loaded with equipment, food, water, and generators at Bragg. Supplies and equipment are in the process of being moved to the other ISBs now.

Additionally, 18 DoD helicopters are deploying to the Northeastern United States to be ready to provide critical life saving and life sustaining support should it be needed. These aircraft are being pre-positioned close enough to render swift assistance, but out of the way of the Irene's path.

Eight helicopters are deploying from Fort Stewart, Ga., to Fort Drum, N.Y. An additional 10 helicopters are afloat on the USS Wasp, an amphibious assault ship out of Norfolk, Va. As with many ships in the path of the storm, the USS Wasp has moved out to sea and out of Irene's way. It will follow in behind the storm and be ready to render assistance as required.

At this time, approximately 101,000 National Guard members are available to the governors of the East Coast states, territories and the District of Columbia if needed.

This includes personnel in the following: Connecticut, District of Columbia, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

I'll be watching for a few things.

First, will FEMA know how to use US Navy capabilities? I think there is a good argument to be made that FEMA has poorly utilized US Navy assets in domestic humanitarian assistance in the past. Six amphibious ships is a major capability. The Coast Guard would know what to do with them, but will FEMA? Something to watch for.

Second, this has the potential to be a heavy causality event primarily because we are talking about so many major concentrations of people that are directly impacted. It's simply a matter of statistics that raises my concern. If a Category 1 hurricane that impacts 250,000 people kills something like 30 people (as we have seen in the past in the Gulf Coast area), extrapolated a Category 1 hurricane that impacts 33 million people could kill nearly 4,000. All I am suggesting is that the law of averages might apply here, so I praise every precaution being taken by the regional political leadership.

Third, not sure if you are aware, but the Northeast has had massive amounts of rainfall in August. Philadelphia, for example, had already set a monthly record for total rainfall in August before Hurricane Irene arrived. The same rain has fallen across the Northeast, and speaking regionally, the Hudson and Mohawk rivers were both pretty high as of yesterday. If the storm track follows the Hudson River north as some forecasts suggest, New York City could be for double trouble with the original hit, then a second hit of massive water flow south from the Hudson. More likely, what I expect to see is that the River water folks will let the Hudson river flood out a bunch of folks in the Hudson River Valley north of the high property areas near the city. Either way, there are all kinds of ways communities in the Northeast could take it on the chin from Irene, or how NYC could see a lot more flooding than what they get just from the original landfall of the hurricane.

Oh and for the record, I'm hoping smart folks at Second Fleet are pondering to themselves something along the lines of..."We should send USS San Antonio (LPD 17), USS New York (LPD 21), and USS Eisenhower (CVN 69) to New York City." The safest bet for the US Navy right now is that whatever big US Navy ships get sent to New York City harbor will be pictured in every newspaper across the globe. In my opinion, the Navy should send the ships they want to be the stars of their show, and for my taxpayer money that is the Nimitz and San Antonio class in this fiscal climate (but I'm also noting that both classes are specifically designed to contribute during disasters in major population centers with water, supply, medical, and transport). Am I suggesting taking advantage of a natural disaster to position ships in places where they will be seen by American taxpayers and voters as a political ploy for more funding?

Your damn right I am! Any credit they get will be as a result of their effort earned though, because just showing up to a natural disaster isn't enough. See FEMA during Hurricane Katrina in 2004 for a modern example.

---

I am very likely to fall off the map for a few days if there is a major power event in upstate NY, which is very likely IMO because we are built for snow up here, not this. That sinking feeling I have is my siding decorating the various lawns of the neighborhood, but luckily I do not think I am in danger of flooding. My Twitter account will be active even if my blogging goes dead, so look for me there.

Stay safe all.

Two Friday Thoughts

Meet Senator John Cornyn. Now read this (PDF). Shots.Fired.Ash.Carter. That is.... remarkable.

Bill Sweetman has written about it here, and in that article he also links to the Bob Work memo mentioned earlier today (PDF).

Did you hear about the new Navy Facebook game? It is mentioned and being heavily criticized at CDR Salamanders, although IMO that link looks like a heavily slanted jab at the Navy made either in ignorance or with intent to insult. I do not know why he didn't explain it or why he implied the wrong target audience.

Believe it or not, this Facebook game is remarkably smart, and depending upon mileage - brilliant. I have checked my Facebook every day this week - and can confirm for CHINFO it did work as intended from my POV. Most folks don't get it at all, which IMO that is one more reason it was very smart.

This "Capture the Flag" game was super savvy social media marketing stuff that to most of this audience probably looks like a big waste of time. I am very curious what the Navy Information folks think of the effort and if they were able to measure results, so I'll wait until after Hurricane Irene to get some background on their impression and explain for those who think this is just a silly Facebook game.

Denny you have some very smart and clever sailors.

Navy Reviews Options for JSF

Bill Sweetman at Aviation Week is reporting what might be the most consequential news yet regarding upcoming Navy budget cuts: Bob Work has ordered the Department of the Navy to go back and examine the Joint Strike Fighter program.

Work also directed service leaders to study whether the Navy and Marines could operate fewer than the 40 squadrons of JSFs currently planned (supported by 680 aircraft, divided equally between Bs and Cs) and to look at the possibility of accelerating development of unmanned alternative systems. Canceling both the F-35B and F-35C was not identified as an option.

The instructions were included in a July 7 memo from Work to Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley, Vice Chief Of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert and assistant Marine Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford. Work told the leaders to form a team to develop three alternative tactical aviation force structures, respectively representing cost savings of $5 billion, $7.5 billion and $10 billion across the future years defense plan. Ultimately, Work expects to determine “the best-value alternative, factoring in both cost and capability.

The analysis was expected to be completed by July 28th. In other words, this review was conducted and completed before the Budget Control Act of 2011 was passed.

DoD Releases Annual Report on Chinese Military and Security Developments

Every year the DoD releases their Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF), and most years (like this one) it is released very late. There are some interesting quotes in this years report, and I'll start what will likely be a very long series of posts on the topic with this one on page 56. I believe this quote gives guidance towards what to expect in the near future.

The pace and scope of China’s military development, combined with a relative lack of transparency, remains a point of concern in the United States and among our regional allies and partners. In recent years China has demonstrated occasional signs of assertiveness in Asia, particularly in the maritime domain. This trend has contributed to friction between China and some of its neighbors over disputed maritime territory in the East and South China Seas.

Additionally, the United States and China continue to hold differing views over the rights of coastal states in the waters and airspace beyond their territorial seas. In 2010 several PLA fighter aircraft conducted unusually close intercepts of U.S. military aircraft operating in international airspace. In recent years Chinese ships have also harassed U.S. military survey vessels operating beyond China’s territorial seas.

As Rory Medcalf of the Lowy Institute has already suggested (on Twitter), this portion of the report suggests another EP-3 incident off China is possible, probably sooner than later.

Something else interesting to read related to China... this AEI article from the other day offers a lot of interesting analysis worth thinking about.

Bravo Zulu Sir

This is what first class professionalism looks like. Cmdr. Tate Westbrook, well done sir.

Seapower and Irregular Warfare

John Sandoz published an article in Small Wars Journal that nicely summarizes why the US Navy should institutionalize an irregular warfare focus.

As Sandoz notes, “While irregular challenges often begin with underlying causes, they can quickly manifest themselves as pernicious irregular threats. The Navy‘s role in confronting irregular challenges includes conducting a variety of preventive security activities, stability operations that respond to crises and operations that deter and defeat irregular threats.”

First off, it is good to see more naval-oriented authors writing for SWJ. SWJ is a ground-centric (read Army, mostly) forum whose readers don’t always appreciate the role and value seapower contributes to “small wars” and in addressing irregular threats. Yet these seaborne threats are pervasive and increasing globally, ranging from insurgents, terrorists, and pirates, to transnational criminal organizations and other illicit traffickers.

Other naval authors who have emphasized similar points at SWJ include LCDR BJ Armstrong and this guy. Outside the NSW community, IW proponents in the navy often seem like salmon swimming upstream, fighting against the current of calls for more investments in BMD, carrier aviation, and other big ticket programs. Nevertheless, there is value in this line of thinking.

If US seapower advocates put all our eggs in the “we’ve got to be ready to fight China at sea someday" basket, we shouldn’t be too surprised when our budgets get cut by those who discount that threat or think that it is too far in the future worry about. But if we can successfully articulate how naval forces are relevant to confronting today’s non-state challenges to our national interests, then we have a better chance at supporting the naval force structure that serves this country in protecting our nation against the full spectrum of irregular and conventional threats. Moreover, when fighting for slices of the shrinking budget pie, I have yet to see any cogent arguments for the contribution a large conventional army will make towards confronting irregular challenges once they withdraw from the active combat zones. If anyone would like to cite them, I’m all ears.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Conduct Worthy of Keeping a Navy Commission

I strongly believe this news reflects more on the naval aviation community as a whole rather than the specific naval aviator at the center of the discussion.

The three-admiral board unanimously agreed that Capt. Owen Honors committed misconduct, failed to demonstrate acceptable qualities of leadership required of an officer in his grade and failed to conform to prescribed standards of military deportment.

But it also voted 3-0 that Honors “be retained in the naval service.”

The three-admiral board consisted of three naval aviators - all fighter pilots with careers very similar to Captain Honors; Rear Adm. Brian C. Prindle, commander of the Naval Safety Center; Rear Adm. Dennis E. FitzPatrick, commander of Strike Force Training Atlantic; and Rear Adm. Walter E. Carter. As three Navy leaders who represent the naval aviation community, they unanimously agreed that XO Movie Night content represents content worthy of holding a commission as a US Navy officer in the naval aviation community.

It is the responsibility of folks in leadership positions to embrace the highest standards in conduct and professionalism. It is a leader's responsibility to train his/her team and root out those who do not meet the obligations and responsibilities desired within the team. Captain Honors behavior was allowed to continue unchecked, and when that happens it erodes unit cohesion and the ability of leaders to lead. After the XO movie night videos, CAPT Honors no longer held ability to hold others accountable for similarly unacceptable conduct.

But apparently we simply didn't get the memo, because as it turns out, Captain Honors represents the kind of character, professionalism, and conduct that is valued by at least three Flag officers in the naval aviation community today - because their ruling specifically says that despite cited misconduct, they want Captain Honors on their team. Captain Honors is one of them, indeed exactly like all of them from a career perspective.

It is hard not to see this result as more evidence and a very visible impact of the culture problem in naval aviation specifically cited by the investigation report. Sexual harassment, discrimination, improper conduct... these simply aren't priorities to a leader who trivializes these matters as part of his professional conduct. It is also impossible to suggest these are priorities for any Flag officer whose role is to hold accountable those leaders who trivialize those matters as part of their professional conduct. When one removes accountability from leadership, the result is the new acceptable standard.

Leadership and Accountability... what else needs to be said that hasn't been said already? It sure is a good thing this will be the big Navy story Americans are most likely to see this week... or not.

Captain Honors: Please Go Away

Apparently folks want to discuss Captain Owen Honors, and by "folks" what I really mean is that he apparently wants everyone to talk about him. Captain Honors has taken to the web in what appears to be a public campaign to appeal for support from the general American population towards... I honestly have no idea what the intention here is. On the website there are two questionnaires, one for military supporters and one for non-military supporters. Visitors to the website are encouraged to fill out the applicable form and email it to... maybe his lawyer? It is not clear who the receiver of the email is.

I won't be emailing my questionnaire, but I have filled out my questionnaire for non-military supporters and posted it here for comment.

NON-MILITARY WITNESS STATEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Commander Naval Personnel Command has directed that Captain Owen P. Honors, USN, former Commanding Officer USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65), be processed at a Board of Inquiry for activities related to the production and showing of some “XO Movie Night” videos over five years ago while he served as Executive Officer USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65). These proceedings may result in Captain Honors being administratively separated from the U.S. Navy with an “Other Than Honorable” characterization of service and retirement at a lower Paygrade. At the Board of Inquiry, Captain Honors is authorized to submit written statements on his behalf and he requests your support and assistance by accurately filling out the below statement and forwarding it to his attorneys by August 01, 2024

Full Name: Raymond Pritchett
Address: http://www.informationdissemination.net
E-Mail: See website for link
Telephone:

Have you watched any of the “XO Movie Night” videos or the press coverage surrounding them? Y/N
Yes.

If yes, were you offended by their content or did you find them inappropriate for an adult audience?
Yes.

Did you think the amount of media coverage surrounding these videos was appropriate and/or impartial? Y/N
Yes.

Why?
Because a naval officer made multiple videos for 5,000 sailors in the spirit of good order and discipline and in the process made a complete jackass of himself. America loves watching train wrecks, and Captain Honors represented a human train wreck made for TV and internet news coverage. How is it possible that this man is expected to command a strategic asset of the United States, a nuclear powered aircraft carrier owned by the worlds only superpower, but simultaneously lacks the judgment and is apparently so politically tone deaf as to fail to realize how these politically controversial videos wouldn't be interesting to American media? I would also note that the actions of Captain Honors has been consistent with someone seeking media attention to his situation specifically in regard to these videos, so to be outraged by media coverage at this stage is hypocritical at best.

In your opinion, did CAPT Honors engage in “misconduct” or “substandard performance” in creating the “XO Movie Night” videos for his adult Sailors onboard USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65)? Y/N
Yes.

Why?
In what American government professional occupation does an individual in leadership simulate masturbation in a training video that is broadcast directly to 5000 members of a government organization while simultaneously claiming the video is "acceptable conduct" or "standard performance"?

In your opinion, should CAPT Honors be punished now for his actions that his superiors, including senior officers and Admirals, knew about and condoned at the time? Y/N
Yes.

Why?
The poor judgment of senior officers and Admirals does not excuse the poor judgment of Captain Honors. Unlike senior officers and Admirals, Captain Honors took the matter one step further by insulting those who disagreed with his judgment regarding the quality of the videos, effectively shutting down avenues of criticism from prospective feedback from the videos. It wasn't simply a matter of his superiors potentially condoning the video content, it was also a case where the audience was forced to condone the videos under implied threat.

In your opinion, do you believe the Navy handled this situation appropriately by issuing CAPT Honors a Secretarial Letter of Censure and convening a Board of Inquiry five years after the alleged misconduct? Y/N
Yes.

Why?
Because the XO movie night videos demonstrate “misconduct” or “substandard performance” of such magnitude that simply sweeping the issue under the rug and ignoring it after the videos became public was not an option. It is particularly important the Navy took action in this matter related to Captain Honors because the videos took place while he was executive officer of the very same aircraft carrier he was commanding officer.

Has this response to this situation changed your opinion of the Navy of the military at all? Y/N
Yes.

If yes, how?
I have a great deal more respect for the mid-grade officer community and specific members of the US Navy leadership who dealt with this matter directly. What caught my attention almost immediately is how the Navy community of current Commanders and Captains was outraged by the behavior demonstrated by Captain Owen Honors in the videos, with several folks breaking down in specific detail the problems as part of a collective learning experience on how to conduct oneself on a large ship where CCTV videos may be the only time many of a ships crew interact with an executive officer. I do not expect to see active duty Navy officers defense the actions of Captain Honors, because they will demonstrate better judgment than Captain Honors by not endorsing his behavior. Admiral Harvey and Admiral Walsh also get high marks for how they handled this incident.

Do you believe CAPT Honors has the potential for further service to his country in the U.S. Navy? Y/N
No.

Is so, why?
N/A

If the Board of Inquiry recommends CAPT Honors be separated from the U.S. Navy and retired from active duty, what is your opinion as to the characterization of his discharge?

Honorable | General Under Honorable Conditions | Other than Honorable
Other than Honorable

Why?
Captain Honors is an attention seeking media whore who has had more face time with the American public than any other naval officer in the naval aviation community. If Rear Adm. Brian C. Prindle, commander of the Naval Safety Center; Rear Adm. Dennis E. FitzPatrick, commander of Strike Force Training Atlantic; and Rear Adm. Walter E. Carter, commander of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, all of whom are fighter pilots who have commanded aircraft carriers, believe there is Honor in the way Captain Honors has represented himself, the naval aviation community, and the US Navy - then in my opinion the Navy has a serious culture problem represented entirely by Captain Honors defensive argument that his actions represent acceptable behavior in the US Navy today. I do not believe his actions represented good order and discipline expected of US Navy officers.

Should CAPT Honors, after 28 years of service, be retired in his current paygrade and receive retirement pay as a Captain/ O6? Y/N
Yes.

Why?
Because I will not dismiss his 28 years of service to my country even if I will outright dismiss him as a credible representative of those who serve this country.

Please provide any further comments about CAPT Honors or this situation that you think might be useful to the Board of Inquiry:
Captain Honors needs to go, sooner rather than later.

Are you willing to testify, either in person or by telephone, on CAPT Honors’ behalf at a Board of Inquiry? Y/N
No.

If no, why not?
I have nothing positive to verbally contribute on behalf of Captain Honors, however if Captain Honors is willing to pay my appearance fee I will provide him 5 good minutes of sharp and critical public humiliation in front of the Board of Inquiry under oath.

I SWEAR THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE. I consent to the use of this statement as evidence for consideration by the Board of Inquiry.
I do.

Signature:
Raymond Pritchett 8/24/2011

On behalf of CAPT Honors, thank you for continuing support and for responding to the questionnaire. If you would prefer to draft a separate statement to include further details about CAPT Honors that you think may be useful to the Board of Inquiry members in making their determination then that document would be appreciated as well. You may be contacted about your participation in this process.

Now please go away Captain Honors, kthxbye.

Airpower Over Libya Revisited

First, I need to apologize for not engaging with the comments to some of my recent posts here at ID. In particular, the comment thread to this post on a Tokyo Naval Treaty is quite good, and I've also received some good e-mails on the idea. I'm bashing my way through the final stages of a book, however, which has drained the life out of everything else I've been doing. In any case, here are my thoughts on the recent success of the Libyan rebels:

One of the crucial military questions that emerged from the campaign involves the effectiveness of airpower. With one long ground war winding down and another in full swing, the United States and its allies are extremely reluctant to deploy ground forces. The leaders of the major intervening countries made clear that ground troops would not play a major role in the Libyan intervention, with U.S. President Barack Obama most emphatic on this point. With ground troops unavailable, the burden of military intervention falls on air and naval forces. The Libyan campaign began with a no-fly zone that quickly morphed into a large-scale campaign to support rebel efforts to destroy the Gadhafi regime. The early course of the campaign recalled the first months of the Afghanistan War, in which the United States overthrew the Taliban with airpower, special forces and Northern Alliance ground forces.

Galrahn was making the anti-airpower case on Twitter yesterday; it's unusual for me to be more bullish on airpower than just about anyone, but I think I'm slightly more optimistic than he.

Crisis Time for US Seapower

In reading around the news lately, I've seen some silly discussions related to the Navy. There is a discussion over at DoD Buzz, for example, that asks if the Navy should be building frigates instead of the Littoral Combat Ship. Talk about a hypothetical discussion completely disconnected from the reality facing the Navy today. Lets do some simple hypothetical math to get people refocused on the real problem.

This was the original Navy POM12 baseline budget plan (all numbers below in billions):

FY12 $161.4
FY13 $165.4
FY14 $168.9
FY15 $173.0
FY16 $175.9

This is the original Navy POM12 Assumption | Less OMB 5% | Less OMB 10%

FY12 $161.4
FY13 $165.4 | (-$8.27) | (-$16.54)
FY14 $168.9 | (-$8.44) | (-$16.89)
FY15 $173.0 | (-$8.65) | (-$17.30)
FY16 $175.9 | (-$8.80) | (-$17.59)

So before we even deal with the current $350 billion in defense cuts as outlined by the Budget Control Act of 2011 that partially funds the government just until the end of the first term of the Obama administration - a process which includes the yet to be decided super committee plan; the Navy is facing heavy cuts quickly from OMB unless they can find some way to completely dismiss OMB guidance (which they might).

Now, I fully expect the DoD to be hit by big budget cuts in the neighborhood of $850 billion over 10 years, more or less the budget cut that comes if the super committee fails to produce an alternative (I believe all alternatives seriously considered will have the same defense cuts included). That means we will see cuts to the Navy like this based solely on the Congress plan, not the additional OMB additional guidance:

FY12 $161.4
FY13 $165.4 (-$3.9)
FY14 $168.9 (-$7.54)
FY15 $173.0 (-$11.02)
FY16 $175.9 (-$14.79)

For those curious how I am drawing these figures, I'm basically assuming a flatline defense budget at $560B for FY13 numbers (which is a high number btw) for 10 years and presuming $850 billion in cuts over those 10 years, then extrapolating what the Navy's share might be if 29% of the total DoD cut is applied to the Navy.

If the Navy gets hit with both the Super Committee cuts and just the OMB 5% cuts (not 10%), this is what the currently planned POM12 budget | Post POM12 cut budget | Total Budget Cut looks like:

FY12 $161.4
FY13 $165.4 | $153.23 | (-$12.17)
FY14 $168.9 | $152.92 | (-$15.98)
FY15 $173.0 | $153.33 | (-$19.67)
FY16 $175.9 | $152.31 | (-$23.59)

In other words, if the Super Committee fails to find a deal and the trigger kicks in for the Budget Control Act of 2011, and OMB guidance for POM13 cuts the DoD 5% like it probably will for every other government agency, the Navy POM13 budget must be introduced with a budget that is ~$100 billion less than expected.

Who in the hell seriously thinks the Navy is going to immediately move to design a new frigate in this fiscal environment? The Navy will be lucky to afford a DDG-51 Flight III design, much less a frigate from scratch.

Lets get back to real issues, shall we?

How long before those 29 Perry class ships in active commission or active reserve status are decommissioned? The best bet is the Navy will retire every single one of them next year. The USS Peleliu (LHA 5) will be retired immediately. The USS Cleveland (LPD 7), USS Denver (LPD 9), and USS Ponce (LPD 15) will all be retired immediately. The USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) and USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20) will both be retired immediately. All of the Coastal Patrol Ships will be retired immediately. Those 10,000 sailors will be the tip of the iceberg in terms of pink slips.

Will the Navy also retire the first 8 Ticonderoga class cruisers because they lack the radar for BMD? Maybe. Will the Navy move all of the MCMs into reserve status immediately? Maybe. The F-35C will likely be immediately canceled. The impact to the Maritime Sealift Command won't be pretty, and those Submarine Tenders among other MSC vessels will be retirement targets.

I honestly have no idea how the Marine Corps will deal with the cut. I can only speculate that there will almost certainly be no new medium vehicle nor an AAV replacement. The F-35B likely would survive, as would the Osprey and H-1 upgrades. The AV-1Bs would likely be retired immediately though, and the CH-53K would be pushed back indefinitely.

Think folks, think. The Navy will do what they have always done when budget cuts come - they will retire old ships quickly and throw everything they can towards building new ships. The LCS is one of the safest shipbuilding programs the Navy has, because it has known costs with fixed price contracts. There is ZERO possibility of a new frigate of any kind in this fiscal environment unless the Navy decides to drop the DDG-51 Flight IIIs, and Congress will absolutely insist the Navy protects the shipbuilding budget so the nation doesn't drop below 5 major shipyards. Surface ship and Aviation Maintenance will suffer as it always does in lean fiscal times, and deployments will drop significantly - as will training.

These silly discussions on LCS are a distraction, because they aren't rooted in either the history of how the Navy deals with budget crisis nor the realities of where the Navy is today. For all those folks who don't like the LCS, I'd suggest you find something to like or suggest affordable ideas to make it better, because the cold truth is those 20 LCS are likely to make up a significant percentage of the entire US Navy surface fleet by the time they are commissioned. If the Navy does in fact build 55 of them, as some still foolishly suggest, the LCS could represent 40% of the entire surface force by 2025. The only way that changes is if you have several hundred billion dollars laying around for the Navy over the next several years, and my guess is you do not.

The American taxpayer doesn't understand the value of seapower to them. That indifference by the American taxpayer who doesn't believe the Navy underwrites and secures the economic vitality of the worlds only superpower represents an existential threat to the US Navy today - and there is no evidence that US Navy leadership understands this. Specific programs in the Navy are not the problem, they are a symptom of a much bigger problem that likely won't be realized or effectively addressed until it is far too late.

The Fall of Tripoli is the End of the Beginning

This is the latest from Tripoli.

Libyan rebels claimed to be in control of most of the Libyan capital on Monday after their lightning advance on Tripoli heralded the fall of Moammar Gadhafi's nearly 42-year regime. Scattered battles erupted, and the mercurial leader's whereabouts remained unknown.

The international community called on Gadhafi to step down and moved ahead with post-war planning as euphoric residents celebrated in the Green Square, the symbolic heart of the Gadhafi regime. Colleagues warned he wouldn't go easily. Two of his sons were captured late Sunday.

Also noteworthy from the article.

A rebel field commander said reinforcements were arriving in Tripoli by sea from the north, south and southeast.

"Our fighters are coming from all directions and, God willing, today we will liberate the whole city," the commander, Suleiman Sifaw, told The Associated Press.

At the beginning of the siege on Saturday early morning, apparently there were several special operations group from Benghazi that landed from the sea as well. Still haven't seen much detail on that though.

This is the end of the beginning, not the beginning of the end. Apparently Tripoli has been mostly overrun by the rebels to the West who were armed up by France, which goes back to the theory that he with the biggest gun often wins. Those rebels have apparently been working with the rebels from Benghazi, which is a great sign of tactical coordination, assisted by NATO no doubt.

But here is the thing... Gaddafi will likely either be killed or captured soon, and the hunt for Gaddafi loyalists will result in a nasty bloodbath. It's revenge time, and lots of folks are ready to carry out vengeance.

But then what? How many tribes will be left competing for political power in Tripoli? It is worth noting that Libya is about to become the first legitimate revolution of 2011 where rebels have overthrown their hard line government. The flip side is that the moment of power vacuum from revolution has arrived, and everyone looking to take political power in that vacuum is holding a gun.

The military tactics used by NATO in Libya have not been impressive. The Air Campaign almost certainly helped the rebels, but it also extended the conflict longer than it needed to be and was only viable because the Libyan military was one of the smallest, worst trained, and worst equipped military forces in the world. Libya is not a model for the use of military power. The only lesson for the US so far is that Libya is an example how to do the least against the least while expecting the least in return - which may have been the political objective the whole time. Said another way, from the United States perspective, there is almost nothing noteworthy to take political credit for to date from the military aspects of Libya - all credit should be given to NATO and the Libyans.

On the political end, it is a different story. The President has been out front from the beginning calling for Gaddafi to go, and has put the government of the United States on a footing committed to the removal of Gaddafi in every way short of military power doing it ourselves. That might be something to take credit for, but the hard part of political support begins now. The future of Libya from now going forward will be how US political policy towards Libya will be judged. No one will care that the US committed barely any military power towards the removal of Gaddafi as long as the post-Gaddafi political support is productive towards a peaceful transition of government.

The two key questions I see moving ahead:

1. Can the State Department be effective in Libya without US military power to back them up?
2. Is the future on the ground in Libya one of peaceful political power sharing or insurgency?

My sense is Libya doesn't end well once Gaddafi is gone and the euphoria of that moment passes. Libya is still a tribal nation deeply divided and heavily armed with no central power structure or source of unity for the people. My advice on Libya is simple: hope for the best but prepare for the worst, and the lower one sets political expectations the better.

The legacy of Liu Huaqing

Recently, I've read a couple of books regarding the development of Chinese air force. More than anything else, this one book by a well known poster on Chinese bbs has really changed many perceptions I've had regarding the modernization of PLAAF doctrine and training. I would say that anyone who has frequented top Chinese language forums would know who I'm referring to. Over the next few weeks, I plan to write several entries on different aspects of PLAAF modernization. The first topic that I decided to make is the legacy of Liu Huaqing, since he is forever linked to the Chinese Aircraft Carrier program.

If you do a search of Liu Huaqing, you are most likely going to see articles describing him as the father of modern Chinese navy. His following quote has accompanied him everywhere

“Without an aircraft carrier, I will die with my eyelids open; the Chinese Navy needs to build an aircraft carrier,”

Liu served as the commander of the Chinese Navy from 1982 to 1987. After that, he served as the deputy chairman of the powerful CMC from 1989 to 1997. During his time as the commander of PLAN, Liu advocated acquiring a medium-sized and conventional-power carrier for operations over the Spratlys. At that time, Jiang Zemin's administration supported soft power in dealing with neighbours, so PLAN development concentrated mostly on the Taiwan scenario. More importantly, PLA budget simply could not support the cost of an aircraft carrier and associated air wing. At the same time, PLAN surface ship build up did not start until 2002, so having a carrier group was not possible. However, I think Liu did get PLAN thinking about expanding its reach from just the shores. Up to that point, PLA was stuck in the Mao era mindset of "people's army". The role of the AF was to achieve air denial rather than air dominance. The role of the navy was just to provide coastal defense. Even up to the start of this century, some in the army still thought that no nation can establish continued air dominance. That really is an astonishing thought when one thinks about how much US air dominance had determined Operation Desert Storm and over Kosovo.

What most people don't know is Liu's influence in the modernization of PLAAF after he became the deputy chairman of CMC. Liu was not only pushing for the modernization and increased power projection for PLAN, but he was also doing so for the air force. When Liu first got to his position in 1989, he was probably surrounded by many army generals in the upper echelon of PLA. Even though China's relationship with Soviet Union had warmed since Gorbachev took over, the army was still gripped with the threat of Soviet encirclement. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, the majority of advanced Soviet equipment became available for China. China had previously been offered Su-27 by Gorbachev's regime, but more weapons became available as the Russian military industrial complex faced the threat of collapse. In fact, the Russians brought T-72 MBTs, T-80U MBTs, SPH systems, SAMs, IFVs to display to PLA. PLA was probably 20 years behind Russia in ground weapon technology at that time. Considering these PLA generals spent the past 10 years developing plans against those front line T-80U tanks, it must have been a godsend for them to be able to buy these weapons. However, China had a limited military budget at that time, so they had to be picky about which system to get from the Russians.

Liu showed his foresight at this point. He believed that the gap between China and the leading standards in the world was the smallest in the army. He also got support from China's industrial complex, who did not believe China needed to import whole systems from Russia. Liu received support from Li Peng and Jiang Zemin to go for fighter jets, SAMs and Smerch MLRS instead of tanks and IFVs. Liu and others also realized that China's aerospace industry needed advancement. So instead of just buying Su-27s, he pushed for licensed local production and transfer of technology.

Looking back on it now, Liu was absolutely right in his vision. The Chinese industrial complex managed to advance to the point where it can produce numerous world class weapon systems despite not reaching ToT for T-80U, BMP-3 and numerous other systems. On the other had, the Chinese military aerospace industry has advanced quite far. Not only was PLAAF able to obtain the rights to produce a 4th generation fighter locally, but it has obtained experience in developing heavy fighter jet. I would say that China would not be able to develop a heavy fighter jet like J-20, if it did not first learn how to locally build Su-27s. At the same time, SAC have been able to develop J-15 based on the Su-27 platform. So Liu's push not only produced tremendous benefit for the air force but also naval aviation. Of all of the military leaders of his generation, Liu stands alone in his role in not only the modernization of PLAN, but also PLAAF.

Meanwhile....in Syria

Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson's column this morning asks the question, "Where's the Syria Plan?"  Proving that many slopes are indeed, slippery, Robinson brings up the uncomfortable reality that Assad is just as bad as Gaddafi, and that he may ultimately kill even more people in his bid to remain in power.  Robinson reaches a reasonable conclusion, that he can't see how--with forces as thinly stretched as they are and budget cuts looming--we can intervene militarily in Syria.

He goes on to state "What we need is something the president has refused to provide: an Obama Doctrine governing the use of force to defend civilians against their own despotic governments, or at least spelling out how the United States views its role in the unfolding Arab Spring." He goes on to question whether "...Our approach seems to be that we seek to oust dictators only when their rule is seriously threatened."  Hmmm....sounds reasonable to me. 

So in an effort to help out President Obama and Eugene Robinson, I offer the following framework for an Obama Doctrine Governing the Use of Force to Defend Civilians Against Their Own Despotic Governments (ODGUFDCATODG).

1.  The default position of the United States Government is that it will not become involved militarily in defending civilians against their own despotic governments.  While these events are tragic and regrettable, the support of armed struggle of another people against its own government is not BY DEFINITION in the national security interests of this country.

2.  There will be times when such support IS in the national interest of the United States.  That determination will be made based on a combination of the following factors:
     A.  The existence of a real and demonstrated threat to the lives and or property of American citizens.
     B.  The imminence of such a threat.
     C.  The likelihood that such a threat would spill across an international border in which these factors would then be re-applied.
     D.  The existence of legitimate economic, military, or geo-political interests (worthy of separate excursion in and of itself).
     E.  The absence of capable military forces of neighboring nations willing to do the job themselves, or participate in the effort.
     F.  The likelihood that such an effort would be successful in toppling the regime with minimal military effort.
     G.  The existence of some other nation or nations willing to step up to post intervention responsibilities.

Critical to this approach though is the recognition that Responsibility to Protect (RTP) is a norm, not a law or a mandate, or a tar-pit for great power resources.

Applying this framework to Syria--I believe Mr. Robinson correct in eschewing military intervention.

Bryan McGrath

New OMB Directive Cuts Defense Beyond Budget Control Act Agreement

The White House has published this OMB directive (PDF), which comes as guidance on top of the debt discussions agreed to in the Budget Control Act.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D. C . 20503
THE DIRECTOR
August 17,2024
M-II-30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

FROM: Jacob J.Lew
Director

SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Guidance

The President has defined our fiscal challenge as demonstrating that we can live within our means so that we can invest in job creation and economic growth now and in the long term. In April, he proposed a balanced framework for $4 trillion in deficit reduction that would put us on path to achieve fiscal sustainability by the middle of this decade. Over the summer, in negotiations with the Congress, the President pursued deficit reduction of this magnitude. Once it was clear a bipartisan agreement could not yet be reached, the President signed into law a down payment toward this goal: the Budget Control Act of 20 11. This legislation set ceilings on total discretionary spending and a target of $2.4 trillion in total deficit reduction over the next decade.

In light of the tight limits on discretionary spending starting in 2012, your 2013 budget submission to OMB should provide options to support the President's commitment to cut waste and reorder priorities to achieve deficit reduction while investing in those areas critical to job creation and economic growth. Unless your agency has been given explicit direction otherwise by OMB, your overall agency request for 2013 should be at least 5 percent below your 2011 enacted discretionary appropriation. As discussed at the recent Cabinet meetings, your 2013 budget submission should also identify additional discretionary funding reductions that would bring your request to a level that is at least 10 percent below your 2011 enacted discretionary appropriation.

By providing budgets pegged to these two scenarios, you will provide the President with the information to make the tough choices necessary to meet the hard spending targets in place and the needs of the Nation. These 5 and 10 percent reductions from the 2011 enacted level should not be achieved by proposing ~cross-the-board reductions or reductions to mandatory spending in appropriations bills, reclassifications of existing discretionary spending to mandatory, or enactment of new user fees to offset existing spending. The latter types of proposals may be included in your package as separate proposals on their merits or for consideration as alternatives to other cuts proposed in the main request. You may also submit priority add-backs with your request.

At the same time as your submission shows lower spending overall, you should identify programs to "double down" on because they provide the best opportunity to enhance economic growth. Finding the savings to support these investments will be difficult, but it is possible if budgets cut or eliminate low-priority and ineffective programs while consolidating duplicative ones; improve program efficiency by driving down operational and administrative costs; and support fundamental program reforms that generate the best outcomes per dollar spent.
Consistent with these guidelines, I ask that your 2013 budget and management plans address the following mechanisms for efficiency increases:

• If relevant, identify priority investments related to economic growth which the Department proposes to expand or protect, stating the strongest possible case for the positive economic impact.
• Identify and include in the budget submission cost-saving efforts that will improve operational efficiency and improve the rate of return to taxpayers, including more program integration, reorganizations within and between agency components, and realignment of resources (such as information technology, facilities, and staff) to improve service delivery to the public.
• To drive long-term productivity increases, your 2013 budget and management plans should explain how your agency will acquire, analyze, evaluate, and use data to improve policy and operational decisions, and how you will reallocate and strengthen your analytic and evaluation capacity to set outcome-focused priorities, identify the most effective and cost-effective practices and programs, and speed their adoption.
• Finally, agency submissions should take into consideration areas of duplication or overlap identified by the Government Accountability Office, as well as others.

I expect this year's budget formulation process to be a collaborative dialogue between OMB and agencies that emphasizes the best options for improving the Government's effectiveness while lowering costs. OMB will strive to offer ideas and assistance to agencies where we can, and to facilitate problem-solving on issues that cross agencies. In addition, I invite agencies to recommend ways that OMB or other Government-wide processes or requirements can be modernized and improved to help your agency meet its objectives more cost -effectively.

I know this will bc a difficult year, but it will also offer an opportunity to make the hard decisions to invest where we can get the most done and pare back in other areas.

I have already seen one source saying the DoD is not immune to this. The FY11 enacted DoD budget was $530 billion (includes military construction), so a 5% reduction would make the FY13 DoD budget $504 billion. The 10% reduction would place FY13 closer to $475 billion. Remember when Secretary Panetta said that more defense cuts would seriously hurt defense? The President wasn't impressed. The budget savings across the board are likely being made to free up FY13 budget money for the President to roll out his new jobs program set to be announced in early September.