This post is about preparing for war with China, so that such a war never occurs. It takes a bit to get to that, so please stay with me.
On Thursday the 4th of August, the Center for Naval Analyses hosted a day-long forum at the Army and Navy Club of Washington, the title of which was “American Grand Strategy and Maritime Power”. It was—as are most CNA events—an interesting and thought provoking day full of panels and Q/A, this time featuring some of the grandees of grand strategy and the history of strategy. The detail of the event is not as important to this post as is something that was said over and over again during the conference in one form or another—and that is that “we are not very good about predicting the future”. I cannot remember how many of our esteemed speakers repeated a variation of this line, but it was notable. Additionally, our lunch speaker (and my favorite Democrat) Richard Danzig crafted his entire conversation around our inability to do so. What amazed me was the extent to which the room seemed to consider this “settled law”. That each incantation was greeted with head-nodding and harrumphing seemed sufficient evidence of abiding groupthink that I thought it might be worth questioning this assumption. I did (in the Q and A) and that exchange forms the basis of this post.
I submit that while we are sometimes surprised by events (or appear to be), we have also been astoundingly and dramatically right in our prediction of the future on occasion. Put another way, if we are so bad at predicting the future, the entire concept of deterrence—conventional and otherwise—must be questioned. Because deterrence has at its heart—the animating impetus of an event or events yet to come which one does not desire to see. And I for one am not ready to make that leap. My case will be supported with only one vignette, but it is an important one. And then, it leads to a recommendation or two.
Retired Army Major General Robert Scales gave an entertaining and animated talk, presumably representing “land power” during the CNA forum. Not once—but twice—General Scales blithely dismissed even the possibility of war with China. No, the General indicated, we will continue to face untidy land engagements all over the world and that will dominate our security environment (this is of course, the very basis of the Army’s latest Operational Concept which—in my opinion—enshrines “Ever-war”). During the Q and A—I rose and asked something very much like the following question: “General, we’ve heard speaker after speaker here today repeat how bad we are at predicting the future. But we got it right—really right—once, and no one seems to remember that. In the 1940’s, we made the prediction that a war with the Soviet Union would be ruinous—not just for them, but for us and the rest of the world. That prediction then animated much of our grand strategy for 45 years. In your presentation—I have heard you dismiss even the possibility of war with China twice. Given that such a war would likely be ruinous also, should we not be as a nation, devoting much energy and resources to deterring THAT war?” Scales was gracious in his answer, and he backtracked a bit. He granted the importance of preparing for conflict with China, and he conceded that we had indeed gotten the Cold War prediction right. Which brings me to my point (thanks for staying with me).
We must as a nation, face the possibility that the United States will someday fight a war with China. We must recognize that the way of human existence seems to presuppose conflict between a rising power and the status quo power where interests intersect. We must recognize that this conflict would be ruinous to China, to our nation, and potentially to much of the world. We must recognize that the central tenet of our national security strategy must be to ensure that such a war never happens. Unfortunately, this is currently not the case.
I am not the most well-connected guy in Washington, and I am certainly not deeply embedded in the councils of the current administration’s thinking—either at DoD or on the NSC—but I get around a bit and I talk to people who DO matter in this issue. What I get is a sense that there are some who affix importance to the prevention of war with China, but they are in the minority. And to the extent that there are those in the administration who are concerned about China, there are a number who believe that the US would be well-served to take a lower profile in Asia as a way of removing underbrush that may lead to a forest fire.
We are treated to any number of national security Brahmin who tell us that our economic status is the greatest threat to our security, or that climate change is the greatest threat, or that the desire for the restoral of the Caliphate is the greatest threat. None of these come close. Great power war—in this case, with China—still represents the greatest threat to our liberty and our existence and nothing else should be more centrally featured in our defense planning.
Don’t get me wrong—I do believe that there are signs of movement here. Posture debates. Air-Sea Battle. Increasing emphases on EW and ISR. Investments in directed energy. A focus on unmanned systems. Secretary Clinton and (then) Secretary Gates have been firm and direct in their public statements with the Chinese. I believe though, that the time is now to raise the intensity of what has been a very low-level, under the radar increase in the centrality of deterring war with China to the central animating feature of our national security strategy. Here’s why.
We predicted world ruin in our planning for war with the Soviets. Our response was to maintain a sufficiently high level of force---both conventional and nuclear—to deter the Soviets from starting such a war. We succeeded. Now let’s turn to China. China is in no position to challenge us in East Asia today. Were they to initiate hostilities, they would suffer far greater losses than we, owning largely to the preponderance of force we maintain in the region, and to our web of alliances. It will not ever be thus. The Chinese are building military and naval capacity designed in no small measure to alter the decision calculus in the region, so that not only would our force no longer be preponderant, but also so that our allies would be doubtful of our capacity and our resolve. The force balance in the region will not tip tomorrow, but it will over time—if present trajectories (theirs up, ours down) continue.
The bottom line is that we must coldly and analytically accept the possibility of war with China in the coming decades, and then craft strategy and policies designed specifically to ensure that such a war never comes. Joe Sestak used to say in the Pentagon that he always wanted us to be strong enough in Asia so that the Chinese CNO wakes up every day and says, “Today is not the day”. Not a bad way to think about it.
Some may say that continuing to be militarily dominant in East Asia acts only as an irritant and an accelerant for conflict, and that we should greatly reduce our posture there and allow our East Asian allies to more appropriately provide for their own defense. Those who believe this way are correct to a point; if we are to allow the balance to tip, some East Asian allies WILL provide more for their own defense (even more so than the ongoing naval arms race there). Others will choose to cast their lot with the Chinese, in what Dr. Krepinevich calls “the Findlandization” of Asia. Whatever the outcome, the likelihood that the security environment that emerges would be MORE stable than the current one is low, and the likelihood of conflict in Asia would rise—a conflict we would be hard-pressed to sit out.
So then, what is to be done?
1. Craft a classified National Security Strategy annex that places the prevention of war with China at its core. The nature of this document would necessitate by definition, a whole of government approach.
2. Craft a classified National Defense Strategy annex that reflects the centrality of this strategic end.
3. Issue programming guidance to the Services for POM 2014 (or 2015 if POM 2014 is too near-term) that reflects the new strategy.
4. Alter force posture in East Asia accordingly. This would require massive State Department movement, as it would be an abidingly diplomatic effort. Extend the Aegis Ashore concept from Europe to parts of Asia and Oceana.
5. Privilege S&T and R&D investments throughout DoD that support the strategy. There is much mischief in such an assessment, so it would have to be done with integrity.
6. Continue to optimize the relationship with our growing web of friends and allies in the region.
7. Ratify UNCLOS and then operate our forces consistent with our interpretation of its provisions, to include routine operations in China’s EEZ. Gain enhanced familiarity with the operating environment, to include intelligence gathering of all the -INT’s. Operate in peacetime in a manner that causes the Chinese to employ their C4ISR network on an elevated footing—and learn from it. Show a little leg now and then with respect to what we can do, and what we may have in reserve. Embrace EMCON once again as a mark of our professionalism, and then demonstrate its power to enhance combat mobility.
8. Begin “operationally relevant field tests” of new capabilities relevant to this strategy on a regular basis. Do so with some fanfare. Recognize the risks associated with deploying less mature technologies and then deploy them anyway—with sufficient support to ensure operating crews don’t become obsessed with keeping new and cantankerous gear working. Combine experimentation and operations in a new way. Create a relentless drumbeat of news and events designed to reinforce the “today is not the day” moment.
Is war with China inevitable? Absolutely not. It is however, more likely if we do not arrest the current movement in force balance in Asia, and if we do not recognize its possibility.
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