Maritime IW Case Study

NWC Professor Paul Povlock has written a superb article at Small Wars Journal on the Tamil Sea Tigers. This study provides a worthwhile history of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, including a broader discussion on the nature of the insurgency. Most interesting (to me, at least) is the elaboration on the role and importance of maritime insurgents in a protracted irregular warfare conflict. To summarize some of the more pertinent points:

On the conflict’s littoral-centric terrain
-“Sri Lanka has 833 miles of coastline”
-“Large numbers of fishing vessels ply the coastal waters, making it difficult to detect and track hostile contacts amongst the numerous native small craft.”
-“The Palk Strait, which separates Sri Lanka from India, is less than 40 kilometers in width. Reefs and shallow waters make the strait treacherous to navigate and hence unsuitable for most deep draft vessels.”


On the Sea Tigers' ingenuity and adaptability
-“During their zenith, the Sea Tigers fielded over 3000 members and conducted operations from the littoral seas of Sri Lanka to the deep ocean areas of the Indian Ocean.”
-“Without large scale shipyards, the insurgents had to build a navy by scratch, often in jungle workshops using off the shelf components…These home constructed vessels had very low superstructures and an angular construction which tended to maximize their stealthy characteristics”
-“The Sea Tiger activities extended below the surface of the Indian Ocean as well. While efforts to buy or build miniature submarines were ultimately unsuccessful, the innovative engineers of the Sea Tigers built floating mines that were used in Trincomalee harbor and off the Sri Lankan coast to hinder SLN operations and damage the Sri Lankan maritime commerce.”
-“When not occupied by wartime duties, the Sea Pigeon ships raised money for the LTTE by transporting legal cargo and by illicit activities such as running drugs and human trafficking.”
-“While efforts to buy or build miniature submarines were ultimately unsuccessful, the innovative engineers of the Sea Tigers built floating mines that were used in Trincomalee harbor and off the Sri Lankan coast to hinder SLN operations and damage the Sri Lankan maritime commerce. The Sea Tigers also developed a combat diver capability. In the 1990s members received training in underwater sabotage, allegedly by Norwegian naval instructors. Rebreather equipment for clandestine diver attacks was purchased to allow stealthy approaches. Semisubmersible “human torpedoes‟ were constructed and jet skis that could be packed with explosives were purchased for use by the Black Sea Tigers, the maritime component of the LTTE‟s crack suicide department.”

On the operational and strategic impact of the Sea Tigers
-“The combination of speed, firepower and suicide tactics made it very difficult for the larger, deeper draft and less numerous SLN units to handle the Sea Tiger attacks”
-“Videos of the destruction of Sri Lanka aircraft and warships helped create enthusiasm and promote continued attachment of the diaspora members for the national aspirations of the oppressed minority remaining on the island.”
-“Effective propaganda motivated an external population to financially support the LTTE war effort, providing the funds to buy more war material to support the struggle…Perhaps most importantly, the Sea Tigers provided the images to reinforce the LTTE propaganda themes required to gain the upper hand in the cognitive domain of the information environment.”
-“The Sea Tigers achieved local sea control to bring this material into the theater of operations. This in turn increased the overall combat potential of the insurgents, allowing them to field more powerful conventional forces as well as conduct devastating suicide attacks against compelling enemy targets.”
-“The Sea Tigers proved as elusive an enemy at sea as the LTTE ground cadres did on land. The Sea Tigers would typically initiate the engagements, choosing the time and location of the encounter. Operating close to the coast, the Sea Tigers fiberglass fast attack craft and suicide boats were difficult to detect and classify amongst all the normal fishing vessel traffic. The tactical engagements tended to wind up as wild melees as opposed to a coordinated engagement based on coherent doctrine. As most of the actions occurred at night, the SLN was hesitant to call for air support as the close action and similarity of the combatants made blue-on-blue attacks likely.”

Ironically, the 2004 Tsunami appeared to be a greater blow to the Sea Tigers than the Sri Lankan Navy ever was up to that point in the war. Professor Povlock describes how in the end, an expansion of Sri Lankan naval power and the destruction of the Sea Tigers’ vital logistics vessels allowed the government to gain the upper hand against the insurgents. The paper also contains several interesting lessons for COIN practitioners, especially on control of the information environment.

Finally, this conflict should serve as a lesson to small coastal countries with limited resources for military expenditures such as those in Africa. Ignoring the development of a competent maritime force at the expense of building a large land force can have strategic consequences. I highly recommend this article for those interested in IW at sea.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.