Galrahn and I disagree only now and again, and his generally good Spidey-senses cause me to look inward whenever we disagree. After such reflection, I find that we are still in disagreement. The plain truth of the matter is that it is entirely appropriate that the US Army be somewhat on the sidelines as ASB is developed (as the Navy was for AirLand Battle--minus the carping) , as it has at best a supporting role therein. To the extent that land power IS involved, it will be predominately amphibious in nature, or derived of those elements of the US Army not generally considered to be among the central foci of the Army (read: Air Defense Artillery). Those who advocate for a "Joint" approach to ASB (read: include the Army) serve the most lamentable ends of "me-tooism" and Jointness run amok, and furthermore, reflect an approach to operational planning that reinforces little but a grab for budget share. Don't believe me? Well, check this out.
I participated in a JFCOM (R.I.P) J9 ASB confab some time ago, one in which it was clear that the Army (and USMC) had found a sympathetic ear to air their grievances against the Navy and Air Force. After all, how could they POSSIBLY move forward with something as important as ASB without ALL FOUR SERVICES and the mediation of a REPUTABLE JOINT AGENCY. There seemed little understanding in the room that what the Navy and Air Force were primarily trying to do was GET TO THE BATTLE. That is, A2AD capabilities were increasingly being fielded which put forward stationed TACAIR--be it land-based or carrier based--at risk, and potentially incapable of ranging important targets. Additionally, ASB was and is intended to create operational synergies between the forward stationed forces of the USAF and USN that would be key to keeping the need for land forces in conflict from ever happening--that is, strengthening our deterrent hand by ensuring that those who seek to deny us battlespace are unable to do so. If deterrence fails, the capabilities gained under ASB would be CRUCIAL in getting the Army to the fight and supporting it once it got there. But there simply isn't a persuasive operational case for the Army to be anything but a supporting organization where ASB is concerned.
Enough of my rambling. Below please find the thoughts of Jim Stark.
Bryan McGrath
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Thoughts on Noel Williams ASB Paper
James R. Stark
Noel Williams has written a stinging commentary on ASB (“Air-Sea Battle: An Operational Concept Looking for a Strategy”) that is getting a good bit of attention around naval circles in Washington. While Noel Williams’ article is well-written, it fundamentally misunderstands what ASB is all about.
Air-Sea Battle was initially an attempt by the Navy and Air Force to identify ways that we could operate together more effectively. Its fundamental basis rests on the fact that both services rely heavily on the other in order to carry out their missions in both crisis and war. The Navy depends on national satellites, usually put into orbit and managed by the Air Force, for GPS, ISR, and communications. Air Force E-3As provide naval forces, especially carrier strike groups, with long range AEW supplementing the Navy’s own E-2C and Ds. Air Force tankers augment CSG organic tankers. Land-based Air Force fighters can play a critical role in taking on some of the air defense tasks of carriers operating in far forward regions, just as Air Force bombers and long-range strike assets will be essential to degrading enemy ISR and offensive capabilities. Air Force capabilities will also play important roles in any anti-satellite and cyber warfare operations. Similarly, naval forces would be required to ensure the resupply of forward Air Force installations. Navy BMD ships could play a critical role in the active defense of U.S. bases in the Far East. Navy MDA would provide important inputs to Air Force situational awareness. And Navy offensive strikes would share responsibility with Air Force assets in covering assigned target sets. All of these things were recognized by both services prior to the start of the ASB study.
To make ASB operationally effective, the Navy and Air Force need to ensure that required operational concepts, processes, training and technical capability exist to enable the close cooperation required for ASB operations, and, where possible, identify areas of overlap or duplication that could be safely scaled back. Further, the services need to identify both conceptual and programmatic initiatives. In addition to the two services, there are other interested parties. The Marine Corps correctly maintains that its air arm is also involved in aspects of ASB. OSD is seeking reassurance that the two services were working closely together. And Congress is looking to ASB as a guide for how to counter their perception of an increasingly dangerous threat from the Chinese A2AD network.
What ASB never attempted to do was to develop an integrated strategy for waging a war or even a larger campaign in a major conflict with China. While the need to keep ASB limited to a manageable scope is completely understandable, the concept or tactic needs to be placed within the broader context of an overall regional strategy in order to be fully understood. There are many actions that U.S. and allied forces could undertake to weaken China’s position that were not covered by ASB—strikes against forward deployed Chinese forces, imposition of a distant blockade, working through allies to place pressure on China elsewhere around its periphery, and using ground forces to destroy any Chinese bases outside mainland China, such as the “string of pearls”.
Williams’ paper seemed to me to be overly concerned that ASB will develop a budgetary life of its own. Clearly, one cannot know before the fact how ASB will be implemented by the servicesp; whether it would metastasize into a programmatic bureaucracy feeding off itself or whether it would simply coordinate between the services. However, my understanding of the ASB study recommendation for such an office was Certainly, some type of permanent coordinating structure as well as a training and doctrine element are needed to ensure that the benefits of ASB are not lost and that efforts to coordinate programs and standards between the Navy and Air Force continue.
Noel Williams makes a series of criticisms against ASB. Below are some of the major charges and my response.
- ASB will be too expensive to implement, requiring OSD to optimize forces for long-range precision strike and neglect other elements of our armed forces. Certainly, support for a prompt global strike capability appeared to be a key item on the Air Force agenda,and it seems logical that long range strike would be extremely useful against a robust A2AD network. Whether we can afford such a capability is another matter, and one which will need to be examined in more detail.
- Air-Land Battle required the integration of two distinct domains, ground and air. Air-Sea Battle, on the other hand, is focused exclusively on strike, it is far more limited. In actuality, ASB aims to integrate numerous aspects of air and maritime warfare. These include EW, ISR, ASW, BMD, integrated air defense, mine warfare and submarine warfare.
- ASB assumes that a great power confrontation with China can be won with only half our military forces (Navy and Air Force). This is perhaps the crux of Mr. Williams’ problem with ASB—a feeling that Army and Marine ground forces have been left out and will be shortchanged in budget deliberations. This type of “me too” attitude has been tripping up joint operations since the advent of Goldwater-Nichols. In reality, joint warfare is based on more than one service working together, not on all services being involved. It is understandable that enthusiastic officers will want their service to have important roles in any major operation. But the criteria for involvement should be which service can best do the job, not the necessity to let everyone have a piece of the action. By that criteria, ASB is perfectly joint, in much the same way as Air-Land Battle.
- ASB does not make appropriate use of US ground forces. While it is true that ASB is based on an implicit assumption that ground forces, both Army and Marine Corps, will play a decidedly secondary role in any major conflict with China, many observers, including former SecDef Gates, have concluded that this is entirely appropriate. It is difficult to envision major landings or an extended ground campaign on the mainland of China. Accordingly, in the event of hostilities, most of the fighting close to China would be conducted by US air and naval forces. And until China’s A2AD network is substantially weakened, we would have a difficult time moving and sustaining a ground campaign on China’s borders. That said, there are still numerous important tasks for ground forces outside China’s A2AD envelope. However, until a broader strategy is examined, it is difficult to relate ASB to these other elements. .
- ASB is a symmetrical response to Chinese A2AD. We should find an asymmetrical approach. “Asymmetric” is a term whose definition is often dependent on the point of view of the writer. In a most general sense, it involves using tactics which are unusual or not normally employed. However, that depends on who is using them. For example, less powerful states or groups will always employ means that are best suited to their capabilities such as unconventional warfare, terrorism, and sneak attacks since they will clearly lose a conventional head-to-head conflict. ASB is not supposed to be either symmetric or asymmetric. It is instead aimed at identifying the best means for US forces to overcome a robust A2AD network. Some of these techniques will be symmetric (air strikes, mining, EW) while others might be consider asymmetric (cyber warfare, ASAT).
- ASB is based on defense of Taiwan. As China builds up its forces, defense of Taiwan will no longer be possible, making ASB unnecessary. ASB is based on overcoming China’s A2AD network regardless of the status of Taiwan. Even if Taiwan were to be ruled by Beijing, other conflict scenarios exist which would require US forces to operate within the First Island Chain.
- The US should consider less costly and less risky operations against China such as control of Chinese SLOCs in the Indian Ocean. This is quite correct and explains why ASB must be considered as part of an overall strategy.
- ASB is essentially “shock and awe” expanded to a complete campaign approach. This is inaccurate. ASB is an element of a larger campaign that would be waged both inside and outside the Chinese A2AD envelope. ASB aims to enable US forces to survive the initial Chinese A2AD attacks, degrade their ISR systems through non-kinetic as well as kinetic actions, and then neutralize their forces to allow us to operate as necessary within the First Island Chain. Accordingly, ASB would likely start out relatively slowly with non-kinetic actions.
- We should not engage in a major conflict with China unless a vital interest is threatened. Accordingly, we should look for an alternative means of resolution than ASB. This gets the whole issue wrong. The US needs to decide if it can afford to be pushed out of the Far East by an expanding and increasingly capable China because we have no means of countering them. If the answer to that question is yes, then we would not need ASB. However, if we intend to support our Asian allies and maintain our position, then the US needs to ensure that its military forces can survive and prevail against China’s growing threat.
In conclusion, Noel Williams has misunderstood both the nature of ASB as well as the role of the various US military services in an extended conflict with China. All of them will have important tasks. ASB will be only one of numerous tactics or operational concepts that will have to be successfully employed in order to be successful. Most ASB discussions arelimited to just a single area of that campaign, albeit an extremely important one. That said, the US still needs to give more thought to the elements of that broader campaign and whether we have the forces, doctrine, tactics and training to successfully carry out these more comprehensive tasks.
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