The US Navy's Combat Ineffective Mine Warfare Force

The article by Sam Lagrone in Janes Navy International this week on the MCM fleet is insanely informative. Titled New Avengers: USN's MCM fleet in need of vital upgrades, it is unfortunately behind the Janes firewall, but I have included a few very important quotes.

Despite the threat, the navy's 14 Avenger-class mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels have one of the worst readiness and obsolescence records in the fleet. At the start of a recent year-long review of the Avenger class, NAVSEA found that only a tiny proportion of the vessels were able to execute their mission, Captain Robin Rusell, representing NAVSEA's Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA 21), told Jane's.

The SEA 21 study was prompted by a report in February 2010 from the Fleet Review Panel of Surface Forces Readiness, led by retired Vice Admiral Philip M Balisle. The Balisle report concluded that nearly two decades of neglect had resulted in acute readiness problems across the surface fleet. "What we had was a naval sea systems organization that was ... not as responsive as it could have been," Capt Rusell said.

Historically, MCM has been given less of a priority by the USN than other warfare areas and has often been relegated to the sidelines of procurement struggles. "There's roughly a USD500 million bill to fix the ships we have and keep them operational," Scott Truver, a director of national security at Gryphon Technologies, who helped the USN formulate its mine warfare doctrine from 1992 to 2004, told Jane's . That bill has yet to be paid in full.

It's actually worse than you think.

In April 2010, the SEA 21 MCM Task Force began an evaluation of the Avenger class to assess its health and readiness. The initial findings were bleak. "What we found out on going onboard all 14 mine countermeasure ships was that only one of them was able to go under way and [fully] execute her mission," Capt Rusell said. "One out of 14 is not too good." Of the remaining 13 ships, some could get underway and perform some of the MCM missions.

Only one in fourteen? That's less than 8% of the total force! Ouch! This quote by Scott Truver is clever, but brutal.

Truver characterizes the six ships in San Diego as "one training ship and five spares".

The article notes that funding for mine warfare is expected to increase in FY13. We'll see, this stuff tends to get high profile right up until it's time to pay the bill, then somehow gets shoved in a desk until there is a real problem.

A news report like this highlights that when it comes to the least expensive, most effective asymmetrical threat virtually any nation can employ, the US Navy is woefully unprepared with funding priorities largely focused on the most expensive, extreme, and unlikely threats.

One good thing about the Littoral Combat Ship program that isn't noted enough - for once, at least MIW is getting high visibility and priority with a budget thanks to LCS. With that said, IOC for the LCS MIW module is scheduled for 2017, so the next 6 years we will be dependent upon the MCMs to meet the needs for MIW.

The Avenger class and it's associated capability is treated like a red headed step child when it comes to budget priority. Hopefully FY13 budget will fund requirements for MIW, because MIW is both art and skill - and that art and skill requires dedication to proper resourcing to do well.