The AEGIS Standard Towards Strategic Balance

Many years ago, and specifically the year I turned 21 years old, that uncle flew me out to his place in Los Angeles to show me a bit about his profession as a global businessman. That uncle was often referred to as the rich uncle, but that's not exactly true. He was remarkably smart and successful pulling in money like it grew on the lawn, but he equally blew through money like his wallet was on fire. In those 5 days he spent the equivalent of my annual salary at the time each day. It was obscene yet exciting, but it also explained why he never got married and never started saving a penny until he reached his late 60s.

I had recently started a new company at the time, and he wanted to show me what he did. His plan was simple: I was going to sit beside him for several days as he met with some of the world’s top bankers. Keep in mind this was in 1997; the US economy was booming, and the biggest concern in terms of global shock came from unknowns like Y2K. Y2K was the topic of these meetings, and in every meeting I was introduced as his Y2K expert (which was true).

I learned a lot, no question, and many things I learned that week have stuck with me through the years, but there was one 3 hour meeting I attended where those gathered discussed the shift in the late 70s away from the gold standard towards the global economy today, and over time I have come to accept their argument as a quiet truth understood by those on the global side of big money: The Gold Standard was replaced by the proverbial F-16 Standard in 1979 to save the world during a global energy crisis. It was at that time America's debt economy was born.

Because of overwhelming US military power and because the US was willing to use force when necessary to protect interests, it was believed that no competitor to the US dollar would ever emerge until a competitor to the proverbial F-16 emerged first. Keep in mind, these are bankers and strategy consists mostly of risk management in their world. The only safe bet in the emerging global economic order that included many new players participating as resource contributors was the raw power of the United States to back the US currency by force.

After watching the banking crisis of the last few years and the war of the last decade, I frequently wonder if the proverbial F-16 standard even exists in the minds of global bankers anymore.

I thought about this as I read Robert Kaplan this morning in the Financial Times.

The financial world is obsessed with stock market gyrations and bond yields. But the numbers that matter in the long run are those of U.S. warships. Asia has been at the centre of the world economy for decades because security there can be taken for granted, and that is only because of the dominance of the U.S. navy and air force in the western Pacific.

Because 90 per cent of all commercial goods traded between continents travel by sea, the U.S. navy, which does more than any other entity to protect these lines of communication, is responsible for globalisation as we know it.

There is no guarantee that this situation will last, however. In the 1980s era of high Reaganism, the U.S. Navy boasted close to 600 warships. In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, that number fell to about 350. The U.S. Navy’s current strength is 284 warships. In the short term that number may rise to 313 because of the introduction of littoral combat ships. Over time, however, it may fall to about 250, owing to cost overruns, the need to address domestic debt and the decommissioning of ageing warships in the 2020s. Meanwhile, the bipartisan quadrennial defence review last year recommended that the U.S. move toward a 346-ship navy to fulfil its global responsibilities.

There is a big difference between a 346-ship U.S.navy and a 250-ship navy - the difference between one kind of world order and another.

The very next statement Kaplan writes in this article is important. Kaplan says "Armies respond to unexpected contingencies, but it is navies and air forces that project power." This is similar to something I believe to be a constant of 21st century national security policy; which is that armies project force, but it is navies and air forces that project power.

In my opinion, this is where Malcolm Turnbull and Hugh White lack detail in their arguments for strategic balance in East Asia. Both suggest the best and most realistic strategic outcome for East Asia is one in which the major powers are in balance, but the term balance is used in generic terms and without context. Balance does not mean equal, and it is where things aren't equal that matter the most in the strategic balancing equation.

Does a world where China becomes the worlds largest economy strike me as a strategic concern? Honestly, by itself; nope. China is the most important trading partner to the United States today, and I see that achievement for China in alignment with US economic advancement in the 21st century, and economic advancement by the US has historically also driven social and technological advancement for the United States as well. With that said, the brilliant and creative Stan Lee was right - with great power comes great responsibility.

What concerns me much more is if China fails to mature within the liberal global order over the next few decades and simultaneously attempts to achieve primacy of the global oceans through naval power. If indeed the best and most realistic strategic outcome for East Asia is one in which the major powers are in balance, then it must also be stated that the strategic balance Turnbull believes is best cannot be achieved should China achieve primacy over US Naval power, and I would go further to suggest US naval primacy is today the single condition that allows strategic balance between the major powers if/when China achieves primacy in other areas of national power like economy.

As the global economic trade winds shift from the Middle East to Asia, other shifts are taking place as well. With the emergence of alternative energy, the proverbial F-16 standard - once the replacement for the Gold Standard that placed the US dollar at the center of the global energy currency market - is itself slowly being replaced by the proverbial AEGIS Standard that protects the global trade lines-of-communication towards insuring global currencies can exchange in the spirit of commerce in the 21st century market.

To use a simplistic and imperfect historical analogy as bloggers tend to do, I would suggest strategic balance in East Asia is achieved as long as the US emerges as Athens and China emerges as Sparta, and the global security environment and global economy is managed better than it was by the ancient and modern Greeks respectively. If that happens, the 21st century has an opportunity for a prosperous and promising future. However, if China strives to become Athens and US policy continues to be driven by the Spartans in the DoD; Australia, everyone else in the Pacific, and Washington, DC should not only be preparing for, but expecting war.

US Primacy in Asia: Not Inevitable

With a hat tip to the Lowy Institute Blog, these are some interesting comments by Malcolm Turnbull, the Australian Shadow Minister for Communications and Broadband, and a very high ranking leader within Australia's Liberal Party.

This is not the typical party line one often sees in the US or Australia, which from a political view, more frequently looks into the future of Asia in the context of US retaining superiority even when nodding to US relative decline. In this speech, Turnbull repeats a new tone on the subject, first noted by Sam Roggeveen last month, and again yesterday by calling for the pursuit of a future regional balance in Asia.

As Henry Kissinger recently reminded us, history is far from bunk in China “No other country can claim so long a continuous civilisation, or such an intimate link to its ancient past and classical principles of strategy and statesmanship.”

That is why when Deng Xiao Ping opened China up to the world in 1979 he invoked the example of the 15th century Admiral Zheng He who led great voyages across the Indian Ocean. In those days, an open and confident China was the world’s strongest nation. When later emperors closed China off to the world, Deng reminded the hardliners, China became weak and began a decline that ended with 150 years of humiliating invasion, colonisation and exploitation by stronger nations.

A humiliation that in the 20th century included the brutality of the Japanese occupation and rape of Nanjing, and in the 19th, the Opium Wars which were the equivalent of the Medellin Cartel sending a nuclear submarine up the Potomac and threatening, successfully, to destroy the Capitol and White House unless the US disbanded the Drug Enforcement Agency.

China drank deep and long from the well of bitterness and defeat. And so when Mao Ze Dong announced his triumph from atop Tien An Men in 1949 his first words were Zhong Guo ren min zanqilai le - the Chinese people have stood up.

So it is no surprise that as China becomes richer it seeks to strengthen its military capacity. Those who interpret this as necessarily meaning a stronger China is a more aggressive one should reflect on that history and recent events.

China lost in the 19th century vast tracts of land in what is now Siberian Russia - the Amurskaya region for example. These thefts were ratified in unequal treaties in 1858 and 1860. Recognising that depopulating yet resource rich Siberia may constitute an opportunity in the future, China could have decided to leave those treaties as illegitimate artifacts of its century of humiliation, to be redressed when times were propitious.

Instead it has chosen to renegotiate and settle the Sino-Russian borders with minor adjustments. Hardly evidence for imminent territorial expansion.

And as Kissinger has also pointed out, unlike the USSR or even the US, China does not seek to persuade other countries to adopt its values, let alone its system of Government.

The central role of trade in China’s prosperity also argues for its rise to remain peaceful. In 2010 China’s trade was 55 per cent of its GDP - the same as for Britain in the 1870s, the era of the Pax Britannica, and five times larger than trade in the US economy of the 1950s and 1960s when American economic dominance was greatest. Given the importance of a stable economy in the regime’s legitimacy, China’s rulers themselves have more to lose than almost anyone from conflict that disrupts global economic flows.

The best and most realistic strategic outcome for East Asia must be one in which the powers are in balance, with each side effectively able to deny the domination of the other - a scenario which Hugh White has written about extensively in the recent past.

With its energy and resource security depending on long global sea lanes, it is hardly surprising that China would seek to enhance its naval capacity. Suggestions that China’s recent launch of one aircraft carrier and plans to build another are signs of a new belligerence are wide of the mark.

In that regard, I disagree with the underlying premise of the 2009 Australian White Paper that we should base our defence planning and procurement on the contingency of a naval war with China in the South China Sea. Prejudice or wishful thinking is not a substitute for coolly rational analysis.

As I said in London, this is no time for another “long telegram” or talk of containment. It makes no sense for America, or Australia, to base long-term strategic policy on the proposition that we are on an inevitable collision course with a militarily aggressive China.

Yet remarkably, while all of us galahs in the political petshop are talking about the rise of Asia, many are apparently laboring under the misapprehension that while everything can change in the economic balance in our region, nothing will change in strategic terms.

In other words, even though China is about to become the world’s largest economy and is actually in the centre of East Asia, nonetheless the United States will remain the dominant power in the region, in the same way it has been since 1945 and even more so since the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

Au contraire.

Plus ça change, plus c’est la meme chose is not a sound basis on which to build Australia’s foreign policy.

Rather, our strategic response to the rise of China therefore should be to continue to deepen our engagement with that nation and with our other neighbours, as friends even if not as allies, and at the same time hedge against improbable but adverse future contingencies, as opposed to seeking to contain (futilely in all likelihood) a rising power.

Of course cool heads are required on all sides. China needs to be more transparent about its goals in the region and on the basis of that build confidence with its neighbours so that misunderstandings can be avoided.

In that light, the decision to host up to 2500 marines at an Australian army base in Darwin could hardly be regarded as a threat to China (just as Australian naval ships exercising with the PLA navy was presumably not regarded by the US as a threat). After all there are over 60,000 American service personnel including 17,000 marines in Japan and Korea - on China’s doorstep in comparison to Darwin.

China’s prickly reaction reflected not the foreshadowed deployment itself, but the context briefed out by the White House - that that this was part of a strategy to stand up to growing Chinese economic and strategic power, a spin reflected in most media commentary despite being contrary to common sense (not to speak of geographic reality).

It suits President Obama’s domestic agenda to be seen to muscle up to China, even if the additional muscling does not bear too much analysis. But an Australian Government needs to be careful not to allow a doe-eyed fascination with the leader of the free world to distract from the reality that our national interest requires us truly (and not just rhetorically) to maintain both an ally in Washington and a good friend in Beijing - which is, after all, our most important trading partner and a principal reason why our unemployment rate is half that of North America or Europe.

If extravagant professions of loyalty and devotion to the United States strike a somewhat awkward note for many Australian ears, how do we imagine they sound in the capitals of our neighbours? And the same may be said in respect of equally extravagant compliments paid to Beijing. Australian leaders should never forget that great powers regard deference as no more than their due.

I have less interest in Australian politics than I do US politics, at least on this topic, because for the most part it is infrequent to see political leaders make bold statements with purpose and wisdom. Some of the issues raised in this speech represent a rare exception.

From a strategic perspective, I note that - finally - we see a legitimate political leader (and as expected, outside the US) at least attempting to raise the topic of policy options should US primacy not be maintained in the Pacific.

Hugh White has been raising the topic for some time, and as he articulated very well in his recent Obama Doctrine article in the Wall Street Journal, President Obama has made clear it is the policy of the United States to resist China's challenge to US primacy in Asia, using all the instruments of its power to strengthen and perpetuate the preeminent leadership the US has exercised in the region for decades. In a news conference in Canberra, Australia, on Nov. 16, President Obama described it as a mistake to suggest the U.S. fears China or is seeking to isolate the world’s most populous nation. He said, “The main message that I’ve said not only publicly but also privately to the Chinese is that with their rise comes increased responsibilities.” He went on to say, “It’s important for them to play by the rules of the road.”

Which is accurate, except it is also accurate to note that US policy is intended to insure they are US sanctioned rules and a road the US maintains some control over.

From Hugh White's recent contribution in the New York Times.

Everything now depends on how China responds. Optimists hope that Beijing will back off in the face of American resolve. Pessimists fear they will push back, escalating strategic rivalry between the world’s two strongest states and threatening the future peace and stability of Asia. Even if the optimists are right in the short term, the longer-term trends favor the pessimists. Historians may well look back at this as the moment that U.S.-China rivalry became overt and unstoppable. The consequences could be disastrous for everyone, including America. China’s economic scale makes it the most formidable strategic adversary America has ever confronted.

Many believe that America has no choice because the only alternative to U.S. primacy is Chinese hegemony. But is that right? Does America need to dominate Asia in order to stop China dominating it? Or could America balance and limit China’s power, while still allowing a rising China more space? Might there be a way to prevent Chinese hegemony and still avoid outright rivalry? We should start asking these questions now, because we are running out of time to answer them.

The Diplomat recently described Hugh White as the Australian Canary. Maybe, but I'm more interested in who will be the US canary. The Republican candidates, one of which is likely to replace Barack Obama unless the President can learn economics in the next 12 months, are almost certain to adopt the Obama doctrine for Asia that centers on US primacy. All evidence suggests that US political leaders cannot take any political stand except one that focuses on US primacy in Asia now and forever. This is a fools gold, but no one ever said politics wasn't foolish.

So we are left to search for other leaders, whether civilian or military, who are ready to promote visions of Americas future foreign policy in Asia and around the world that is congruent with the very real possibility that China may indeed have the largest economy in the world by 2025 - just 15 years from now. If China becomes the worlds largest economy, would that disrupt American primacy in Asia? President Obama's policy record isn't very good, indeed he isn't running a reelection campaign based on his record in case you haven't noticed, so there is certainly no evidence this new Obama Doctrine for Asia will be successful. There is also little evidence that anyone is thinking about a Plan B.

As China builds up military resources and capabilities commensurable with their economic growth, how should the US respond? Whose strategic vision of the future includes US prosperity and security regardless of whether China is the largest economy in the world or not?

Where Was the Sea Base?

Military Times has a six-part series of articles up on what they call The Secret War in Africa. It is a provocatively named series, and technically accurate as what the series has done to date is reveal the unknown details of previously reported but never detailed military activities in Africa - mostly Somalia. The 6th article is expected next week.

This is the 5th article in the series, and it involves a topic worth discussing here.

The U.S. operators were in trouble. Deep trouble. Along with some Ethiopian troops, a “really small” number of U.S. personnel were hunting a high-value target near the town of Bargal in Somalia’s autonomous Puntland region when they came under heavy fire that not only prevented them from killing or capturing the target but also pinned them down, according to several sources.

Running out of options on June 1, 2007, the operators called the destroyer Chafee sailing off the coast. In response, Chafee fired more than a dozen rounds from its 5-inch gun, a senior Pentagon official told Stars and Stripes (without mentioning that the mission was a desperate bid to rescue U.S. troops in Somalia). That naval gunfire — a rarity in the modern age — enabled the United States and Ethiopian troops “to break contact” and get away, a senior intelligence official said.

When I read this, I remembered this incident was reported and that I had discussed back in June of 2007; in fact I distinctly remember Jeff Schogol describing the Navy using gunfire support as "Old School."

I remember that incident because I recall thinking about how the US Navy had the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) somewhere near that region and yet was using a destroyer to support forces ashore. Now maybe in that case it was smart to use a destroyer for a little naval fire support, because as the article notes - it solved the problem.

But hindsight being what it is, I do have serious questions if the US Navy leverages the flexibility of the amphibious ships well in modern irregular warfare situations like offshore of Somalia. Does anyone honestly think it is a good idea to put a $2 billion ship like USS Chafee (DDG 90) in green water for fire support? Our destroyer force is being primarily resourced to fight sophisticated air targets, not shoot guns to shore in littorals which are always the most risky.

What a false choice current US force structure forces on warfighters for gunfire support - either send in $3 billion DDG-1000s with advanced gun systems or send in the less expensive, terribly armed 57mm hauling LCS. Honestly, where are Reapers on LHDs, because right now the only other option is to task the RW community for their capabilities.

I encourage folks to read the whole Military Times article and give it some serious thought. When I read that article, I ask myself why the US Navy and US Marine Corps spends so much money building and maintaining amphibious ships to deploy structured air-sea-land battalions if the MEUs are unable to accomplish the sustained irregular warfare missions by sea as described in that article. That situation in 2007-2009 off Somalia appears to have been crying for a Sea Base, and yet none existed. Why?

It seems to me that scenario is both the past and the future of irregular warfare in any ungoverned or weakly governed littoral nation, and if expeditionary forces (amphibious readiness groups) aren't properly configured to be relevant for the missions found in that situation - maybe Marines are no longer relevant because Marines are not organized towards the most probable mission sets.

Then again, perhaps they are organized but are poorly utilized, because using Marines for the work as described in that article would appear to require as many changes to policy as much as it does changes to doctrine.

Lots of angles for conversation here I think.

An Influence Squadron!

Exciting:

Russia is sending a flotilla of warships to its naval base in Syria in a show of force which suggests Moscow is willing to defend its interests in the strife-torn country as international pressure mounts on President Bashar al-Assad's government.

Arab League sanctions and French calls for the establishment of humanitarian zones in Syria have increased international pressure on Assad to end bloodshed that the United Nations says has killed 3,500 people during nine months of protests against his rule.

Russia, which has a naval maintenance base in Syria and whose weapons trade with Damascus is worth millions of dollars annually, joined China last month to veto a Western-backed U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Assad's government.

Izvestia newspaper reported on Monday, citing retired Russian Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, that Russia plans to send its flagship aircraft carrier the "Admiral Kuznetsov" along with a patrol ship, an anti-submarine craft and other vessels.

"Having any military force apart from NATO is very beneficial for the region as it prevents the outbreak of armed conflict," Kravchenko, who was navy chief of staff from 1998-2005, was quoted as saying by Izvestia.

An indication that Russia continues to support the regime, and also that any multilateral effort to conduct a no fly zone regime change would have to go through a venue other than the United Nations Security Council. Still, it's a risky move, because if Assad falls, the new regime will likely remember the visit of the Kuznetsov for just as long as the Indians remembered the deployment of the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in 1971. You have to wonder about the decision-making procedures in the Kremlin; how much information do the Russians have about the foundations of the regime, and how much of this is generated by anti-NATO animus as opposed to an effort to engage in regional influence?

Winding Down the Year

I'm going to slow down my posting as we approach the holiday season. The reason is actually two fold. First, my wife is due to have our third child at the end of December, and I still have many things to get done before then. Second, Christmas is approaching and I am absolutely committed to finish reading all the books I have purchased and not yet read this year so I can restock via a delivery from Santa.

With the budget basically being a 90 day hanging curve-ball, I figure now is as good a time as any to step back awhile.

But I also believe now is a good time because the Navy is also winding down for the year. The USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) is on her way home while the USS George Washington (CVN 73) has wrapped up her patrol, and not likely to sustain another patrol until closer to the new year.

The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) will soon deploy, but otherwise there are few US Navy deployments I have my eye on, although there is one in particular I think everyone should be following closely.

On Sunday, January 8th the USS Bataan (LHD 5) deployment will be 291 days (41 weeks and 4 days) old. On that day the USS Bataan (LHD 5) will pass the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) as the longest big deck deployment since the Vietnam War (290 days in 2003).

Friday, January 20th the USS Bataan (LHD 5) deployment will be 303 days (43 weeks and 2 days) old. On that day the USS Bataan (MHD 5) will pass the USS Okinawa (LPH 3) as the longest amphibious ship deployment ever (302 days in 1990).

The Navy public affairs folks have informed me the USS Bataan (LHD 5) will come close but not break the record for longest deployment since WWII set by USS Midway (CV 41) at 327 days in 1973. My experience with Murphy's Law is that you never say never.

If for any reason the USS Bataan (LHD 5) finds itself in contingency mode and unable to return on schedule, the day the ship would potentially break the USS Midway (CV 41) record of 327 days in 1973 would be February 15th, 2012 - the day after Valentine's day 2012.

It is noteworthy, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) came as part of the support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while USS Okinawa (LPH 3) happened as a result of the response to the first Gulf War. The USS Bataan (LPD 5) deployment went early in response to Libya, which we downplayed politically as only a minor military operation, and is staying late because of a legitimate lack of amphibious ships to cover rotation requirements for ARGs. If you recall, the extended deployment of Bataan ARG was announced early by the Navy who because of Libya, was forced to keep the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) ARG late from August 27, 2024 through May 16, 2024 - a nearly 9 month deployment.

This is the Tipping Point. The Naval services - all three of them - are doing more with less for longer periods of time, and do not have the support necessary on Capitol Hill to sustain the requirements being driven by Presidential policy. Something has to change - either on the policy side or the resource side, but either way something has to change.

Something to think about.

Pivots

I had a few thoughts on the "East Asia Pivot" at WPR last week:

Indeed, the announcement of the base at Darwin has a military as well as a strategic logic. China’s increasing capabilities, particularly in the field of ballistic missiles and potentially in the field of stealth strike aircraft, have placed current U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea in the radius of attack. And so while the shift of resources to Australia could be seen in this context as a retreat, it also represents a more realistic distribution of capabilities, given current Chinese military strengths. Potentially, China could misread this step as a U.S. decision to give the PRC’s ambitions a bit of space. However, it appears that the Chinese have thus far read the move as aggressive rather than accommodating.

See also this interview with Paul Keating (via Sam Roggeveen), and this White House background briefing on the Australia and ASEAN trip.

I hope that everyone had a wonderful Thanksgiving holiday. On a less happy note, I think that everyone at the blog joins in offering heartfelt condolences to James Joyner upon the unexpected passing of his wife, Kimberley.

CBO Looks At Amphib Numbers

The incomparable Eric Labs from the Congressional Budget Office has produced a report on the Navy's Amphibious fleet.  Like all of Dr. Labs' work, it is fact-laden and unemotional.  The Navy will never field enough amphibs in its 30 year plan to support the Marine Corps war fighting requirement, nor will it field enough to keep up with COCOM presence demand which has increased 80% since 2007.  Both of these requirements are subject to further scrutiny, but it is hard to reach any conclusion other than we need to build more of these highly desired and incredibly flexible ships.

Bryan McGrath

PERSTEMPO - The Hollow Force's Canary in the Coal Mine‏

Along with other reporting and data, recent Personnel Tempo, or PERSTEMPO trends illuminate cracks in the Navy’s readiness. As previously noted in this blog, Bataan, Mesa Verde and Whidbey Island are on their way to setting records with 10.5 month deployments. For those not familiar with Navy deployment patterns who might try to view these data in the context of recent 12-15 month Army deployments, I’ll try to add a bit of context on why anecdotal evidence and other statistics are a harbinger for future problems.

Partly as a result of the post-Vietnam “hollow force” of the late 1970s, the Navy began tracking PERSTEMPO in 1985 and has kept detailed data on these trends ever since. Past Center for Naval Analysis PERSTEMPO studies demonstrated that six month deployment lengths and 2:1 turn around ratios (or dwell, as its now called in joint parlance) are optimal for balancing forward deployed presence, allowing ships enough time to receive depot-level maintenance, and sustaining retention and morale for Sailors who are generally assigned to 3-5 year periods of sea duty. Prior to 2007, deployments longer than six months required CNO approval. As with other standards in DOD, when they can’t be met regularly, they are often redefined. The attached graphic shows these trends up to 2004. One thing not illustrated in this slide is how ship numbers have declined in relation to PERSTEMPO increases. In 1991, during Desert Storm, the shipcount was 529 ships. In 2004 at the end of the graphic, it was 292. Today, it's only 284.

I haven’t seen recent data on PERSTEMPO “busts” or CNO waivers, but we know that the new PERSTEMPO instruction extended the deployment length limit to seven months and shrunk dwell to 1.0:1 between deployments. And more than a few ships seem to be tripping those limits. Another interesting data point is the number of ships deployed at any given time. After running approximately 30% of the force deployed on any given day for decades, today 36% of the force is deployed away from home station, a figure previously seen only during wartime surge periods such as Desert Storm, immediately prior to Iraqi Freedom, etc. A detailed analysis of recent PERSTEMPO trends might make for an interesting NPS Thesis…

In the late 1990s, the realization occurred to the Navy that PERSTEMPO data demonstrates how frequently platforms and units are deployed, but doesn’t account for the amount of time individual Sailors are away from home. In response to Congressional concerns, an attempt to capture this data, and possibly even compensate Sailors for excessive time away, resulted in the creation of a system called “ITEMPO.” However after 9/11, this system was simply ignored as unworkable, because the limits set were frequently broken with war time requirements such as individual augmentee deployments. Therefore, it’s difficult to measure the actual strain of time away from home on each Sailor over the course of a career.

It should be noted that unlike the Army, the Navy (and Marine Corps) was heavily deployed prior to 2001 - albeit with more ships and aircraft - and will continue extended deployments for operational forces following the Afghan withdrawals scheduled for 2014. This pattern is the nature of what makes naval forces responsive and ready - continuous forward presence.

However now, the Combatant Commanders’ global demands for deployed naval forces are higher than current the ship count can sustain. Sooner or later, something will give, resulting in either a (more) precipitous decline in readiness due to maintenance problems, retention, or a combination of both. History demonstrates that what likely won’t give are these presence requirements, or the Navy’s obligation and inclination to fill them. So we seem to be left with two choices: a pending readiness disaster; or to simply build more ships. A force of less than 300 ships does not bode well for maintaining the US Navy’s status the world’s premier sea power. The exact force composition, high-low mix, etc. has been and should continue to be debated, but the fact that we can’t sustain maritime primacy without more ships and submarines should be clear to all by now.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Sequestration Orchestration

For months, people have been saying (including people like me), that the "gun" held to the head of the Congress by the threat of sequestration was overdone, that as a creation of legislation, it can be legislatively "holstered".  That none of the funds to be sequestered were earmarked for sooner than 2013 seemed to add to this perception.

While it is true that the Congress can holster this gun, they must be conscious of how and when it must be done, or much of the damage of sequestration will occur whether they wish it or not. 

Unless Congress acts to avert sequestration by the middle of next year, each service will have to start canceling contracts and laying people off to meet the budget targets by Dec 31. The system simply isn't nimble enough to flip a switch to stop spending money in every account. Since sequestration will impact every PE (program element) line item, programs will begin to be broken six months out.  

Another big problem with this timetable?  A little thing called a Presidential Election...

Message to Congress, DoD and the Administration?  Time is running out...fast...

Bryan McGrath

New Chinese ASW aircraft

The long rumoured ASW aircraft has finally been revealed. In recent photos from an airport (my guess in Shaanxi AC), we see Y-8 ASW aircraft (dubbed HIgh New 6) amongst them. Here are some of its photos. You can see from here that it has a large surface search radar under its chin, a FLIR sensor, internal bomb bays on both side of of the middle section of fuselage, a series of antennas underneath the fuselage and MAD boom at the back. You can also see a large window on each side of the rear fuselage for observation purpose. The aircraft itself is using the Y-8 Category 3 platform as can be seen by the 6 blade propellers.





Before anyone gets overly anxious or excited about this ASW aircraft, one should remember that there are over 100 P-3Cs in service with JMSDF and over 150 P-3Cs with USN. Since this is only a second generation ASW aircraft, it's probably a generation behind P-8 Poseidon in terms of the platform and sensors. At the moment, there appears to only be 2 of this aircraft. When one considers all of the different types of Y-8 special mission aircraft and the production capabilities of Shaanxi AC (around 10 such platform a year), it's really hard to see this number will go much higher in the next years.

In the same set of photos, we also see the tails of other Y-8 aircraft. Two of the tails are for Y-8 ASW aircraft, two are for KJ-200 and the remaining two are for unidentified platform.

We also get a picture of these aircraft from outside. It seems to indicate the existence of 3 KJ-200 here.


We see a KJ-200 painted in PLANAF colours with number 9421. We've previously seen a KJ-200 with number 9371. This should be joining the same PLAN regiment. The other two maybe joining the same regiment too or maybe for a new unit.



I have a previous article on the Y-8 special missions series of aircraft here.

Russia's Nuclear Battlecruiser Ambitions

This National Defense Magazine article discussing Russian nuclear powered warship ambitions for the future is interesting.

The Russian navy recently announced plans to build either a nuclear powered destroyer or cruiser — depending on translation — by 2016.

The pronouncement, made at the 5th Maritime Defense Show in St. Petersburg, caused an uncomfortable surprise in many naval circles.

A move to build a nuclear surface ship would give Russia a capability that is not currently possessed by most navies around the world. These potential nuclear powered surface ships would be faster, not as dependent on supply ships for refueling, and have the ability to traverse greater distances. In terms of future technology capacity, it could also provide greater energy resources to charge directed energy weapons.

The Russian navy’s ambition is worth examining because it suggests that the Russians have a different view of the cost versus benefits of fulfilling their evolving mission needs. These developments, further, should be analyzed in the context of planning and designing future U.S. combatant warships.

I believe we are past that point considering recent laws that have been passed related to nuclear power for surface vessels, laws that require nuclear power for ship types over a certain tonnage absent a waiver. One would imagine that the waiver for nuclear power for future Navy vessels includes a cost-benefit analysis.

Either way, nuclear power is already part of the future US Navy, indeed the new laws are one of many reasons the US Navy is calling the AMDR warship a DDG-51 Flight III instead of DDG(X). By using an old warship program to move forward, the Navy is avoiding Congressional requirements of new ship classes; requirements like nuclear power but also to leverage previous success of the DDG-51 program to avoid any potential Nunn-McCurdy issues. Maybe that isn't the intent by the Navy, but with a complete redesign for the AMDR ship, it sure looks like it.

Still, the NDM article goes on to make several interesting points about nuclear power in the Russian fleet. Worth reading in full.

Meanwhile, the Russian Navy is reportedly showing the flag off Syria. While it represents a show of support for Assad, via naval diplomacy, it is noteworthy in the regional media Russia is getting a lot of political mileage out of an old Kashin frigate .

Naval diplomacy - in the words of my teenage daughter, it's so underrated. Except, when naval diplomacy comes in the form of those large nuclear surface combatants, it isn't really overrated at all.

On Syria and Turkey

The Arab League is starting to look west as they struggle to influence Assad in Syria, which means the world appears to be moving in the direction of escalation. I do not see military intervention in Syria in the short term, but do not dismiss it as a long term possibility.

One aspect of the Arab uprisings of 2011 that has caught my attention is the genuine interest by nations in the Arab world to attempt to take some responsibility for political problems within that region by leveraging the frameworks of established international institutions like the Arab League, United Nations, and in the case of Libya - NATO. I don't want to overstate that as an important event, even if it is important; because it is a relatively new development for a region that last century largely conducted foreign policy with leaders standing at a podium shouting threats and waving a gun.

Even a nuanced political change is change.

While I'll agree we are observing very weak data points, collective political action by regional partners through established institutions like the Arab League (and even African Union in Somalia to some extent) does suggest that international institutions are showing signs of gaining some strength in addressing some types of international political problems, even if the process is still incredibly ugly to watch and the success of action through those institutions is still yet to be determined.

The latest news regarding the Syrian uprising is that the Arab League is reaching out the UK and France for some guidance and leadership on ways to move forward effectively. What caught my attention was a Reuters report that some folks associated with Syrian politics believe that a Turkish military intervention would be received well in Syria. Part of me thinks this comes from the Middle Eastern School of Dick Chaney Diplomacy or perhaps even a Middle Eastern version of Sun Tzu that looks to others to do the dirty work, but I don't have the expertise and understanding regarding the internal politics of Syria to know if this is legitimate or not. Either way, it is worth consideration... here is the Reuters report:

A leader of Syria's outlawed Muslim Brotherhood said on Thursday the Syrian people would accept military intervention by Turkey, rather than Western countries, to protect them from President Bashar al-Assad's security forces.

Mohammad Riad Shaqfa, who lives in exile in Saudi Arabia, told a news conference in Istanbul the international community should isolate Assad's government to encourage people in their struggle to end more than four decades of Assad family rule.

Hundreds of people have been killed this month, one of the bloodiest periods in the revolt that began in March. The United Nations says more than 3,500 people have died in the unrest.

If Assad's government refused to halt its repression, Shaqfa said Turkish intervention would be acceptable.

I understand a lot of folks get immediately skeptical when they read "Muslim Brotherhood," but it is a fact of life that the Muslim Brotherhood is a political entity in the Middle East and North Africa that will have to be dealt with by the US directly on a diplomatic and political level for years to come - and all indications are that will be especially true for Egypt. While there are obviously differences, the Muslim Brotherhood of 2011 reminds me of the Ba'ath Party rise in the 60s. I have a feeling the US will take a similar political approach with the Muslim Brotherhood as we did with the Ba'ath Party - we don't like them, we don't trust them, and we'll find a way to work with them anyway.

Commentators and opinionators in the US seem to believe the US has full control over whether military action takes place against Syria. This New York Times Op-Ed, for example, contemplates military action against Syria and encourages the US to avoid military intervention. It is an interesting Op-Ed, but it reads like a political narrative from the first decade of the 21st century, not a narrative compatible with the adjustments guiding use of military power in the second decade of the 21st century. When discussing Syria and military intervention, there is only one key player who will decide when military intervention is necessary in Syria, and it isn't the United States, UK, or France - military action related to Syria begins and ends in Ankara.

For all the talk that trouble might break out between Turkey and Israel or Turkey and Greece or Turkey and Cyprus; for example, how flotilla's from Turkey might create an international political incident with Israel or how energy competition between Turkey and Cyprus could spark a conflict; all that heat has led to exactly zero smoke. Today, Turkey remains a strong ally of the US and one of our most important partners in the region. The news the US intends to set up BMD capabilities in Turkey suggests the political relationship between the US and Turkey is still being looked at in the context of long term commitments, not in the context of short term adjustments.

Because the relationship between the US and Turkey is and will remain strong long term, one question we should be asking is what happens when Turkey reaches a red line with Syria and Assad? It is still very possible that Turkey will approach NATO and say - this emerging Syrian civil war issue is a legitimate threat and we want NATO to help us intervene. Events in Syria could easily unfold in ways very similar to how events unfolded in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if you recall, Bosnia and Herzegovina evolved from a UN political intervention into a NATO military intervention. With the Arab League and Turkey, it isn't impossible to see a similar scenario unfold regarding Syria.

As both France and the UK get more involved behind the scenes in helping the Syrian opposition movement, and as Turkey becomes more frustrated with the current Syrian government, a lot is yet to happen. While first steps in Syria do not appear to be military in nature, the militarization of policy can unfold over time, and events can unfold in predictable and unpredictable ways that can expedite the militarization of policy. One possible scenario that could emerge from the political fog is a limited Turkish led NATO military mission to deal with Syria, and that potential scenario alone suggests the US cannot rule out supporting military activities related to unfolding events in Syria. Calling for US military restraint is wise, but recognizing the potential for legitimate US support for military intervention in Syria is also wise.

I do not necessarily see Syria unfolding towards military intervention, but I also do not believe we have seen the last domino fall as it relates to the political uprisings that began earlier this year in the Middle East and North Africa. I also do not believe we have seen the last military intervention as a result of the ongoing unrest in the region.

The uprisings in Syria are starting to get more attention politically, and that uprising isn't going away anytime soon. Sanctions and other international pressures will only increase the stakes for the Assad government, which suggests to me the situation is approaching a policy change moment for the United States who in the words of some will assert power through the "lead" from behind model. Whether it's lead from behind or lead as part of a front, US leadership on the issue appears to be inevitable - but the US will "lead" only after Turkey asks us to.

AMDR Will Bring Very High Fleet Costs

Sam Lagrone has a Janes Exclusive up behind the firewall. There is a lot to think about and discuss here, too much to cover in one post although I encourage folks to open fire in the comments.

The first of the US Navy's (USN's) future Arleigh Burke-class Flight III ballistic missile defence (BMD) destroyers could cost between USD3 billion and USD4 billion to build, Jane's has learnt.

The projected figures, which appeared in early USN estimates for a replacement for the cancelled next-generation guided missile cruiser (CG(X)), were confirmed by several industry and military sources. Shipbuilders Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII, formerly Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding) and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW) were asked to provide the cost data for the Flight III - which will perform the BMD role in lieu of CG(X) - as part of the navy's 2009 Hull and Radar Study.

One source familiar with the estimates said a BIW-built Flight III destroyer would cost about $2.7 billion in total while an HII ship would cost about $3.7 billion, both under fixed-price construction contracts.

As has been previously discussed, the DDG-51 Flight IIIs are expected to field the radar selected as a result of the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) study from 2009, and with that requirement alone the Navy is required to make several changes to the DDG-51 design. The end result means that DDG-51 Flight III is not really a DDG-51, but an evolved new class of warship based on the best and lessons from the DDG-51 and DDG-1000.

With a planned aperture of 14 ft, the AMDR will be less sensitive than the 22 ft variant that was planned for CG(X) but more sensitive than the SPY-1D air-search/fire-control radar that equips Flight IIA ships. The power-hungry AMDR will require a costly new electrical system encompassing a more robust electrical grid, and must be able to integrate follow-on systems, adding risk and uncertainty to the Flight III design.

In particular, ship designers will probably have to upgrade the 440 V grid in the current Arleigh Burkes to a 4,160 V grid to accommodate the 10 MW needed to drive the AMDR. Increasing the voltage in a Flight III grid would allow more power to flow safely and reliably to the ship's systems, but it would incur additional engineering and design expenditures.

Ballistic Missile Defense is now the primary combat specialty driving the future ship design in major surface combatants. The major surface combatant of the future is being designed, by intent, to fight not only under the ocean, on the ocean, against targets on land, and over the ocean - but is also now expected to offer naval forces superiority against weapons that maneuver in low orbit space.

The DDG-51 Flight III design will leverage a hull form similar to the DDG-51 but will apparently require a complete redesign internally in order to leverage DDG-1000 technologies like electric power systems in order to support the expanding mission areas. Preliminary design of the new warship is currently planned through 2012 with a contract design phase towards specific detail planned for 2013-2014.

It is important to note, that while this warship is being called DDG-51 Flight III, that is a Flag level communications snafu waiting to happen. This ship clas should be a new program. The Navy is basically going to try to design, build, and field a new high end destroyer in about a decades time, which for naval construction is remarkably fast. As an evolutionary design - thanks largely to R&D from DDG-1000 and the DDG-51 Flight IIA restart - the Navy is actually saving a lot of money in developing this new warship, but with cost estimates of between $2.7 - $3.7 billion for the first ship, the Navy finds itself right back where it started with DDG-1000.

This is why, and I discussed this many times on the blog at the time, the Navy never made a cost argument in Congressional testimony regarding the DDG-1000. The Navy said a lot of things, but neither the CNO nor admirals in testimony ever publicly used the high cost of DDG-1000 or the lack-of-AEGIS issue as justification for truncating the DDG-1000 program. Right about now, that whole on-cost, on-schedule DDG-1000 program after ship #3 is looking like a real bargain, but again, DDG-1000 is designed to be a warship with superior land attack and gun warfare capabilities, while this new warship is intended to give the Navy the ability to be superior against low-orbit threats like ballistic missiles.

The enormous cost of this new surface combatant in the context of an emerging age of global naval power growth and more capable anti-access, area denial capabilities raises legitimate questions regarding the future force structure of the US Navy. As the high end surface combatant suffers from legitimate mission creep, now requiring capabilities towards military superiority against ballistic missiles, combined with all the other tasks found in the development of multi-mission capable warships, is the Navy properly accounting from a holistic perspective the impacts of more and mroe investment in sustaining mutli-mission capable ships that can perform at the highest end of every mission area? How long can the Navy sustain generational growth at the high end of surface warfare at a cost of an extra ~$1 billion added cost per ship before the fleet is too small to meet the primary mission of the Navy vs the threats given primary mission focus for the Navy?

When the Navy increases the capability requirement at the high end of any mission capability of the surface force, an action that will almost certainly require a reduction in the size of the surface force to compensate for the new requirement cost trade-off, how does that impact the lesser assets of the surface force? The Navy has argued, and until now I have agreed, the Navy does not need a frigate because the Navy has a high quantity of major surface combatants capable of meeting the entire range of combat requirements a frigate would perform. However, in the context of the cost of the AMDR surface combatant, quantity at the high end is very much in doubt, and the argument the Navy does in fact need a higher quantity of surface combatants at the low end to compensate for the reduced quantity of high end vessels is a very compelling argument in favor of a frigate. I know one thing, I do not see how the Navy can justify construction of the current LCS designs after the existing contracts through FY15 are fully executed, because as the high end shrinks due to cost constraints, the low end of the force must be adjusted in capability to compensate.

With that said, the requirement to field unmanned systems in quantity doesn't simply go away, and the contributing combat role the LCS represents for the 21st century fleet is just as necessary but very different from a frigate. Throughout the history of the Navy, major influences to force structure - like adding BMD to the fleet or observing cost increases in aircraft carriers or submarines - required a holistic view of the fleet and adjustments across the total of force structure. This is why, for example, since WWII ships are introduced as part of a family. The ASW destroyer (Sprunance) and convoy escort frigate (Perry) were part of a family, a family that included the Sea Control Ship until that was canceled. The DDG-1000 and LCS were part of a family of ships that included the canceled CG(X). The current cruiser and destroyer warships of the US Navy are part of the AEGIS family of warships. I do not see how the Navy can change the high end of surface warfare to be centric to fighting low-orbit threats like ballistic missile defense at such a high cost and not compensate this major force structure without introducing a family of ships that addresses the cost relationship this major combatant will have on the total force.

Today the Navy is facing significant costs, and is adding significant risk to the total force, by following a pattern of force structure evolution that may have reached the end of it's ability to meet mission requirements for the United States. Evolving the Nimitz CVN -> Ford CVN, evolving the DDG-51 Flight IIA -> DDG-51 Flight III, evolving the Los Angeles class SSN -> Virginia class SSN, and evolving the Ohio SSBN -> to SSBN(X) has resulted in the Navy building bigger, more capable, but a much smaller and more expensive force where combat capabilities are being condensed into a very powerful, but numerically challenged fleet relative to the scope and scale of demand and requirements. Has the multi-mission fleet evolution model for naval force structure reached a point of risk where, by putting all eggs into fewer baskets, the Navy now potentially assumes risks too great to compensate for should the Navy suffer from attrition in warfare?

What is the red line, and who has the guts in OPNAV to admit it gets crossed when the institution isn't really designed to admit potential weaknesses in major program efforts. It's like the big deck nuclear aircraft carrier question, how will anyone really know when it becomes obsolete in an age of increasingly sophisticated long range and lethal military capabilities being proliferated globally? It's why I warn young naval officers, be very careful not to be too critical of the battleship admirals prior to Pearl Harbor in 1941, because that same scenario could easily be repeated with the carrier admirals of 2011.

If the Navy was to build a larger quantity of smaller, single purpose ships - when comparing the cost of just four DDG-51 Flight IIIs at a cost of $12 billion in shipbuilding, what are the trade offs from a cost/benefit risk assessment perspective when evaluated against alternative force structures? Would 6 smaller frigates at $1 billion each, 1 LPD-17 sized unmanned systems mothership at $2.5 billion, and 1 $3.5 billion major surface combatant be a better mix of combat capabilities at the same cost as 4 DDG-51 Flight IIIs? What ever happened to the large, simple single mission destroyer? You know, the Brits might be a lot smarter than we think for building so much empty space into the Type-45s to keep costs down. I do wonder, was the proposed expensive CGN(X) large ballistic missile defense cruisers that would serve as major networked radar vessels really a bad idea, or was it simply a bad idea in the context of a surface navy that appears completely unwilling to address the changes such a vessel would have to the rest of the force structure?

One thing is certain, this DDG-51 Flight III is so expensive that it appears irresponsible for the Navy to introduce it as simply a replacement program for major surface combatants. This warship should be part of a family of ships that are designed to compensate for the stresses a smaller high end surface force will inevitably place on the rest of the fleet.

Flattening the Chain of Command

Following the recent public news articles of the toilet troubles on CVN77, I think it is time to ask some questions that - at least today - may not have answers. Has Navy senior leadership created a cultural environment within the ranks that allows - even encourages - a sailor to go outside the chain of command and publicly air grievances on the internet? Do sailors now have the expectation that every electronic complaint should merit four-star attention? In doing so, is the system trending towards undermining the authority and responsibility of the Commanding Officer?

When a four-star admiral reads and personally participates in discussions about the Navy on blogs and message boards, it is and should be hailed as great dialogue and engagement. But what about when an admiral personally replies to electronic whines and rants posted by officers and sailors on blogs and message boards and publicly orders one star admirals to dig into these complaints? I understand not all of these situations are equal, but it is worth asking whether these type of actions by admirals is changing the culture of communication and undermining the authority of commanding officers. When senior leadership enters crisis mode every time negative press hits the wires, it can serve to encourage others to use this known, predictable response for their own benefit.

Instead of dropping a note in the CO’s suggestion box, making a suggestion on a survey, or even speaking with the chain of command, sailors are now finding it more effective and expeditious to rant and air grievances publicly on the internet. It is the responsibility of the leadership of the command to ensure that there is encouragement and positive reinforcement for making challenges known to the command. Yet, today, even if a command enjoys a command climate that encourages healthy internal dialogue, some now see the internet as the place to conduct that dialogue anyway.

When the admiral shows interest with an online post, that interest might be as simple and innocuous as a single question in an email to a chief of staff. But then that email takes on a life of its own as it travels downstream. Time pressure to respond to the admiral’s question falls squarely upon the shoulders of the commanding officer. As it should. The flag-level attention takes over the plan of the day and draws the command’s attention. What might be one of many competing command priorities suddenly might garner as much priority as a shipboard mishap. By allowing and encouraging the dialogue to go beyond the chain of command directly to senior flag officers, are we observing a mechanism forming for the statistical outlier to represent the population?

Is this just a part of life in the electronic age? Is the Navy simply “flattening the chain of command?” Are we simply observing the dynamics that comes with competing the hierarchical structure of the chain of command against the flattening of communications that has resulted from tools that allow greater accessibility? Is the Navy effectively balancing the flattening of and hierarchy of the chain of command?

If the Navy is willing to flatten the input side of public communications, the Navy should also be willing to flatten the feedback response. The proper response to a public complaint about a specific command should come from the commanding officer of that command, and no one else. In my opinion, the actions taken by Captain Luther regarding the toilet troubles on CVN77 is the model for dealing with these types of public complaints.

When sailors take grievances about a specific command publicly with intent of bypassing the chain of command, while it does represent a challenge to be addressed by the specific command, it also represents a challenge for those up the chain of command - all the way to the 4-stars. In my opinion, it is a legitimate challenge for admirals to know when and when not to engage public grievances about a specific command. I also tend to believe there is a broader issue for the Navy at large, for example, does it become paradoxical for someone in the Navy to publicly bash AM1 and and his mommy for blogging about toilet problems on CVN77 when USFF encourages and enables the same behavior publicly? I believe these are thin lines, and the questions are worth the discussion towards answers.

And to blunt the criticism ahead of time, as a civilian unassociated with the Navy - the paradox doesn't apply to me.

Finally, life in the Navy is not easy. The first response to challenges should always be to work together as a crew to find solutions, not find ways to blame the command.

Slow Learning

I observe with some degree of pride that Captain Andrew Betson (Army), a student of mine at the Patterson School, has an article in the latest Armed Forces Journal. The article began life as a seminar paper in last spring's Counter-Insurgency course. It's excellent work; check it out.

Normally in a given year I teach a fall course on National Security Policy, and a spring course on Defense Statecraft. Each year I also have the opportunity to teach an additional seminar of interest. Last year it was Counter-Insurgency, this year Airpower, and next year Seapower. Fun to teach what you love...

The Makin Island Deployment - Another Reminder the US Needs More Amphibs

The Makin Island ARG consisting the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8), the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18), and amphibious dock landing ship USS Pear Harbor (LSD 52) departed San Diego with Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 5 and the 11th MEU on Tuesday. The deployment has generate a bit of news in the media with articles at DoDBuzz, Marine Times, the San Diego Union Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times. Of the various articles, the Los Angeles Times has this right - pirates should be concerned.

While ARG deployments in the Pacific are old hat for the Navy and Marine Corps, it is becoming increasingly rare to see an ARG deployed from either coast to spend any significant amount of time anywhere other than operating under CENTCOM command in the 5th fleet. I have heard many suggestions that the Makin Island ARG has been working overtime during deployment preparations training for activities specific to activities one might find around Somalia and Yemen - like piracy. If I was a pirate warlord, my advice is to take the best deal you can for ransom as soon as possible, and start looking for a new job with less associated risk.

All I'm saying is that I have noticed the US is giving the Horn of Africa a lot of attention lately, and if we are ever going to see a shift in US policy towards piracy, that policy change will arrive in the form of an ARG that added extra training specific to the piracy issue - and a new ARG just deployed to that region following rumors of intense anti-piracy training.

But while we are talking about Amphibious Ready Groups and CENTCOM, I want to point out that Makin Island hasn't done anything yet, and the real amphibious ready group story is the unfolding record breaking deployment of the Bataan ARG. If you recall, as a response to unfolding events in Libya, the Bataan ARG deployed a few weeks early on March 23, 2024 - 207 days ago (nearly 8 months ago). Lets just say she isn't coming home for Christmas, and if she isn't home by Valentines Day (a legitimate possibility) - the ships will break all records for deployment length since World War II.

Tipping Point much?

Seriously, keeping up with folks on LHD5 has been one of my most enjoyable blog related activities in 2011, and while that deployment has been very challenging for the families, I will pass on that the morale on The 5 is still very high. There are some special folks on those ships, and it's a good thing too because a deployment that will exceed 10 months like that Bataan ARG requires nothing less to be successful.

For the record, Bataan ARG represents a visible data point regarding the need for more amphibious ships. When amphibious ship deployments start breaking modern deployment length records - which WILL happen with Bataan - that means the Navy has not built enough amphibious ships. Politicians in Washington have held many hearings on the topic of dwell time for the Army, but right about now I'm thinking the Navy and Marine Corps folks who have been on ship for over a year in training and deployment are probably wondering who the hell their dwell time advocate is in Washington DC. At what point will Congress get the message that without more amphibious ships - which consistently has by percentage the highest number of days at sea annually of any surface vessel type - the nations leaders are asking way too much of the smaller, always desired but usually-overlooked-by-big-Navy amphibious force. 10 months is a long time for a battalion of Marines at sea, but because they are Marines - no one will ever hear a single complaint about it.

That doesn't mean it isn't a real problem.

The maintenance bill at the end of these very long ARG deployments isn't going to be small. Remember, Kearsarge ARG was at sea for 8+ months and now Bataan ARG will be at sea for 10+ months. I think these are important issues to keep in mind as Makin Island ARG heads to sea.

Observing the Sh!t Talking About George H. W. Bush

On Monday the Navy Times ran a story about the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) having some problems with their toilets. It is one of those news stories where the jokes write themselves, if you are the general public and only see the issue from an outsider (non-Navy) perspective. What is less known is that there is a back story that has led to the media attention. Apparently the mom of an AM1 (supposedly w/ 16 years experience in the Navy) set up a blog dedicated to this specific problem.

Obviously a discussion about shit, literally, is not the kind of news the Navy wants to see discussed publicly in the press following the amazing public relations achieved with the Carrier Classic on the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), but the blogger has reached out and driven as much media attention as possible to this issue. Headlines in response to the issue include:

Toilet Trouble on Navy Carrier Leaves 5000 Sailors Doing the Pee Pee Dance from Gizmodo, Broken toilets keep sailors squirming from the Atlanta Journal Constitution, $6B Navy Carrier Has Lousy Toilets by Newser, and 10000 man hours to keep 423 aircraft carrier toilets working by The Inquisitr.

Today the CO of the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) published a statement on the aircraft carriers Facebook page regarding the toilet issue. I quote in full:

Dear Families and Friends,

It has come to my attention that a blogger has posted about our Vacuum Collection Marine Sanitation (VCHT) system…our heads (i.e., restroom facilities). The blogger provided her blog as a “media release” to various news outlets. Unfortunately, the blogger has never once contacted us for information and the blog has since been quoted in multiple outlets as undisputed fact. The blog casts the ship in a very poor light. It paints a picture of heads frequently out of order, out of order for 24 hours or for 8 days at a time. Further, the blog states that only ship’s company heads worked, operating heads are locked so Sailors cannot use them, or that medical issues have developed as a result of the heads. Lastly, the blog claims that heads are even affecting morale and military readiness. Had this blogger contacted the ship I could have provided some facts about each and every one of her claims.

All individuals embarked - whether permanently assigned to CVN 77 or one of its embarked units - are responsible for the cleanliness, stocking of supplies, and upkeep of their assigned spaces to include heads. If a system or piece of equipment is malfunctioning, the individual unit is required to place a trouble call (request for maintenance) with the CVN 77 engineering department. The engineering department dispatches repairmen on a job priority basis. Additionally, there are no individuals assigned to USS George H. W. Bush - or any other naval vessel - whose sole job is monitoring of commodes.

It is true that the USS George H. W. Bush has a VCHT system that is unique amongst aircraft carriers but it is not unique to naval vessels. It uses a vacuum to draw waste from the commodes into the temporary holding tanks. The system divides the ship’s heads into two independent loops. The system is maintained by Hull Technicians (HTs) who respond to trouble calls associated with the ship’s VCHT system. These Sailors are also responsible for welding, brazing, and sundry other duties commonly associated with plumbing and pipe fitting. I’d like to share a little information my engineering department has reconstructed using the ship’s trouble call log over the last year.

• In the 12 month period from 15 November 2024 through 15 November 2011, 4054 trouble calls have been placed throughout the entire ship (electrical outlets, doors, leaks, etc.)
• During the same 12 month period, 2,036 of those trouble calls have been associated with heads (i.e., restroom facilities).
• Of the 2,036 trouble calls, 976 have been for commodes and 280 for urinals. The rest are for lighting, ventilation, etc.
• Trouble calls for the heads have been split 51% on the forward loop and 49% on the aft loop.
• Trouble calls for the head mentioned by the blogger include: one (1) each in July, August, and October - all three calls were resolved in less than 24 hours. There were zero (0) trouble calls in September and November. The blogger started commenting on November 7th when every commode in that head was working.
• In each instance, the individual trouble calls were for a single commode within the head. The head has 6 total commodes and 2 urinals. At no time has there been a trouble call for more than a single commode out of service in that particular head.

The HTs maintain the overall system and problems vary from loss of vacuum within a loop to clogs in system piping. Loss of vacuum is most often caused by damage to individual flushing mechanisms but can also be caused by a clog in the loop. I mentioned earlier that there were two loops in the system. A loss of vacuum momentarily affects all heads on the same loop.

• The most common loss of vacuum is a failure/disconnect of the vacuum valve connected to the individual commode. The average time to return the loop to full service is typically less than 15 minutes. The follow-on repair to the individual commode/head in question depends on the malfunction but is typically complete in less than 30 minutes.
• Severe clogs can also cause a loss of vacuum in a single loop. The average time to isolate, locate, and repair significant clogs is less than three hours.
• The single longest loss of service to an entire head occurred in June due to a massive clog while the ship was in port. It took three days to repair because a section of pipe had to be removed and re-welded into place. The three day repair affected a single head on the starboard side of the aft loop. That berthing had a second head in the same area on the port side of its berthing that was functional the entire time of the repair.
• Inappropriate items that have been flushed down the commode and caused clogs during deployment include feminine hygiene products and their applicators, mop heads, t-shirts, underwear, towels, socks, hard boiled eggs, and eating utensils.
• There have been ZERO (0) clogs caused by toilet paper and human waste.
• There have been six (6) instances of both loops of the VCHT system being simultaneously unavailable during deployment. The longest dual (i.e., whole ship) outage was 15 minutes.

I have addressed the crew multiple times during the deployment about the system and damage caused by inappropriate items being flushed down the commodes. The indifferent, inconsiderate and irresponsible actions of a few Sailors were adversely affecting everyone onboard. To address the abuse of heads and commodes, I made the decision to allow departments and squadrons to install cipher locks on all heads. This would limit access to heads to members of the berthing assigned and foster a sense of ownership amongst berthing inhabitants. It would also allow better forensics into the source of the vandalism because the number of people allowed in a particular head would be known. It worked… during the roughly 50 hours that some heads were locked, trouble calls dropped by 67% and Sailors reported their heads were noticeably cleaner.

• Eight (8) heads were identified as public heads which would not be locked. They included two (2) head each for both sexes on the port and starboard sides for each loop.
• Lock installation began on 3 November 2024 with 4 of the 18 departments assigned to CVN 77 because they had submitted trouble calls requesting locks and had ordered locks from Supply.
• The total number of heads locked was 23 of the 93 heads associated with junior enlisted berthing.

The blogger asserts Sailors are afraid to speak out for fear of retribution. Not true. I have an electronic CO’s Suggestion Box which allows anyone onboard USS George H. W. Bush to email me with questions, suggestions and comments. Because comments are emailed, each and every comment has the Sailor’s name on it. I received one email on the first day of installation, 18 on the second day and 15 on the third day. The comments ranged from understanding why the locks were being installed to complaints about the inconvenience associated with leaving their work center and walking to their berthing to use a head. On the third day, I was made aware there were insufficient locks available through purchase or reallocation to provide every head with a lock in a timely fashion. Accordingly, I directed that every cipher lock be reprogrammed to a common code. However, I briefed the crew that this would remain only as long as clogs did not return. Since all locks have been recoded, there has not been a single clog.

Based on blogger comments the media has reported increased health issues, such as dehydration, and increased urinary tract infections. Again, not true. In fact, for deployment, 91.5% of all personnel onboard this ship have not been to medical. There have been 60 total cases of urinary tract infection during deployment with two major spikes occurring immediately following port visits. This represents approximately 1.3% of the crew. During the period of the blogger’s comments, potential urinary tract infections have declined each month from September through November.

I understand the concern for your friends and loved ones and their living conditions onboard the world’s newest aircraft carrier. While I disagree with the blogger’s comments, I will defend with my life her right to make them. However, she presents the unsubstantiated comments of a single Sailor as fact and, in doing so, denigrates the efforts and sacrifices of the other 4,800 members of the entire strike group team who during the last six months supported ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. During this time we also have hosted ambassadors, members of foreign governments, foreign nationals, members of the foreign media, coalition partners, entertainers, folks from home and, without fail, they have left singing the praises of the Sailors and their ship.

I can assure you the ship has, and continues, to perform admirably. While we have a ways to go yet, your Sailors are healthy, happy and excited to be heading home. I am proud of each and every one of them and look forward to bringing them safely home to you soon.

Warm Regards,

Brian Luther

I appreciate the detailed response by Captain Luther. The Navy Times conducted a phone interview with the CO of CVN 77 about this issue today, and this second Navy Times article on the issue that resulted from that phone conversation paints a different picture than the one by Captain Luther.

The system was designed with unusually narrow pipes to help keep a high vacuum pressure. However, these narrow pipes make it more likely that the system will clog. They should be wider to let potential clogs move through, Luther said.

Additionally, the individual commodes need to be upgraded. Sometimes vacuum pressure is lost when someone presses the flush button with his boot instead of his hand, breaking a mechanism. Or a tube is knocked out of place during a regular cleaning, causing pressure to drop, Luther said.

The toilet problem has become unbearable, said sailors onboard the carrier, who spoke with Navy Times on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak with media. There have been occasions during the deployment when every toilet went offline. More frequently, every commode aft of midship will be out of order, they said. Or several heads in a single area will go down, and when they are repaired, a new problem will occur elsewhere, sailors said.

The problem has left sailors searching for a proper place to relieve themselves, a quest that can last an hour. Often, when they do find a working commode, they need to wait in line and the head is filthy from overuse. As a result, sailors are taking extra showers or using industrial sinks in their workspaces. Men are urinating into bottles and emptying the contents over the ship’s side. Some have cut down on their food and fluid intake, and some women are holding it for so long that they’re developing urinary tract infections.

Luther said that 8.8 percent of the sailors onboard have received medical attention for either dehydration or urinary tract infections, and sick bay data show that cases of urinary tract infections have declined through the deployment. Comparable figures for other deployments were not available Tuesday night.

The ship’s sanitation system is divided into forward and aft sections, which operate independently of each other. However, six times since the deployment began, both sections broke simultaneously, leaving each of the carrier’s 423 toilets inoperable. However, at the worst, both sections were concurrently down only for 15 minutes. No commode is immune, Luther said, and his own toilet has gone out of service.

“If you use vacuum, you lose vacuum. Whether you’re me, the admiral, or the most junior sailors. And even I’ve gotten a call from the admiral who said ‘Hey! What’s up with that?’ ” Luther said. “It’s egalitarian."

It is a safe bet neither the CO nor the Navy saw this narrative associated with the maiden deployment of the nations newest aircraft carrier. I see three issues here.

First, this is an aircraft carrier that is supporting operations over Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia and this discussion about the ships terrible toilet system represents the only headline the ship has been able to generate to date. Maybe if the Navy did a better job telling the public what they did with their multi-billion dollar warships when the fleet deploys for 6 months to CENTCOM, when a news article discusses toilet troubles on a ship, the news would also mention other more naval centric newsworthy events the ship has been previously involved in.

Second, this looks like a design problem on the ship. Why is the VCHT system divided into only two zones? Why does the Navy have this problem on their aircraft carriers but cruise ships, which rotate thousands of passengers every week, don't seem to have this VCHT problem? When 2,036 of the ships 4,054 trouble calls (50%) are specific to the ships heads, and 30% of the 4,054 trouble calls are specific to the toilets, that suggests to me there is a legitimate technical issue here and the problem isn't limited to human behavior.

Third, how can I ignore this nonsense in response to the CMC from an AM1 that supposedly has 16 years of service? When the CO says "individuals embarked... are responsible for the cleanliness, stocking of supplies, and upkeep of their assigned spaces" he is clearly responding directly to that specific blog post, and to what could be described as one whiny bitch of a First Class Petty Officer.

I don't know about the Navy, but in every private sector job I've ever worked, when an employee with 16 years experience and in a position of leadership complains about basic tasks like keeping their space clean, keeping supplies properly stocked, or maintaining upkeep to ones limited area of responsibility - we describe those type of folks in the context of a useless middle manager who works in the organization as a public reminder to everyone else what is broken within the bureaucracy. Sorry, but some 30 something year old First Class Petty Officer complaining to his blogging mommy about the CMCs legitimate, remedial instruction didn't sit well with me at all. The CMC had this exactly right, First Class Petty Officers should be expected to be part of the solution to a ships problems, but that guy decided to add an additional layer to the ships problem. Classy.

So what are we learning here? In my opinion, we are learning that Captain "Lex" Luther is the real deal. I like that he is using social media to tackle a social media centric public relations issue. I like that he is addressing the issue directly, publicly - owning the problem instead of ignoring the problem. I like that he has implemented solutions that have, at least according to some statistics, helped address the problem, although not completely. I like that the ship is carrying on it's responsibilities despite distractions and ongoing problems that have no permanent fix while on deployment. Public relations challenges are always difficult, particularly in the Navy that as an organization really doesn't always deal with public relations challenges well, but the CO of CVN 77 is doing everything right here. Information is the best weapon against ignorance, and I think the information by the CO was on target.

We are also learning about a very shortsighted engineering problem on CVN 77, because I can't think of any good reason for a VCHT system to be divided into only two zones. It's not like this issue is something new to the Navy. When 30% of all trouble calls over a 12 month period are specific to the toilets and urinals of the Navy's largest ship, this is bigger than a human behavior issue. If the Navy is serious about reducing crew sizes on ships in the future, smarter design and engineering for spaces and systems that consumes maintenance time of the crew while underway would be the logical place to start.

Finally, anyone who suggests the public attention by this AM1 or his mom has somehow contributed positively to the ship or crew would be wrong. Does public knowledge of a poorly designed VCHT or public knowledge of a misbehaving crew flushing inappropriate items in the toilets somehow help the ship? No. Are the folks who are working to address these problems aided by public awareness of the challenges they face when they work? No. Was the ships leadership somehow unaware of the issue? As I understand it, the CO has directly addressed this issue every few weeks throughout deployment over the 1MC, which suggests to me that this is not a problem being ignored, and the various actions taken like cipher locks also suggests the ships leadership was actively engaged in trying to address the issue as best they can. Can anyone name any specific good that might come from public awareness of this issue? I'm struggling to find any positive that comes from publicity of this issue.

The way I see it, generating public interest regarding the inconvenience of low quality shitters on CVN 77 isn't a whistle-blower scenario as this AM1's mommy suggests, and it is hard to find a legitimate intention for making the issue public other than to embarrass ships leadership who, according to every account I can find, has throughout deployment been legitimately trying to address a legitimate problem.

When I look at this story, in my opinion, this AM1s public whiny attitude towards a pristine pissing environment properly managed on his behalf by other sailors reveals itself as a questionable character issue at least as interesting as the issue of a poorly designed VCHT, and for that reason I find this whole story to be one of terrible judgment by a First Class Petty Officer and his blogging mommy in using social media as an instrument of publicity that ultimately does absolutely nothing to help a ship and crew dealing with a legitimate issue.