Red Lines

In my latest at WPR I take a middle road between McGrath and Galrahn on ASB:

And of course, both sides have to prepare for war, both to improve their negotiating positions and in case negotiations fail. China’s military might is now sufficient that the United States cannot leave room for the kind of error that inter-service conflict normally produces; its military machine has to run as efficiently as possible in order to plausibly threaten the People’s Liberation Army with defeat. While AirSea Battle doesn’t officially designate China as the expected opponent, no other foe would be plausible. For its part, China will continue to develop a system of anti-access capabilities designed mainly to force a U.S. president to hesitate before deploying aircraft carriers to respond to a crisis in East Asia.

And herein lies the problem: Any plan for war against China indicates that the United States is thinking seriously about war with China, thus potentially inspiring a Chinese reaction. What’s more, doctrinal and procurement decisions made now without full consideration of how the strategic situation might change could leave the United States -- or China -- with capabilities that don’t support their future diplomatic commitments. But a lack of preparation for war would indicate to the PRC that the United States has few if any “red lines” in East Asia, thus encouraging Chinese assertiveness. Given the likelihood that the United States is indeed willing to fight over some values -- perhaps Taiwan, perhaps South Korea -- such a message could prove disastrous, leading to misperception, miscalculation and the chance that the partners might become locked into a path to war.