More Sea Hippies and DIY UAVs

Bit of an update on the Sea Shepherds post. First, nix one high speed vessel from the fleet. Having a high speed intercept ship such as Brigitte Bardot or the former Ady Gil in the fleet makes a lot of operational sense, but running a 35 meter trimaran at speed in 6 meter seas, probably doesn’t so much.

Second, the post responses on this topic always amaze me. It is interesting how one non-governmental organization can be characterized in the comments by terms varying as widely as maritime eco-terrorist organization, vigilante group, hippies, and fishery enforcers.

Additionally, I’ve been corresponding with Jimmy Prouty, the creator of the Osprey UAS, who provided some corrections on my posted assumptions and additional information on his equipment. Some of the Osprey’s specs are competition sensitive and not readily available except to clients, but there are some interesting tidbits shown in the email excerpts below:

First, the Osprey is not at all modeled after the Scan Eagle. It is an optimized airframe with a high aspect ratio wing designed for maximum efficiency and range and it's similarity with the Scan Eagle is only that it has a long wing and round fuselage.

For the most part, all of our aircraft are designed as airframes that can be adapted to any number of uses. While videography and vertical photography are the most popular uses we also have them being employed in nuclear/biological/chemical detection system test that would detect those agent in the event of a spill/disaster.

We also do custom airframe development and are currently working on three new designs of various sizes and capabilities. The Osprey has proven to be a very capable airframe and has seen a great deal of use in various areas including the development of cooperative soaring where two aircraft search for thermal lift and communicate the conditions with each other. The Osprey’s design lets it turn off the motor and circle autonomously in lift, conserving the main battery and greatly extending its range. A good example of this in nature is the sand hill crane - it thermals up to high altitude and then glides off looking for its next thermal during its migration. [Ed note: I’m not sure if there are many thermals in the Southern Ocean, but this is certainly a useful capability for a STUAS]

We work with clients to get them the range that they desire as we did with the Sea Shepherd. Advancing technology in Power systems (batteries, motors, etc) is really letting is stretch our legs. Low cost, reliable autopilots such as the AttoPilot have matured and become extremely reliable to the point that we can duplicate flight paths within 1 square meter accuracy while still being able to reroute ourflightpath or call the plane home with the click of a mouse. EO payloads are also evolving rapidly and have a lot of great use.

Third, your assumption on the range of the video system are also off base. There are commercially available units that will provide excellent video reception well beyond the the 10km are reported in your article. There are several hobbyists that fly 25+ miles via video goggles and they don't have access to the higher end video equipment that can be deployed our airframes. The system can also provide geo referencing to give GPS location for any picture or video that is shot during the flight for later review which doesn't require a video downlink.

One of the biggest benefits of companies such as ours is that we can produce a high quality product for general use at a very affordable price with absolutely no cost to the taxpayer. The majority of the major UAS manufacturers rely on government funding (DARPA etc.) to develop their products and then turn around and sell them to the taxpayer at greatly inflated prices. We’ve proven that we (small business) can do it for a minimal investment, provide a high quality, safe product, and get the consumer exactly what they want.

Hangar 18 has an interesting concept and I wish them well in their effort to commercialize affordable, yet tactically useful UAVs. STUAS of all types, including rotary wing platforms capable of launching from a vessel as small as a CB-90, are rapidly improving in performance and capability and will soon proliferate throughout the world's navies (and non-state navies).

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

2012 Prediction Sure to Go Wrong, or Not

The only sure prediction for 2012 is that it will be an interesting year for surface warfare discussions. The DDG-1000 is going to be an amazing ship, assuming the software side works out. Will it be a better investment than the DDG-51 restart? The answer is starting to look more and more like YES everyday, primarily because the DDG-51 restart isn't restarting the DDG-51 you think it is. AVIATION WEEK has been discussing this topic all year, specifically Michael Fabey in his many DDG-1000 vs DDG-51 articles, which in hindsight will be the background material for events soon to unfold in the coming year.

Here is his latest, an important read. I'll predict it here and now (again) - the GAO is going to look very favorably on the DDG-1000 over the DDG-51 restart. I'm looking forward to observing the SWO community reaction, because I expect to observe a great deal of denial and irrational reactions resulting from the GAOs analysis. I could be wrong about that, but I don't think so. The ugly side of AEGIS is soon to go public, and AEGIS is not simply a technology in the Navy - it's something similar to a religion.

Interesting times.

Happy New Year

I'm usually not a fan of polls and popularity contests on the internet, that just isn't my thing, but in this case I am making an exception. The US Coast Guard is posting their top 10 videos from 2011, and is asking the community to vote on their favorite video. All of the videos are expected to be released by the end of the year, and voting on the videos will continue until mid-January. So far, the video of the airplane landing in the water is my favorite, but all of the videos are impressive.

The Navy can't do a top 10 video, but we all know if there was such a thing, a US Navy SEAL shooting Osama bin Laden in the face would almost certainly be number ONE. US Navy videos of live action represent - for the most part - documentation of political statements by other means. US Coast Guard videos on the other hand are acts of valor in the line of duty with no tie to politics, and watching the videos is a reminder why Coast Guard Alaska on the Weather Channel has been one of the most interesting television shows this year. The people in the US Coast Guard are INCREDIBLE.

You can follow the countdown of videos on the Coast Guard Compass blog.

I continue to be out of pocket, with my wife due to deliver our third child, our first boy... today, and likely to bust open any second. My tax return is screaming delivery before midnight Saturday night, but my karma is likely shouting otherwise. Either way, I intend to get a better feel for the new schedule before picking back up here, as time organization is very much a big part of the process for content on the blog. It isn't so much the writing that consumes time... it's all the reading!

I want to thank the authors of the blog for picking up the slack in my absence, and I send my best wishes to all the folks who have made Information Dissemination a part of their daily routine. It is our hope ID is an interesting way to follow maritime issues that impact our nation and the world at large.

To all the members of the maritime services, thank you for your service to our nation. I wish you and your families a happy, safe New Year.

Ekaterinburg

Alarming:

After battling for hours to extinguish a blaze aboard a nuclear submarine, Russian firefighters finally gained control of it early Friday by submerging the stricken vessel at a navy shipyard. There was no radiation leak, the authorities said. Television showed a giant plume of smoke above the yard in the Murmansk region of northern Russia as more than 100 firefighters struggled to douse flames that witnesses said rose 30 feet above the submarine. The firefighters tried for hours to douse the flames with water from helicopters and tugboats before trying another approach: partly sinking the submarine. The fire continued to burn, but the intensity was reduced. “The fire has been localized,” Emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu said from a control room in Moscow more than nine hours after the blaze began on Thursday.

This probably doesn't speak well of Russia's ability to maintain its nuclear deterrent...

Russia-India Cooperation

Finishing a book manuscript, and so haven't had much time for serious blogging recently.  Nevertheless, would like to drag everyone's attention to Dmitry Gorenburg's excellent series on Russia's military relationship with India.  First part examines naval, second part ground and air, third part joint projects.

There's a lot of interest here.  From a strategic point of view, the Indo-Russian relationship suggests that there's something wrong with geopolitical scenarios that don't take balance-of-power considerations between the three Eurasian giants seriously; I'm not looking at any one in particular, of course, but... From a technical point of view, I think it's interesting how dependent both China and India continue to be on updated Soviet technology. I think that Feng might have more to say on this, but there's a fascinating contrast between India and China as customers of Russian military tech.  India is a better international intellectual property citizen than China, and also lacks any serious security flashpoints with Russia.  On the other hand, China seems to be interested in pushing beyond what Russian technology can offer, even if major questions about the quality of the product of the Chinese military-industrial complex remain.

Cross-posted at LGM.

Open Source Maritime UAVs and the Evolution of a Non-State Navy

The Sea Shepherds continue their campaign against Japanese whaling “research” vessels this Antarctic summer. New this year are enhanced ISR capabilities,with the introduction of two hand-launched UAVs. One of the Osprey UAVs, named after the Jerseylicious daughter of the recycling mogul who donated it, has already been deployed successfully against the whaling fleet.

The UAVs, roughly modeled after the proven Scan Eagle design, were developed by a small company in Wichita, Kansas. Performance stats on this SUAS aren’t available, but a range estimate of less than 100 miles is likely, given indications of 1-2 hour endurance and 75 MPH speed on various websites. The system flies with a commercially available $2300 GPS-enabled autopilot, but video and telemetry transmission limitations probably result in a much shorter working range (only 10KM from the ship by one source), resulting in an overall range much less than Bob Barker’s embarked Hughes MD500 helo. Still, the increased sensor height greatly extends the ship’s ability to scout for the Japanese whalers when the helo isn’t flying due to crew rest or weather issues. The Ospreys provide the Sea Shepherds with full motion HD video or digital stills and the website’s reference to “detection equipment” may refer to some sort of SIGINT/radio detection payload. These sorts of smallish drones tend to crash frequently for various reasons, especially when flown by inexperienced operators, so we should expect this year’s use of UAVs to be short-lived unless additional spares become available.

The adoption of much more sophisticated (and expensive) ship-launched UAVs such as the Scan Eagle or Siebel S-100 would be needed to really take the Sea Shepherd’s airborne scouting capabilities to the next level. Though given readily available and inexpensive R/C aircraft turned open-source naval UAS such as the Osprey, other non-state maritime actors, many of which are less-benign in intent than the SSCS, may soon adopt UAVs as reconnaissance tools for terror attacks or to avoid navies conducting counter-smuggling operations.

ISR improvements are just one component of the Sea Shepherd’s evolution. The table below (compiled from various web sources) is an attempt to illustrate the changing nature of Sea Shepherd’s capabilities over the past eight anti-whaling campaigns in the Southern Ocean. Note, SSCS’s history dates back much further from the 1970s, and the organization has been involved in many other sea-life defense campaigns, but the annual “Whale Wars” remain their most highly publicized effort.


Also noteworthy are the Japanese whalers' evolving tactics, which include smoke screens, stun grenades, ramming, water cannon, LRADs, and their own information operations campaign.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Happy Holidays

From everyone at ID, Merry Christmas!

House Acts on Superferry's

From here:

SEC. 1015. TRANSFER OF CERTAIN HIGH-SPEED FERRIES TO THE NAVY.

(a) Transfer From MARAD Authorized- The Secretary of the Navy may, subject to appropriations, from funds available for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2012, provide to the Maritime Administration of the Department of Transportation an amount not to exceed $35,000,000 for the transfer by the Maritime Administration to the Department of the Navy of jurisdiction and control over the vessels as follows:

(1) M/V HUAKAI.

(2) M/V ALAKAI.

(b) Use as Department of Defense Sealift Vessels- Each vessel transferred to the Department of the Navy under subsection (a) shall be administered as a Department of Defense sealift vessel (as such term is defined in section 2218(k)(2) of title 10, United States Code).

Noteworthy Message Traffic

Picked this up from the public broadcast, issued last night as an ONI Special Advisory.

REPORTS FROM MARITIME FORCES AND COMMERCIAL MARITIME INTERESTS INDICATE CONCERN WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR LOCALIZED DISRUPTION TO SHIPPING IN CONJUNCTION WITH FUTURE IRANIAN NAVAL EXERCISES. DURING PREVIOUS EXERCISES IRANIAN MARITIME FORCES CONDUCTED BOARDINGS AND INSPECTIONS OF MERCHANT SHIPS, INCLUDING THOSE FLAGGED TO EUROPEAN NATIONS. THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT IRAN WILL ATTEMPT TO CONDUCT BOARDINGS AND INSPECTIONS DURING EXERCISES BETWEEN DECEMBER 2011 AND MARCH 2012. THE MOST LIKELY LOCATION FOR THIS ACTIVITY WOULD BE IN THE VICINITY OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS CLOSER TO IRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS.

AirSea Battle, Budget Crunches, and Organizations

Now that all four Services will have representation in the AirSea Battle Office, one is forced to consider the possibiilty that this new organization potentially overlaps with one already in existence.  To that end, I offer the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Office (JIAMDO), formerly known as the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organzation (JTAMDO).  By way of full disclosure, I worked at JTAMDO for three years from 2001-2004.

Staffed by officers from the four services (with heavy emphasis on those elements of the Joint force most in play in AirSea Battle, including air and missile defense, electronic warfare and attack operations), JIAMDO already provides a Joint venue for the coordination and integration of DOTMLP-F.  Additionally, JIAMDO is the primary Joint organization responsible for interoperability/management of data links and networks that are critical to the kinds of things ASB seeks to do.  Never a big favorite of the Services, JTAMDO/JIAMDO played the role of honest broker in reviewing Service plans, wielding Joint authority to attempt to ensure IAMD was "organized, trained and equipped" as an ensemble.  Additionally, JIAMDO/JTAMDO stewards a number of highly classified capabilities also likely to be important in an A2AD environment.

What doesn't JIAMDO have?  It doesn't work all aspects of A2AD (anti-surface, anti-submarine in particular).  But rather than build an organization whose work is largely done by another already in existence, why not "subsume" JIAMDO as the nucleus of the ASBO and supplement it with SME's from the capability areas not already covered?  I'm sure there are enormously important bureaucratic reasons why this is downright impossible, but in an era of constrained resources, should we be starting up an office from the get-go that overlaps another's AOR? 

Bryan McGrath

North Korea and Pacific Geopolitics

This would seem to be an appropriate time to re-up my post on last year's Patterson School simulation, which involved a North Korean succession crisis.

While we didn't talk North Korea, I had a good conversation last week on Pacific politics with Sam Roggeveen of the Lowy Institute. Here we talk aircraft carriers:

Reflecting PLAN in 2011

2011 has been a really hectic year in PLAN world. Although I have personally not had a chance to post as many updates, this years has seen non stop activities around different shipyards. When I write annual reviews like this, I'm almost afraid that I will miss an important part. As I wrote previously, the second wave of PLAN shipbuilding activity begun in 2010. The pace has only picked up in 2011. This blog entry will explore this and much more.

During this past year, we have seen the Varyag project move into the sea trial stage. Varyag's first and second sea trials captured some headlines around the world and was discussed quite a lot on this blog. While Varyag will most likely function as a training and test ship in the coming years, it is the most noticeable step taken by PLAN to shift from a green water fleet to a blue water fleet. As China learns to operate its first carrier, it will be fun for PLAN and other naval followers around the world to see how China intends to operate future carriers. Personally, I have already been trying to identify the different close in defense systems and sensors they have installed on Varyag. One thing that seems certain is that PLAN would like to follow the path of USN rather than USSR in carrier doctrine. We have already seen them remove all anti-ship missiles and long range SAMs from Varyag to allow more space for other stuff (including hangar space). We have also seen the development of fixed wing AEW project as well as the purchase of Ka-31 and the ongoing Z-8 AEW project. The J-15 project is also expected to be far more multi-role than the original Su-33s. Basically, PLAN is trying to modify a carrier that was original designed to conduct ASUW on its own with a limited number of Su-33s providing air cover to a carrier that relies on its air wings for all aspects of naval warfare. The amount of electronics on Varyag's island also indicates that Varyag is not only expected to provide command & control for supporting fleet, but also targeting info in an integrated environment. As we move forward in 2012, it will be interesting to see the continuing evolution of this ship..

Aside from the much talked about Varyag, Chinese shipyards have continued to pump out naval ships capable blue water missions. The lead ship (866) of the Type 920 class hospital ship has also been quite busy this year. It has been an important part of PLAN's display of soft power and was sent around different third world countries on a good will tour. The Type 071 project has continued to roll forward with the induction of the second ship (999) into the same flotilla as the lead ship (998) and the launching of the third ship. We have also seen newer amphibious ships under construction in HD shipyard. In the past year, we have seen more evidence of PLAN learning how to operate something of Type 071 class with the induction of Type 726 hovercraft (Chinese LCAC). We have seen different helicopters take off/land on 998 as well as many amphibious vehicles (and even a MBT) operating from 998 and Type 726. Clearly, they are still learning to use it, but PLAN appears to be quite pleased with the Type 071 class. The new class of submarine tenders also saw two new units launched in Guangzhou shipyard. The lead ship (864) was equipped with the LR7 submarine rescue system from UK. It will be interesting to see if the next two continue to use that or an indigenous option. Consider they already have 3 other large submarine tenders, they may not be building any more ships of this class. Aside from these major naval projects, I find the launching and possible induction of the No. 88 "life style" ship to be the best indication of PLAN's blue water desires. From all of the pictures I have seen, this ship looks to be a ship where sailors (who have been out in the sea for a long time) can party and release stress. I guess that's PLAN's substitute to having port calls.

Aside from all of the larger ships, Chinese shipyards have also continued to building different classes of warships. The JiangNan shipyard is in the midst of building a second batch of 4 052C class ships. The first one seems to have already joined service with East Sea Fleet. The second one was launched a few months ago and will probably start sea trials sometimes after Chinese New Years. The third one looks to be close to launching and the fourth one is still just many large modules. We know that these ships are using indigenously produced QC-280 gas turbines rather than the original GT-25000 gas turbines from Ukraine. Other than that and probable upgrades and fixes to sensors and command system, I don't really see any change from the first two 052Cs. After these 4 052Cs, the next batch of JN destroyers will apparently have some real changes. We will probably not see these new ships until 2013. The two ships from the 052 class finished receiving their major upgrades this year. They should stay in service for a decade or two longer. I do expect old Type 051 class ships to start retiring in the next few years, but we will probably see the number of PLAN destroyers increase with the rumored production plans at JN shipyard.

The 054A project has also continued to sail along. These ships have proven to be very capable of long range missions in all of the deployments to Gulf of Aden. PLAN seems to be very pleased with its performance, because it has ordered more 054A than what was originally expected. At least 9 054A have joined service by now (4 in SSF, 4 in ESF, 1 in NSF). On top of that, 4 more 054A have been launched with one of them currently undergoing sea trials. I do believe that 054A production is drawing to a close and they will start producing 054B soon. The 054 series of ships should eventually replace the 053 series of ships. However, many of the 053 class ships are still quite new and have undergone upgrades in the past year. The 6 Jianghu-V ships (558 to 563) finished modernization this year and should continue to patrol South China Sea for a while longer. The 4 Jiangwei-I ships have received new TAS system in the past couple of years and appear to be going into docks for more upgrades. Similar to destroyers, the number of PLAN frigates should also increase in the next few years.

052C and 054A are part of PLAN's move to become blue water navy, since they are likely part of PLAN's first carrier group and expeditionary strike group. There are also newer littoral ships that are coming into service. The 022 class production have almost stopped completely now. Enough of them have been produced to replace all of the old FACs. We have been waiting for an OPV class to appear between 022 and 054A class to guard the littoral waters and patrol in South China Sea. For a while, it seemed like all of the newly built cutters will be taking that role, even though they are practically unarmed. Finally, the long rumored 056 class ships are now under construction in multiple Chinese shipyards. We have already seen 056 hulls forming in HuDong and HuangPu shipyard (part of the reason why I think 054A production is stopping), but smaller shipyards around the country are also expected to be building 056 ships. While I am still waiting to see how 056 will turn out, I do expect it to eventually replace a good number of 037s in the service. Some may even serve in the role of sub-chasers. MCM ships have also restarted productions again. This year, we saw the 5th Type 081 minesweeper class ship and the 2nd Type 082II minehunter class ship joining force. With the ramp up in production at JiangNan shipyard, I certainly expect to see more of these ships produced in the coming year. In this area, PLAN is finally catching up to the wave of MCM ships that came out in Europe in the 90s. PLAN will need to develop blue water MCM capability eventually, but they need to learn how to use these things first. And finally, numerous 039B class (Yuan) submarines entered service this year. I have now completely lost track of the count, since they don't paint numbers on the diesel submarines. I think at least 3 039B from Wuhan shipyard and 1 039B from JiangNan shipyard joined service. The mysterious new diesel submarine that some have named Qing class seems to be undergoing extensive sea trials right now. I don't expect this class of ships don't be mass produced for a while. It seems like they are really building a lot of 039B class and might do so for another year or two. After which, I think Song, Yuan and Kilo submarines will represent the majority conventional submarine force. From that, I can say the diesel submarine fleet has modernized faster than any other area of PLAN. In comparison, the latest nuclear attack submarine is still stuck at least 2 generations behind Virginia class. There has been rumors that a 095 class submarine has been launched, but we won't find out for a while if that's the case.

Naval aviation also continued to modernize this year. The first naval regiment of J-10 and J-11B were formed this year. Naval aviation for PLA is very different from that of USN. The fixed wing aircraft do not operate from any ship. They are just expected to operate jointly with ships in naval warfare. Previously, PLANAF consist mostly of the extremely short legged J-7 and J-8 aircraft. By this year, all of the naval aviation divisions have at least one regiment of J-10, JH-7 or flankers. At the same time, more Y-8 special missions aircraft have been produced this year (including the new ASW aircraft). This means PLANAF should at least be able to help out naval ships in littoral conflicts. Back in the days, they were pretty much useless. In the coming year, I expect to see more Y-8 special missions aircraft and naval helicopters to join PLANAF. One of the biggest problems of PLAN is the shortage of helicopters. This problem is getting better with the induction of more Ka-28/31 and Z-8s, but will remain a huge problem until Z-15 enters service.

As I look back in 2011, this was a really exciting year to follow PLAN. I have spent a lot of time talking about new toys that PLAN is getting. That's something which is relatively easy to quantify when one follows PLAN. The much harder question to answer is the software part of modernization. With all of these new hardware, how much has the training and doctrines improved to be able to effectively use these new weapon systems? With all of the new ships coming into service, PLAN will need to train new sailors to be able to operate these new ships. I have read many articles about large military exercises, new training methods and great achievements by PLAN. However, much of those pieces just seem to be propaganda. It's easy to see that PLAN is happy with ships like 052C, 054A and 071, but it's much harder to compare PLAN training to that of Western navies. We have certainly seen PLAN sending ships on more missions away from home. Gulf of Aden deployments have been a great success. Hopefully, that will also lead to greater understanding and cooperation with Western navies. We have also seen more joint exercises and port calls in the past couple of years. Hopefully, that will also lead to better relations with other nations. However, the recent naval expansion has also caused a lot of discomfort among China's neighbors. While I'm not advocating that PLAN should stop modernization and transformation into a blue water navy. It should also be mindful on how its actions will affect its neighbors.

Looking forward to 2012 and beyond, it's easy to see that this modernization process is not slowing down. All of the major naval shipyards are continuously churning out new ships. In a couple of years, we will start seeing fixed wing aircraft take off and land on Varyag. The greatest support for PLAN modernization comes from the launching of 893 test ship. As recently as 2005, PLAN only had one ship (891) to test out new sensors and weapon systems. Now, it has 3 ships testing out new weapon systems. I have read about quite a few weapon systems that they are developing, so I'm waiting to see them appear on these test ships. I do also see possible problems ahead. With China's economy facing a turbulent future, that should also effect the amount of money it can spend on its navy. It's unlikely to face the same level of austerity as European countries, but it should also not get overly ambitious with new developments.

AirSea Battle Paranoia Continues

I apologize for covering ground I thoroughly turned over once before, but Professor James Lacey of the Marine Corps War College has offered me a fresh opportunity to comment on rise of clinically significant levels of paranoia among some of our land power friends.  In a post on National Review online, Lacey takes to the e-pages of one of my favorite journals of the vast right wing conspiracy to skewer the ruminations of the unnamed "defense intellectuals" behind AirSea battle.  Putting aside for the moment the irony of a PhD in Military History on the payroll of the Department of Defense mocking "defense intellectuals" (presumably there are none of these at Quantico), Lacey recycles arguments and acts--to quote the founder and spiritual guide of National Review William F. Buckley once put it--as a "pyromaniac in a field of straw men."

Lacey--as is fashionable among like-minded land power advocates--sees ASB as little more than a naked budgetary putsch by the Navy and Air Force, presumably aided and abetted by that wildly enthusiastic booster of seapower and airpower, Robert Gates (he of sacked Secretaries/CSAF's, and speeches questioning the relevance of carriers and our dominant Navy).  Apparently, news of the end of combat in Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan has not reached Dr. Lacey at Orthanc on the Potomac, as presumably cuts to the Marine Corps and Army strike him as somehow strategically unwise, even discounting the sneaky machinations of the Air Force and Navy (oh, and USMC, who is also part of ASB--as is the US Army, news of which has also apparently not reached the good Professor).

But lets move past the budgetary rationale offered by Dr. Lacey, and on to some of his other arguments.  Lacey writes:  "In truth, the Air-Sea Battle concept addresses a very real problem: How does the U.S. military operate in a world where many potential foes can afford missiles and other weapons that could deny it entry to or use of an area. Problems arose, however, when this search for a technical fix to a tactical problem began to morph into a strategy, one that was widely perceived as being aimed at containing or if necessary militarily defeating China."  So, after conceding that ASB addresses a very real problem, Lacey indulges in the largest of the conspiracy theories floating around, that being the perception that ASB is or was EVER a strategy to do anything.  This is simply not true, and the suggestion that ASB in some way represented a war-winning plan against China or anyone else is simply wrong.  Lacey is correct in thinking that maritime and air power are rarely  the instruments of victory in war.  Generally speaking, a land force must threaten the strategic goals of an opponent to bring war to a close.  That said, unless the Army and Marine Corps have cooked up a special access program of which I am unaware, our land power is unlikely to be transported a la "Star Trek" to battle.  First, it must traverse the land and sea between its staging bases and the fight--where potential opponents wield "anti-access" capabilities.  Then--in order that it might enjoy freedom of maneuver, it must operate in locales where the opponent seeks to deny them that freedom--again, largely in the air and on the sea.   Put another way, in order for American  land power to perform the necessary tasks it uniquely wields in victory, it must rely on the Navy and Air Force to gain SOME MEASURE of dominance in the air and on/under the sea.  That ability is increasingly challenged by China, Iran and others, and no matter how magnificent our land armies may be, and no matter how few wars are won exclusively by air and seapower, it is a relatively simple idea to hold that while Navies and Air Forces do not win modern wars--modern wars are not won without them.  And increasingly it appeared that there were conflicts for which DoD MUST necessarily plan, that we were in danger of NOT having a clear path to victory due to emerging anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities.

Lacey goes on to say that "Of course, given today’s political concerns and current diplomatic niceties, having the Pentagon work on plans for how to defeat China was beyond the pale. So, for the past several months, the Department of Defense has been busily walking back the idea that Air-Sea Battle is a “strategy” aimed at militarily defeating China. Rather, it is once again firmly in the “concepts” corral, where it is available to assist U.S. military commanders in any region where they might encounter an enemy with substantial “anti-access” or “area-denial” capabilities."  I challenge Dr. Lacey to find even a single reputable figure associated with the Navy or Air Force who has ever claimed ASB to be anything BUT a concept.  Who has been doing this "walking back"?  What have they said? 

Lacey goes on to mock the Joint Staff's latest effort , the Joint Operational Access Concept, and in doing so, exposes himself as ill-educated as to what "Joint" actually is, and how it is the JOAC came to be.  He writes, "So what is wrong with the new concept? Plenty. Although this is a “joint” concept and therefore supposed to include all the services, the Army still seems to be odd man out."  Again, Lacey is an educated man, presumably with access to reputable sources--I challenge him to provide a definition of Joint that specifies ALL Services must be included.  He will not, as it does not exist.  Additionally, the very existence of the JOAC is a credit to the paranoia flamed in no small part from his outpost at Quantico (and from the Army's at TRADOC) which couldn't stomach the possibility that the Navy and Air Force were working on important concepts without them.  That the JOAC does not rise to Lacey's definition of great doctrine is notable in view of his Service's efforts to impose it on the renegades at ASB. And again--the Army is now a part of the ASB Office, so lets hang that one up.

I could go on...but I urge you to read the post I linked to in the first paragraph for a fuller examination of land power paranoia.  Dr. Lacey does neither himself, his school, nor his service credit by recycling tired arguments. 

Bryan McGrath

Rebuilding the Libyan Armed Forces

I have some thoughts on rebuilding the Libyan armed forces:

The rump Libyan military is unlikely to be of much help. Although Moammar Gadhafi cultivated conflict with neighbors and distant foes alike, he relied more on Libya’s vast, inhospitable geography than on the Libyan armed forces to protect him from conventional attack. While neighbors, such as Egypt, might have brushed aside the relatively weak and unprofessional Libyan army, they would have faced tremendous difficulty maintaining supply lines and coherence across the long distances needed to bring any campaign to a successful conclusion. Gadhafi purposely kept the army weak and divided in order to prevent it from becoming a threat to his own rule, relying for security instead on a variety of military and paramilitary organizations controlled through personal connection rather than through professional obligation.

Moving forward, the Libyan government will almost certainly want to develop an army with modern, professional training and a strongly embedded understanding of its professional obligations to the civilian government. Controlling the army through personal ties may seem appealing in the short term, but will likely be very bad for the future of Libyan governance and democracy. Given the lack of professional norms in the pre-revolutionary army, the primary avenue for the development of professionalism will be the cultivation of relationships with foreign armies. NATO’s training mission in Iraq has recently ended to mixed reviews, but the experience of working with the new Iraqi army almost certainly improved the alliance’s ability to train a force like the Free Libya Army and to inculcate professional norms. The United States has also entered talks to help rebuild Libyan forces.

Also some thoughts on the reconstruction of the navy. I find the concept of building a military service more or less from scratch fascinating, mostly because the process illuminates a wide set of organizational dynamics that tend to get obscured with older, more established services. In particular, the influence of transnational norms and expectations becomes relatively clear, as does the impact of direct connections with foreign military experts. Libya has far more resources at its disposal than many of the countries in its position, so it'll be interesting to see the choices that the new government makes.

Finding Stability with Somalia's Nascent Navy

Here's a good article from the Somalia Report on the TFG's underfunded, underequipped Navy. The littorals play no small part in Somalia's instability. Piracy from Somalia's shores continues to threaten the Indian Ocean, despite a dropping success rate due to a greater acceptance of embarked armed security teams. Al Shabaab has begun to exercise its own crude maritime force, skirmishing with the Kenyans at sea in November and December. Al Shabaab also receives funding, weapons, and fighters from the sea. Finally, some combination of Somali pirates/criminals/al Shabaabers continues attempts to kidnap tourists from Kenyan coastal areas.

Building indigenous naval capacity is one of the ways that the international community can help stabilize Somalia. As we know from recent experience trying to stand up Iraq's Navy, building a nascent navy is not easy, inexpensive, or fast. US legislation on security force assistance doesn't facilitate multiyear funding mechanisms optimal for these sorts of efforts, and Navy culture and force structure (outside of MCAST) are not conducive to working with smaller navies. However, there may be a role for US and allied support to the African Union in training, equipping, and deploying an AMISOM maritime capability. The US State Department's ACOTA program has supported training Ugandan Defense Forces which are the bulwark of the AMISOM mission. A program to deploy willing West African navies to Somalia under the auspices of the AU, train and equip them with patrol boats that they might retain following mission completion, might be enough to bolster the tiny Somali Navy and reduce the impact of maritime crime, insurgency, and terrorists who ply the coast of Somalia. In turn, these navies would redeploy more capable, interoperable, and experienced to defend their own shores.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Brazilian Naval Ambitions

My latest at WPR concerns the mismatch between Brazilian naval ambitions and resources:

In the first decade of the 20th century, Brazil attempted to stake out a space for itself as a major Western Hemisphere naval power, ordering a pair of dreadnought battleships from British yards in 1906. Dubbed Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo, these ships were as capable as any then in operation among the world’s navies, and indeed outgunned early British, German and American contemporaries. The acquisition of the two ships -- as well as the planned purchase of a third -- set off a naval race in the Southern Cone, with Chile and Argentina soon following suit. Unfortunately, the battleships were startlingly expensive, virtually bankrupting the Brazilian government. Brazil’s pursuit of regional naval hegemony ended when the poorly paid and brutalized sailors (.pdf) that made up the battleships’ crews turned their guns on Rio de Janeiro. After the revolt was quelled, the main guns of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo were disabled, and the ships were allowed to decay over the next 40 years of intermittent service. Brazil’s first effort to declare itself a maritime power ended in expensive rust.

Dusk Approaches For the Big Deck Nuclear Carrier Age

Presented for comment. Confirmed by multiple sources, this is the very latest from OMB to the DoD regarding aircraft carriers and FY13:

The navy has proposed an additional 2-year schedule slip to its newest carrier, CVN79, which would extend the funding profile from the original 8 yrs to 12 yrs. The Navy would initiate the 4-yr construction process in FY15 after 8 years of advance procurement activities. Given the challenges of implementing the BCA caps, OMB allows the additional 2 year slip to CVN-79. However, the Navy should request authorization to commence regular CVN-79 construction in FY13 and continuing through FY18. The CVN-79 funding profile does not change, and because construction belongs in FY-13, there is no need for additional advance construction. The navy should work with OMB to develop a legislative proposal to implement this guidance. For the subsequent carrier, CVN-80, the Navy should include no more than 8 years total funding.

This is what Matt Mulherin, President of Newport News Shipbuilding, told a group of folks like me on the phone a few weeks ago:

I think everybody gets it; that if we don’t build it on a five-year center proves to be the most efficient timeline, so as soon as you’re finished being a structural guy on Ford you walk over and be a structural guy on Kennedy. I think everybody gets that, so they understand that the cost is an adder. I think what we've got to think about - and that’s why we’re focused on - is, “How do we drive cost out?” because you don’t want to be the used-car salesman that says, “You've got to buy it today because tomorrow it’s going to be more expensive.” I think everybody gets that. I think the value proposition of this whole thing is, “Let’s work with the Navy and figure how we take cost out of it,” so they want to buy.

Nope, I don't think everybody gets that it, or at least the accountants at OMB don't get it.

This schedule change almost insures the cost of CVN-79 is going to be enormous due to loss of trade skill at the yard, which means CVN-80 is also going to be a whole lot more expensive. By 2020 aircraft carriers are going to have such an enormous cost that there is no way the nation will build CVNs after CVN-80.

I see only two ways this doesn't happen. Either Obama loses in 2012 and the new President addresses this issue directly, immediately following election, or in some future 2016-2020 time frame the nation funds and builds 2 carriers of the Ford Class just like Reagan built 2 with the Nimitz class as a way of getting long term costs for the CVN as a strategic entity under control.

Otherwise, there will be 3 Ford class carriers, and by around 2025 the nation will have decided that based on cost alone a new way to project airpower from the sea will be necessary in the future. If you don't believe this move will end the big deck aircraft carrier, then you are in denial how the industrial reality will be seen in a political context once the costs go up.

For the record, opponents of big deck nuclear aircraft carriers will welcome this news, as they argue for purely military and strategic reasons that CVNs are too difficult to protect in future naval warfare to justify their price anyway. They are not fools. They know this kills construction of the big deck after 2025, hell everyone except those who talk out of their ass in politics knows this change will effectively end the age of big deck aircraft carriers as we know it today.

What do I think? Honestly, my first thought was that this almost insures Virginia goes red in the 2012 election unless people who live in Virginia hate jobs for people in their state and actually want that large area around Norfolk to be a ghost town, so it's hard to see this as the end of the road - rather the beginning of something different altogether.

But I also honestly believe the Aircraft Carrier Admiral of the US Navy today has a better than 50/50 shot of being the Battleship Admiral of 1941, and those Aircraft Carrier Admirals will be the very last people under any circumstances to admit that the age of the big deck nuclear powered aircraft carrier has been approaching dusk for some time now anyway.

My argument is this: at $10 billion a pop, and now likely in the $15 billion average range for CVN-79 and CVN-80 under this new schedule that will almost certainly cost the US taxpayer way more money than it would ever save - can the Navy do more and better for the same money? ~$30 billion for 2 aircraft carriers that has no aircraft or escorts and drives requirements for both aircraft and escorts in the rest of the US Navy budget is an investment that goes well beyond ~$30 billion, and for just $30 billion I am pretty sure Newport News could build 8 SSGNs at $4 billion a piece average based on the SSBN(X) design because of cost savings that would come from increasing the quantity of submarines purchased during the 2020s decade.

In my world of strategic and political theory, I'd take those SSGNs with that money anyway while admitting under many circumstances not named China that I'm probably getting the raw deal. This is a bigger deal than the politics and economics and budgets will ever reflect in conversation. What is the true value of 50 years of projecting airpower from sea? A big deck nuclear powered aircraft carrier today is a strategic investment that the US really can't afford get wrong. Making the wrong choice would be a strategic and political blunder of incalculable magnitude; one history would record as our nation casually tossing aside the aircraft carriers strategic advantages without a clear understanding of the consequences, but doing so knowing full well that once you lose the big deck production line - there is no going back.

I'd be really curious to see how the CBO scores this, because I was told by very serious folks when this rumor started earlier this year that the nation would not save any money long term by doing this move, and wouldn't be saving more than $1-2 billion in a single fiscal year at a time the Obama budgets are in the trillions. If the CBO found that to be true, this would be incredibly EPIC fail by economic and political standards for the Obama administration.

Very ironic this news is breaking on the day remembered for Pearl Harbor. Maybe that's karma trying to tell the Aircraft Carrier Admirals something they don't want to hear...

VTUAV Updates

In the past year or so, Navy Fire Scouts have been proving their value in Afghanistan, Libya, for counter-piracy, and other operations. The Navy recently announced the stand up of its first operational VTUAV squadron, HSM-35, in 2013. As the author notes, the Navy has taken a cautious approach to deploying UAVs. Better late than never, I suppose.

What is interesting is that the Fire Scouts are being incorporated into an existing rotary wing squadron, rather than getting their own squadron as the Air Force has done with their unmanned aircraft. The Navy has recently experimented with data links between manned helos and unmanned aircraft. Does it make sense to include UAVs in a helo squadron or should they be considered a capability distinct from manned aviation? I’ve heard arguments for both ways. What do y'all think?

Also of note, the Navy has decided to arm the MQ-8s with 70mm guided rockets. This capability is hugely important and will extend the anti-surface/ground attack capability of small surface combatants.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

What would happen if European embargo is lifted

I have written in the past about the gap that has closed between China and Russia's military industrial complex. At the same time, I've also talked about the gap closing between China and Western countries. One of the questions that have always been asked is what would happen if the European arms embargo gets lifted. I certainly think that it could happen in the next 10 years. The question is what would follow after such a decision and I would like to explore the answers here.

In the event of arms embargo lifting, I think different EU countries would likely pursue different levels of military clearance when it comes to exports to China. For simplicity, I will make the assumption that most non-strategic systems from EU countries will be available to China.

For a look at how I think lifting European embargo will help China, we can take again at the cidex article. The part about Norwegian manufacturer Sensonor was most enlightening.

Sensonor’s MEMS gyroscope components offer the possibility for radically improving the accuracy of Chinese missile systems and precision-guided munitions. The central component is the STIM202 Butterfly gyro, which is a 55-gram miniature module that replaces previous-generation fibre-optic, ring laser and mechanical gyros .....
If the Sensonor technology is purchased by Chinese industry in significant numbers, their missiles and other guided weapons will achieve levels of performance and accuracy comparable to their western counterparts, but at a much lower total system cost. Even though Kotel in China are already producing a similar product, the people from Sensonor said that they are not worried about their product being reverse-engineered and illegally copied....
Why selling this product into China is not considered a violation of the EU arms embargo on the PRC is unknown. Having no ITAR content may be one issue, but the significant increase it will bring to the accuracy of Chinese weaponry certainly violates the spirit - if not the letter - of the EU embargo.

What I want to illustrate here is that EU companies are already helping PLA modernization even with the arm embargo in place. When China wants to purchase platforms or technology from Russia, it has to deal with Rosoboronexport and Russian government. Unlike its dealings with Russia, China relies on EU companies more for components and subsystems rather than whole systems. Small European companies like Sensonor provide quality commercial off the shelf products that can be used on missiles, avionics and platforms. The entire Russian defense industry has progressed more into the world of capitalism, but much of its practice is still stuck in Soviet Era mindset. The Russian companies that produce components for military systems can do so for Russian weapons, but they are not commercially competitive. In fact, many Russian weapon platforms (for domestic and export) are using European suppliers now. Similarly, China has been purchasing whatever dual use components it can from EU companies. In many cases, Chinese suppliers do exist, but the European suppliers may produce higher quality components. As in the case of Sensonor's MEMS gyroscope, Chinese missiles and PGMs have benefited with increased accuracy. I feel like if the European embargo gets lifted, more EU suppliers will be able to support different COTS components for Chinese weapons. That will simply improve the quality and price of Chinese weapons. And this will be the case even if it takes another 50 years for the embargo to be lifted. We are in globalized world economy where most products require suppliers from different countries around the world. Even if the Chinese manufacturers can build everything, they will never be the most competitive supplier for every component. As shown in the recent scandal over fake Chinese components, even US military systems require parts from everywhere around the world. Having the option of purchasing from a technologically advanced base like EU could only be very fruitful for new Chinese weapons.

At the moment, China already benefits from working with numerous EU suppliers. Certain weapon systems like HQ-7 SAM, Type 360 radar, 100 mm naval gun and PL-11 AAM are from contracts signed prior to the arms embargo. Other subsystems like Sky Master surveillance radar, SEMT Pielstick engines for different PLAN ships, Kamewa waterjet propulsion for 022s, Arriel-1 engine for Z-9s and different parts of Z-10 have been allowed to export under the dual use umbrella (or too old in the case of WS-9 engine). China has even been able to leverage the dual use nature of helicopters to enter into co-development projects for EC-120 and EC-175. China is also able to enter into co-development projects with European companies for WZ-16 (to be used on EC-175) and SF-A (the domestic option for C-919). I would imagine that propulsion technology is one area where China would seek for help if arms embargo gets lifted. Different types of turbofan engines and gas turbine would become available for aviation and naval platforms. The other areas that China can purchase from EU countries are radars, different types of sensors, combat systems and sonars. As we’ve already seen with foreign participation in the avionics of C-919, China still has a lot to gain for cooperation with Western companies. Due to concerns over IP, what EU countries are willing to export to China may not be better than Chinese products in many cases. China could also purchase European technology for air defence technology. In many of these areas like Long range SAMs, China has already made significant progress in the recent years. However, they could still cooperate on some kind of medium ranged active radar guidance naval SAM based on Aster-15 to replace the semi-active radar HQ-16. They could also cooperate with European countries on Anti-aircraft artillery as most of PLA’s AA artilleries are developed based on what they imported in the 80s. They could also obtain different kind of air defence ammunitions like DART to improve the capabilities of the 76 mm naval gun and future naval gun class. I don’t think China needs to import gun systems, but they could certainly get help on improving target acquisition and guidance. They could also cooperate with European countries to obtain the latest torpedoes. The capabilities of Chinese torpedoes are rarely mentioned, so it’s hard for me to get an idea of where they are. However, Europe certain has advanced light and heavy torpedoes that China could purchase.

There are also whole systems that China could purchase from Europe. European countries are generally fairly advanced in weapon sectors that highly leverage civilian technology like helicopters and transports and comparatively less advanced in weapon sectors that require specialized military industries like any kind of strategic platform like nuclear submarine and aircraft carrier. China can certainly purchase different kind of naval helicopters like NH-90 for the navy. It can also purchase large transport like A400M or the A330 tanker or a platform for AWACS. Even though China is making progress in these areas, it’s still quite far behind Europe in large aircraft. I’m not only talking about R&D, but also production capabilities. China is still probably a generation behind Europe in submarine technology. Even the latest submarine we saw out of WuChang shipyard is still behind the likes of U-212 and Scorpene in terms of acoustic levels and signature management. I don’t think China needs to purchase entire systems, but it could cooperate with European companies like DCN to improve the design off future submarines. Other than these areas, I can’t see a compelling case for China to purchase any other large system from Europe.

Pivot to the Gates of Tears

The clash between radical Islam and modernity manifesting itself in the littorals of the Indian Ocean is an interesting subject. Recently, one of my friends currently patrolling the Indian Ocean invited my attention to book on this very topic by Camille Pecastaing, a professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS.

The title and cover jacket (a photo of a lone Aegis cruiser) of Jihad in the Arabian Sea are a bit misleading; navalists looking for a detailed account of terrorism on the high seas might be disappointed, with only one chapter really devoted to al Qaeda’s activities on the water along with a quick treatment of Somali piracy. Those interested in understanding the reasons behind AQ's operations at sea can save some time and read a more concise account of that subject here.

That said, I'd strongly recommend the book anyone involved in researching the region or preparing to deploy there. The book provides a wealth of context on the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula’s importance to al Qaeda. Detailed chapters on the violence and chaos endemic in Somalia and Yemen for decades give the reader a greater understanding of the conditions that allowed terrorism to take root there. Knowing the history and geography of areas in which policy makers and strategists are trying to devise solutions seems like common sense, but is often dismissed in favor of combing over the latest intelligence reports for "ground truth."

Rob Farley (and others) have written about the coming “pivot” of US defense focus to the Asia-Pacific. The reality is that a pivot has already occurred, especially in naval focus. As al Qaeda’s core has been decimated in South Central Asia, the network has dispersed to safe havens around the Indian Ocean and Africa where it can parasitically latch onto other insurgencies and unrest. Yet terrorism is just one of the problems driving US national interests in the region.

As Pecastaing writes, “At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the challenges for the countries on the littoral of the Arabian Sea are civil war(s), piracy, radical Islamism, transnational terrorism, and a real risk of environmental and economic failure on both sides of the [Bab el-Mandeb] strait.” Since the demise of Saddam Hussein, attention of the US Navy has shifted from the Arabian Gulf to the Indian Ocean in response to those challenges. While ground forces remain locked in a protracted nation-building effort in Afghanistan, since 2005-ish, the US Navy has dealt with a range of irregular threats from the Mediterranean to Pakistan’s Makran Coast. Quiet, but platform-intensive counter-terrorism operations, coalition piracy efforts over millions of square miles of ocean, large scale humanitarian assistance operations, and support to regime change in Libya are just a few of the missions that have driven demand and PERSTEMPO sky high for Naval and Marine Corps units of all types. Although in the long term, forecasters of a pivot to East Asia are likely correct, in the mid-term, we should expect continued requirements for naval presence in and around the Gates of Tears.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

NPR Discussion of Military Retirement Benefits and Health Care

I did an interview with NPR on Friday for a piece airing on "All Things Considered" tonight (Sunday), and the topic was military retirement and health care benefits.  Apparently, I am one of three or four folks they interviewed for the segment, in which they wanted to put a "human face (voice)" behind some of the issues in the news today. 

A link to the story and the podcast is here.

Bryan McGrath