US Naval Institute Mails Bad Ballots to Members

My copy of Naval History Magazine came in the mail today. I note the ballot includes the Election of the Board of Directors and the Election of the Editorial Board, but does not include the election for the mission statement change.

It strikes me as a serious concern that the first ballot some members are getting in the mail doesn't even have the most important issue on the ballot. What happens to ballots that get sent in without the issue on the ballot, are those ballots invalid? Do they get counted, or tossed out, and who informs the members that they submitted a bad ballot to the vote?

Here is a picture of my Naval History Magazine ballot without the mission statement issue.


You can click and enlarge the pictures.

I originally thought this was a case where good people with good intentions were poorly executing an admirable objective in the wrong way.

It is starting to look more and more like a wardroom of assholes trying to shove a shit pie down the Institute memberships throat.

Voting shenanigans are not acceptable.

The Scarlet E--Military Style

Note to ID readers:  This piece is MUCH more politically oriented than I normally post here, it was written primarily for my political blog, but treats with subject matter of interest to many here. .  If you  wish not to read a politically oriented post, please skip this.

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I have written before that the middle class of the United States increasingly wears a Scarlet "E" pinned to its chest, with "E" standing for "entitlements".  You can find those thoughts here, here.   I've also written about the rise of the view that "taking care of our troops" and being "pro-military" increasingly means lavishing more and more social benefits upon military members, their families and retirees (here, here, here,  here)  This of course, in a nation drowning in the chop of its own debt.

Into this atmosphere comes the latest unspeakable injustice; it seems that the Congress, in an effort to reform what was already a far too generous  VA education benefit, has capped tuition that can be paid to veterans pursuing higher education, creating a situation in which such students qualify for ADDITIONAL money in 39 states, and students in 11 states will see a cut in their benefit.  Of course, those students seeing a decrease in their benefits have taken to the barricades in opposition to this crime against all that is good and proper.

I've seen a plethora of reports about this on Facebook, and on a very human level, I understand the financial shock of attending a VERY pricey university--mostly on Uncle Sugar's dime--and now having to pony up for some portion of the tuition.  I get that you budgeted on the basis of a certain costshare agreement with the federal government, and that this change is going to be very discomforting.  But read this article.  Are we supposed to muster righteous indignation over the plight of a young man who has attended Columbia for three years on this benefit who is going to have to come up with some of his own money to finish (whoops--he chose political science as a major--bad decision, champ!).  I'm just not there, folks.  We are in a genuine debt emergency here, and the Congress had NO business writing this blank check to begin with.  I fee bad for Mr. Boehm, but I figure he'll make it with some student loan debt and a Columbia degree.  Additionally, I've seen others protest the new funding who are picking up their third degree courtesy of Uncle Sugar--and so I am unable to show any empathy.

What we're seeing here is the micro view of the macro problem.  We're taking on water but no one wants to be the first to bail.  Groups parade about with signs that call for cutting government spending on one side and "Hands off My Medicare" on the other.  Cutting government spending is oh so popular, until people actually have to start thinking about what should be cut.  It seems the only thing that gets any real support for cutting is the foreign aid account, which always disappoints those who hear how pitifully small a pot it is. Many caught in this issue urge a "grandfather clause" that states those already in the program continue to receive at the level they previously were.  And so continues the buck pass to the next guy. 

I'm sorry friends, especially those of you still on active duty who are going to have to dig deeper for the cash to finish your degrees.  I think if you consider the big picture, and the percentage the government ultimately does pick up, you'll still see your own contribution as an investment.

Cross-Posted at The Conservative Wahoo

Bryan McGrath

United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter From VADM Bob Dunn

Naval Institute Mission

One day shortly you will be receiving a ballot from the Naval Institute. Among the more important items on which you will be asked to vote is the Mission , listed as Issue 2 on the ballot. What that proposed change would do is to change the current 138 year old Naval Institute Mission from,

" ...provide an independent forum for those who dare to read, think, speak, and write in order to advance the professional, literary, and scientific understanding of sea power and other issues critical to national defense,"

to one of advocacy.

In the event you have not seen the proposal I have attached it for your review. The USNI has well served the sea services and the Nation by providing a forum. Neither the Navy nor the other sea services need another advocate. There is already a plethora of organizations and the Navy's own CHINFO and Chief of Legislative Affairs that do just that. Advocacy is specifically not what the Naval Institute should be all about. In fact, in personal conversation some former CNOs have said to me, “I don’t need another lobbyist.”

Yet, to my knowledge there has not been a discussion of this most important and basic change in the Mission outside the Board of Directors and, I understand, there is no literature with the ballot that offers an explanation.

I most strongly recommend you vote, No, to the change.

Let me also stress how important it is that you vote. The Naval Institute, like so many other membership organizations, seldom garners more than fifteen percent of the members' votes in an election of any sort. When those who care don't vote, those with an agenda will carry the day. If those with the agenda of changing the mission carry the day in this instance, the Naval Institute as it has been known since 1873 will degenerate and eventually pass into history as just another of the plethora of naval oriented organizations and Proceedings will degenerate along with it.

Please vote!

By the way, I write from the perspective of a Golden Life Member, a former chairman of the editorial board for Proceedings, a former interim Naval Institute Press director and a frequent contributor to the forum.

VADM Bob Dunn


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If you vote using the online ballot system set up at the United States Naval Institute, you may notice the first vote on the ballot is for the Board of Directors. It can be a bit confusing and doesn't come with an instruction manual, so this short tutorial might be useful for those willing to express a sense of opinion towards those who are involved in pushing this change to the mission statement of the United States Naval Institute.

On the first page, you may notice you are asked if you are FOR or AGAINST the election of the nominees listed for Board of Directors. If you choose FOR then select the option at the bottom of the page to "Record my vote Now" you will cast a vote for every member of the Board of Directors. If you choose the AGAINST option, you are taken to a page where you can be more selective. For example, on the first page I choose AGAINST and then selected the option to "Record my vote Now":
After I choose the AGAINST option, I am taken to page 1a where I get to be more specific about my vote. The default on the page is everyone checked, but you are specifically asked to "un-check the nominees you'd prefer not to vote for." There was only one person that I wanted to vote for, so my selection looks like this:
I do not know anything about Mr. Cady or Mr. Miller, but after putting together the extraordinary number of rumors circulating around the roles in the current mission statement change of the other seven people on the list, I feel very comfortable with my vote on this ballot.

I encourage every member of USNI to vote against the proposal to change the mission statement. Previous information on this discussion can be found here and here.

The Seamless Whole: Bring Naval Tactical Fleet Employment Back into Professional Military Education

The following article was contributed to Information Dissemination by Phillip Scott Wallace. P. S. Wallace is a Lieutenant Commander in the Individual Ready Reserve who served ten years on active duty. A graduate of Georgia Tech, he was an enlisted sonar technician on the USS Columbia (SSN-771) before being commissioned. Winged as a Naval Flight Officer, he has 1100 flight hours, flew with VF-103 "Jolly Rogers" in the fleet, and was the last Operational Test Director for the Tomcat at VX-9 Detachment Point Mugu before leaving active duty. A graduate of the Naval War College's College of Distance Education, he is currently a flight test engineer with the F-35 Integrated Test Force at NAS Patuxent River.

In his famous 1965 letter to the then-President of the Naval War College, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz said that there was nothing that had happened in the Pacific war that had not been predicted or studied prewar by students and faculty at that institution [1]. While some may care to argue the exact particulars of that point of view, it is true that during those interwar years students played tactical war games and also planned whole campaigns as they figured out how to defeat the Japanese threat; and thus were fairly familiar with many issues at a broad level when they later had to make flag-level decisions during the real war. It shouldn’t be too hard to see that it was this combination of study at both the tactical and strategic levels by many of its future Admirals that helped lay the groundwork for the success of the United States Navy in World War II.

Today’s Naval War College JPME I curriculum focuses on the operational level of war, especially in joint environments. This is not to be slighted, not by any means, not in the least--for it is a first-class education; an absolutely necessary one; one that is highly critical to being both a commanding officer (at any level) and a staff officer for a joint command; and one that is valued by any who holds it. But it is not enough.

The naval tactical level—and especially exploration of the concepts of fleet tactical employment as a combined arms whole [2]--needs to be brought back as a serious item of study in the curriculum at the War College and elsewhere. This need becomes more imperative if we think that we may one day face a challenge on the seas as in days of old.

This is because for a sea service, great changes in strategic fortune can come from single tactical events, unlike modern land war [3]. The Battles of Midway and Savo Island are exemplars of this fundamental truth. Sunken ships cannot be sent replacements from the training battalions, nor can their depleted motor pools be refilled from rear depots. Once gone, they are gone.

In addition, like the Air Force, the fate of the Navy in combat is more heavily tied to the relative quality of its equipment vis a vis the enemy (ships, airplanes, and weapon systems) than is correspondingly true for the Army (which can at times rest on the fighting spirit of ill- or under-equipped infantry units, such as in the 1944 defense of Bastogne by the 101st Airborne). The proper selection of naval equipment (including aerial vehicles) is therefore heavily reliant upon a proper understanding of the tactical environment that equipment will operate in; because far more than in land warfare, in naval and air warfare tactical success means strategic success—and it is far harder to quickly re-equip a Navy or Air Force with the right gear once war has begun than it is for land forces. Tactical study and innovation matter, and they pay off most if done in interwar years[4].

Regarding today’s professional military education, a credible case can be made that sometime after the McNamara years of the 1960s the Navy started distancing the officer corps from a continuous study of war at all its levels, in part because of the need to compete with academic national security experts who had influence over civilian leaders and had greater prestige because of those academic credentials. Advanced military study became focused on the operational and higher levels, including those larger national security issues that the academics specialized in. The lack of a peer naval competitor with a credible battle fleet threat may also have played an initial role in this trend. In addition, there has been the fracturing of the Navy into the three main warfare communities, each of which at times has perhaps shown no desire to learn about the other (except in how to counter opposing budget proposals).

This has meant that senior and mid-level military professional education has became increasingly divorced from intense study of the lower levels of war, with the study of employment at the tactical level being often left to fleet training schools and/or small centers. Much good work is done there. The problem with this approach, though, is that tactical innovation often becomes left to highly capable personnel at the O-3 and O-4 level who are nevertheless still only beginning their warfare educations at the higher levels (if at all); personnel who might not yet have the vision and experience to make large jumps like a Jackie Fisher made with the Dreadnought; personnel who can often only innovate with what is already in the fleet or can be made available on a short time line; personnel who also often don’t have the time or credibility to get their ideas heard at the senior levels (meaning that perhaps new ideas and new equipment proposals increasingly start coming from think tanks and DOD civilians instead of from the service itself); and personnel who in today’s combined arms environment are from one branch of the service, say aviation, and may never become familiar with the tactical employment of another branch—say the Submarine Force—to any great depth, because they never had a chance to do so in a serious, formal manner.

It also means ideas for tactical employment of the fleet as a whole (including the maritime patrol aircraft element) may not get the study they need, and certainly may not get widespread propagation or the familiarization needed for immediate use in war from day one.

This is simply a poor way of doing business for an organization heavily dependent upon tactical outcomes. If today’s Navy thinks tactics and tactical innovation are mainly the province of the O-3 and O-4 in training schools, with the higher ranks, after they have earned their marks of excellence as operators, going on to focus on other things (operational staff items, personnel, administration, budgets, etc.) it is wrong. The above opinion is based upon the author’s own familiarity with Naval Aviation, and he acknowledges affairs may be different in than he thinks, especially in other communities—but does not feel it to be overly so such as to make the larger point irrelevant.

Innovation naturally does occur in fleet training schools but may get stifled if a “schoolhouse answer” approach starts reigning. Ideas generated in the schools may also have difficulty breaking out upward through the chain of command; or in being able to get new equipment delivered to the fleet—and the same goes more than double for ideas generated outside the schools or any specialized study centers. The potential solution is that tactical study at academic institutions will serve as a way around these kinds of choke points if they occur, especially for studies of unified fleet combat operations.

It should also be obvious that a nation that has prospered under a free enterprise system will benefit if competition in ideas occurs in an orderly way in its naval establishment. The heritage of Proceedings shows that. Competition is good, and so is exposing broad numbers of officers to concepts in a way that asks them to not just learn, but to think and innovate—for in creative thought as well in war, numbers can tell out. The more officers you have looking at an issue throughout their career, the more innovative ideas you will have, and the more the unrestricted line officer corps will think of themselves as samurais of the Naval Art and not just members of a warfare community.

Therefore, my argument is that it is simply not enough to study grand strategy, national security, and operational warfare at the more senior levels (O-4 and above). In both battle itself and, in war overall, the tactical, the operational, the economic, the technological and the grand strategic all merge—each influencing the other in a way that cannot always be neatly separated into non-interfacing bins segregated by rank or level.

Serious, formal, on-going thought about tactical fleet employment concepts needs to be part of formal professional military education all the way to the O-5 level, to provide a proper base for later decisions and tactical innovation as well as to demolish barriers between the Navy’s warfare branches. The O-5, O-6, and O-7 should be just as ready and able to compete in the game of tactical innovation as the O-3 and O-4.

For it was Nelson—the “battle group” commander--who innovated at the Battle of the Nile; and it was Admirals Joseph Reeves and William Moffett who did so much to advance Naval Aviation during the Golden Age. It is vitally important that senior personnel be interested in tactical innovation (especially at the combined-arms fleet level), for pre-war concepts of tactical action play a large role in making funding decisions and naturally impact the way the later battle play out[5].

As an example, the actions in the Slot during the Guadalcanal and Solomons campaigns were in part predetermined before they ever occurred by the Japanese pre-war emphasis of the Long Lance torpedo and night action; and by the emphasis by the American navy on using the naval gun in daylight action. These pre-war funding and training decisions heavily influenced the tactical outcomes of the individual night action battles; whose outcomes then heavily determined the operational and strategic flow of the war as a whole for a while[6].

The inability of American surface forces to decisively halt Japanese resupply efforts, in part because of the kind of Navy that was created before the war relative to the one the Japanese created, resulted in the Guadalcanal campaign lasting six months and in the diversion of some supplies from one theater to another. The tactical, economic, political, organizational, and strategic all affected each other—a truth then and now. The Southwest Pacific campaigns were not just a live-fire exercise in the Operational Art, nor a reading in National Security—as genuinely important as both those fields are. The campaigns of 1942-3 were tactical, operational, and strategic problems, all at the same time, and each level affected the other.

The naval tactical thus needs to be brought back into the systematic study of war at all levels—including the Naval Academy and NROTC via Naval Warfare courses--so that it can shed light on many factors necessary for flag-level decision makers and civilian leaders to consider as they make force-level decisions; so that it can create a common naval warriors ethos; and so that it can hopefully result in a steady sharpening of the tactical level sword by more-senior personnel who add the additional years of study in comparative warfare they have (hopefully) made during their careers to the tactical operational familiarity of more junior personnel who actually operate the equipment.

The fleet tactical should not be divorced from the operational or strategic, either in planning or study or thought or training. The flag-level commander and the plebe should be as enthusiastic and interested in the fleet tactical as the operator. War is a seamless whole—the tactical affects the grand strategic, and vice versa. Especially for navies[7].

Therefore, the different levels of war are interlinked, and in the Navy flag-level decision makers are really making tactical decisions when they make budget decisions. They should thus have a life-long interest in tactics and tactical innovation, and tactics should not be just considered an issue for the individual boat or CRUDES squadron or aviation formation commander and the respective training establishments behind them—for fleet employment as a whole will fall through the cracks, if nothing else. We may face a peer competitor at sea one day. We might want to be ready. Serious, widespread study of tactics and tactical innovation, especially on a fleet level, should be reintroduced to places like the Naval War College and Naval Academy, as well as continue in the places where it is happening today.

[1] Letter of 19 September 2024 from Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN to Vice Admiral Charles W. Melson, USN; Source (among others): Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm’s Way by Professor Douglas V. Smith, United States Naval Institute Press, 2006, p. 8.

[2] See page 10 of the first edition of Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice by Captain Wayne P. Hughes, USN (Ret.) for a useful definition of what is meant by the phrase “fleet tactics”. The book is recommended as a must-read in its entirety.

[3] Consider for example Winston S. Churchill’s famous comment that “Jellicoe was the only man on either side who could lose the entire war in an afternoon.” Quote found in The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War, Colin S. Gray, 1992, p. 19.

[4] A recurring theme in Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat, Robert Higham and Stephen J. Harris, eds., 2006, is that the air forces presented as case studies failed the test of combat once it began because at some level—technological, economic, material, doctrine, etc.—those combat arms were “not ready” when the war occured—and that the cause of not having the right service at the right time for the right war often had its roots in pre-war long-term conditions.

[5] In their book Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, 1990, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch highlight the role “Failure to Learn” has in military disaster, and recommend robust studies in empirical history as palliatives. Their concept of “Failure to Anticipate” is also pertinent here, especially in consideration of the need to think about possible enemy tactics in relation to our tactics and strategy.

[6] For narratives and discussion of these very illuminative campaigns and battles, see RADM Samuel Eliot Morrison’s History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume V: The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942—February 1943 and Volume VI: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier 22 July 1942—1 May 1944; as well as CAPT Hughes discussion in Chapter 5 of his book.

[7] A quote from Clausewitz’s on p. 386 of the Michael Howard and Peter Paret translation of On War, 1976 is very pertinent: “That is why we think it is useful to emphasize that all strategic planning rests on tactical success alone and that—whether the solution is arrived at in battle or not—this is in all cases the fundamental basis for the decision. Only when one has no need to fear the outcome—because of the enemy’s character or situation or because the two armies are evenly matched physically and psychologically or indeed because one’s own side is the stronger—only then can one expect results from strategic combinations

SECDEF Preps the Budget Battlefield

The Secretary of Defense gave another one of his bravura performances Friday, with this speech at West Point.  Like his speech at last year's Sea, Air and Space Symposium (in which he challenged Navy and Marine Corps sacred cows before a largely naval audience), Gates showed no timidity in shaking things up for an Army audience.  Key quote for those of you keeping track of my quixotic quest to unbalance the defense budget in favor of American Seapower:

The need for heavy armor and firepower to survive, close with, and destroy the enemy will always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and Fallujah can no doubt attest.  And one of the benefits of the drawdown in Iraq is the opportunity to conduct the kind of full-spectrum training -- including mechanized combined arms exercises -- that was neglected to meet the demands of the current wars. 

Looking ahead, though, in the competition for tight defense dollars within and between the services, the Army also must confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements --  whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere.  The strategic rationale for swift-moving expeditionary forces, be they Army or Marines, airborne infantry or special operations, is self-evident given the likelihood of counterterrorism, rapid reaction, disaster response, or stability or security force assistance missions.  But in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should "have his head examined," as General MacArthur so delicately put it.

I have a feeling that were he to remain in office, Gates might actually take this one on.  I would like to see Congress hold him accountable for this statement in any upcoming testimony, by asking him to elaborate on how statements like this can serve as the impetus for change, and whether he believed such change was possible in the current Pentagon environment.

Bryan McGrath

The Mission of the U.S. Naval Institute by Rear Admiral Tom Marfiak (ret)

Dear Norm,

Thank you for sending your thoughts on the forthcoming ballot issue relating to the mission statement of the Naval Institute.

I must confess I was surprised to hear of this development. Although it has been several years , I am proud of what we achieved, and prouder still to have many friends and colleagues with whom I maintain cordial relationships. Yet, I had heard no preliminary whispers. It seems logical to me that changing the mission statement, after some one hundred thirty seven years, is an epochal event. As such, the entire membership should weigh in. From the bright junior officers who represent our future, to the eminent senior officers whose sense of vision has sustained our profession, to the articulate and thoughtful civilian members who enrich our institute with their thoughts and insights, all of us have a role in determining the future of the Naval Institute. If a course change is warranted, we should make it, but knowingly, after a debate in the best traditions of the Naval Institute itself.

As I understand it, we are to shortly receive a ballot where the mission change will be an item, inter alia. Why isn't it a separate item, highlighted, and discussed at some length in the pages of Proceedings? Have I missed something? Has the Naval Institute failed to meet its goals and objectives? Has it failed to adapt to the rigors of the digital age? From my perspective as a former CEO, it has done so brilliantly. The pages of our flagship journal have been enriched by an active and ongoing discussion on the issues before the United States and its maritime services, both as unique services and as parts of the Joint Armed Forces of the United States. Before we vote on a matter of such fundamental importance to the future of the Naval Institute, we should have a far reaching discussion. I know I have been preoccupied with many other issues, but I don't recall us having had this discussion. It may be time to have it, but it deserves more visibility than a checked box on a ballot.

Read the mission statement. It is straightforward. It says what the Naval Institute is, "an independent forum." It defines who is part of it, "those who dare to read, think, speak,and write." Then it says why we exist, "to advance the professional, literary and scientific understanding of seapower and other issues critical to national defense." The brave men who sat down in Annapolis in 1873 wrote well. Their vision was long. They could not have seen the future, yet they gave us a framework for thinking that has withstood the test of time. Before we change it in a fundamental way, we need to examine where we are, where we want to go, and determine if changing the mission statement, and the related vision and objectives of the Institute need to be changed as well.

The vision statement, for example, says that "through intellectual rigor and honesty second to none" the Naval Institute will "test the intellectual wisdom and explore the power of new ideas." How it does that, of course, contributes to our relevancy in the information age. I'll let others comment, but it seems to me that the Naval Institute does that now, just as it has for the past thirteen decades. Further, the objectives of the Naval Institute are clearly stated. They are three. First "foster an understanding of the need for a strong national defense." Second, foster an understanding of "the role of the sea services in preserving it", and third, foster an understanding of our "obligation to the men and women of the all volunteer force who provide it." The final section states three characteristics the Institute must embody. It must be independent, i.e. no government support. Its goals and objectives must "transcend political affiliations." And (this is important), it must "encourage ideas." All of these, the vision, objectives and desired characteristics, are tied together by the open forum. Before we embark on a new course, we should understand more completely the necessity for change, lest we lose that which is most precious to us, our intellectual honesty and our vision.

There are consequences to any action. We should understand the consequences of a vote before we take it. That is what democracy is all about. We need to be an informed electorate. Nothing less than our future depends on it.

Thank you again for alerting me and others. I hope these few thoughts help focus the issue. They are too important not to merit our most careful and thoughtful consideration.

Tom Marfiak
Rear Admiral USN Ret.


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Rear Admiral Marfiak (ret) hits on an important point that this has not been a transparent process. Furthermore, it would be difficult to suggest this is a call for broader discussion when in fact there is nowhere to actually discuss the issue, except in the broader naval blog community. Any member who has published with the USNI in the past can at any time contribute an opinion on this blog to be published. Just email me using the link in the top right of this blog.

Many of you have emailed me for more information on what is going on at USNI. I really do not know the full story, only parts of it. I will provide more background and history as I know it next week, including where various members on the Board of Directors comes down on this issue. I do know that the Board of Directors effectively fired General Wilkerson as CEO for not supporting this change to the Institutes mission statement. As I understand it, Tom's last duty as CEO will be Honors Night in October and as you might imagine, the Board of Directors has already assembled a search committee to find the next CEO; no doubt a CEO who is more willing to implement this new mission direction.

That is cart before the horse in my opinion, because this mission statement proposal will be going down in flames.

I intend to discuss this issue for the next several weeks, and I hope all of you are sharing information with your network of USNI members over email, social media, and in your place of work should you know other USNI members. As always, I encourage members to email the USNI Board of Directors with your thoughts regarding the new mission statement proposal and other current events at the USNI.

USNI members can begin voting against this proposal online at this link. In playing with it a little, there are a few tricks to the online voting system, so I will likely make a blog post specifically on the online voting system next week.

People have asked me how big of a deal I think this mission statement proposal is at USNI. With the exceptions of the wars and the FY 2011 / FY 2012 budget, I honestly believe this is the most important thing happening in the national security debate in the United States today. From the ashes of this proposal will be an opportunity to boldly move forward the United States Naval Institute, and if done with the right vision and with a commitment to the existing mission statement; I honestly believe the United States Naval Institute today is optimally positioned to facilitate the national security debate of this country in the 21st century just as the United States Naval Institute has done at other times over the last 138 years.

I intend to explain my vision for how that can be accomplished next week.

US Naval Institute Official Announcement on Mission Change

The United States Naval Institute has published an official member ballot announcement regarding the mission statement change.

A few things annoy me about this statement.

The use of the phrase "Proactive advocate" suggests to me the organization would change into a political lobby. That seems to me to be the fastest way to get the USNI thrown off the campus at Annapolis.

"Proper role" is just as bad in my opinion, and in the context of events taking place around the world in 2011 - shockingly ignorant. I'll be revisiting this topic very soon.

I could not be more disappointed by the decision to push this change by the Board of Directors, and when you combine the lack of transparency and the removal as CEO of General Wilkerson as part of pushing this change, I begin to wonder what the motivations are.

Apparently, the Board of Directors at USNI honestly believes that some specific message is most important, as if only someone could perfectly articulate the right collection of phrases and speeches then "global seapower" would suddenly emerge as a national priority.

To me, such logic reveals a lack of understanding regarding modern communications, which means these folks would be completely inept as advocates anyway.

Asia Sending Ships to Libya

From China Signpost, Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson offer some analysis regarding the latest news from the PLA Navy.

The PLA Navy has just dispatched Xuzhou, a Type 054 Jiangkai-II class missile frigate, from the ongoing seventh PLAN anti-piracy task force deployment off Somalia to steam to Libyan coast to provide support and protection for the ongoing evacuation mission there. The escort mission has been approved by the Central Military Commission, according to Xinhua, and at least 6,300 of the roughly 30,000 PRC citizens in Libya have been evacuated. The news agency adds that the Chinese evacuation is also utilizing chartered aircraft, overland routes to Egypt and Tunisia, ships from China’s major state shipping firms, and Greek merchant vessels in the region, which are said to be closely coordinating their operations with the Chinese government and plan to evacuate up to 15,000 Chinese from Libya.

They also have some insights into what this represents.

Xuzhou’s mission marks an important milestone because to the best of our knowledge, this is the first ever dispatch of a PLA military platform specifically assigned to help protect a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) to help PRC citizens trapped in an active conflict zone. Chinese policymakers now have a precedent for future military operations in areas where the lives and property of expatriate PRC citizens come under threat. We expect that the Chinese people’s popular support for the mission will be high.

Their entire analysis is worth reading.

Also noteworthy, the South Koreans are dispatching the 4,500-ton Choi Young KDX-II destroyer and the Indians are sending a three ship task force consisting of 2 destroyers and INS Jalashawa, the former USS Trenton. Both the Chinese and South Korean ships are being redirected from anti-piracy duties to Libya.

Not the Stuff of Bud Light Lime

I've been reading the latest cover story of Rolling Stones by Michael Hastings titled Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators. This is a very well written article, so I encourage people to read it before reading further. Reading the article is quite necessary to understand what is actually happening here.

Read it? Good.

I have taken from the article all of the quotes from Lt. Colonel Michael Holmes that were used to frame the context of the story. Holmes is the leader of the information operations unit that works for Lt. Gen. William Caldwell. I have intentionally left out all the "context" Michael Hastings added to the story to frame the narrative.

The way the article is written, one would likely get the impression some shenanigans were going on in Caldwell's office. Perhaps, however, if we add our own context to the very same statements, a different picture emerges.

It starts with Lt. Colonel Michael Holmes describing in his words what his job as a social software internet messageboard warrior is in the Army.

My job in psy-ops is to play with people’s heads, to get the enemy to behave the way we want them to behave"

"I’m prohibited from doing that to our own people. When you ask me to try to use these skills on senators and congressman, you’re crossing a line."

Facebook friending a House Armed Service Committee member is bad. Got it. No Farmville with the Senator from North Dakota. Got it.

This is where it gets interesting, because this is where Lt. Gen. Caldwell assigns Lt. Colonel Holmes a job to do.

According to Holmes, who attended at least a dozen meetings with Caldwell to discuss the operation, the general wanted the IO unit to do the kind of seemingly innocuous work usually delegated to the two dozen members of his public affairs staff: compiling detailed profiles of the VIPs, including their voting records, their likes and dislikes, and their "hot-button issues." In one email to Holmes, Caldwell’s staff also wanted to know how to shape the general’s presentations to the visiting dignitaries, and how best to "refine our messaging."

According to Holmes, the general wanted the IO team to provide a "deeper analysis of pressure points we could use to leverage the delegation for more funds."

The team was also instructed to "prepare the context and develop the prep package for each visit."

"How do we get these guys to give us more people?" he demanded. "What do I have to plant inside their heads?"

In other words, Lt. Colonel Holmes and his IO team are being asked to take a break from their messageboard warrior time and Facebook friend time and being delegated to do staff nerd work, and their job is to prepare Lt. Gen. Caldwell for the dog and pony show of visiting VIPs. The ego of this Holmes guy is incredible, because he is making the suggestion through this Rolling Stones article that his skills with a keyboard are so l33t, the simple task of being assigned the role to prepare a General for a briefing with VIPs equates to an information operation against elected officials by deploying his Google searches and subsequent analysis as an influence weapon. The irony is, this kind of staff work is usually done by someone all the time, and the great offense here is that the IO Team, which is basically a social software debate club, is being assigned this work. The shame!

How did Holmes approach his responsibility as a staff nerd?

"We called it Operation Fourth Star," says Holmes. "Caldwell seemed far more focused on the Americans and the funding stream than he was on the Afghans. We were there to teach and train the Afghans. But for the first four months it was all about the U.S. Later he even started talking about targeting the NATO populations."

Under duress, Holmes and his team provided Caldwell with background assessments on the visiting senators, and helped prep the general for his high-profile encounters. But according to members of his unit, Holmes did his best to resist the orders.

In other words, being delegated to a mere research assistant was so offensive, that he lashes out at his boss for giving him the remedial task of providing "Caldwell with background assessments on the visiting senators" to help "prep the general for his high-profile encounters." Instead of doing the work assigned as ordered, because Holmes thinks his keyboard skills are lethal, he "did his best to resist the orders."

Are you kidding me? A disgruntled Lt. Col. who normally does information operations in the Facebook fan club of Caldwell's social software shop gets assigned staff work for VIP visits, and the article frames that assignment to Holmes - leveraging his opinion of being assigned what he considers work beneath his keyboard skill set - as a crime? Yep, and that context is reinforced by the author with this statement in the article.

In a statement to Rolling Stone, a spokesman for Caldwell "categorically denies the assertion that the command used an Information Operations Cell to influence Distinguished Visitors."

That statement is accurate, because for it to be inaccurate we would have to believe that the research skills of Lt. Col. Holmes are so incredible that his background research alone can "influence Distinguished Visitors." Does Michael Hastings realize the insult he is delivering regarding the intelligence of Congressmen and Senators for that assertion of his to be true?

Some are suggesting there needs to be an investigation. Based on what, the claim by Hastings that Holmes is so skilled at research that such research is influential to the point that it represents an information operation? Seriously, show me the allegation by Holmes that something illegal took place, because the article makes clear he was asked to do prep work for VIP visitors, and the implication being made here is that only because it was HOLMES who was asked to do that work is it somehow improper. Oh no, dude has to do work other than counter Jihad on the messageboards... oh the shame - the criminal shame!

Sorry folks, but I don't see this as the stuff of Bud Light Lime. The only allegation being made is that Caldwell dared to ask this Holmes and his internet nerds to research and plan for a visit by VIPs for the purposes of briefing and prepping Caldwell for the visit, and the intent was so that Caldwell would be prepared to communicate more effectively his needs for more money and more people. Those are the specific allegations made by Holmes in the story, everything else in the story was the narrative that implied illegal activity added by Michael Hastings.

All we have learned is that either Holmes of Hastings are excellent at PSY-OPs, because either Holmes pulled an excellent PSY-OP over Hastings to burn his former boss in Rolling Stones magazine, or Hastings pulled an excellent PSY-OP on Rolling Stones readers to suggest that Army staff work done for the purposes of preparing for VIP visits is criminal.

What I see here is a disgruntled staff officer with an axe to grind against his boss, and a reporter willing to play along.

United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter From Norman Polmar

The following letter is being circulated and is for members of the United States Naval Institute. I can guarantee that I intend to discuss this topic quite a bit over the next month.

All,

I am writing to you--fellow members of the U.S. Naval Institute--to urge that you vote against the proposed change of the USNI mission statement that is being mailed out with the March issue of the Proceedings magazine. The current statement is refined from the original, 1873 mission written at the establishment of the USNI (see below). I believe that USNI members who believe in the principles of our 138-year-old professional organization should strongly object to three words/terms in the proposed change of the mission statement:

(1) "an independent forum advocating" I believe these words are self-contradictory. The USNI has established itself as the leading international naval--and increasingly "defense"--forum because it has not "advocated" anything but has let authors (military and civilian, of all ranks, genders, and even nationalities) express their opinions. "Advocating" a position will unquestionably deter the USNI serving as an independent forum.

(2) "global sea power" What does this mean? The Soviet Union from 1970 (the massive Okean exercise) until 1991 was certainly a "global sea power"--does the USNI advocate a rehabilitation of Russian sea power? Or a buildup of Chinese global sea power? Or Japanese? Or ...? And, does "global sea power" include a strong merchant marine--which we do not have and will not develop in the foreseeable future? Or fishing fleet? Or ....? Again, "global sea power" is ambiguous and misleading.

(3) "economic prosperity" Again, for whom? The world? Then the USNI is encouraging every nation (including Iran, N. Korea, China, etc.) to develop global sea power. Or only for the United States? How does "global sea power" help U.S. prosperity--other than the shipbuilding industry?

The proposed new mission statement makes the USNI appear to be a lobbying and "cheerleading" organization for.... I am not quite certain for what or whom. In the years that I have been associated with the Naval Institute (since age 15), I was taught that those roles--lobbying and cheerleading--were the purpose of the Navy League, not the Naval Institute.

The USNI now exists "to provide an independent forum for those who dare to read, think, speak, and write in order to advance the professional, literary, and scientific understanding of sea power and other issues critical to national defense." I believe that mission statement is still valid and germane.

I strongly urge all members to REJECT the proposed change to the USNI mission statement.

All good wishes/Norman

I stand with Norman Polmar, and strongly believe that information and education on the issue will overwhelmingly lead to a rejection of the proposed change to the USNI mission statement. I encourage all members of the United States Naval Institute to forward a copy of this letter, and all other information about this proposed change to every USNI member you know; via email, Facebook, Twitter, and with every other communication tool you prefer.

The mission statement of USNI is Acticle I, Section II of the Constitution and By-Laws and is available from this link to USNI members. The existing mission statement:

ARTICLE I Name and Mission

Section 2. The Mission of the Institute is “to provide an independent forum for those who dare to read, think, speak, and write in order to advance the professional, literary, and scientific understanding of sea power and other issues critical to national defense.”

The proposed change would be:

The Mission of the Institute is “to be an Independent Forum advocating the necessity of global sea power for national security and economic prosperity.”

In discussing this issue with many of you over the last week, several of you have commented that we already have a Navy League. I agree, The Navy League is a great organization that some on the Board of Directors apparently want USNI to compete against. The Navy League mission statement is:

The Navy League of the United States is a non-profit organization dedicated to educating our citizens about the importance of sea power to U.S. national security and supporting the men and women of the sea services and their families.

Some folks on the Board of Directors are trying to pull a fast one here hoping no one is paying attention. I will be doing everything I can to insure every member in my network is aware of the choice represented in this vote. My goal is two fold:

• Help campaign for members to reject this proposal.
• Help get out the vote so that this becomes the largest vote in the 138 year history of the United States Naval Institute.

As I intend to outline in detail over the next month, I believe the United States Naval Institute has been steadily moving forward over the last few years and is poised to do amazing things towards the objective of the existing mission statement, but apparently before the organization takes that step; the members of USNI will have to burn this bad idea to the ground before launching boldly from those ashes. I cannot stress enough how shortsighted I see this proposal at this time by the Board of Directors, because the appropriate analogy as I see it is to suggest this is like fumbling the football on the 5 yard line on first down after driving all the way down the field, and just as you are about to score after being down at halftime.

According to the Constitution and By-Laws of the United States Naval Institute, to amend:

ARTICLE XVI Amendments to Constitution and By-Laws

Section 1. Proposed amendments to or changes in the Constitution and By-Laws must first be approved by the Board of Directors. Then, they shall be circulated to the members entitled to vote at least thirty days before the date the change becomes effective, if approved. Each such member in good standing shall be furnished a ballot on which to record his or her vote, and no amendment to or change in the Constitution and By-Laws shall be made without the favorable vote of two-thirds of the members voting.

I shall have many things to say on this topic over the next month. If any member who has previously been published by the United States Naval Institute (book, Proceedings, blog) wishes to write an open letter of your own to the United States Naval Institute Board of Directors on this topic, I will happily publish that letter on this blog and make sure your letter gets broadly circulated through my network of hundreds of USNI members who over the past week have volunteered to help get the word out regarding this issue.

For those who might want to be heard on this topic, I encourage you to email the USNI Board of Directors with your thoughts regarding the new mission statement proposal.

Picture Worth a Thousand Words

Could only be better if it was a photo, but close enough. From Gypsy Rogue and published at The Jawa Report.



This picture compares the Iranian corvette Alvand with a silhouette of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer. This little 4 missile corvette in the Mediterranean Sea is one of the two Iranian ships making all the news. Freedom of the seas is a rule set long enforced by the United States, so when Iran exercises that freedom they are simply conforming to our global rule set.

Feedback on Recent Discussions

A Marine Colonel submits by email to recent posts, posted with permission.

Remember When the Navy/Marine Corps Did NEO? Yes, I hope no one is forgetting that in 2006 USN/USMC evacuated 16,000 from Lebanon. To date, it does not appear that there have been any requests from DoS for NEOs in the region. Unless there is an actual shooting war, the Mediterranean area offers a robust commercial shipping and aviation infrastructure, which combined with a strong NATO maritime presence, is the preferred option for NEOs. This is the optimal way to evacuate large numbers of people out of harm's way as safe a manner as possible.

Much preferred, especially where safeguarding US lives is concerned, to trying to jam a whole lot of evacuees into military naval vessels. Italy is currently leaning forward, or may be conducting an aircraft centric NEO. Does the author really doubt Gen Ward, Adm Stavridis, or Gen Mattis are not leaning into this to look at military capabilities to support to our frontline diplomats? Just doesn't seem the author is applying strategic and critical thinking to this issue. More emotion is seems than pragmatic problem solving.

The author is on to a larger strategic thread however: current Navy orientation seems to either want a world in which it can hand out medical supplies and food, OR, go after the Chinese as part of the AirSea Battle (Beltway speak for "acquisition program"). Reality of course for the foreseeable years ahead, the real world that the rest of us live in, is that large range of operations in the middle, between these two bookends (and where China is concerned, unlikely), that many senior Navy leaders seem reluctant to want invest in for needed capabilities.

He nails me. A ferry sailed a few hours ago is loaded and ready to sail, waiting on weather, with many American citizens looking to leave Libya. With that said, I have done a fair bit of research into NEO (see here and here, for example) and I note that in most cases where Marines are called for NEO, not all, we usually leaned well forward with the presence of an amphibious ship as an option. We have done nothing like that yet on the North African coast. Because we have not done so, I do legitimately wonder if we have enough amphibious ships, and if the lack of amphibious ships available limits our options. I think it is a legitimate question for Congress to ask.

From the same Marine.

Somali Pirates Murder All 4 American Hostages: the growing perception in the trenches is that the military has long since ceded pragmatic enforcement of anti-piracy efforts to the lawyers. The author places blame on the Administration, however, I'd like to hear what our military commanders are advising. Who in the chain of command has advised civilian leadership that at minimum, we must kill the pirates and destroy their vessels at sea whenever an act of piracy occurs?

Based on these comments last month by Vice Admiral Fox, my impression is that depending upon where in the chain of command one might look, you'll find a different opinion. I could be wrong, but my assumption going in is that Mattis/Fox are ready to take back operational initiative in the region, but the civilians are pushing back. The Colonels questions and comments are on target.

Libya: The Western European Response (The Assets)

While Galrahn is raising some interesting questions about what the US has so far (not) done when it comes to Libya (loved the #carelovejoyrainbow) , I thought a overview of what the individual Western European countries are doing might also be interesting.

I'll focus on the actual assets used and not on the politcal rhetoric.

Austria: Was the first EU country to react and prepositioned a C-130 at Malta. She returned to Austria the 21st with 62 people. She is back at Malta now.
A regular Austrian Airline flight also got 136 people from Tripoli to Vienna on the 21st.

France: 3 planes (Airbus A-340 & A-310). The first plane to arrive back in France had 172 people on board, the 2nd 230 and the 3rd plane left from Tripoli today with 152 people on board.

Germany: A chartered Lufthansa plane and 2 Transalls picked up 350 people. More flights with these planes are being planned.

Italy: Alitalia tries to regularly fly to Tripoli. A C-130 has also been used. So far they got 400 people out of Libya.
Also 3 naval vessels are underway: INS Francesco Mimbelli and not INS Elettra as was posted by some news agencies, INS San Marco and INS San Georgio.

Ireland: a Learjet 45 and a CASA 235 of the Air Corps have been prepositioned at Malta.

The Netherlands: A RNLAF KDC-10 has been to Tripoli and back, returning with 82 people. A C-130 has been prepositioned at Sicily and should fly to Tripoli tomorrow.
The Dutch also have a Coast Guard Dornier 228-212 in the area, because of Operation Hermes.
The Netherlands have also sent HNLMS Tromp to Libya. The vessel was in the Red Sea on her way to Operation Ocean Shield, but was ordered to
return to the Med. This means that HNLMS De Ruyter will not return home from Ocean Shield for the time being.

Portugal: Has flown with a C-130 to Libya twice, returning with 130 people the first time and 84 the second.

Spain: Wants to send an air force plane. The Spanish Foreign Minister has received harsh critique for the length it takes her to evacuate Spanish citizens. The first Spanish plane has yet to land in Tripoli, while the French have had 3 planes return already. Spanish oil giant Repsol thought it took too long and arranged a charter plane themselves.

UK: Has chartered a plane, but that never left Gatwick Airport because of a mechanical fault. Have also ordered HMS Cumberland to go to Libya. This is her last job, as she will be decommisioned on returning home.

So how many naval vessels are we counting?
HMS Cumberland (F 85)
HNLMS Tromp (F 803)
INS Francesco Mimbelli (D 561)
INS San Marco (L 9893)
INS San Georgio (L 9892)

So, that's 1 destroyer, 2 frigates and 2 LPD's.

It's the usual suspects that are sending ships I guess, although I'm really missing the French in this list, because when it comes to Africa, it's usually France that leads the other European countries.

Yet everyone can learn something from Turkey. They were quick to react and at first sent 3 ships, followed by 2 more a day later. Total capacity: 4800 people and they are carrying more than that now on their return.

Somali Pirates Evolve Tactics After US Navy Incident

The tactical agility of pirates has long been something worth observing. It seems this took about a day.

Pirates in Somalia said Wednesday they are ferrying ammunition and men to the 30 hijacked vessels still under their control, and they threatened to kill more captives following the violent end to a hostage standoff that left four Americans dead.

This is a well written article, which later reports on an interview with EU spokesman Paddy O'Kennedy and a pirate in Somalia.

Pirates once were believed to be disgruntled and financially motivated Somali fishermen angry that international trawlers were illegally fishing Somalia's waters. Now criminal gangs dominate the piracy trade, and have begun systematically torturing hostages, including locking them in freezers.

"What we're seeing is that because of the business model the pirates have adopted is so lucrative that you're now getting organized criminal gangs involved as opposed to fishermen who just decided to have a go at piracy," said Wing Commander Paddy O'Kennedy, spokesman for the European Union's anti-piracy force.

"Criminal gangs are more violent than your average fisherman who's turned to piracy," O'Kennedy said.

A pirate in Somalia who gave his name as Adowe Osman Ali said fellow "soldiers" had ferried the reinforcements to hijacked ships in their hands on Wednesday in a bid to deter more hostage rescue attempts. He said after Tuesday's incident, captains of hijacked ships have been ordered to tell navies not to approach or hostages would be killed.

"In the past, 20 or so soldiers used to guard every ship but now the numbers are ranging between 60 and 70 soldiers," said Ali, a pirate in the coastal village of Gara'ad.

"We are more alert than anytime before," he said. "In the past, we allowed the foreign navies to approach us but now we have warned them to not get nearer to us."

Also see Katherine Zimmerman discussing the links between pirates and Al Shabaab. In that story, I got a nice laugh out of Secretary Clinton's comments about what folks concerned about piracy should do...

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted that those concerned about piracy should "contribute to AMISOM by providing material, financial, and logistical support."

Wow.

In testimony last week, Secretary Gates mentioned during one of the hearings he has over 10,000 lawyers in the DoD, describing it as excessive. Well, I hear anti-piracy is manpower intensive, so why not send the JAG Corps to VBSS school and then forward to man the VBSS boarding teams until we can find a better policy for Somalia.

I'm only sort of joking, sort of.

Last Thucydides Post...

My WPR column this week puts a cap on Thucydipalooza:

Thucydides is nearly ubiquitous in the serious and general study of American foreign policy. Although we lack good statistics for how often particular texts are taught in graduate or undergraduate courses, nearly every professor of international relations I spoke to at the conference confessed to teaching Thucydides to undergraduates, and most remembered first reading selections from "History of the Peloponnesian War" as undergraduates. But the study of Thucydides extends to graduate and policy programs as well. At the Naval War College, students are required to read Thucydides in their first course, with additional study available. Thucydides also appears on syllabi in required courses at the Army War College...

Consequently, almost everyone involved with either the professional study or formulation of foreign policy is familiar with some parts of Thucydides.

Boundaries of Social Media

If you follow the security twittersphere, you're probably familiar with the work of @JCCentCom. I don't follow JC directly, but his tweets are regularly RTed by people I do follow. Adam Weinstein suggests that there may be trouble ahead.

Remember When the Navy/Marine Corps Did NEO?

Remember when naval forces could conduct non-combat evacuation operations of American civilians in trouble? I do too, which is why I am very curious why after many weeks of governments falling on the North African coastline the US Navy doesn't have any ships in the region capable of making it happen. Instead we get stuff like this.

"As always, the safety and well-being of Americans has to be our highest priority," she said. Clinton didn't mention Gadhafi by name.

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said 35 U.S. Embassy personnel and families, who were ordered to leave Libya on Monday, haven't yet been able to depart. "The fact is today we were not able to move any of our personnel out of the country," he said.

The State Department said late Tuesday that it had chartered a ferry for U.S. citizens wanting to leave Libya that would depart from Tripoli on Wednesday to the islands of Malta, across the Mediterranean Sea.

So who is responsible for making sure the Navy is prepared for these type of operations when unrest is now into its seventh week in the region? Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Locklear, Vice Admiral Harris, or Rear Admiral Wary? Did any of these folks request a ship and get denied?

After seven weeks without a single ship surged, I am starting to wonder if the problems related to the San Antonio class has prevented the Navy from surging an amphibious ship to the Mediterranean Sea. I get it that the Kearsarge ARG might be in a holding pattern near 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain due to the tensions in that region right now, but is the Navy so short on Amphibious ships that despite the last month and a half of protests in North African coastal nations we lack the ability to get an amphibious ship from Norfolk to the Med?

The JHSV sure would be handy right about now. For that matter, if LCS-2 was actually operating as designed, she could move the 300 folks in Tripoli to Malta without any trouble.

The Day After Reflections and Questions

CTF 151 operates in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia covering an area of approximately 1.1 million square miles.

CTF 151 is a multinational task force established in January 2009 to conduct counterpiracy operations under a mission-based mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) area of responsibility to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.

CTF 151 has previously been commanded by the U.S. Navy, the Korean Navy and the Turkish Navy. The command staff is comprised of personnel from a number of coalition countries, and it manages daily operations from onboard the TCG Gokceada.

Pakistan Navy Cdre. Abdul Aleem currently commands CTF 151.

The day after the tragic murder of four Americans by Somalia piracy there are still many questions to ask. Some questions will not have answers until the FBI and Navy investigation is completed, but other questions we can begin to think about today.

The quote that begins this article is from the 5th Fleet website here under the section for Task Force 151. I believe we can read that quote and get an understanding what the mission of Task Force 151 is, but what is not stated is what the objective of Task Force 151s mission is. General and Flag Officers talk about how the US is in an era of persistent conflict, but when our military forces lack objectives like they do for the Afghanistan campaign or Somalia piracy, wouldn't it be more accurate to describe ourselves stuck in an era of perpetual conflict - potentially perpetuated by us? The only objective a civilian leader will ever discuss for Afghanistan is a withdraw date, and there has never been an objective discussed by political leaders in regards to Somali piracy.

In many ways, I believe this is what Admiral Fox has been trying to say in his cryptic speeches lately. There is no objective in anti-piracy, because when we claim "to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy" is the objective, what we are really saying is that fighting piracy forever is the objective. If piracy operations were to cease, wouldn't that mean the US Navy failed the objective of their mission? It would if we read the Task Force 151 page incorrectly.

It isn't very often the US Navy has an aircraft carrier, a cruiser, and two of the largest destroyers on the planet and loses a battle, but that is what happened on Tuesday. Obviously there are reasons why it happened, but 4 Americans died - and that is the outcome. So lets start asking questions.

The Navy's official statement said the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65), the guided-missile cruiser USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55), the guided-missile destroyers USS Sterett (DDG 104) and USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) were all involved. Could the 58 ft yacht see all four massive ships, or just the USS Sterett (DDG 104) 600 yards away? What is the message to pirates when 4 US Navy ships with a combined displacement over 130,000 tons is looming over a hijacked yacht with 21-23 people crammed together? I think I'd be nervous, and I do wonder if that made the pirates nervous enough to shoot the hostages.

How much Khat was seized? The Navy tracked the yacht for several days, meaning 17-19 pirates were living in close quarters on a little yacht likely strung out on Khat. Did they run out? We know that during the Maersk Alabama incident that when the pirates ran out of Khat the tension rose considerably, and that led to conditions that prompted the CO of Bainbridge to take action for the safety of Captain Phillips. How much Khat was seized, and if they ran out - was the Navy aware of any Khat shortage on the yacht? Drugs might explain the violence between pirates and pirates, and/or pirates and hostages. Does the widespread usage of Khat by Somali pirates make longer negotiations at sea more dangerous than quick resolutions to hostage standoffs? The FBI prefers to be patient in hostage negotiations, but does Khat change that calculation?

The US Navy has yet to conduct an armed hostage rescue against Somali pirates where violence wasn't required, and in both situations it was the threatening actions of the pirates that forced the Navy to act. One can legitimately say that armed negotiations at sea by the US Navy does not work, or one could say force is always required in hostage situations at sea. Both statements represent the pattern to date. Remember, the Magellan Star was not a hostage situation, the pirates never captured any members of the crew.

How many of the pirates had been caught and released for piracy before? As the naval forces approached 13 pirates seemed to know to drop weapons and surrender. I find that a bit odd, and it suggests that perhaps they had been part of the catch and release programs that have been ongoing for years off Somalia.

What was the name of the mothership, and what pirate town did the pirates who control the mothership come from? Is there a Xarardheere connection or an Al Shabaab link to why the Americans were killed? How long are we going to let pirates drive tankers around the Indian Ocean using them as motherships before someone decides that's a very bad idea?

Since the United States Navy cannot articulate an objective of their piracy mission, how do we measure whether or not the US Navy is helping, or hurting, the piracy situation off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean? This is the choice we must make. Either the United States Navy is incapable of dealing with pirates, or the political policy guiding the United States Navy dealing with piracy is a complete failure. Every statistic shows the number of piracy incidents is getting higher, and the number of hijackings is getting higher, and the area pirates operate is expanding, and the costs are going up, and the violence is getting worse. This is failure by every standard.

In my view, this is a complete, total, and absolute failure by the current Commander in Chief who appears to be incapable of setting objectives with Somali piracy, and anyone who lacks the gonads to say exactly that needs to have a damn good argument why the United States Navy is otherwise incapable of dealing with men carrying AK-47s and RPGs in little skiffs. The media and the think tank community is made up of chicken shit cowards who refuse to ask why the US Navy sails circles around the Gulf of Aden while piracy gets worse, and under no circumstances will anyone criticize the Obama administration for an aimless, endless perpetual violence policy in the Indian Ocean. What is the point of continuous military operations without objectives?

Can someone explain why the US Navy is sailing $2 billion destroyers around the Indian Ocean not fighting pirates while all the governments on the North African coast are imploding, and the US Navy can manage only a single destroyer in the entire Mediterranean Sea right now?

Col. David Coffman, about one year ago, sat in front of a huge audience in San Diego and discussed about 2 dozen options other than invading Somalia that the 13 MEU could do to dramatically decrease piracy events in the Indian Ocean. He and the 13 MEU deployed today to that region, why not allow Marines be Marines, and give some of those options a try?

The Obama administration's policies contribute towards the reason the United States is in an era of persistent conflict, and only his loyal but truly blind defenders can claim otherwise. The situation off Somalia is getting worse, not better, because of the actions of US Navy forces. US Navy military actions serve towards no articulated military objective while disrupting the only process that does work - the hostage for ransom exchange program that industry created when Navy's failed to take any meaningful action to curb the problem.

We talk about the merits of cooperation, but the details Admiral Fox gave today in his press conference suggests cooperation doesn't add significant value to actually dealing with issues, only responding to events after the fact.

We currently have 34 vessels, warships, that are patrolling in this area, under 15 different flags, as we speak. And that number will vary. There's an EU [European Union] counter piracy task force, there's a NATO counter piracy task force, and then I'm in command of a counter piracy task force. We each take -- we work well together and cooperate and share our resources and our information. But even with the vast distances that are involved here, you know, there's a lot -- there's a lot of places where we are not.

All this actually means anymore is that there are 15 different interpretations of international law that addresses piracy. Do you realize that the PLA Navy has more strategic clarity regarding Somali piracy than we do, because they can define mission (escort convoys) and objective (escort convoys without a hijacking) - and they have legitimate data by which to measure success or failure. The US, EU, and NATO cannot define the objective of their mission, nor do they have raw data that can be demonstrated towards mission objective success or failure.

There are many legitimate questions Congress should ask, because our nations ineffectiveness in curbing piracy is quite expensive.

If policy does not change, the only things we know will happen is the situation will continue to get worse - except maybe for the Somali pirates. It is a shame to say, but we are lucky it is only a yacht with four Americans, because we all know that with Somali piracy the world is sitting on a powder keg that could go off in any direction at any time.

Meanwhile, Off Libya at Sea

Events in Libya continue to unfold, with a Libyan Naval vessel now getting some attention:

Reports that a 'defecting' Libyan naval asset has reportedly entered Maltese waters. According to Al Jazeera, the vessel is being monitored by radar by the Italian army and concerns exist that if the vessel has defected, it might be attacked by the Libyan air-force.

Yesterday I was sent a private message asking if any rank other than a couple of Colonel's in the Libyan air force would have enough experience and knowledge to fly to Malta to defect. I guess the answer is, "Yep - naval officers could do it."

Still, the crew of an entire naval ship? I guess not everyone took the order to bomb a residential neighborhood from sea the same way.

Either way this is worth watching.

Somali Pirates Murder All 4 American Hostages - Updated

From CBS News.

The four Americans aboard a yacht hijacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia are dead, CBS News has learned.

Hijacked last Friday off Oman, the Quest was being piloted toward the Somali coast - and was being shadowed by a U.S. Navy warship.

CBS News national security correspondent David Martin reports that gunshots aboard the yacht were heard, and the warship took action.

All 4 Americans were dead, killed apparently by their captors.

There were more than a dozen pirates on board, some dead and others captured, Martin reports.

The Americans were Scott Adam and his wife, Jean, of Marina del Rey, Calif.; and Phyllis Macay and Bob Riggle, both of Seattle.

No comment, for now.

Update: Official Navy story details events.

At approximately 1 a.m. EST today, while negotiations were ongoing to secure the release of four American hostages, U.S. forces responded to gunfire aboard the pirated vessel (S/V) Quest.

As they responded to the gunfire, reaching and boarding the Quest, the forces discovered all four hostages had been shot by their captors. Despite immediate steps to provide life-saving care, all four hostages ultimately died of their wounds.

"We express our deepest condolences for the innocent lives callously lost aboard the Quest," said Gen James N. Mattis, U.S. Central Command Commander.

During the boarding of the Quest, the reaction force was engaged by pirates on board the vessel. Two pirates died during the confrontation and 13 were captured and detained along with two pirates already in US Forces custody. The US Forces also found the remains of two other pirates already dead aboard the Quest. In total, it is believed 19 pirates were involved in the hijacking of the S/V Quest.

US Forces have been closely monitoring the S/V Quest for approximately 3 days, once it became known to be pirated. Four U.S. Navy warships comprised the response force dedicated to recovering the S/V Quest: the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65), the guided-missile cruiser USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55), the guided-missile destroyers USS Sterett (DDG 104) and USS Bulkeley (DDG 84). The ships are deployed to the region to conduct maritime security operations and to provide support to operations Enduring Freedom and New Dawn.

I don't know what Operation New Dawn is, but there is certainly a "New Dawn" regarding the reality of what to expect from Somali piracy when it comes to Americans at sea in the region.

Update Two:

During the press conference this morning with Admiral Fox, we learned that it started with a RPG shot at USS Sterett (DDG 104), with gunfire from the yacht heard shortly afterward.

The Navy responded with small boat VBSS teams, where many pirates surrendered. Upon clearing the ship, one additional pirate was shot while another was killed in close quarters combat with a knife.

The Americans were already shot and mortally wounded when the Navy boarding team arrived, and all four died from those wounds.

2 pirates were on USS Sterett (DDG 104) negotiating when the incident occurred. 2 pirates were already dead before the Navy arrived, and 2 were killed while clearing the yacht. In total, there were 19 pirates involved in capturing the yacht, and the 15 pirate survivors will be brought to the US to face trial for piracy.

The Navy did not fire a shot prior to boarding the yacht, meaning the boarding was not resisted by pirates. Only after boarding and capturing 13 of the 15 pirates on the yacht did the Navy face resistance. The operation was carried about by Navy Special Operators, but the term "SEAL" was intentionally not used in describing the boarding party.

There are still several questions, but they are unlikely to come out until a full investigation is complete. The investigation is important because it will determine the charges for the pirates. One question I've already seen asked by Phil Ewing of Politico is whether the pirates on USS Sterett (DDG 104) were in contact, or able to send a signal, to the pirates that led to the violence. It's a good question.

Marines Talking Seapower

A couple of retired Marines are discussing the value of Seapower here. You know I love that.

Iranians Deface Voice of America Websites

The Iranian Cyber Army has struck again, this time by defacing the Voice of America website.

Iranian computer hackers on Monday hijacked the website of the Voice of America, replacing its Internet home page with a banner bearing an Iranian flag and an image of an AK-47 assault rifle.

The group called on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to “hear the voice of oppressed nations.”

The banner stated that “we have proven that we can.”

The message called on the United States to “stop interfering in Islamic countries.”

It then listed more 90 websites of VOA it claimed has also been hacked.

A State Department spokesman could not be reached for comment.

An administration official said the group identified with the banner is known as the Iranian Cyber Army.

VOA operates a global network of news and information outlets that reflect official U.S. foreign policies. It broadcasts, through radio, television and the Internet to scores of nations around the world.

It is interesting news that a pro-Iranian group defaces Voice of America websites, but we need to put this in the appropriate context by noting that US and/or Israel hackers wrote Stuxnet, while Iranian hackers have defaced a news website. The levels of skill in those two attacks are not comparable, with webpage defacement ranking as an entry level to moderate level hacker skill while Stuxnet is considered one of the most impressive pieces of code in programming history.

It is however noteworthy that over the last few months the Iranian Cyber Army has managed to deface Baidu (China's largest search engine), Twitter, and now Voice of America. In all of these attacks known vulnerabilities and techniques were used in the attacks. The Iranian Cyber Army is thought to be a Shiite group that supports Hezbollah based on images used in previous attacks.

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By the way, if you want to read an interesting story that has to do with internet security, this new HBGary story is quite the read.

The Ungoverned African Coastline is Becoming Enormous

As I continue to observe the events unfold in Libya, allow me to play the role of Captain Obvious and raise a bit of concern regarding what we have been watching over the last several weeks.

If we just look at a typical map of Africa, like the one in this blog post, allow us to look closely at how much Africa is transforming before our eyes and why now is probably the right time to get the US Navy over there in force.

Start at southeast Africa at the border between Somalia and Kenya and start tracing Africa around the HOA, and we find Djibouti, then we find Eritrea, then Sudan, then Egypt, then Libya, then Tunisia until we get to the Algeria border. The tiny country of Djibouti is now the most stable country along that enormous coast line. Eritrea and Sudan, both of which contribute nothing positive to security of the region, are the next most stable (unless you count South Sudan, which I'm not), but ultimately Somalia, Egypt, and Tunisia currently have no functional government today. The actions by the government in Libya on Monday were very disturbing, and we should keep in mind that Algeria and Morocco could be next.

That is a lot of coastline to be ungoverned along major sea lines of communication trade routes for Europe. I find it a bit disturbing that the EU isn't calling for a surge of European naval power to the Mediterranean Sea, because the US Navy may have one, possibly two ships, in the entire Med right now while the entire northern coastline of Africa is suffering from government revolts? I keep thinking any day now Russia is going to announce a huge naval deployment to the Med, because Putin has a history of seeing political opportunity in the midst of chaos.

I was thinking about that when I read the last two paragraphs in this Navy.mil article titled: USS George H.W. Bush Strike Group Certified Combat Ready.

"The scenarios [the crew] experienced during COMPTUEX/JTFEX are based on real-world operations today's carrier strike groups can expect to face in the deployed environment," said FitzPatrick. "Geo-political situations are fluid and ever-changing across the globe, and leadership needs the multi-mission flexibility a strike group brings to their area of responsibility. The mission of our carrier strike groups can change at a moment's notice depending on real time events, and the George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group Sailors are ready to deploy and accept any mission given to them."

"The Navy's carrier strike groups are critical to the nation's maritime strategy," said Tyson. "Our combined capabilities allow us to deploy to any region around the globe to lend support, whether it's to U.S. forces on the ground or to mariners in distress or to countries reeling from natural disaster. We are a powerful force for good, and our success during COMPTUEX and JTFEX is proof that this Strike Group is ready to take on any tasking we are given."

When that much coastline of Africa is in turmoil, I just don't see a scenario where NATO can stand by and watch. For all the talk about how NATO doesn't have a mission, I'd suggest it might be time to shelve such talk; because the mission just popped up on Europe's southern lawn. The hit to the European markets is likely to get much bigger before it gets smaller, particularly when there were quite a few unconfirmed reports going around on Monday night that several oil rigs off the Libyan coast were on fire. Libya is an important oil producer for Europe, or at least was until now.

The next 6 months in the southern Mediterranean Sea is going to be very important to shaping the next several years of what could be a renaissance in North Africa, but the same region could also become a complete meltdown of security and stability. Engagement is going to be key in deciding the outcome there, and not being engaged politically is absolutely the worst approach.

It seems to me that if the George H.W. Bush (GHWB) Carrier Strike Group has indeed been training for this mission, now might be the time to send them on their mission.

The GHWB Strike Group ships and units include, USS George H. W. Bush, USS Mitscher (DDG 57), USS Gettysburg (CG 64), USS Truxtun (DDG 103), USS Anzio (CG 68), the squadrons of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8, as well as Spanish frigate ESPS Almirante Juan de Borbon (F 102), French Frigate Primauguet (D644) and French Submarine Perle (S606). Carrier Strike Group TWO is led by Rear Adm. Nora W. Tyson.

If one was to add Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 with additional ships from contributing European countries under a NATO flag, I believe naval power can be leveraged to diplomatically and economically support the region to buy time until the election periods in Egypt and Tunisia, and potentially even prevent a colossal bloodbath in Libya by enforcing a No-Fly zone and other potential UN mandated assistance.

There are many good reasons not to get involved in the activities taking place in North Africa today, but when one considers the sheer size of the coastline of Africa we are dealing with that has fragile littoral governance and security - at best, one glance in the direction of Somalia informs what happens when you don't engage in the stability of volatile regional issues. NATO and the UN must engage, and the US must contribute, at least initially.