Could Al Qaeda Take Control of a Warship?

Usually the death of a reporter in Pakistan wouldn't constitute news for this audience, but this is an usual story about the death of a reporter. Here is the Reuters report on the death of Saleem Shahzad.

Ali Dayan Hasan, Pakistan representative for Human Rights Watch, said Shahzad had told him that he was under threat by Pakistan's military intelligence agency.

"He told me he was being followed and that he is getting threatening telephone calls and that he is under intelligence surveillance," he told Reuters.

"We can't say for sure who has killed Saleem Shahzad. But what we can say for sure is that Saleem Shahzad was under serious threat from the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) and Human Rights watch has every reason to believe that that threat was credible."

Why would the ISI take out a reporter in Pakistan? Probably because his last report was an eye-popping backgrounder on the PNS Mehran attack that reveals the Pakistan Navy has been thoroughly infiltrated by Al Qaeda.

I highly recommend everyone reads the entire report by Saleem Shahzad to consider why he may have been killed, and what this means in relation to the Pakistani Navy. The report is supposedly one of two, but it is unclear if the second article was written before Saleem Shahzad was murdered.

The report raises very serious questions, like how deep the penetration actually goes when it is clear that Al Qaeda has already broadly infiltrated the Pakistani Navy including apparently at high enough ranks of the Pakistani Navy to be aware of very sensitive, secret information like where specific highly sensitive prisoners are being held.

Is it possible that Al Qaeda could take control of a warship, like PNS Alamgir (ex-USS McInerney (FFG-8)) or other warships that frequently operate near warships of other navies? Keep in mind that even the old Perry's being sold are armed well enough to cause considerable damage. The Pakistani Navy has consistently been a serious partner supporting various missions in the region like anti-piracy off Somalia, and Pakistan Navy ships can approach highly sensitive sea infrastructure throughout the Middle East much easier and without the same scrutiny of other vessels.

Eco-insurgents at Sea

A Greenpeace ship evaded its Danish naval pursuers and deployed a boarding party in a pod yesterday to disrupt arctic oil drilling. This boarding is Greenpeace’s third recent attempt at offshore oil production disruption, but their use of the tactic dates back to the early 1990s.

Comparable to the cliché that one man’s freedom fighter is another man's terrorist; one man’s environmental vigilante is another’s criminal economic disruptor. As with other open-source insurgencies, (see Brave New War) it is interesting to watch the competition and cooperation between non-state maritime actors. During the peak of the Iraq War, numerous insurgent and terrorist groups tried to one up each other to maintain relevancy (and still do, to a certain extent), launching more and more spectacular attacks. On the less violent end of the conflict spectrum, we’ll probably begin to see a similar phenomenon with non-state maritime actors. Although much older, GP has to fight for recognition and funding from the same group of donors as its more tactically aggressive and marketing savy spin-off Sea Shepherds.

Ship naming is political and fish don't vote, right? Greenpeace is currently trying to reconstitute its fleet and has started construction on a new Rainbow Warrior. The Sea Shepherds seem to have found a winning formula for building brand recognition by naming their ships after celebrities who have championed animal rights, something Greenpeace may want to consider emulating.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Seapower in The Weekly Standard

The Weekly Standard has printed an adapted version of the piece Mackenzie Eaglen and I wrote for the Heritage Foundation. 

Bryan McGrath

The ROI Challenges of the CSG

What is the most effective way to achieve the missions of the US Navy: sea control, sea denial, power projection or protection of open commerce?

The Janes Defense Weekly (subscription) opinion by David W. Wise posted for discussion yesterday raised several interesting questions for community comments. I appreciate those who contributed thoughtful comments in yesterdays post. As we head into a three day weekend, I thought I would add a few of my own comments to the discussion for you guys to kick around over the holiday.

I am not convinced the large aircraft carrier is obsolete, but I do believe the currently constituted capability of a modern Carrier Strike Group is due significant innovations and as a combined arms system and concept the CSG has not sufficiently adapted to the changing strategic environment - with the focus of all adaptations being vertical upwards rather than horizontal challenges towards the increased lower end requirements.

Innovations over the last several years include AEGIS combat system improvements on the escorts, cost controls towards a single F-18 platform in the Air Wing, and the addition of submarines to the strike group. The Navy also deserves credit for operational and tactical organization changes of the CSG like dispersal, concentration, and integration at the operational level that has been mostly enabled by better technology, but these tactical and operational adaptations are reaching the limits of flexibility allowed by the existing organizational design of the CSG centered around an aircraft carrier, handful of escorts, air wing, and submarine(s). If we focus on the carrier platform itself, or any specific technology, platform, or system within the CSG and not the entire strike group as an organized capability; I think our focus becomes too narrow, too tech centric, and may in fact miss the mark completely.

I would suggest that as new technologies come online, we are still missing the combined arms information system that informs a combined operational concept for how a Navy addresses the strategic environment of the future. I think if one breaks it down into just a carrier strike group, the issues and challenges are easier to discuss directly.

The author raises the roles of sea control, sea denial, power projection or protection of open commerce as examples of how the CSG can fall short in meeting mission requirements across a broad spectrum. Thinking out loud about these roles in the context of the modern CSG in the modern environment suggests to me that the Navy has reached the limits of the existing organization, and I think informs towards where innovation is necessary.

Sea Control - The more restrictive the RoE, the less effective a CSG is in sea control. Fewer surface platforms are a result of requirements for high end defense capabilities, but few surface combatants translates into less coverage to meet the demand signal of lower intensity security challenges that often extends over large areas of sea. Can a CSG organization be adjusted to meet the demands of both ends of the combat spectrum at similar cost?

Sea Denial - Submarines in the CSG increase lethality substantially, but the threat matrix is expanding as well. The US Navy surface community offers very little to sea denial these days with a lack of long range weapons that offer mission kill to targets. Has sea denial become a function of submarines and aviation with various payloads ranging from mines to missiles to torpedos? Are we innovating? What can the surface community bring to meet sea denial requirements in various environments, and not just with the combatants, but the amphibious ship and MSC force as well? When it comes to Sea Denial (and Sea Control), does the Navy ignore the capabilities the Marine Corps could bring to the fight?

Power Projection - the CSG is the ultimate power projection capability today, but is it leveraged correctly with the appropriate corresponding communications strategy? Is the Navy sufficiently invested in other ways and means of projecting power globally? Here we are seeing innovations that can be highlighted, from hospital ships to global fleet stations, but those innovations are mostly on the lower spectrum towards soft power. Is there a sweet spot for low cost, high return investments for power projection where a CSG is overkill but combat power is required, for example in many third world shadow zones where limited government and civil security infrastructure exists? An aircraft carrier may not influence a region like Somalia, but I do wonder that if the Navy had a better communication strategy with amphibious ships, could a LSD or LPD be as intimidating or influential in shadow zones?

Protection of Open Commerce - Absent war against a credible state military power, the CSG contribution towards the protection of commerce runs up against cost effective usability issues. There are too few surface escorts in a CSG to contribute significant assets to commerce protection under the current CSG organization, and the primary manned capability that contributes to the protection of open commerce that is deployed on CSGs today is the helicopter. At the high end, the loss of fixed wing carrier ASW is significant.

Think about this sentence in the Janes David W. Wise article:

In an age of networks, small wars, unmanned systems and diffusion of military technology, the best solutions are unlikely to be found in highly expensive, complex, centralized systems requiring massive manpower. Answers are likely to be found in ways that distribute firepower to lower-cost platforms for more widespread and rapid deployments on more numerous, but less visible, lower-signature vehicles. Solutions are likely to stress reliability over theoretical elegance, quality achieved through quantity and simplicity over complexity while utilizing the emerging capabilities of robotics and unmanned systems.

There is a challenge that has become more stark for naval forces as costs of manpower have increased. In modern warfare, military forces including naval forces require more manpower in the complicated irregular warfare and small wars battle space, whether it is company sized units spread across Afghanistan or the need for more manned ship presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. More restrictive Rules of Engagement due to the presence of legitimate civilian populations contribute to the difficulty in directly assessing threats to take action, particularly threats that are distributed across broad areas and great distances at sea. In contrast, the lethality of conventional military power requires less manpower at the pointed end of the spear than at anytime in history, meaning the systems that deliver combat power requires less manpower than in the past.

This suggests models of organization where higher manpower requirements exist in the irregular battle spaces encountered even when peaceful relations exist between states. Peacemaking is a very human intensive function, both on land and at sea. The manpower requirements for warfighting at sea when rules of engagement are relaxed due to clear definitions of what constitutes combatants and enemy forces are much lower today. The range of lethal missile systems and the increasing lethality of unmanned systems allows naval power with less manpower to be lethal from great distances.

The requirements for manpower dispersed over great distances in large numbers of small, but capable concentrations to meet dispersed irregular challenges in the more restricted RoE environments is organizationally converse to the high concentrations of manpower in the CSG model designed to challenge sophisticated high end warfare capabilities. This is a real challenge for the US Navy, because the enormous financial and manpower requirements of the CSG, as currently organized, severely limits US Navy forces from meeting the roles and responsibilities expected of naval power in the constantly changing strategic environment.

When I look at the aircraft carrier in the context of the total strike group and the full spectrum of operational requirements, I think it is too simplistic to suggest simply changing the design and/or quantity of the aircraft carrier platform is going to address the challenges of a rapidly evolving strategic environment while maintaining the capability to meet the high end strategic requirement that is demanded by the CSG. It seems to me the aircraft carrier challenge must be looked at in multiple ways.

For example, within the context of the layered systems approach to defending high value vessels like aircraft carriers, if the surface force disconnected sensors from shooters from a single platform, is it possible to build more surface combatants and still meet the defense requirements for the battle force defense network while also increasing the distribution capacity of the CSG surface combatant escort force? For the cost of a single escort, is there a way to broadly address the capability gap of the CSG using different kit purchased? If the big AMDR radars were on the CVNs, LHDs, LPDs, T-AKEs, and T-AOs instead of the combatants, networked with CEC throughout the strike group, how many more smaller frigate shooters could the Navy purchase instead of large destroyers at the same price?

Aircraft carriers are very large and that space offers enormous flexibility. Is there a potential design flaw in current super carriers that needs to be addressed, for example, the ability to carry several large, deployable vessels (M-80 or Lighter than Air surface vehicle for example) instead of aircraft to meet operational requirements in certain situations or environments. Are there sea plane or lighter than air systems that could significantly increase the flexibility of a CSG without significant costs, for example, a carrier supported sea plane that could rapidly deliver a RHIB and VBSS team 300 miles from the carrier in two hours, conduct a contested boarding with sufficient fire support from the sea plane, and return to the carrier with all personnel and equipment upon mission completion.

The challenge facing the CSG is that it must be more capable to justify the cost, and not only does the CSG need to meet the high intensity capability requirements at greater ranges in the future, but also needs to be able to meet low intensity capability requirements (while delivering the higher manpower that comes with those requirements) at longer range.

Between the aircraft carrier, the Air Wing, and the various surface and subsurface escorts I see several avenues possible towards innovation and adaptation to meet emerging requirements that doesn't necessarily mean the aircraft carrier itself must change. The Carrier Strike Group includes the Naval Aviation, Submarine, and Surface Warfare communities of the Navy. In the Navy today, only the Air Wing is being changed to address the limitations of the changing strategic environment, which leads me to ask where the innovation is in the surface warfare and submarine communities to address the challenges of the CSG today towards maintaining existing requirements and capabilities while also increasing the capacity for a broader mission set for the CSG?

The way I see the large aircraft carrier debate, if the supporting elements including the Air Wing and Escorts required to support the large aircraft carrier within the CSG organizational construct do not adapt or cannot adapt, then the cost of the large aircraft carrier will ultimately be what makes the platform obsolete.

Blue Angels CO Resigns Command

Here is the press statement.

The commanding officer of the Naval Flight Demonstration Squadron was relieved of command by chief of naval air training May 27.

Cmdr. Dave Koss requested that Rear Adm. Bill Sizemore relieve him of his command following a lower-than-normal maneuver during the team's last performance at the Lynchburg Regional Air Show May 22.

"With deep personal regret I shared with my command today that I will be voluntarily leaving the greatest flight demonstration team," said Koss. "I performed a maneuver that had an unacceptably low minimum altitude. This maneuver, combined with other instances of not meeting the airborne standard that makes the Blue Angels the exceptional organization that it is, led to my decision to step down. I have the utmost respect for the Sailors and Marines of the Blue Angels organization and all that they embody. The reason this team is so successful, brings thrills to millions of fans across America, and represents the U.S. Navy so superbly, is because of the absolute commitment to safety and perfection by every member of the team. I am honored to have been a part of this organization, and I look forward to watching its success in the future."

Koss will be replaced by the previous Blue Angels' commanding officer, Capt. Greg McWherter, for the duration of the season.

This move requires the cancellation of the Blue Angels' scheduled performances at the Rockford Airfest June 4-5, and the Evansville Freedom Festival Air Show June 11-12. The Blue Angels will remain in Pensacola for additional training and air show demonstration practice. Any potential changes to the team's future schedule will be announced at a later date.

The Blue Angels regret any inconvenience and look forward to continuing to represent the Navy and Marine Corps service members serving around the world.

HT Sam LaGrone of Janes

Unsatisfactory

Here comes the Cobra Judy replacement...

The Howard O. Lorenzen (T-AGM 25), built by VT Halter Marine at Moss Point, Miss., is a 12,000-ton, 534-foot-long ship intended to carry the Cobra Judy Replacement (CJR) radar, a key sensor used in treaty monitoring and verification for ballistic missile issues. The ship and the new radar are needed to replace the original 1970s-era Cobra Judy system, now becoming unsustainable and scheduled for decommissioning next year.

Oops, maybe not yet.

The Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey, known as INSURV, conducted the Lorenzen's acceptance trials in the Gulf of Mexico during the week of May 9, according to the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in Washington. INSURV's role is to carry out meticulous inspections and tests of the ship and its systems and recommend whether or not the Navy should take delivery.

The trial "was reported as unsatisfactory" by INSURV, NAVSEA said in a statement. The failed grade was due to three major discrepancies - thrust bearing temperature, and steering and anchor demonstrations. Three of 15 graded areas - electrical, damage control and aviation - were also graded unsatisfactory.

INSURV recommended that acceptance not take place until the systems "can be fully re-demonstrated."

The timing is noteworthy, it comes the day after the Navy goes up to the Senate to talk about how much better everything is getting in shipbuilding. I'm not saying this is a big deal, but it doesn't look good when the announcement is the day after the testimony.

The SAR for the Cobra Judy Replacement program lists the cost at $1,714.2 million in then-year dollars funded through the Navy's RDT&E account. The December 2010 SAR for the program shows the actual and programmed funding in that account as follows:

FY Millions of then-year dollars

FY03 101.0
FY04 126.0
FY05 175.1
FY06 236.8
FY07 263.2
FY08 267.8
FY09 243.8
FY10 115.8
FY11 71.0
FY12 80.6
FY13 33.1

Total 1,714.2

On a dollar per ton basis, Cobra Judy is the most expensive non-combat vessel operated by the Maritime Sealift Command.

Lowering the Domestic Costs

Last month, Curtis Bradley of Lawfare had some observations regarding the implications of drones and stand off weapons for reducing the legal and political barriers to US intervention:

In the past, one of the central obstacles to greater U.S. participation in humanitarian intervention has been the domestic political cost. The American public appears to have little enthusiasm for suffering casualties in support of operations that have no direct connection to U.S. security, something illustrated by the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia following the Black Hawk Down episode in 1993.

Bypassing Congress, and using technology that substantially lowers the risk of U.S. casualties, may make it substantially easier for the United States to use force abroad for humanitarian purposes. It is not surprising, therefore, that supporters of this type of intervention have shifted their positions somewhat, now that they have a presidential administration that shares their view of the proper use of military force...

Nevertheless, I want to suggest that, even for proponents of humanitarian intervention, there are reasons to question whether lowering the domestic political cost of the use of force for humanitarian purposes is an unequivocally good development. Most significantly, a shift in this direction requires a substantial faith in the wisdom and motivations of the Executive Branch.

See also Jack Goldsmith on the argument that the intervention in Libya is insufficiently aggressive to trigger the War Powers Resolution. Two observations:

1. I'm not actually convinced that technology has substantially reduced the political and legal bar for intervention; an argument could be made that technological advances have substantially increased casualty aversion, leaving the political situation effectively a wash. I don't know either way; we'd need more research.
2. As for whether we should welcome such a development, my answer is "no." The argument for seems to be that by limiting casualties, technological essentially makes the public indifferent to decisions about intervention. This allows policy elites to determine when and where to intervene based on both robust understanding of US interests, and a sophisticated appreciation of America's place in the world. This seems to me to be mildly insane; it's fair to say that the number of people who would substantially agree with all of the intervention decisions of the last three Presidential administrations is quite low. Even if the cost is limited, the public ought to be consulted (if only in informal terms) regarding the wisdom of international military intervention.

The Tough Questions

Is anyone else tired of the same line of questioning regarding the vulnerability of the Carrier Strike Group? There are legitimate questions that need to be asked regarding the aircraft carrier centric force of the US Navy, and in my opinion the way to ask those legitimate questions is well presented in a recent opinion (subscription only) found in Janes Defense Weekly: Questioning super carrier ‘invulnerability’ by David W. Wise.

However, in the final analysis, debating CSG vulnerability asks the wrong question - and one that cannot be answered fully until a day no one wants to come.

What is the most effective way to achieve the missions of the US Navy: sea control, sea denial, power projection or protection of open commerce? In an age of networks, small wars, unmanned systems and diffusion of military technology, the best solutions are unlikely to be found in highly expensive, complex, centralised systems requiring massive manpower. Answers are likely to be found in ways that distribute firepower to lower-cost platforms for more widespread and rapid deployments on more numerous, but less visible, lower-signature vehicles. Solutions are likely to stress reliability over theoretical elegance, quality achieved through quantity and simplicity over complexity while utilising the emerging capabilities of robotics and unmanned systems.

The nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN), with a crew of just 159, carries the equivalent inventory of Raytheon Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles as an entire strike group at a fraction of the cost. It can be reconfigured to carry other weapons and unmanned systems, insert special forces and serve as their command centre. The SSGN is mobile, difficult to detect and impervious to anti-surface missiles and attack boats. Other lower-cost submarines and guided missile destroyers might also provide alternatives. In the era of distributed capabilities, retiring the very concept of the capital ship may be necessary.

Dean Robert C Rubel of the US Navy War College advises speaking of the “governing weapon”, which may differ from theatre to theatre and situation to situation. The new realities of technology make it dangerous not to ask these fundamental questions. Our indebted national government, in which the phrase “economy of force” will take on new resonance, makes this debate unavoidable. Fortunately, asking tough questions in this budget crisis may lead us to lower-cost solutions for a more effective defence.

New York, New York

It is Fleet Week in New York City, and I'd like to highlight two items I think folks will find interesting. First, ROTC is returning to Columbia.

Student and faculty leaders voted in April for the move after the military dropped its ban on openly gay service members. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus and university President Lee Bollinger plan to sign the agreement aboard USS Iwo Jima as part of New York's annual Fleet Week today.

The Navy will have an office on Columbia's campus, and recruits will train at SUNY's Maritime College in The Bronx. Columbia already participates in Army and Air Force ROTC, as well as the Marine Officer Candidate School, but none of those programs has space on Columbia property.

Second, speaking of SUNY Maritime College, the school is currently conducting a search for new President. Four current flag officers are listed among the six finalist candidates for new President at SUNY Maritime College including RADM Wendi B. Carpenter, VADM Derwood C. Curtis, RADM Joseph Kilkenny, and RADM Michael J. Lyden.

I think the array of candidates interesting, and I also really appreciated that I was able to read the submitted biographies of the applicants online. I think it is interesting to look into the careers of Navy leaders as they present themselves in their own words.

After careful review of each of the biographies, I almost went the way of a homer and was going to root for Rear Admiral Michael J. Lyden for the job because, well, he is an RPI guy. I'm breaking ranks with the hometown cooking criteria though, and I'm cheering for VADM Derwood C. Curtis instead. After careful review of all the biographies, his quickly became the easy choice to cheer for among the listed biographies, because VADM Curtis is the only applicant who lists the United States Naval Institute as one of the associations listed in his biography.

Nice!

Seriously, good luck to all. I think it is good to see several US Navy leaders interested in SUNY Maritime College.

Whether it is the Ivy League or the maritime colleges, only good things can happen as the US Navy and the education communities build closer relationships.

Rethinking USVs

Unmanned surface vehicles are rapidly approaching practicality for naval uses. Although I’ve sung the praises of UAS for some time now, I’ve been a bit skeptical on the utility of their robotic surface cousins. I recently had an opportunity to check out the high and low ends of the USV spectrum in person. The Piranha is an “optionally manned” 16M carbon fiber diesel-powered beast that tops out at 45 knots and is purported to have a remarkable endurance of 40 days. The Piranha can be air dropped, operate up to sea state 6, employ a 2.5 ton payload of weapons, people, or sensors, and as a hybrid, it sips gas and can be operated very quietly on battery-power.

At the opposite end of the scale is the boogie board-like Wave Glider. Originally developed for oceanography purposes, the wave and solar-powered platform moves at a leisurely knot and a half and has already made an 82 day transit from the US West Coast to Hawaii.

Needless to say, both of these craft have utility for special operations and coastal counter-terrorism missions. They seem tailor made for long duration ISR patrols and the deployment of other unattended sensors where the presence of SOF (or larger manned vessels) is operationally too risky or politically untenable.

I am less a fan of USVs for force protection missions. Although there is certainly appeal in an unmanned craft taking the place of a patrol boat crew in rough seas and harsh weather, I just don’t think the soda straw situational awareness USV’s provide is a good choice for operations which require split second decisions on assessing hostile intent and applying ROE in the close quarters of a harbor. Though in the long term, I foresee autonomous USV swarms attacking enemy ships with missile barrages or “suicide” bombing missions against high value platforms. Of course, as with UAVs, technology spreads rapidly, and it’s only a matter of time until we see USVs deployed by state and non-state enemies for smuggling, reconnaissance, and other nefarious operations.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Russia's "new" secret ballistic missile - a solid-fueled Sineva?

On Friday May 20, the Russian Navy reportedly successfully test fired an RSM-54/RS-29RMU Sineva (“Blueness”)/SS-N-23 Skiff submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in the Barents Sea by the Project 667BDRM Delfin-class/Delta IV-class strategic nuclear ballistic missile carrier submarine (SSBN) Ekaterinburg (K-84). However, late yesterday Russia’s missile center stated that the test was in fact a launch of, a previously unknown “Liner” ballistic missile (Russia Today, May 25) The Russian government has since not commented on the matter. Speculation surrounds this “new” ICBM/SLBM, and several analysts have suggested (including myself) that “Liner” is actually a heavily modernized, and possibly solid-fueled version, of Sineva. The official report from the Russian Defense Ministry officially lists the missile as Sineva. The R-29RMU Sineva is a liquid-fuel SLBM which is capable of deployment as a MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) and comparable to the American Navy’s UGM-133 Trident D-5ballistic missile.

Currently there are plans to deploy Sineva as a MIRV-capable SLBM within the Russian forces(ITAR-Tass, May 24). This is consistent with development/upgrade programs for other Russian Strategic Strike Systems, including land-based ICBM systems like the RS-24 Yars/SS-X-29. “The rearmament of the RS-24 ICBM fitted with a MIRV warhead boosts the RSVN (Russian Strategic Missile Troops) attack force's combat capability to counter missile defense systems, thus strengthening the nuclear deterrent potential of the Russian strategic nuclear forces,” said RSVN spokesman Colonel Vadim Koval (Interfax, May 24). Clearly, the Russian post-Cold War era policy of single-warhead strategic strike systems is coming to an end, as the RSVN drives to reach the limits of the New START treaty as perceived in Moscow.

However, despite a reputation as a fairly reliable and effective weapons system, liquid-fueled missiles like the RS-29RMU are extremely heavy, very volatile, and maintenance intensive. Furthermore, in order for the Russians to utilize the liquid-fueled Sineva aboard their Project 955 Borei and Project 941 Typhoon-class nuclear submarines should the solid-fueled RSM-56 Bulava SLBM fail to pass operational testing, massive design modifications would need to be implemented on their SSBNs (Voice of Russia, Dec. 26, 2010). A solid-fueled version of Sineva would greatly ease the costs and technical challenges should this be required. In addition, a solid-fueled version of the RS-29RMU would likely be much lighter, probably boosting its range to upwards of 15,000 km./9,450 miles. This is an incredible target footprint for a SSBN/SLBM system, and would make for a highly flexible and survivable strategic strike system for Russia well into the middle of the 21st Century.

Whether the “Liner” is a brand new ICBM/SLBM design, or a massively upgraded Sineva variant, it clearly represents a push by the Russian government to modernize, enlarge, and deploy its rocket and space forces, something the United States government does not appear to be presently interested in. Given the extremely nebulous “count” language in New START, it is difficult not to be concerned over this new development in what is beginning to look like a major Russian strategic arms buildup.

Vengeance and Surrender

In this week's WPR column, I make a (strained?) parallel between the hunt for Bismarck and the hunt for Bin Laden:

In a book released last year, British naval journalist Iain Ballantyne argued that the story of the Bismarck's end might not be so simple. The damage to its rudder effectively made the Bismarck a lost cause. Morale on board the ship reportedly collapsed in the last hours, even before two British battleships came over the horizon. Once the British task force engaged, the Bismarck was rendered harmless in short order. Its firing became uncoordinated and spasmodic, and it lost the ability to maneuver under its own power. At this point, Ballantyne reports that several British observers noted that at least some portions of the German crew appeared to be offering a surrender. But the act of surrendering itself was perilous; one German officer who may have been attempting to "strike the colors" was killed by a British shell as he approached the flag.

Ballantyne's argument is interesting in context of the Navy SEAL strike that killed bin Laden. Much ink has been spilled on the question of what the Navy SEAL team would have -- and should have -- done if bin Laden had attempted to surrender. U.S. authorities, including CIA Director Leon Panetta and State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh, have argued that it doesn't really matter whether bin Laden was attempting to surrender or not. Because he was a military target, because he had made clear his intention to die instead of being taken alive, and because of the threat that he might employ some kind of suicide device if he was seized, the SEALs had no particular responsibility either to give bin Laden the opportunity to surrender or to accept his surrender if he offered it on "inconvenient terms." Bin Laden's death certainly spared the Obama administration the trouble and inconvenience of managing the legal difficulties of trying the terrorist in a court of law.

Admiring the Job Done by Admiral Roughead

Spencer Ackerman has an article on Danger Room that focuses in on the career of ADM Roughead as CNO. I think it is a a really good piece, and I do not generally think ADM Roughead gets enough credit for what he has done as CNO.

I noted in the comments at Danger Room that already some internet nerds are suggesting history will not reflect kindly on ADM Roughead as CNO. I couldn't disagree more, ADM Roughead made some tough calls as CNO, and I'll be the first to admit I disagreed with several of them, but making tough calls is what good leaders do. I also believe that hindsight in all of those decisions will never be 20/20, that is how hard the calls were.

A great example is DDG-1000. Should the Navy have stuck with building 7 DDG-1000s instead of moving back to DDG-51? Some may argue yes, and some may argue no, and there are absolutely valid arguments on both sides. The key to many of those tough decisions isn't the decision that he made, it is that he was the guy who was forced to deal with that mess in the first place because the folks ahead of him created such a spectacular mess long before the difficult decisions landed in ADM Rougheads lap.

Sorry, but on the tough calls like DDG-1000, ADM Roughead did in 2008 what ADM Mullen didn't do in 2005, he dealt with the problems directly instead of punting in hopes things would work out down the road. ADM Roughead consistently dealt with such issues, and there are numerous examples. Noteworthy, I do not see any scenarios where the next CNO will be forced to deal with a major problem because ADM Roughead punted. Challenges yes, but one hallmark of ADM Roughead as CNO is the absence of a can being kicked down the road.

Under the 8 years of Bill Clinton (FY1993-FY2000) the Navy built a total of 40 ships. Under the 8 years of George Bush (FY2001-FY2008) the Navy built a total of 44 ships, but I also now add the 1 JHSV the Army paid for in FY08, giving the Navy a total of 45 ships over those 8 years.

In the 4 budgets of Admiral Roughead, FY2009-FY2012, the US Navy will build 35 ships, plus the 4 Army JHSVs that the Navy will operate, for a total of 39 ships. Look at the details and you will find that under ADM Roughead, the Navy is building on average the same number of major hulls as the Navy did for the previous 16 years, and yet somehow the Navy is buying all the JHSVs and Littoral Combat Ships also. People who run around claiming the Navy is buying JHSVs and LCS instead of major ships are factually inaccurate.

People do not seem very well informed regarding where the Navy was before ADM Roughead. Look at the three budget cycles prior to ADM Roughead. Admiral Mullen was CNO from July 2005 until September 2007, but was also the key person who testified in early summer of 2005 regarding the DDG-1000 which many observers describe as the make or break moment of that platform in the budget, so I put FY06, FY07, and FY08 under Admiral Mullen.

In hindsight based on the historical record, ADM Mullen was the lowest point of the post cold war period for the US Navy. Under Admiral Mullen, the Navy planned to build 17 ships, but because of high costs and major problems with the Littoral Combat Ship, the Navy ultimately only build 4 ships in FY06, 5 ships in FY07, and only 3 ships in FY08. That is only 12 ships in three years at a time when the Defense Budget was the highest since WWII! By every definition the Navy was a dumpster fire when ADM Roughead took over as CNO and shipbuilding specifically was at the lowest point of any three year period in over a century.

I completely agree with those who note ADM Roughead never proved to be a great public speaker for the Navy and in general never hit any sort of stride as a public advocate for the Navy. At least his speech writers were good though, which sometimes matters more in the information age. I note that many critics of ADM Roughead say he that while he was always a solid officer, ADM Roughead was never the best at anything in his community. That might be true, maybe he never was the #1 SWO, but do you know where he was the best? When he served as the Department of the Navy’s Chief of Legislative Affairs.

And as CNO that really paid off. The fact is ADM Roughead has tremendous political skills and those skills have been used to turn the Navy around in virtually every community. Under ADM Roughead naval aviation is in a great place with both fixed wing and RW, legitimately giving the Navy remarkable flexibility with the JSF. Under ADM Roughead the Navy was building 1 submarine a year, and will be building 2 submarines a year as he leaves. Shipbuilding has been turned around from the lowest point in over a century of 4 ships a year to an average of 9.75 ships per year under ADM Roughead. Every community is doing better because of ADM Roughead, being the best SWO ultimately meant jack shit while being brilliant politically on Capitol Hill ended up meaning a lot.

ADM Roughead told Spencer Ackerman “I don’t think I’ve been as excited about anything as the unmanned carrier aircraft.” That might have observers wondering why we haven't seen a Reaper fly off a LHD or LHA? Probably because Admiral Roughead had to buy a huge block of F-18 replacements with a couple billion dollars of his aviation budget, and there isn't enough money to do both. It may not look like a difficult decision, but buying a bunch of F-18s may have set the Navy back several years on fielding more unmanned strike platforms from ships, and was a lot tougher call that casual observers might have thought at the time. Many of those decisions were taken for granted by his critics, but they shouldn't be.

ADM Roughead was not the CNO that many wanted to lead the Navy when he was appointed, but 4 years later it is very clear he was the CNO the Navy needed, and the US Navy went from being one giant dumpster fire to being a ship sailing relatively calm seas with his hand at the helm.

"If We Had a Carrier..."

This is a great article on Libya in the Guardian. Also check out the graphic. The article bring with it the quote of the day.

Data shows the US initially dominated the military campaign before taking a back seat and handing over control to Nato on 31 March. France also took a leading role, deploying its aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, the head of the British navy, told MPs: "If we had a carrier, it would be there."

If the UK had an aircraft carrier, the Guardian wouldn't be reporting how Norway and Denmark have both dropped far more bombs - nearly 700 between them - than the UK in Libya.

The latest news suggests Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope might be on to something, as there are now reports that HMS Ocean is being sent to Libya to support 12 Apaches. The latest Guardian article discusses the politics of that possibility, and raises some interesting questions.

Aren't helicopter carriers the same as modern light aircraft carriers (rhetorical question, or not)?

If not, too bad, because I tend to think if it was possible to build a low cost LPH, the platform would be a very useful addition in the modern maritime domain where the irregular threats are usually met first and foremost by unmanned vehicles and manned helicopters.

Al Qaeda and the Threat to Tankers

Count me among those who think there has been too much information released regarding the raid to kill Osama bin Laden. One of the surprises, I think, has been the amount of intelligence from that raid discussed in public. Perhaps I am reading it wrong, but it seems to me when this much collected intelligence in reported in the press, what it really means is we didn't get much useful intelligence at all. Still, this is noteworthy.

"In 2010, there was continuing interest by members of al Qaeda in targeting oil tankers and commercial infrastructure at sea," Department of Homeland Security spokesman Matt Chandler said in a statement Friday. He added that "we are not aware of indications of any specific or imminent terrorist attack plotting against the oil and natural-gas sector overseas or in the United States," and said "it is unclear if any further planning has been conducted since mid-last year."

Last summer, a Japanese oil tanker was attacked while passing through the Strait of Hormuz, though it suffered only minor damage. Investigators concluded that was a terrorist attack.

The materials gathered by U.S. Navy SEALs in the raid earlier this month in Abbottabad, Pakistan—including Osama bin Laden's personal journal—sketched a broad picture of targets the terror group would like to attack, but provided little detail about actual plans to carry out such missions, officials said. The targets revealed so far, including commercial aviation and railroads, have long been in al Qaeda's playbook.

Oil tankers and oil-industry infrastructure also have been a preferred target for al Qaeda and associated groups, in keeping with the militants' stated goal of causing economic disruption to the West and to Arab regimes they consider hostile. In 2002, militants used a small skiff packed with explosives to blow a hole in the side of a French-owned oil tanker off the coast of Yemen in 2002.

It is very difficult to sink a tanker, but it is proving to be very possible to hijack one - at least based on what we have seen from Somalia. Lloyds List ran a story several days ago about how the mariners who work on several tanker lines that ship out of the Gulf are getting very frustrated and are thinking about boycotting working on unprotected tankers moving through the pirate infested region. A refusal by the civilian mariner crews to work on tankers is essentially the same effect of shutting down oil in the Gulf.

As a result several companies are putting aside their concerns about security teams and will potentially be arming up large tankers moving through the region. One side effect of adding security teams on tankers would be to potentially further protect tankers from Al Qaeda style attacks. Another side effect is that we may now have a new permanent cost added to energy supplies traveling at sea from the region.

In that context, I am not sure which is the bigger threat. Is the possibility of Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against tankers a significant threat or just one more attack vector to be concerned about? I tend to think the refusal of civilian mariners to work on ships without security protection from pirates presents a bigger concern over time, because the extra costs associated with either paying mariners more to work without security or paying for the constant presence of security on tankers is a cost that simply gets passed on to the consumer.

Those costs come before adding insurance costs and potential legal costs that may get applied as shippers put dudes with guns on ships loaded with petroleum and other highly flammable materials.

The Army's Most Extraordinary "Luck"

Both Noah and CDR Salamander have this right, no matter how you look at it - General Cartwright has been taken to the mattresses by a smear campaign. General Cartwright is so completely done in the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff job that Loren Thompson has even brought up the rumor about his romantic involvement with the head of a government agency, although Dr. Thompson waited to reveal that after Josh Rogin had reported that Sandee Cartwright "is planning to go public with her feelings about her husband."

Yeah, it's that ugly.

But it is actually the other details that are emerging from various sources that are quite interesting, and tell a very interesting story in their own right. For example, Navy Times is reporting what I mentioned last week - that General Dempsey is the Pentagon's recommendation for top job.

But sources said the Pentagon has forwarded two choices for chairman and two for vice chairman. The options for chairman included Dempsey, who became the Army chief last month, and Gen. Ray Odierno, who heads the Joint Forces Command, which is in the process of being eliminated. Dempsey is said to be the top pick, sources said, with Odierno expected to succeed Dempsey as Army chief.

The choice of chairman is always a priority for any administration. The chairman is the principal military adviser to the president, who has the legal right to the choice. The next chairman is expected to help shape America’s drawdown from Iraq, operations in and withdrawal from Afghanistan, and changing military-to-military relationships, all as budget changes will force program, personnel and strategic choices.

Dempsey’s inclusion surprised many observers.

Then it gets really odd, because Navy Times also reported that the two recommended names for Vice Chairman to replace General Cartwright were "Navy Adm. James “Sandy” Winnefeld, who has run U.S. Northern Command for the past year, and Air Force Gen. Norton Schwartz, currently his service’s chief of staff."

It actually gets more strange, because the two people recommended for CNO were Adm. Jonathan Greenert and Adm. Robert Willard.

So what happened to Adm. James Stavridis? According to Loren Thompson "The possibility that Gen. Dempsey might get the nod for the top military job only began circulating two weeks ago, when rumors started to spread that Adm. Stavridis had not fared well in his White House interview for the chairman's position."

There could be valid reasons Adm. Stavridis isn't in consideration, but it is asking a lot of us, the sheeple, to believe that a former SOUTHCOM commander and the current EUCOM commander, not to mention Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, not to mention one of the greatest writers and speakers the Navy has had since WWII; somehow flunked his interview. The suggestion the interview went poorly would raise serious questions about the interviewer than the interviewee. The interview nonsense is clearly a distraction, and more likely yet another distraction in what has become a contest filled with distractions.

I have serious questions regarding the purpose of Goldwater-Nichols when the two most impressive military officers of this generation, General Petraeus and Admiral Stavridis, both PhDs, both experienced COCOMs, and both with experience leading large coalitions in wars we are fighting; have somehow been passed up and aren't even being considered in the massive rotations at the top of the military.

I also do not understand how at a time when the nation is trying to wind down two land wars in Asia, at a time when the DoD has been developing the AirSea Battle doctrine, and at a time when the Department of Defense is facing very large budget cuts, that one would seriously believe two Army Generals would rise to be the first, best choices for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have to say, that would be the most impeccable timing possible should the Army, from out of nowhere and with the assistance of a random 3 month early appointment to Chief of Staff of the Army for General Dempsey, suddenly take over CJCS just as the DoD was about to transition away from the large land war in Asia approach to foreign diplomacy.

There are rumors of high politics flying around the DoD related to all the above, and apparently no one has figured out yet what is and isn't true. When I observe what is taking place in the military rotations at the top of the DoD I seriously begin to wonder if it is even possible for the United States to think strategically.

I am not saying that General Dempsey couldn't do a good job as CJCS, but I do think it is remarkable that he or General Odierno would get the nod before Air Force Gen. Norton Schwartz based solely on the timing and strategic environment. It is a really good thing the leadership of the Army is generally thought incapable of pulling off a master plan and positioning themselves at the top of the DoD food chain for the CJCS post at the precise moment the Army needs the post the most due to the supposedly changing strategic environment. Without that reputation of lacking the skill in planning for such a master plan, I would have to give them credit for doing exactly that.

The Coming Summer of Bulava

There have been a lot of critics and commentators regarding Russia’s Bulava Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), which is, arguably one of the best-known weapons in the world even before she enters service. Over the years, observers around the world have watched, as failure after failure had been reported. One of the most spectacular malfunctions came in December 2009, when a number of mysterious swirling white and blue lights appeared over the skies of Norway, the result of failed Bulava test launch in the Barents Sea. I remember the day very well, because I suddenly became inundated with phone calls and emails at my office asking why I was (or more precisely, “we” were) “attacking” Norway? The jokes were meant in good-natured fun, but what it represented was another public failure of a program that desperately needed a “win.”

Things have changed a lot in eighteen months.

Today Bulava is roaring towards her first deployment later this year, after a pair of spectacularly successful full-range tests in late 2010. In fact, the Russian government is so confident in the fixes and improvements to Bulava that they are planning to broadcast the test launches from the Barents Sea live to the world. This is an amazing shift in transparency from a country that historically closes itself off. Clearly the Russian leadership views Bulava as a potential “game-changer,” and is planning to leverage the first new strategic strike system in a generation for all it is worth in the decades ahead.

The Road to Bulava
Those with memories long enough to remember the end of the Soviet Union two decades ago, probably recall that at the very end, Russia was producing an extraordinary variety of newly deployed strategic ballistic missile systems to provide deterrence to the Rodina. Two of these, the RSM-56 Rif (Russian Designation - R39, NATO Named - SS-N-20 Sturgeon) and RSM-54 Vysota (Russian Designation - R-29RL, NATO - SS-N-23 Skiff) were state-of-the-art SLBMs, had finally matured and thus deployed aboard the USSR’s two newest Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs), the Project 941 Akula (Russian - Shark-class, NATO - Typhoon-class) and Project 667B (NATO - Delta IV-class). These missiles were and continue to be extremely capable second-strike weapons, able to provide follow-up nuclear strike capabilities for up to a year aboard their submarines lurking under the polar icecap.

In addition, there were well-defined plans to improve these Soviet SLBMs into first-strike weapons, much like the American/British Trident D-5 (UGM-133) carried aboard the Ohio-class (SSBN 726) and Vanguard-class (S28) SSBNs. However the events of 1989 through 1991 stopped this effort to make the Soviet SSBN/SLBM the equal of the United States and Great Britain. The breakup of the USSR at the end of 1991, and the decade-long economic and social depression that followed stopped every weapons modernization program in the Defense Ministry’s portfolio of projects dead in its tracks. And while the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, which included the missile-carrying SSBNs, were kept at least on life support financially, there was virtually no work on new strategic submarine/missile designs for the better part of the next decade.

This situation began to change, with the appointment (in 1999) and eventual election (in 2000) of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia. By the middle of the first decade of the 21st Century, reestablishment of basic social structures and finance allowed Putin’s government to selectively begin modernization of a few key military systems, including SSBNs and SLBMs. Paid for with Russia’s flood of money from it’s fast-growing oil and gas sector, the first result was an improved version of the liquid-fueled RSM-54, the R-29RMU Sineva (Blueness), which went into service in 2007. However, the old hope of a SLBM that could meet and even exceed the capabilities if the U.S. Trident D-5 was still out there, thus the RSM-56 Bulava (Mace, NATO SS-NX-32) was born.

RSM-56 Bulava Development
Bulava is unique in that she is the first all-new strategic strike system from anywhere in the world to be developed since the end of the Cold War. The Bulava was designed as a replacement of the solid-fuel R-39 SLBM and while there are similarities to the recently updated Topal-M, she was, in essence, designed from scratch. Bulava is a three-stage solid fuel missile with an operational range of between 8,000 and 10,000 kilometers. Its guidance system is believed to be Russia’s GLONASS navigational satellites and its launch platforms are the Project 955 Borei and Project 941 Typhoon-class nuclear submarines. Bulava has also a relatively low flight trajectory, thus allowing some analysts to qualify it as a ‘quasi (or semi) ballistic missile.’ This lower trajectory allows for higher speeds. Bulava especially can maneuver in and out of different altitudes making it all the more difficult to intercept.

There has been a lot of speculation on whether or not Bulava will or will not be impacted by the new U.S.-Russian START Treaty. The generally accepted understanding is that Bulava is not affected by any restrictions or limitations. “New START” addressed only strategic weapons currently in the existing Russian arsenal and as the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publically stated, "The plans we had to develop the strategic component of the armed forces remain in force, this concerns Bulava and RS-24 Yars." However, many American analysts feel that ANY strategic ballistic missile launched from a submarine is subject to inspection and that the Russians SHOULD provide telemetric data and information on Bulava precisely because testing had already begun from subs. This contradiction in understandings highlights the ability to interpret New START in whatever way is desired by the reader. Bulava is a brand new, strategic weapon of which we know very little about. The present Russian policy of withholding information on Bulava and other strategic strike and carrier systems inhibits an American response, and restricts our missile defense policy.

Bulava Coming On Fast
Russia and the Russian Space Forces have placed a lot of hope in Bulava. It is designed to be the missile backbone of their naval submarine fleet and the cornerstone of their nuclear triad. The newest, most advanced ballistic missile on the market, a jewel to show the world that just because the Soviet Union no longer exists, that doesn’t mean that Russia is no longer a global force to reckon with.

Up to this point Bulava has failed seven out of fifteen tests; the last two however, have been outstanding successes. The main technical challenges are believed to have been issues with the navigation system, problems with the third stage propulsion systems, and officially, manufacturing defects. Many of its critics have suggested that Russia rely on the (currently) more reliable Sineva. Sineva, while comparable to the Trident, is less advanced, weighs almost double than that of Bulava and is a liquid fueled missile. As Russian defense policy analyst, Victor Litovokin, points out, “Solid fuel missiles have certain advantages as compared with liquid fuel ones. First, solid fuel missiles can stay on combat duty for a longer time than liquid fuel missiles. Second, the last ones sometimes catch fire, and there have been a lot of emergences already. But if there have been some with solid fuel missiles, they can be counted with the fingers of one hand. Third, in spite of being hermetically sealed, fuel tanks of fuel liquid missiles steam poisoning substances. Fourth, as to experts, a solid fuel missile leaves a silo quicker, thus, it’s difficult to trace it during the active phase. It means it’s much more affective in terms of survivability.” Furthermore, exclusive use of Sineva would require major changes to Russia’s new Project 955 Borei-class subs.

Nonetheless, when it works, Bulava is said to be technically capable of out maneuvering any known missile defenses on the planet. The belief is that Bulava can mislead detection systems on its pre-ballistic launch and then while ballistic, change its azimuth to confuse satellites and sensors attempting to track and intercept its flight path. Bulava has a number of countermeasures, and its warhead can withstand an electromagnetic pulse and the effects of a nuclear blast only 500 meters away. Additionally, Bulava’s payload of up-to six warheads (conventional and nuclear) are all independently targeted reentry vehicles.

The Russia Defense Ministry has announced that this summer it will test Bulava four times, the first of which will come between June 15th and June 17th from the Typhoon-class SSBN Dmitry Donsky in the White Sea. Additionally, the test launches will be televised lived, a first for Russian Defense. What this represents is a confidence in Bulava and Russian engineering that has seldom been seen before. Both President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have stressed the importance of Bulava and the need for it to succeed.

Currently in play in the missile defense sphere is Russia’s standing with the west in reference to the recent NATO-Russian BMD shield, as well as current relations ‘reset’ with the United States. If Bulava works and deployed by the end of the year (which by all accounts she will be), it shifts the burden of missile proliferation onto the United States and the controversial topics of developing a new ballistic missile or continuing to upgrade and maintain its aging Minuteman III and Trident force.

As we enter the end of spring and the summer of 2011, I suspect that we will see a string of success for Russian missile systems in general, and Bulava in particular. The Sineva SLBM was successfully demonstrated twice in the past two months and if Bulava can also come through we may see a sharp change in policy, and perhaps standing on the global stage certainly a shift within European and Central Asian regional influence, for both Russia and the U.S. - that is, if anyone cares enough to take notice.

Hello, I am Primoris Era...

Hello, I’m Primoris Era, or as I’m more colloquially known, “The First Lady of Missiles,” a nickname one of my Professors gave me. Called, “the lady with the ‘prolific missile tweets,’” I am a self-described Werner von Braun and Deutsche luftfahrtforschung groupie.

I am also 28 years old. Suffice it to say, I’m not your average anything.

I was born and raised in the San Francisco Bay Area of California, and began college while still in prep school. Before graduating undergrad, I studied Russian and Eastern European politics at Harvard University, and worked for Senator John McCain (R-AZ). In 2006, I graduated with honors from Arizona State University with both a Bachelors of Science and Bachelors of Arts, along with three certificates. I am currently finishing three Masters Degrees: a Masters of Arts in Security Studies and Government specializing in International Relations and Masters of Business Administration focusing on Space Acquisitions from The Johns Hopkins University, and a Masters of Legal Laws with an emphasis in Air and Space law from the University of London.

Regionally, my work focuses on Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Caucasus. I also specialize on matter involving missile defense, arms control policy, law and legislation. Missile, rocket and satellite proliferation including their development, transfer and deployment; and theoretical space weapons research and space/counterspace analytical analysis, are also areas of professional study and interest. I have worked on projects for the U.S. Strategic Command and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, amongst other agencies.

Navy Fires Another CO, 11th CO Fired This Year

The Navy has fired a commanding officer for the 11th time this year:

The commanding officer of Norfolk Naval Shipyard has been temporarily removed from command while a formal investigation into the command environment at the yard is completed, Navy officials said.

Capt. Greg Thomas, who has commanded the Portsmouth, Va., shipyard since September 2010, was assigned to temporary duty at Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, D.C., pending the outcome of the investigation, being conducted by the Naval Inspector General, according to NAVSEA spokeswoman Pat Dolan. She described Thomas as being “temporarily reassigned.”

A Navy statement said only that the investigation involved the command environment.

Capt. Gregory Thomas had assumed command in September of last year after the Navy fired Capt. William Kiestler for command issues related to submarine maintenance. Also noteworthy Capt. Gregory Thomas was on the flag officer promotion list last year.

It is becoming more and more clear that Navy leadership is taking the responsibilities of command in NAVSEA more seriously. In the long run the fleet will be much better for it.

Pakistani Naval Station Mehran

Shashank Joshi has a good rundown of the strategic implications of the Taliban attack on PNS Mehran. The only part I'm uncertain about is this:

Thirdly, the attack's terrible human toll was accompanied by the highly visible, and militarily significant, destruction of at least one, perhaps two, P-3C Orion anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft (one has been destroyed; two others appear damaged). These $35m US-supplied aircraft - advanced variants of the older P-3 aircraft - were inducted last summer, with the expectation that six more would follow by 2012.

Their loss compounds an already lopsided naval balance with respect to India, which now possesses twice as many submarines, and five antisubmarine warfare squadrons. In the first place, this prompted some to ask, in conspiratorial tones, why the Pakistani Taliban would attack such a site, and whether 'foreign agents' might be the more likely perpetrators of an attack whose beneficiary would be India. Although increasing numbers of Pakistanis recognise internal militancy as a serious threat to the country, the peculiar nature of the target may reinforce the self-destructive narrative that violence in Pakistan is the product of external meddling rather than internal rot. But the longer-term military implications are also important.

These may seem of little relevance in an age in which nuclear deterrence has tightly constrained the scope and intensity of Indo-Pakistani wars (see, for example, the enormous limits on escalation during the 1999 Kargil War). Does anyone really envisage a naval war, except as part of an all-out war in which third parties and their navies would be anyway engaged? But this perspective ignores that India might, in the aftermath of a future crisis, view a naval blockade as a suitably calibrated response that applies pressure on Pakistan without crossing nuclear thresholds. [3] Pakistan's now degraded anti-submarine warfare capabilities may prove to be of more than symbolic value.

If I recall correctly, the P-3Cs were being used by Pakistan as COIN patrol craft, rather than in their ASW role. Thus, the destruction of the P-3s might have less to do with a symbolic attack on Pakistan's naval capability and more with a direct attack on Pakistan's COIN capability.

Army CGSC Instructor Gets American Seapower

The Navy should make 535 copies of this paper and distro to every Congressional office on the Hill.  Army CGSC Instructor David S. Pierson hands the ball to the Navy--will it run with it? 

Bryan McGrath

Finding Piracy’s Tipping Point

After several unproductive years of dithering in the Indian Ocean, navies and shipping companies are slowly changing their mindset towards countering piracy. Unsurprisingly, this shift has begun to produce a positive outcome. For 2011, the number of attempted Somali pirate attacks has continued to increase as in previous years; however, it appears that to date this year, the rate of successful attacks has actually begun a decline. What is contributing to this change? First, shipping companies have started to put aside their fears of liability and embraced the only foolproof deterrence against successful attacks - embarked armed security. Eaglespeak’s post here demonstrates the higher incidence of armed security defeating attacks.

Last week, Intertanko, the association of independent tanker owners, revealed a reversal in its earlier position by releasing guidelines on contracting armed security. The tanker industry had no choice but to get tough on piracy, as loaded tankers are especially susceptible to boarding due to their slower speed and low freeboards. Additionally, with the skyrocketing cost of bunkers, the four or so more days of transit that crude carriers from the Arabian Gulf use in an effort to hug the Indian coast is beginning to take a toll on profits. One of the oft-heard reasons against using armed security is that it will escalate the amount of violence in piracy. This argument holds little water as attacks by automatic weapons and RPGs, the torture, and execution of crews by pirates demonstrate the level of violence in these crimes is already quite unacceptable. Furthermore, I’ve heard industry executives mention that there are rumblings that crews might soon refuse to sail in the Indian Ocean if something isn’t done to protect them. The economic consequences of this sort of reaction couldn't be ignored by anyone, much less the shippers themselves. What additional armed security will do is force the pirates to seek out softer unarmed targets. Inevitably, other components of the shipping industry will have no choice but to tell their lawyers to pack sand and embrace this positive measure to protect their crews and cargoes.

The second factor contributing towards a tipping point in piracy is that the coalition navies have abandoned worthless catch and release tactics and increased their own level of violence. Some of the more aggressive European navies have set the standard for proactively stopping pirates, and even the USN has begrudgingly begun to see the value in killing pirates caught in the act.

In addition to more aggressive tactics on the part of navies and the shipping companies, what else needs to be done to rid the Indian Ocean of the scourge from Somali Piracy? First, we need to continue to target pirate facilitators. As I’ve noted, detaining teenage criminals and cajoling various jurisdictions into expanding their jails is ineffectual and tantamount to flushing taxpayer money down the CHT system. Finally, we should:

Disrupt and Dismantle Pirate Bases Ashore - Piracy at sea can only be abated if pirate bases ashore are disrupted or dismantled. We have obtained appropriate authority from the United Nations Security Council and agreement from Somali authorities to do so. We will work with concerned governments and international organizations to disrupt and dismantle pirate bases to the fullest extent permitted by national law.

Interestingly, this passage is an excerpt from National Security Council’s December 2008 policy on Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa. Granted, this document was created under a previous administration, but it’s still the most current US counter-piracy policy openly published. Lacking the will to enforce our own policies is an indicator of a disfunctional bureaucracy at best.

Although the monsoon season is about to begin, given the pirates' use of motherships, we should expect the number of attacks to not fall as severely as in previous seasons. Nevertheless, with the hardening of many targets and the realization by most involved that lawfare doesn't work, we are now presented with an opportunity to tip control of the seas in the Indian Ocean towards rule of law and away from hapless youths with AKs. Taking the fight to the pirates' leadership and sanctuary ashore is the logical next step.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Eye Candy at Andrews

It's cheap and gratuitous, but always nice to look at.  Photos of the Joint Service Open House currently going on at Joint Base Andrews are best found on the base's Facebook account: http://www.facebook.com/home.php#!/jointbaseandrews. 

The F-35 just flew over.....it was too far away to see if the paint was dry yet.

NATO's Quiet War Off Somalia

Last weekend I noted several strange and inconsistent reports of anti-piracy actions taking place off Somalia. There were numerous reports, some saying it was NATO while others claiming it was the EU, then we got word of others involving an Iranian vessel. This doesn't even count the recent USS Buckeley (DDG 84) helicopter incident where a handful of pirates learned about Davy Jones locker.

NATO put out a press release describing some of their activities last weekend (PDF).

NATO action frees hostages and defeats pirates

London: Recent disruptions of several Pirate Action Groups by NATO forces within the Somali Basin have freed a significant number hostages from captivity and denied the pirates their motherships.

By careful co-ordination of his available forces Commodore Michael Hijmans, NLD (N) NATO’s Commander of its Counter Piracy task force was able to seize the initiative and engage known pirate motherships. NATO was then able to disrupt them by either forcing their surrender or removing their capacity to attack merchant ships by the destruction of their attack skiffs.

In the most recent pirate disruption on 16th May the USS BAINBRIDGE was tasked to investigate a report of a pirate attack by the MSC Ayala. The Ayala was well prepared and had good self protection measures in place to deter the attack and the pirates broke off. The BAINBRIDGE however was by then in the area and quickly located the dhow which had launched the attack and observed ladders being thrown into the sea. The US ship questioned the crew over VHF radio and initially they tried to deceive them by denying that they were pirates but then changed their story and agreed to leave the ship in their attack skiff. Once clear of the dhow it was observed that the skiff was unseaworthy and the pirates were themselves then rescued by the BAINBRIDGE. The dhow, which had been hijacked four days previously, was cleared and then allowed to go about her lawful business on the high seas.
In two other separate incidents last week the American ship USS STEPHEN W GROVES and the Danish ship HDMS ESBERN SNARE and both encountered armed pirate gangs actively hunting for targets of opportunity.

During an engagement between the USS STEPHEN W GROVES and the Taiwanese fishing vessel Jih Chun Tsai 68, a known pirate mothership, shots were exchanged before the pirates surrendered. Subsequently a boarding team from the STEPHEN W GROVES was able to access the fishing vessel where they found 4 dead and 2 injured people. The dead were identified as the master/owner of the fishing vessel and 3 pirates and the injured were 2 of the pirates. The surviving pirates have been returned to Somalia. The event is under review to determine how the fatalities occurred and no additional information is available at this time..

When the HDMS ESBERN SNARE approached a suspicious dhow she was fired upon without warning and returned fire in self defence while manoeuvring to increase the distance between the ships for safety. After the pirates surrendered ESBERN SNARE sent her armed boarding team to the dhow to secure it and assess the situation. The boarding team discovered 4 dead pirates and 10 with injuries of varying degrees of seriousness as well as 14 uninjured pirates, none of the 16 Iranian hostages of the dhow’s crew was hurt. The injured pirates were transferred to the ESBERN SNARE for medical treatment along with the remaining pirates. The freed hostages have been repatriated to Iran.

Speaking today Rear Admiral Hank Ort NLD, Chief Of Staff at MC Northwood said of the task force’s successes “This has been a busy week but through these actions we have clearly demonstrated the resolve of NATO to press home the advantage we have of disciplined crews, excellent support from our maritime patrol aircraft and co-ordination with other international counter piracy forces to suppress piracy. We are sending the message that piracy is a criminal activity that the international community will not tolerate. Of course we are very concerned about the decision by pirates to open fire on our forces and the loss of life is very regrettable which is why we investigate the circumstances on every occasion.”

This doesn't really explain much of anything, and I believe transparency regarding anti-piracy operations continues to be a major problem the EU, NATO, and the US is ignoring. Lack of transparency gives more credibility to other versions of events.

With more engagements we are finding that a lot more people are getting killed, and not only pirates but civilian mariners are getting killed in the cross fire while the western anti-piracy naval forces aren't mentioning that these actions are even taking place at all until several days later.

There continues to be a lot of evidence that NATO is engaged in a lot fighting and killing at sea off Somalia nobody is really talking about. Does that bother me? You bet it does, because it means NATO is being used as a blanket to conceal US military operations in a quiet war off the East coast of Africa. I'll be honest, I really don't care if we kill pirates engaged in piracy, but we are doing something wrong and sending the wrong message if we have to hide that we are doing it.

Thud

This is the transcript of the President's speech yesterday about the Middle East and North Africa.

I thought the speech was too long and poorly crammed two different issues into one speech, and the speech never really found a way to link the different issues effectively.

The Arab Spring is a unique event, and the White House needs to be smarter and understand that it is a big enough event that it doesn't need to tie into Israel and Palestine. Had these two issues been treated separately, the President would have resonated with more people on each issue. Instead I believe the message intended got lost.

The President tried to spread it around too much, and my sense by the reactions I have read by those in the Middle East and North Africa, this speech hit with a resounding thud of 'ho-hum' to many target audiences while leaving the President exposed politically on Israel.

I find some of the Israel related political criticism by the Presidents political opponents very legitimate, and I believe that criticism could have been avoided. It is hard to be Presidential in credibility when the President issues hollow warnings of possible UN sanctions to government leaders in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria regarding the killing and imprisonment of their own civilians when the only real substantial action advised to Middle Eastern nations by the President was his instruction to Israel to concede land for peace.

Threatening governments with possible UN sanctions that may not even be attainable politically is hardly the stuff of a bully pulpit by the President of the United States in the defense of people seeking freedom and liberty from tyrannical regimes, and yet that was the substance of the speech to the Middle Eastern government leaders dealing with the Arab Spring by killing or rounding up their own people. I was underwhelmed.

There were so many mixed messages in the President's speech that it is difficult to believe the message communicated was the same message delivered. What exactly is the message to the Middle East when on one hand the President asks Arabs to quit blaming Israel for their problems, and on the other hand the President tells Israel the path towards peace with a neighbor that rejects the existence of Israel as a starting point is land concessions of major population centers?

Everyone knows Israel must make concessions for peace, but if the policy of the United States in addressing the issue doesn't begin with the concession by Palestine for 2-state, peaceful mutual existence with Israel as a starting point - then any US policy related to Palestine and Israel is going nowhere.

While I think the part of the speech that focused on Egypt and Tunisia was very well done, I'm not sure the rest of the speech did much to forward American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East or North Africa, nor did much to build American credibility with the various folks engaged in the Arab Spring movements throughout the Middle East. I wouldn't call the speech a strike out, but with that speech the President never made it to first base.

Lockheed Martin Takes a Broadside in the Senate

When Dr. Ashton Carter testifies in front of the Senate that your program is unaffordable in this fiscal climate, the only hope left is to find enough politicians that will sell out. Something drastically changes, or the Joint Strike Fighter is done.

"Over the lifetime of this program, the decade or so, the per-aircraft cost of the 2,443 aircraft we want has doubled in real terms," said Ashton Carter, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics.

"That's our forecast for how much the aircraft's going to cost.

"Said differently, that's what it's going to cost if we keep doing what we're doing. And that's unacceptable. It's unaffordable at that rate."

The cost of the plane has jumped to $385 billion, about $103 million per plane in constant dollars or $113 million in fiscal year 2011 dollars, said Christine Fox, the Defense Department's director of cost assessment and program evaluation.

Republican Senator John McCain called the figure "truly troubling," considering the original price was $69 million per airplane.

"The facts regarding this program are truly troubling," said McCain. "No program should expect to be continued with that kind of track record, especially in our current fiscal climate," said McCain.

"It seems to me we have to start at least considering alternatives"

CNA almost had it right. The tipping point wasn't the point at which the Navy fleet was unaffordable, it was the point where naval aviation became unaffordable. Most folks don't realize that the Navy consistently spends more budget money on aviation than the Air Force does, but they in fact have for many, many years.

Here is the biggest problem facing the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps not to mention all the other nations invested in the Joint Strike Fighter program. The cost per aircraft is now so high that it doesn't justify the expenditure, meaning the combat capability of the less capable F-15, F-16, and F-18 alternatives exceeds the combat capability investment one gets with plowing ahead with the Joint Strike Fighter. Quite frankly, there simply isn't enough difference in the payload, range, speed, electronics, or stealth that separates the 5th generation JSF from it's 4th generation alternatives to move ahead.

The UCAS, on the other hand, has game changing range and endurance, not to mention lower manpower costs so even if it runs at a higher cost that estimated per platform, the capability opportunity in the investment is so much more than lesser alternatives that the cost justification is there.

The only thing left is for reality to set in among elected officials, not to mention entrenched interests in defense. The Joint Strike Fighter is the modern A-12, and only the F-35B VSTOL version (which is also the most expensive variant) is the capability that is unique and lacks a legitimate replacement. It is also the most likely version of the JSF to find international interest in continuing the program at very high cost even if the F-35A and F-35C is canceled.

Perhaps there is another way ahead, but right about now the Air Force would be wise to propose a F-22 high and F-15/F-16 low mix of fighters just to streamline maintenance to three specific platforms.

Pentagon Leadership Shuffle

There is a lot of truth in this RUMINT.

This was the final list that was sent to the White House.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff = General Dempsey
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff = General Schwartz
Chief of Naval Operations = Admiral Greenert
Army Chief of Staff = General Odierno

Something important has happened. A few of the reporters already know about it, all of it, and it is about to get really interesting, and ugly.

Folks are pissed.

I am too.

I'll wait for the reporters to catch up.

A PLAN Sea Control Ship?

David Axe has an interesting article over at the Diplomat on the possibility that China is developing a VSTOL jet. My first inclination is to agree with David that the evidence of such a development is sketchy, and that it's probably some other kind of project. However...

• The interest in VSTOL aviation isn't only in the United States, and isn't simply a question of finding aircraft that can fly off big amphibs. Smaller navies have a) operated strike and air superiority Harriers from CVLs, and b) expressed an interest in the capabilities of the F-35B.
• Why wouldn't China be interested in developing an analogue to the Sea Control Ship? If China's chief maritime interests in the future will be the protection of supply lines from the Middle East, as well as projection of power and maintenance of maritime order in the Pacific island chains, wouldn't a Sea Control Ship fit the bill? Less expensive than a big CV, capable of being in more places, and more expendable in a conflict. As we know well, there are plenty of Americans arguing that we should focus on smaller, less risky carriers; why would it be a surprise to see the PLAN moving in this direction?
• While there's little indication thus far that the PLAN is building Sea Control Ships, is it necessarily true that we'd see evidence of carrier construction prior to the mastery of VSTOL technology? If the ships are dependent for effectiveness on a plausible VSTOL fighter/attack aircraft, then it might make sense to delay construction until development of the aircraft had sufficiently progressed.

More Feng's area of expertise than mine, really. We should be prepared, though, for the possibility that China's blue water navy won't be structured very much like our own blue water navy.