Study Material

Several different posts have gone up in topic areas of interest. As I am still working out my posting (and overall) schedule, I am going to link to them by general topic here. Read at your leisure if interested., and comment, please. I will get back to these items as I am able over the next several posts.

Piracy

Courtesy of GCaptain.com, the International Sailing Federation (ISAF) has some strong advice (Here):

"Do not sail in the western Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden. ISAF robustly endorses this position. It considers that sailing in these waters is highly irresponsible"

Arctic Policy

EagleSpeak discusses the USCG Commandant's recent testimony on Capitol Hill regarding USCG Arctic preparedness. A quote,:

"Our current Arctic capabilities are very limited. We have only one operational ice breaker. We do not have any coastal or shoreside infrastructure."

Then there is this port visit press release from the two days later, where the only mention of the state of the USCG icebreaker fleet is:

"The nation’s largest ice breaker, Coast Guard Cutter Healy"

From Dark Roasted Blend, some photos of the Russian Icebreaker fleet in action

Cutter Fleet

Chuck Hill over at CGBlog.org, discusses an item that I have followed closely, the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program.

CGBlog also discusses how strategic communication (or lack thereof) can impact the future cutter fleet. This well-written piece also ponders how could USN and USCG fleet construction efforts be better coordinated (this overall discussion is also relevant to Arctic policy)

Maritime Interdiction

Chuck Hill also discusses how the Israeli Navy applied lessons learned in a high profile interdiction effort.

Please take a look at these links. We'll discuss these and other topics in the near future.


The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard.

Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Maritime Implications

Stewart Patrick at CFR does a pretty good job here of an overall assessment of the new White House Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). Below are some possibly contrarian viewpoints on the maritime aspects of this strategy.

First, and most obvious, threat prioritization is important. This problem is complex, global, and will never be defeated totally. Therefore, the nation's sea services must prioritize deployments in a resource-constrained environment. This means less naval support to the long running, but largely ineffective counter-narcotics efforts in our own hemisphere, and more emphasis on dismantling smuggling routes that facilitate terrorist groups. A shift in CN patrols from the Eastern Pacific to the Eastern Atlantic would be a good start. But aren't these drugs from Latin America killing our children, creating violence on the border, etc? Of course, but four decades of interdicting the transit zone hasn't changed those dynamics, especially when most of those drugs enter the US across the land border anyway. Meanwhile, networks of illicit traffickers on the other side of the world -- mostly motivated by money, but indifferent to whom they support -- move people, drugs, weapons, bulk cash, etc. at the behest of extremist groups who whose motives are ideologically driven towards the wholesale destruction of our way of life, not to mention our energy supplies. These are the maritime facilitators who warrant more of our limited Navy/Marine/USCG resources.

Second, although we tend to put more time and money into figuring out how to defeat high end enemy naval capabilities, disrupting these shadow networks at sea is just as challenging (if not more so) than denying it to another navy. Denying SLOCS to illicit transnational actors is a complex three dimensional problem, requiring coordination between air, surface, and subsurface and ground forces, with the cooperation of other agencies and commerical organizations. Identifying a singular fishing vessel smuggling foreign fighters over hundreds of miles of coast or the proper container containing weapons on a 10,000 TEU ship, then arraying the proper assets for an interdiction is not a trivial matter. However, once fixed, boarding or sinking an illicit trafficker at sea is fairly straight forward.

In addition to resource allocation, the problem set requires unique arrangements of command and control, improved legislation, and shifts in rules of engagement and use of military force policy. Along these lines, the preemptive use of deadly force must be considered as a viable option against the most dangerous at sea facilitation targets, in the same way we lethally interdict enemy supply lines on the battle field and used to interdict them on the high seas. Boarding an illicit shipment has advantages in many cases: the ability to gain prosecutorial evidence, exploit intelligence, etc.; but in others, the first choice should be disrupting the threat violently and encouraging illicit mariners to find another line of business. The viability of lethal versus legal approaches to terrorism has been debated ad nauseum and now should be (re)introduced to the maritime realm.

Another reality is that in order to execute this strategy, we will need to learn to work with non-state maritime surrogates to counter illicit maritime facilitation, especially when traditional nation state partners are complicit in these activities. This engagement requires interagency cooperation and a serious relook at arcane legislation and regulations against DOD involvement in local capacity building. To wit, an example from the TOC Strategy:

“The recent re-appointment of U.S. Treasury-designated drug kingpin Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto as Naval Chief of Staff is likely to further entrench drug cartels in the permissive operating conditions prevailing in Guinea-Bissau. In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime criminals operate in areas of weak governance, kidnapping oil workers, stealing oil from pipelines, and causing environmental damage that harms the citizenry. The United States will work with African governments, European partners, and multilateral institutions to counter this threat to development, democratic processes, and the rule of law in the region.”

Those conventionally-oriented recommendations are fine, but in most cases, networks of local surrogates can provide the best intelligence, and a wider variety of options for disrupting illicit networks.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

The Many and the Few

Andrew Bacevich in Ballpark Liturgy: America's New Civic Religion. Worth reading.

Introduction

Hello to you all. My name is Edward Westfall. Gahlren and the team here at ID have been kind enough to invite me to join the team as a part-time contributor. To regular readers, you may have seen me mentioned incidentally in some posts discussing the Coast Guard and strategic communications. I have been an author on an official unit blog in the past.

My posts here are done in an unofficial capacity. I am an active duty officer in the Coast Guard with over 26 years of enlisted and officer experience. I have served at sea for over 17 years and have commanded four cutters in that time. I have been stationed in a variety of locations in the United States, as well as at the US Embassy in Mexico City. I will be starting my JPME II at the National War College in the next few weeks.

For those that wonder, the Coast Guard is very supportive of unofficial social and print media authorship in both policy and practice (You can see the Coast Guard policy guidance starting on page 10-8, Online Self-Publishing, in the Public Affairs Manual here). Of course, I am required to place a standard disclaimer in any post that reiterates the unofficial nature of the post, so here it is:

The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard.

I am proud of my experience and certainly have thoughts and opinions regarding topics relevant to ID. That being said, I also recognize that expertise is relative and that my perspective on issues is likely not the only one. I plan on focusing my posts on topics such as strategic communications, social media at the field level, joint and multilateral operations, leadership and command climate, organizational planning and development, illicit trafficking interdiction, and Coast Guard familiarization. I also ask that you pass along any questions or topic ideas through comments or the e-mail link to the right.

Thanks for your interest. I appreciate the opportunity to tell the stories of the hard-working Coast Guardsmen I have had the good fortune to serve with, as well as provide whatever insights that I can. I look forward to your thoughts and comments as well.

Best regards,

Edward Westfall

Amos: "Changes to the Navy and Marine Corps Force Structure Were Certain"

Carlo Munoz appears to have missed something. This is the how this AOL Defense article ends.

When asked if more amphibious ships could compensate for a potential cut to the carrier fleet, Amos said changes to the Navy and Marine Corps force structure were certain, but it was too early in the process to talk details.

Same old song.

What same old song is he talking about? When did General Amos admitting with certainty that the Navy and Marine Corps force structure would change become an old song? Seems to me, that paragraph is the story - and the last sentence doesn't belong.

In Admiral Greenert's confirmation yesterday, there were no statements that suggested a force structure change, only that the budget situation could force one. I tend to believe Amos, that we are already at the point of change, but if that is true it is disappointing that Admiral Greenert didn't take the moment that included absolute certainty of his confirmation and use the hearings to describe in detail to the Senate what the future of the Navy looks like under certain scenarios.

"Worried about the industrial base" isn't good enough if the Navy wants to discuss aircraft carriers, admitting the Navy will lose the ability to build these big deck carriers forever is important.

The Navy needs to be more like the Marines, and tell folks how it is without all the cryptic language that just adds more uncertainty and zero clarity.

The Murdoch Interview

I'm only now reading this interview with Rear Adm. James Murdoch, the new LCS PEO, that was posted up at Defense News earlier this week.

Q. What's your assessment of the LCS program right now?

A. Overall, the program is pretty healthy. The shipbuilding side has reached a place where we're into the contracts we want; we're in serial production with a stable design. Mission packages, we're getting in to the test phase. The challenge now is to put it all together.

Establishing a single PEO gives an end-to-end responsibility for the warfare capability to one guy. We'll have one organization covering three big themes: getting the shipbuilding in a stable march down the learning curve; testing the mission packages with all their components and then into the ship; and introducing it into the fleet.

I recognize the concerns that recently surfaced, but frankly these are all part and parcel of the challenges in building ships, and complex ships at that. Where there are issues, we're going to assess, analyze and fix 'em.

The LCS program is healthy? Really? Where is there evidence of that? Concerns "recently" surfaced? Seriously? Is "recently" a time measurement in minutes, days, months, or years?

I am optimistic on the Littoral Combat Ship, but it doesn't give me confidence when leaders say things that stand in direct opposite of all available evidence. What is the status of the modules? Where is a discussion regarding the LCS CONOP? Where is the article in Proceedings on LCS that inspires folks to believe the Navy is on the right course with the LCS investment, or is the Navy content to let CDR Patch dominate the narrative?

There is no confidence in the Littoral Combat Ship from the Navy community - especially the SWO community - so it is hard to find evidence that justifies Murdoch's happy times assessment.

Q. Compared with last year's public relations effort to show off LCS 1, there has been a dearth of news about the Independence (LCS 2). It's operating from Mayport, Fla., rather than the main fleet base at Norfolk. It has yet to make a significant cruise. There is almost no word of its activities, few photos are released, and Austal USA, unlike Lockheed Martin and LCS 1, has become very reluctant to talk about the ship. The only news that's out there is about corrosion problems. Is LCS 2 broken?

A. There's nothing wrong with LCS 2. Fair observations, I wouldn't dispute you. You could certainly draw the conclusion that you haven't heard about the ship, then, gosh, is there something wrong with it? That's why I'm here. I believe the fleet introduction of these ships is very important. When it comes to these ships, nobody cares like I care.

I guess I agree with you. LCS, in the press, has kind of gone sinker, and maybe we shouldn't have let that happen.

LCS 2 has been doing things. Vice Adm. Richard Hunt, commander of Naval Surface Forces, was on board last month. He watched them maneuver an unmanned vehicle around the mission bay, put it in the twin-boomed extensible crane, launch it from the ship. They operated it, drove it back into the recovery system, picked it up and brought it back aboard the ship. It was the first underway day he had in his new job, on the Independence. So why aren't we getting that message to you? I don't know.

I don't know either, but I suspect it is because nobody believes there is value in developing communication strategies that includes articulating objectives and the steps of the process towards meeting objectives. Whether operational or in Navy programs, the only place we ever see commitment to communication strategies is when executing a soft power mission. Again, this goes back to the absence of STRATCOM in doctrine at the operational level in OPNAV, and the absence of STRATCOM at the program level that for the Navy would serve as communication regarding ROI for the taxpayer.

What is the status of Fort Worth? When should we expect Independence to make her first deployment? What changes are going into Freedom during her availability? Where is the next deployment taking Freedom? If Murdoch agrees with Chris Cavas, he and OPNAV need to start setting expectations for the evolution of LCS as both a program and an operational asset.

Owen Cote (MIT) on US/China Underea Balance

Owen Cote is predictably one of the smartest and most insightful naval thinkers in the US--especially where submarines and sub-surface operations are concerned.

His latest assessment of US/China undersea balance is on the interwebs, and it is well-worth the read.  I've written here before about the necessity of "amping up" our competitive advantage in undersea warfare by putting conventional ballistic missiles to sea on subs--Owen's got a good bit to say on that subject here.

US undersea dominance is something Defense decision-makers need to weigh as the budget ax begins to swing.  There is no military skill practiced today in which the US is more dominant over the 2nd place practitioner than it is in undersea warfare.  Now is NOT the time to let others catch up.

Hat Tip: Andrew Erickson

Bryan McGrath

Varyag officially acknowledged

Today, China's Defense Ministry finally admitted to the existence of refitting the Vayarg carrier. Here is the Xinhua link on the subject.

Here is a Reuters Article.

And here are the highlights of the news conference with Defense Ministry. I wish to get a clip of the news conference and watch it over later, but here are the interesting points.

• Some anonymous source said 2 more aircraft carriers are being built at JN shipyard in Shanghai. (I'm not 100% on the number or the location, but it sounds quite plausible)
• Geng did not give an official sea trial date and said that it is not related to South China Sea drama.
• Geng said the task of training carrier-borne aircraft pilots is under the way. He also said that China is relying on its own effort to train naval pilots. (This is interesting, because I've read that the first Chinese pilots already got to Brazil.)
• Varyag is used for research, experiment and training. (I think it will have be eventually used for more than that, but we will see)
  

Here are some of the Varyag pictures taken in the past couple of days. Looking at the work on the deck, it looks like the refitting is close to being done.

We Don't Tend to Expect Unexpected Events...

In my WPR column this week, I take some time off to think of the children, and of radical uncertainty in foreign affairs:

In retrospect, we can identify the structural factors that motivated the century's great clashes and set the framework of national competition, but this is different than being able to predict specific events. In fact, from the vantage point of 1909, what is striking is just how unpredictable the past century worth of foreign affairs is. Much less could anyone have predicted how its international and foreign policy concerns would affect and shape the lives of individuals. And yet, what we think of as the international phenomena of the past century -- including war, pandemic, genocide, revolution, economic collapse and reconstruction, and cultural renaissance -- help constitute a very substantial part of how we would understand the contours of an individual's life who had lived in that time...

It is almost too trite to point out that foreign policy professionals from around the world would agree in principle that the next 80 years should ideally be better than the past 80. Every analyst, diplomat, soldier and policymaker hopes to make a better world for his or her children. Unfortunately, this common hope cannot, in and of itself, solve most international disputes. People continue to disagree about both what constitutes a better world and how we should divide its fruits.

There Will Be Three.

From Chris Cavas at Defense News.

"The Navy has reached an agreement with General Dynamics-Bath Iron Works for pricing, terms and conditions for DDGs 1001 and 1002," Sean Stackley, the Navy's top acquisition official, said in a statement.

"This is an important step in the process to ensure a fixed price contract in line with the Navy's 'should cost' estimates," Stackley said. "While we continue to complete final mechanics of the contract award, we can proceed with funding material and other work to keep 1001 and 1002 on track, until actual contract award before the end of the Fiscal Year."

It will be interesting to see the totals for the final contract. There are little if any savings from economy of scale with the Zumwalt class, so the nation is basically paying full price. Luckily, the maturity of design hasn't raised any red flags with GAO or CBO yet in terms of cost creep, so at least the program is being well run despite the high cost.

What I find most noteworthy however is how nobody can yet find anything about the ship to complain about except for the cost. The Zumwalt is going to be amazizng. When the Navy fields this ship with its new technologies (specifically integrated power system), it will change everything we think we want to do with future surface combatants. DDG-1000 is looking to be the greatest surface combatant in the world the day it is commissioned, and it won't be close.

Zumwalt is basically the gold plated Iowa-class version of HMS Dreadnought.

The third Zumwalt has not been named yet, and I'm hoping that Ray Mabus aims high with a name to the third Zumwalt - something like Earnest Evans for example. The Navy set a sky high bar when they named DDG-1001 Michael Monsoor, and I hope DDG-1002 gets the same treatment.

Red Lines, Fair Shares, and Inflection Points

The headlines this morning try to tell a story. Spencer Ackerman at Danger Room goes with the headline that reads Top Brass Unloads on Austerity Plan. Not to be outdone, Hugh Lessig of the Daily Press has the headline Military brass warns against deep cuts. Phil Ewing at DodBuzz has a similar headline that reads Vice chiefs bemoan readiness in bid to save budgets. If we were to read these headlines alone we might get the impression the proposed cuts to the Department of Defense was the story that came from the hearing, but unfortunately we would not be very informed if we didn't dig deeper.

The story from Tuesday's House Armed Service Committee's Readiness hearing isn't that military leaders do not want budget cuts - no government agency leaders like budget cuts. The real story is that the Department of Defense leadership sent a clear signal to political leaders where the red lines are and what those red lines mean. Representative Forbes choose the number - $400 billion - and each service defined what that red line means to them. Lets start with the Marine Corps.

FORBES: General, you have heard the same statements that we have heard about potential cuts from different sources, $400 billion to $1 trillion.

Assuming that we divided those equally and the Marine Corps had to take as much as $200 billion of cuts over the next 10 years, could you absorb those? And what would the impact be on the readiness state of the Marine Corps if that were to come your way?

DUNFORD: Chairman, we have taken a look at the figure of $400 billion and we've taken a look at what our fair share would be, if it would come down to the Department of Navy and we would take a cut of those reductions inside the Department of the Navy.

I think, within $400 billion, we would have some challenges in taking those cuts. I think, if they would exceed $400 billion, we would start to have to make some fundamental changes in the capability of the Marine Corps.

Did anyone else catch the important point that the Marine Corps has 'taken a look at what their fair share' of the cuts would be? If the military services have already divided the pie regarding the budget cuts before the strategic review is completed, then the Obama administrations strategic review is little more than a bullshit popsicle. General Dunford ultimately does not disclose the figure that would form the red line for "their fair share" of cuts, but if the strategic review is real and not the bullshit popsicle it appears to be, crossing the magic "fair share" total means "fundamental changes in the capability of the Marine Corps." That is a red line.

Forbes asks the same of the Air Force next.

FORBES: I'm looking right now at the average age of some of your fleet. And it could be a few years either way, but as I look at it, your strategic bomber's about 34 years old; tanker aircraft, 47; your airlift aircraft, 19.

What impact would those cuts have on the readiness for the Air Force?

BREEDLOVE: We have also looked at the conversation which is happening about our fair share of $400 billion. And it would cause us quite some concern in the recapitalization of just what you talk about, Mr. Chairman.

We do have an attack air fleet and a bomber fleet that is in bad need of recapitalization. And our plans throughout this period would be challenged by -- by those cuts.

Similarly to General Dunford, what we have looked at is that, in a $400 billion cut, our capacity would have to come down. We have determined that we will not go hollow.

When I came into the flying business in the '70s, I looked at what hollow was on Air Force bases as I walked down the line and saw holes in aircraft where there were no engines, and we had maintained a certain amount of infrastructure and iron but it was unflyable.

And we can't afford to go there with the requirements of our COCOMs today. So a $400 billion cut would force us to constrict our force in order to maintain a ready and fit force to fight.

And we come to almost the same conclusion that General Dunford did. Beyond $400 billion, we would have to go into a fundamental restructure of what it is our nation expects from our Air Force.

There is that phrase "fair share" again - adding more credibility to skeptics of legitimacy of any DoD strategic review by the Obama administration. Can anyone explain how a legitimate "roles and missions" analysis based on strategic thought leads to "fair shares" of budget pies?

General Breedlove has a good answer overall though, because he not only defines the red line as "beyond $400 billion" but also describes what a hallow force is. It is very smart, because by outlining what a hollow force looks like, the US Air Force positions themselves to make cuts that they deem necessary rather than allowing others to dictate - and this testimony makes clear the Air Force will choose to contract itself rather than spread itself out too thin to be effective. These signals are important because smaller Air Force means fewer planes, and fewer planes means local job impacts to specific districts.

Just like the Marines, the US Air Force makes clear that beyond their "fair share" of cuts the Air Force will have to go into a "fundamental restructure of what it is our nation expects from our Air Force." That is a red line.

Forbes then moved on to the Army next.

FORBES: General Chiarelli, again, thank you for being here. No-surprise question to you -- you've heard the questions that I've asked to General Dunford and also to General Breedlove. I'd like to ask you the same thing.

In your best professional military judgment, given the demands of the Army currently, are you currently able to provide the combatant commanders, all of our combatant commanders, with the resources they need to meet the operational requirements of the missions that they currently face?

CHIARELLI: No, we cannot meet all the other COCOM commander's validated demands. Those are prioritized through the global force management process. We work hard to meet them. We are not able to meet them all, and we help them manage that risk.

We are looking very, very hard at a $400 billion cut. We don't totally understand the total impact that's going to have on the force, but when you double that to $800 billion or more, you're reaching an area there that I think would definitely we'd have to look very, very hard at our strategy, what we can and cannot do.

The Army budget is currently enormous - two wars will do that. Even if we take just the baseline DoD budget, excluding the war costs, the Army budget for the last decade has held a higher percentage of the overall DoD budget than it has at any time since WWII, around 26%. What is noteworthy here is the Army doesn't really understand what the $400 billion budget cut figure means, but the red line for the Army is apparently $800 billion.

The Army also receives about $70 billion annually in war supplemental funding, so that might explain in part why $400 billion isn't too bad a hit to the service compared to the other services, but why closer $800 billion would be.

Finally, Rep Forbes brought up the issue with the Navy, but what is remarkable is the extraordinary detail that went into asking the question.

FORBES: Admiral, last question I'm going to ask is this. When Admiral Burke was here a little over a week ago, he said that the COCOM demand was for about 16 or 18 subs at any one time. He said we could only deliver about 10 subs at any one time, not because they didn't need them, but because that's all we could afford to deliver -- big difference.

I'm looking at the shipbuilding plan that has been submitted by the Navy in looking out. We had Admiral Willard testify before one of our subcommittees a little over a year ago that the Chinese now for the first time in our lifetime had more ships in their navy than we did in ours. And I know we can argue about capability, but at some point in time, numbers become capability.

The second thing we looked at is the Navy has said we needed a floor of 313 ships. Then they came back and somewhat tweaked that and said 328. You know, and we've chatted about this before, in the QDR independent panel that did an analysis on that number, they came up and felt we needed 346 ships.

Regardless of whether it's 313, 328 or 346, in CBO's review of the shipbuilding plan that has been brought forward, they asked the question how the numbers work out, because based on their numbers and the cost of the ships, they feel instead of going to 313, we could be going down to 270, 250, even 170, depending on the cost of the ships.

Here's the question I have for you. This year this committee put $14.9 billion in shipbuilding. The average over the last three decades, as you know, has been $15 billion that Congress has put in for shipbuilding. We know we can't supply enough subs right now for our combatant commanders' request.

We know, as you mentioned and also as CRS has come out and told us, if we were to delay a carrier, that carrier cost for either not building one or delaying them would increase not just our carrier cost, but the cost of our subs and the cost of doing the maintenance on our ships.

We also know that last year the Navy had a $367 million shortfall in their ship repair account. Admiral Burke, Admiral McCoy testified about a week or so ago that when we don't do the maintenance on the ships, we reduce the lifecycle for those ships, and we increase the cost of the maintenance.

The number differentiation on that shipbuilding plan is this. If we had the $15 billion, we can't reach even a 313-ship goal. You heard General Breedlove say when the Chinese say they're going to do something, they normally do it. And they're talking about building a lot of ships over the next few years.

My concern to you is if we are short already, and I think the numbers are between -- that we need $17 billion to $19 billion, so we could be short $2.5 billion to $19 billion, what in the world would the navy do on its shipbuilding plan, if you have to take further reductions coming down from some of these budget hits?

GREENERT: Well, Mr. Chairman, you really eloquently described the conundrum we're in, the balance.

FORBES: I try.

GREENERT: And it's really all about that balance.

If we have a reduction of a kind that was passed around here, $400 billion, $886 billion, without a comprehensive strategic review, a fundamental look at what we were asking our forces to do, without a change in activity, as I described, we won't be able to meet the global force management plan today. I'm pretty sure of that.

It will exacerbate our readiness trends, which you're familiar with. And if we have to go to force structure, reduction of force structure, which you mentioned, I'm concerned about the industrial base. You're familiar with it, and you know that it's a fragile item.

Later in testimony, this exchange also takes place.

FORBES: And, Admiral Greenert, the last question I have for you, going back to the numbers we were chatting about earlier on our shipbuilding plan, I think it would be fair to say that the Congress has been averaging about $15 billion over the last three decades.

This year, we put in $14.9 billion. As you know, CBO has come out with their report, suggesting that to follow your plan, you would need about $19 billion per year.

I think some of your earlier figures -- but I don't want to throw these at you -- show that we'd need about $17.3 billion. But let's just take the CBO figures.

How realistic do you think it is with the budgets that we're seeing and proposed cuts that we're going to have those kind of increases going into the shipbuilding plan over the next several years?

And if we can't come up with a realistic scenario of getting those dollars, does that mean our shipbuilding plan is not a realistic plan?

GREENERT: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I looked at the CBO report and as we know, in the -- in the -- the differences vary by year, a few are by tranche years (ph).

First 10 years, we're pretty close. It's about inflation indices, labor differences, cost differences, and really the foundation, if you will, or the assumptions put into the design of the ships. We vary slightly on what the future ship might look like.

But, nonetheless, to get to the -- to your question at hand, if we receive a reduction of the ilk we were talking about, $886 billion, and we have to reduce force structure, and we can't build ships to the level that we need to.

Then, you know, our shipbuilding plan, it gets back to strategy. I have to change the strategy. So we, as stated by all our leadership, we need a change in strategy.

Admiral Greenert had a great day on the Hill in my opinion, particularly considering he is in a somewhat difficult position with the CNO confirmation hearings looming. In his opening statement, ADM Greenert said this very interesting bit:

I can't tell you for sure, Mr. Chairman, if we're at an inflection point or a tipping point. But I can't -- but I don't see how we can sustain this pace of operations indefinitely and meet the readiness standards.

If we try to do so, I think it'll consume the expected service life of our force structure earlier than designed and planned, and we'll face a cascading increase in the cost to achieve the expected service life for those ships. And reaching that expected service life is a foundational element of our future ship inventory and, accordingly, our shipbuilding plan.

ADM Greenert nailed his testimony. The news folks can afford to be simplistic and frame headlines as a DoD vs the budget drama, but it is clearly more complicated than that. There are serious strategic and political issues on the table, and there is nothing simple about the challenges.

The approach Admiral Greenert consistently took was a strategic view calling for a strategic review. It's brilliant, because the Navy faces very difficult decisions and this approach results in burden sharing - specifically when the Navy takes the strategic road it shifts the burden of the political consequences onto elected leaders - and the consequences are enormous.

The shipbuilding industry in America is almost exclusively supported by the government sector, as it lacks the private sector alternative like the airline industry - for example. Loss in shipbuilding capacity by reduced government sector spending cannot be made up via other means, and neither Congress nor the Obama administration has a policy that could help the shipbuilding industry become more competitive globally in the private sector. When Admiral Greenert says he is "concerned about the industrial base," he is speaking directly to capacity now and into the future. Loss of that capacity will translate into regional impacts to economy likely to have election outcomes, and that is particularly true in states like Virginia and Florida.

The Navy needs the strategic review more than the other services do right now, and ADM Greenert has sent a clear message the Navy faces difficult choices, and only with a legitimate strategic review can the Navy make informed choices based on the budget cuts to the Navy. The decisions by the Navy must be guided by a political policy with a clear objective. In many ways, the US needs to decide whether we are Sparta or Athens, because in this economy the nation can no longer afford to be both.

ADM Greenert specifically used the phrase "inflection point," which I think is brilliant in describing exactly where the Navy - if not the nation - is today. Whatever the strategic review decides, what is clear is that Congress will want to have a copy of it for evaluation, because ADM Greenert made it pretty clear that while the Navy can adapt to the review decisions, the political consequences of the choices that will need to be made will be very real.

Did we learn anything? I think we learned a lot. We learned the Navy is standing on the red line. We learned that the 313-ship plan is almost certainly dead. We learned that ADM Greenert is going to present the Navy to Congress as guided by his strategy, and he has signaled that will probably be a new strategy for the Navy. We learned the demand for naval forces is around 400 ships, so the Navy is well below and unlikely ever to be sized to meet COCOM demands.

Most importantly, we learned that right now the Navy is at an inflection point, and the Navy has given clear indications the Tipping Point exists, potentially at $400 billion in budget cuts and absolutely at higher numbers.

POM 13 News Expected Today

This Aviation Week article is important, and I want to highlight something as we move towards the hearing this afternoon that is likely to discuss the budget challenges facing the DoD. This was the article that really kicked off the legitimate discussion regarding the potential of big deck aircraft carrier cuts.

Cartwright acknowledges the Pentagon is considering delaying deliveries of the proposed next-generation Ford-class carriers — or even more severe options such as canceling one of the carriers and reducing the overall carrier fleet size.

Further, he acknowledges, the Pentagon is mulling whether to cancel the proposed SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarine replacement and instead use a more “evolutionary” approach by elongating SSN Virginia-class attack subs.

“It’s certainly something that’s being considered,” he says. “Nothing is off the table.”

The Pentagon is “relooking” at its overall strategy to determine not only how carriers, for example, can be used, but what types of other ships or assets could be employed or deployed with what kind of capability and at what cost, Cartwright says.

Referring to Cartwright’s comments, Navy spokesman Cmdr. Danny Hernandez said, “Specific details and discussions are pre-decisional and part of program objective memorandum (POM) 13.”

While none of these ideas are particularly new, they seem to be getting much greater traction as Defense Department officials struggle to make deeper budget cuts than they had thought they would have to.

The options on the table have been speculated as delaying a carrier by 2 years, cutting an aircraft carrier, or even retiring an aircraft carrier early instead of the mid-life refuel. But the key point here is the specific target of POM 13 - the next budget.

What is likely to come up later today is that POM 13 has been reopened by the DoD who has been instructed to find more defense cuts. These cuts are not what is being discussed in debt discussions, rather the latest mandate for DoD cuts by the Obama administration. The Navy number is $15 billion. I don't know what the Air Force and Army numbers are, nor what the total number is.

This is one more thing to watch for during the 3:00pm hearing today in the House.

Talking Taiwan

Lots of coverage over the last few days regarding this incident last month in the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan's Defense Ministry sent two F-16 fighters in late June to intercept two Chinese aircraft that crossed into its airspace in what it described as the first such incursion by China since 1999.

The ministry said Monday that the Chinese planes quickly turned around, and that it believed the brief incursion, which it said took place on June 29 over the Taiwan Strait, was an accident.

Luo Shou-he, a spokesman for the ministry, declined to comment on a report Monday in a Taiwan newspaper, the United Daily News, that the Chinese aircraft were SU-27 fighter jets trying to drive away a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane.

I don't buy this is the first time that Taiwan has had to send up fighter planes to repel an incursion by China in Taiwanese airspace since 1999, rather this happens much more frequently than we are told, and there is a reason why we are learning about this specific incident right now.

It also comes just days after John Cornyn, a Republican senator for Texas, quoted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton telling him the U.S. would make a final decision on whether to sell 66 new F-16 C/D fighters to Taiwan by Oct. 1.

Yep, that would be the reason.

Two points here. First, this incident came during the period where the US was exercising and working with the nations of the South China Sea back on June 29th. China was trying to be aggressive because they were not happy about the US activities in the South China Sea. The second and perhaps most important point here is that the Chinese actually confirmed the incident to the Financial Times before the US military confirmed it to folks like the Washington Times.

That's new.

Taiwan is the source of this incident and the opinion of this news has divided the country along political party lines. The reason we are hearing about it is almost certainly due to the discussions regarding selling F-16s to Taiwan. A lot of folks believe that selling 66 advanced F-16s to Taiwan will boost the defense of Taiwan substantially. The folks who believe that are political scientists, not tacticians.

China is aiming well over 1000 ballistic missiles at Taiwan, and 66 F-16s will go boom if a war ever breaks out between China and Taiwan. If Taiwan wants to be nasty in a fight against China, they will need high quality submarines and other sea based denial capabilities to prevent the landing of men and material from the mainland. Air superiority would be nice, but 66 F-16s can't fly from runways taking a pounding by ballistic missiles and they aren't going to be enough against China, who has the worlds largest air force. F-16s represent a symmetrical response by Taiwan to a symmetrical threat by China. This path to defense is industry driven, thus political, not strategic.

Lets be blunt though - it really doesn't matter. If for any reason war breaks out between China and Taiwan, it represents a failure of US policy in maintaining peace and stability in the Pacific, and it would represent the biggest crisis in the Pacific since Vietnam, if not World War II.

I do not know if the US will come to help Taiwan should a war break out along the Taiwan Strait, but I do know that in Section 2, Part B of the Taiwan Relations Act it states "It is the the Policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."

The Taiwan Relations Act also discusses arming Taiwan, but I think that quoted section is the most important aspect of the law. Few Americans realize the Taiwan Relations Act is one of the very few laws that directly informs the Department of Defense regarding what specific purpose US military forces must be organized to do. That is not trivial, and something to keep in mind when thinking about the complexity of these issues.

----

Worth noting: Have you seen this analysis from The Jamestown Foundation by James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara on Taiwan's Naval Strategy for the 21st Century? Worth checking out, and well timed release based on current news.

New CEO at US Naval Institute

Vice Admiral Peter H. Daly has been appointed the 52nd Chief Executive Officer of the United States Naval Institute. In my opinion, this is terrific news and represents the best news that organization has had in awhile.

USNI is a dumpster fire right now under the leadership of Steve Waters and the current Board of Directors, and the primary reason I have avoided discussing USNI on the blog for the last many weeks is because I had heard Peter Daly was on the short list for CEO, and I didn't want to write or say anything that might in any way influence him not to take the job. USNI is in one of those places where a steady hand is needed at the helm during this turbulent time, and I believe Peter Daly can be the person to get the organization through this troubled period.

General Tom Wilkerson will be replaced immediately (sometime this week) as CEO. Thank you Tom Wilkerson for being a mentor over the last several years, and I appreciate very much the friendship we have developed over that time. I also truly appreciate that your work over the past year that has without question saved the Naval Institute Press from the desires of the Board of Directors to outsource it, not to mention get the US Naval Institute onto more firm financial ground during a difficult economic time for everyone. Every member who attended the members meeting was exposed to the blatant dishonesty of men like Steve Waters, and as a Naval Institute member I appreciate that Tom handled this difficult situation with class.

As I said during the members meeting in April, I am very excited about the future of USNI. Peter Daly's appointment reinforces my excitement about the future of USNI. I think I safely speak for the vast majority of members who attended the members meeting back in April that once Steve Waters and his disreputable pals on the Board of Directors are gone after the next election, the future for USNI is very bright.

West African Piracy

The Benin pirates are at it again. Since March, 12 tankers have been attacked in West African waters. Previous attacks by these pirates have been more violent than their East Coast brothers, such as those in May of this year and in the fall of 2009, which both killed crewmen. It is no surprise that piracy has escalated West Africa. Successful operations beget imitators.

Unfortunately the local countries involved shouldn't expect much assistance in fighting this growing problem, with the preponderance of Europe's navies heavily involved in countering the Somali pirates and stuck in a protracted maritime embargo against a north African dictator who knows better than to quit. Even for the USN, West Africa presents a challenging presence and logistics problem. We've been able to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean mostly because the ships deploying for CP ops can be tasked for other CENTCOM and AFRICOM missions. However, other than APS, scheduled naval deployments to the other side of the continent are non-existent. Regrettably, West Africa presents a number of irregular challenges that cannot just be wished away: growing piracy; insurgent groups bent on disrupting the flow of oil; an increasingly militant Islamist movement in northern Nigeria (Boko Haram); and a burgeoning narcotics trade that in part, supports AQIM's broadening reach across North Africa. AFRICOM's naval requirements are growing, and US force structure is not. It's past time to buy ships we can afford in a quantity that can meet current and future demands for maritime security operations and security force assistance.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

On the Way to Battleship Cove...

A reader sent me this home movie of USS Massachusetts being moved to Battleship Cove:

Film was taken by Irving W. Bieler. His son sent me the following, along with the film:

It's August 1965 and three (visible) tugs are bringing the battleship up the Taunton River. Most of the pleasure boats that have come out to welcome the ship are from the local Power Squadron, where my dad was the commander, even though he didn't own a boat, which I always thought was a neat trick.

We schoolchildren of Mass. contributed our change to buy the ship from the Navy.

The ship's radar was removed so it could fit underneath the Braga Bridge, which had either just opened or was about to.

There's a Coast Guard cutter and a Navy escort in the convoy. You can see the cutter's hull number so I'll let you google her yourself. I can't figure out what the other ship is.

The part where the camera swings wildly was caused by somebody's wake. I remember that my sandwich fell overboard.

The two little boys are my best friend and my little brother. Odd to think that we're all past 50 now.

On Leadership and Crisis Management

If you intend to read something today or over the weekend, I highly encourage you to read this transcript from Freakonomics Radio from their story "A Mouse in the Salad." Fair warning, it is a little long, but well worth it all the way to the end. You can also find the podcast download here. It is a very interesting and well told story regarding leadership and crisis management.

On Tuesday July 26th the House Armed Services Committee subcommittee on Military Readiness intends to hold a hearing to explore the future of the aircraft carrier fleet, the depletion of pre-positioned stocks, the grounding of the F-22 fleet, training deficiencies, and unfunded requirements. Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, General Peter W. Chiarelli, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., and General Philip M. Breedlove will be giving testimony.

I believe reading "A Mouse in the Salad" before Tuesday will assist folks in setting expectations for the hearing. You'll see what I mean on Tuesday.

A very clever friend of mine described the way the Navy would handle "A Mouse in the Salad."

Navy's answer to a mouse in the salad would have been to initiate a command investigation, then issue a statement that it couldn't comment on an ongoing investigation. The investigation would have been inconclusive, but the waitress would have been fired, the chef censured, the manager promoted, and the customer ignored.

I think he nailed it.

Notes and Links

- I've fixed the links in the Daily Read section - removed and added a few. I've decided against changing the ads, so no new ads. Yeah I'm not going to get rich with that approach, but I'm not blogging for the money either.

- I missed the SASC nomination hearings today, but this observation from Capital Alpha Partners, LLC as part of their overall analysis on the Senate hearings is noteworthy.

Witnesses were asked several times about what happens if Pakistan shuts off the supply routes that the U.S. uses to support operations in Afghanistan. Gen. Fraser stated that 35% of supply for Afghanistan comes by ground through Pakistan. Since the question was asked, there must be legitimate concern.

How many heavy lift aircraft would be needed to create an air bridge to Afghanistan in order to deliver 35% of the military's daily war supply in Afghanistan if something like this happens? The political ramifications of such an event occurring would not be trivial, because I'm not quite sure how Americans would react if suddenly 100,000+ American soldiers and Marines suddenly lost 35% of their lines of communication in a land locked country in Asia.

- Carl Pines post titled A Woman For All Reasons is interesting. Admittedly I added GrEaT sAtAn"S gIrLfRiEnD to the ole RSS after this May article, and have followed ever since. What kindof disturbs me is that I can actually read the language there without an interpreter. She's sharp, but she's young. She's also starting to talk - which suggests study - the merits of seapower. Once her delusion balloon on the merits of COIN busts into a fireball of disappointment, we might have a winner. Until then I'll still keep reading.

- Have you heard the one about China and ASEAN agreeing on behavior ‘guidelines’ for settling disputes on the South China Sea? Call me a skeptic. Rory Medcalf has a different take than mine, and is worth reading. I think ASEAN is an economic body trying to punch above it's weight class, and the EU has proven that doesn't work well. Something tells me China won't be impressed.

- Tom Ricks is keeping score on the number of Navy COs fired, now up to 15. I agree completely with his comment: "I do admire the sea service for continuing its tradition of accountability, and for being public about it." Amen.

- CDR Salamander had one take on the recent report regarding the performance of the MQ-8B Fire Scout, and the Navy apparently has a different take. I think they are both right, and as a matter of fact the winner here is all of us for finally seeing some transparency regarding a NAVSEA program. If NAVSEA isn't stupid, and that's a big IF, NAVSEA will use the MQ-8B program as a test of more transparency by NAVSEA and learn how to discuss important programs in the context of development evolution. Like I said last month, I am very pleased to see that field testing the Fire Scout included putting the system in a position where it could be shot down.

On Command and Crew

My greatest reward for blogging is meeting the people of the maritime services; the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. It is why I write, why I travel, and I strongly believe people are the most important element to success for all three maritime services. Yes, I discuss stuff a lot on the blog, but the human aspect of the maritime services is where the power is in American Seapower.

At any given moment I am blessed to have an opportunity to ride along with those deployed by getting personal correspondence and trading ideas with folks who are out at sea. In many cases these family and friends update emails are insightful, but have almost nothing to with content discussed on the blog. In other cases, the correspondence with folks at sea might be specific to a topic discussed on the blog, although often the correspondence arrives several days or even weeks later than the topic was published here. In all cases the activity serves as something of a virtual window for me into the lives of those who work long hours during long deployments, and while the medium may be online - these private messages have a very real impact on me personally.

One of the individuals I have had great pleasure following on deployment the last few years is Commander Edward A. Westfall, United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is remarkable, probably the best organization in all of the US government and absolutely the most underrated government organization in the United States. We take young men and women and divide them into small crews, send them out on small ships, and then ask their leaders to hold long command tours with multiple deployments both near and far from home in what usually ends up being some of the most dangerous situations at sea in the world today. The Coast Guard is doing something right when it comes to Command at sea, because this small crew, small ship, long command tour organizational model has somehow allowed most of those old white war horse cutters to apparently serve the nation forever.

Commander Edward A. Westfall's change of command ceremony was today at 10:00am in Boston. Up until as recently as two weeks ago, I had every intention of attending that ceremony in Boston - indeed I was going to take my teenage daughter so we could both tour the USS Constitution museum together for the first time. Alas, my attendance was not to be for personal reasons. Luckily, Commander Westfall sent me the remarks he intended to share today, and with his permission - I share them with you.

Admiral Parker, Ambassador Eagen, Representative Mitchell, Admiral Neptun, Colonel Reynolds, Colonel Davis, Captain’s Sinnett, McPherson, Throup, and Bert, distinguished guests, ESCANABA officers and crew, family and friends, thank you for being here today. First, I must recognize the absence of a key member of the command: the ship itself. The ESCANABA hull is not here today as she is currently beginning an eleven month Mission Effectiveness Project at the Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore, known as MEP. MEP will upgrade and improve many of the ship’s systems, and provide the opportunity for completing other work. The ESCANABA crew is now here in Boston. During MEP, they are balancing their time between cross-decking with sister cutters and taking advantage of training, qualification and leave opportunities. It is admittedly a little odd to have a cutter’s change of command with the hull itself hundreds of miles away, but this is a unique circumstance.

The process has, for me, underlined how much a crew, THE crew, is the soul of a ship. The ESCANABA hull without her crew is but a hollow shell. Those of us who were aboard in Baltimore after everyone had left can attest to that. The ESCANABA crew without the hull, however, is still a force to be reckoned with. Chris, welcome and congratulations on assuming command. Undoubtedly this will be a challenging time as you command both separately. I know that you look forward to the day when the ESCANABA hull and crew are reunited.

The change of command ceremony is, conceptually, a simple process. In language used every four hours aboard a naval ship at sea, the new Captain relieves the old, marking the seamless transition from one to another. The crew is assembled here to bear witness to this simple yet profound event. Any guests that are present are merely observers of this elegantly simple yet significant event between Captain and crew.

Thank you, each and every one. Everything for which I was just recognized is due of you. I am proud of my role in steering, guiding, and leading (and, as often as not, vice versa) over the past two years, but a captain without a crew is merely someone alone on the water. All of the concepts, insights, plans, decisions, and such that are the daily details of leading are nothing more than daydreams without all of you to make them real. You are the finest crew that I know of in the fleet, and I am proud to have been your shipmate and captain.

Without a doubt, your next year will be challenging. While tracking the work being performed on the ESCANABA hull, you will travel far and wide, work separately and together, even take two different sister ships, SPENCER and SENECA, out for a deployment or two. This will test your resilience as individuals and as a team. It will be your new Captain’s task to lead you through this, but I do have some thoughts on how you have succeeded for me. I believe that you can apply this to succeed in the future.

To me, the timeline for gauging MEP success has never been turning the hull in or even picking it up a year from now. The real measure of success will be how well you prepare and execute your first deployment reunited with the ESCANABA hull more than a year from now. Working with that as your time horizon will be a challenge. I am confident that you will not only rise to meet that challenge, but, in true ESCANABA fashion, you will redefine the organizational understanding of how it is done. You will do this because it is what you have done, can do and it is what you expect of yourselves. You will also do it because of your strong sense of mission.

Mission focus and understanding is far more than the concept of a certain deployment or action. Mission is more than just “what”. Mission includes an understanding of why. Missions have time horizons, from immediate to long-term, and we often are responsible for multiple missions with competing interests: do we remain at a heightened state of readiness, waiting for a smuggler expected at some unknown future time, or do we stand down to ensure adequate rest? Do we work long hours immediately after a lengthy deployment or stand down and run the risk of having to scramble to prepare for the next big thing? Ultimately, determining priority comes down to me, but the way in which the long and short term mission can interplay is something important that all of you understand. The greatest risk in balancing missions is in emphasizing short-term gain at the cost of a long-term mission without good reason; many times, the immediate mission IS the most critical, but this is not always the case. As you move forward over this next year, bear that in mind.

Understanding why we are doing something and how it affects unit, service and national goals matters. I give your intelligence and curiosity the credit I believe it deserves and work to provide context as to why we are doing something. Whether deploying to the South Atlantic, racing to get to a search and rescue case before dark, or slowing to ensure we arrive at first light for a boarding, understanding why it matters provides each of you with the power to improve what we do. As I’ve said before, it is your individual actions that make our mission’s succeed. Current and future leaders, take note: Better informed not only motivates, it also improves the final product.

You are all professionals. You have regularly distinguished yourselves by executing missions and tasks, some as straightforward as navigating the harbor, to those as complex as preparing and delivering the cutter to MEP, or coordinating an all-night pursuit of a smuggler that included surface and air units from partner services, agencies and countries.

In every case, you have shown that you know your trade, are dedicated to doing things correctly, and improved things for the fleet when that is what is needed. This approach is not always the easy option, and it often requires extra work; doing less can become a too frequent choice. Choosing to do things the right way is a hallmark of professionalism and is what all of you have done repeatedly.

Doing things the right way requires a hard-won ability to self-assess. None of us, as individuals, departments, teams, ships, or what have you, are perfect. We should all strive to be our toughest critics, understanding that perfection should be pursued, but also knowing it is rarely, if ever, achieved. The pursuit of improvement is what drives us to challenge ourselves. It is what leads us to continue to train and to learn. It is what drives us to plan as far out and to the best detail we can, all the while understanding that few if any plans survive their first use. These are the things professionals do.

Finally, I remind all of you to take care of yourselves mentally, physically and emotionally. Life at sea in the service of your country is immensely rewarding, but also challenging, demanding and dangerous. At times we, by design or circumstance, must perform flawlessly at the edge of our capacity and capability. This is the nature of the service we have committed ourselves to, and is, quite simply, what we do.

When a go-fast chase erupts in gunfire, migrants must be removed to safety before darkness and foul weather set in, or we prepare the ship for MEP, your shipmates and I, and the public we serve, need you to be able to surge to meet the demands of a situation. We don’t maintain that capacity by accident, but through deliberately managing how we work, stand watch, and enjoy our down-time. There are times when the mission and our service demand that we give all we have and more; as your Captain, I have been acutely aware of how much that truly could be. With planning, good leadership, and a willingness to challenge the norm, those times are not that frequent. We can use technologies and policies to reduce how many people we throw at a routine or planned event. We have the responsibility to ensure that no individual is indispensible at a given time so that they may take leave when needed. We have the tools and ability to stand ourselves down when the mission allows and the situation demands. We can shift our routine to suit the particular mission or threat we face. These are the practices we have employed, these are the practices that have made us resilient, and these are the practices that foster success.

Thank you again for being my shipmates and for making this an outstanding two years. I look forward to hearing of the continued achievements of ESCANABA, and it would be my distinct pleasure to serve with each of you in the future. Perhaps we will be shipmates, or I will see you as a leader at a different unit. In any event, I value the time we have served together here. Best of luck to you all.

A little blogger trivia... of all the Americans (I won't speak for foreigners) who will attend NDU this year, I would be shocked if there is any other student with as much time at sea or with as much experience in Command at sea as CDR Westfall, USCG - in fact I would be surprised if it is even close by years. CDR Westfall is truly one amazing American sailor, and the USCG and the country is blessed to have such men in service to our country.

Good luck on your next assignment sir.

The Silent Service Finds a Voice

"Let us dare to read, think, speak and write." — John Adams - 1765

And for COMSUBFOR - Blog.

The first post is discussion "Design For Undersea Warfare," and according to Bubblehead, the reviews so far are good. Things might get interesting if the Silent Service learns how to talk about themselves in public. At minimum I have to give VADM Richardson credit - he's going to give it a shot.

Commercial Seabed Mining at last?

I do not have an opinion on UNCLOS, because I have not been persuaded by arguments for or against. I've read it many times, but I am far from an expert. Most Americans don't know anything about it. I think issues involving UNCLOS represents an important discussion on ID, and I fully expect the Obama administration to take on the treaty now that START is completed. With that discussion looming, potentially later this year, I welcome these types of blog contributions on the subject because I believe they are important. The following post is contributed by Dr. Miles Libbey.

Miles is a retired Navy Captain who studied Law of the Sea at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy during his appointment as the Navy's first Samuel Eliot Morison Scholar, eventually leading to a Ph.D.; he founded the startup Seaminr last year to provide technology, international law and business impetus to worldwide commercial seabed mining efforts creating exploration companies.

Commercial Seabed Mining at last?
....UNCLOS gains importance for USA…

The close association of the United States and the Law of the Sea (more correctly UNCLOS, the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, Dec 82) over its long maturation period from the 60’s until today, has impressively passed a significant milestone Tuesday as the first two commercial claims for polymetallic nodule exploration were approved at the International Seabed Authority (ISA).

These claims are potentially worth many tens of billions of dollars by harvesting the readily accessible, important minerals such as cobalt, nickel, copper and the Rare Earths that are helping to build green motors and generators. Admittedly the impression of “readily accessible” may be stretching the point a bit when these potato-sized rocks lie on the seabed surface at about two and a half miles deep.

30 years ago it was stretching technology some to collect these attractive mineral nuggets… today not so much. Three major inflection points have jointed to revitalize this wonderful ocean resource and technology is one of them. Driven by the feats of the deep water hydrocarbon industry in offsetting foreign US gas and oil, seabed mining can now borrow and shape their technology to use a light touch to bring these metals to the surface. Environmental responsibility is an international byword and backed by regulations evolving with our increasing knowledge.

The economic inflection point could drive the race for seabed resources alone. Market demands for nodules and closely associated crusts cause give economic incentives long lacking in tepid markets for harvesting seabed minerals. The new world economy demanding stainless steel and rare earths for green energy by the burgeoning BRICS (Brazil, India, China, South America …as well as Indonesia, Malaysia and other economies) need more than terrestrial resources can easily and economically provide as we look to the future. By having their claims approved yesterday, the island states of Tonga and Nauru show their prescience by making their claim first, leading the rest of us to understand a environmentally and economically sound path to needed resources.

The final inflection is driven by the international acceptance of over 160 countries of the law of the sea as expressed by UNCLOS. This literal world-wide acceptance has led to a settling and increasing stability of the international legal regime governing the seabed, consequently creating an environment in which capital markets can enter safely and likely thrive.

Infamously, most of the countries who have not yet acceded to UNCLOS are small like the Vatican, do not care because they are landlocked, or have USA in their chant.

The US has several pioneer claims each about the size of Rhode Island with an estimate of over trillion dollars of important metals to harvest: but only after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee breaks its 30-year lock on stopping a full vote of the Senate to allow Ratification. Perhaps Tonga’s and Nauru’s foresight and leadership will change some minds on Capital Hill this year.

China and Pakistan - A Russian View

If you read Russian, this is an interesting read. Like all discussions of Chinese naval exports to Pakistan, we will have to wait and see.

The key point - China is supposedly building 6 AIP submarines for Pakistan. The first four will be built in China and the last two will be built in a shipyard in Karachi, Pakistan - in a shipyard which will be refitted by China. There is speculation that the first of these submarines has already been launched, and the second is under construction.

So far the sourcing for the Pakistan-China submarine deals are well outside mainstream coverage, indeed almost entirely Indian, Russian, and Pakistan information sources. Time will tell.

HT Kursed

Gang Of Six Will Cut Deep Into Defense - Updated

So when I gave a few personal thoughts regarding the Navy at the Tipping Point this morning, did you give it a casual glance before you dismissed it, or did you actually read it and take my advice to start thinking about alternative futures? My sense is most Americans - much less DoD employees - are still not ready to be serious about the debt problem, but maybe a bit of cold water will help get the point across.

Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg reported today on Twitter that House Armed Services Chairman Buck McKeon has warned a panel of GOP members today that the Gang of Six proposal will cut $886 billion in defense spending over 10 years. This number is compared to the $400 billion President Obama proposed, not on top of.

With the Navy budget running between 27% and 31% of the defense budget over the last 15 years, that means between $239 and $275 billion in cuts to the Navy over the next 10 years, or an average of $23.9 - $27.5 billion in cuts annually to the Navy over the next decade if the pie is distributed the same way moving forward. This suggests a budget cut for the Navy will fall between 17% and 19% annually.

With the Ford class aircraft carrier running around $14 billion to procure the first ship, and the Joint Strike Fighter running around $3 billion just to procure the aircraft for two squadrons for the carrier, not to mention the remarkably high per-hour flight cost of the JSF, nor to mention the coming UCAS addition to the air wing, and stack on costs for the loss of efficiencies that occur when supporting multiple types of aircraft instead of 1 type (F-18), and before you get to other operational costs and organizational costs you find that the cost of building and fielding a single big deck aircraft carrier is simply unaffordable by any metric.

To be perfectly honest, the costs on everything related to carrier strike groups has grown so high over the last few years that the Ford class carrier centric organizational model for US Navy forces is almost certainly a worse investment than other credible alternatives even if the money did exist. The budget challenges facing the Navy simply force the issue.

August 2nd is rapidly approaching, and the Gang of Six option is the most likely idea to be reconciled by all sides. The DoD number will likely remain part of the debate, but expecting a better result means hoping for the Presidents $400 billion defense cut proposal as the floor.

Regardless how it goes down now, US Navy is out of money. It's time to start thinking.

Update: This is the memo sent out by Buck McKean:

In addition to other analysis being done on the potential tax implications regarding the Senate’s Gang of Six budget proposal, “A Bipartisan Plan to Reduce Our Nation’s Deficits,” I wanted to provide a quick analysis for HASC members on the impact on defense.

Gang of Six Proposal Impact on Defense:

Based on what we’ve read the proposal would result in $886 Billion in security cuts over 10 years. Due to a firewall in the proposal between security and domestic spending, nearly half of the discretionary savings in this proposal comes from security programs. The Department of Defense spending accounts for roughly 85% of security spending.

Additionally the proposal would require changes to military retirement and other benefits our men and women in uniform fought so hard to earn. It is our belief that this proposal raises serious implications for defense and would not allow us to perform our constitutional responsibility to provide for the safety and security of our country or keep faith with men and women in uniform. Keep in mind, since the President originally submitted his budget proposal for FY2011, defense has already shrunk $439 billion over 10 years.

In its current form, I cannot support the Gang of Six proposal.

Secretary Gates May 24, 2011:

“I am determined that we not repeat the mistakes of the past, where the budget targets were met mostly by taking a percentage off the top of everything, the simplest and most politically expedient approach both inside the Pentagon and outside of it. That kind of “salami-slicing” approach preserves overhead and maintains force structure on paper, but results in a hollowing-out of the force from a lack of proper training, maintenance and equipment - and manpower. That’s what happened in the 1970s - a disastrous period for our military - and to a lesser extent during the late 1990s.”

And the battle continues...

USS WillProbablyNeverSail Has Engine Problems, Again

WHAT THE .....!!!

The Navy's problem-plagued amphibious ship San Antonio is undergoing engine repairs again.

The Navy said Tuesday that it called off crew training off the coast of Virginia last week after all four of the San Antonio's diesel engines experienced problems.

Naval Surface Force Atlantic spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Bill Urban told The Virginian-Pilot that all four engines experienced leaks with the intercoolers and the leak-off boxes. One engine had to be shut down.

Repairs, which will be done at Norfolk Naval Station, are expected to be completed in time for a pre-deployment training in August.

"Fortunately, these additional maintenance issues on San Antonio are not as significant as those in the past," Adm. John C. Harvey, the head of Fleet Forces Command, said in a written statement. "I fully expect San Antonio to begin her basic training phase on time in early August and deploy on schedule next year."

Last week huh? Was that before or after the testimony of VADM McCoy and VADM Burke on Navy readiness including Navy surface vessel maintenance problems?

Would Jim Webb be the Most Hawkish GOP Presidential Aspirant on China?

With the exception of Rick Santorum, maybe so.

For the most part, candidates for the GOP presidential nomination have avoided inflammatory rhetoric about the military threat represented by China. While former House Speaker Newt Gingrich has warned of the dangers of an electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) attack against the United States, China specifically does not figure prominently in his rhetoric. Rep. Michelle Bachman’s critique of China is limited mostly to the economic realm,saying recently, “With all the money that we owe China, I think you might correctly say, Hu’s your daddy.” One of the selling points for John Huntsman’s candidacy is the business opportunities generated by his recent ambassadorship to China. Similarly, Mitt Romneyhas emphasized China’s role as both an economic competitor and economic partner, more than as a military threat. Tim Pawlenty has argued that the United States should try to achieve China-like rates of GDP growth. Of the notable Republican candidates, only Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania has sounded a note of warningabout China’s military ambitions, faulting President Barack Obama for “acquiescence to China’s saber-rattling in the South China Sea.”

I also talk some Red Dawn. Frankly, I'm not sure that I'm going to be able to bring myself to watch the North Korean Army invade Washington State.

The Tipping Point Is Here

I've been thinking and rereading the CNA Tipping Point study. I am finding it is a good framework for thinking about different scenarios that might emerge from the overwhelming challenges facing the Navy today. While CNA did a good job thinking about this issue, I'm not sure I am happy with this description of what a "Tipping Point" is.

The inherent flexibility of naval people and platforms and assets has been proven again and again. The ability of high-end assets to flex for a number of missions along the spectrum of operations has been a staple of deployments by carrier strike groups and their escorts and their air assets. What has not been proven is the ability of a global navy to use forces that are not dominant or not present overseas to deter challengers, deny regional aggressors, or reassure partners. When you are no longer present in one or two areas of vital national interest with dominant maritime forces, you are at the “tipping point.”

My problem with this description is: I believe the factors by which the Navy can be described as being at the tipping point are far more numerous and complex than the described operational metric. As far as I can tell, the Navy has not met the criteria laid out by CNA, thus by the CNA description the US Navy is not at the tipping point.

However, I believe the Navy is indeed at the Tipping Point right now, today, and even if many know it - no leaders are ready to publicly admit it. There is a convergence of several factors including budgets, existing plans, ongoing operations, readiness levels, geopolitical changes globally, cost/value capabilities calculations, and policy demands that taken together suggest the Tipping Point for the US Navy has arrived.

If I was to describe a single metric by which I believe everyone can safely agree the US Navy is at a Tipping Point, my criteria would be whether the US Navy must fundamentally change the way they think about force structure moving forward in the emerging fiscal and geopolitical environment. I think most people who follow this blog are following the news regarding the potential of the US Navy cutting one - maybe more than one - big deck aircraft carriers.

Today, US Navy force structure is organized around the big deck aircraft carrier, and a reduction below 10 big deck aircraft carriers would require the Navy to rethink the fundamental organization behind the existing force structure of the US Navy.

The way I see it, if for any reason the Navy goes below 10 big deck aircraft carriers, the Navy passes the Tipping Point. My research and investigating over the last few months leads me to one inescapable conclusion that I've been very hesitant to date to discuss on the blog: the time when the Navy will fall below 10 big deck aircraft carriers is near.

In my opinion that means the Tipping Point is here.

Ms. Bordallo Asked the Right Questions

From the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness hearing last week.

FORBES: Ms. Bordallo, I recognize you for whatever time you require.

BORDALLO: Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. There are a few miscellaneous questions for the admiral. Admiral Burke, it is my understanding that the DOD rates for fuel increased on June 1st from $126 a barrel to $165 a barrel. Can you please explain the total cost and the impact to the ship operations and flying hour program accounts? And if the fuel rates remain high in fiscal year 2012, how will you pay for that deficit?

BURKE: Ma'am, you're absolutely right. It's roughly $39 a barrel. In the last four months of 2011, if that price holds, it will cost us an additional $140 million in the ship operating account, an additional $204 million in the flying hour account, for a total of $344 million through the rest of the fiscal year. The likely source of payment for that will be supplemental funding.

$165 a barrel? Yep, and while I am not certain, I believe $344 million is just the Navy/Marine Corps budget shortfall to meet the higher price. I could be mistaken, but I thought I read somewhere the total DoD shortfall due to rising prices of fuel is $517 million. Regardless, the $165 a barrel number is important. Tell me folks, which direction is energy heading in the future... up or down?

From Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress by Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs dated January 18, 2011.

2006 Navy Alternative Propulsion Study

The more comprehensive and detailed 2006 Navy alternative propulsion study was conducted in response to Section 130 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2024), which called for such a study (see “Prior-Year Legislative Activity”). The study reached a number of conclusions, including the following:

In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost.

For a small surface combatant, the procurement-cost increase was about $600 million.
For a medium-size combatant (defined as a ship with a displacement between 21,000 metric tons and 26,000 metric tons), the increase was about $600 million to about $700 million.
For an amphibious ship, the increase was about $800 million.

Although nuclear-powered ships have higher procurement costs than conventionally powered ships, they have lower operating and support costs when fuel costs are taken into account.

A ship’s operational tempo and resulting level of energy use significantly influences the life-cycle cost break-even analysis. The higher the operational tempo and resulting level of energy use assumed for the ship, lower the cost of crude oil needed to break even on a life-cycle cost basis, and the more competitive nuclear power becomes in terms of total life-cycle cost.

The newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even cost-ranges, which supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look analysis, are as follows:

Although nuclear-powered ships have higher procurement costs than conventionally powered ships, they have lower operating and support costs when fuel costs are taken into account.

A ship’s operational tempo and resulting level of energy use significantly influences the life-cycle cost break-even analysis. The higher the operational tempo and resulting level of energy use assumed for the ship, lower the cost of crude oil needed to break even on a life-cycle cost basis, and the more competitive nuclear power becomes in terms of total life-cycle cost.

The newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even cost-ranges, which supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look analysis, are as follows:

• $210 per barrel to $670 per barrel for a small surface combatant;
• $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel for a medium-size surface combatant; and
• $210 per barrel to $290 per barrel for an amphibious ship. In each case, the
• lower dollar figure is for a high ship operating tempo, and the higher dollar figure
• is for a low ship operating tempo.

The life-cycle cost break-even analysis indicates that nuclear-power should be
considered for near-term applications for medium-size surface combatants, and
that life-cycle cost will not drive the selection of nuclear power for small surface
combatants or amphibious ships. A nuclear-powered medium-size surface
combatant is the most likely of the three ship types studied to prove economical,
depending on the operating tempo that the ship actually experiences over its
lifetime.

Compared to conventionally powered ships, nuclear-powered ships have
advantages in terms of both time needed to surge to a distant theater of operation
for a contingency, and operational presence (time on station) in the theater of
operation.

CRS sourced that information to the written statement by The Honorable Dr. Delores M. Etter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), et al., Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Integrated Nuclear Power Systems for Future Naval Surface Combatants, March 1, 2007, pp. 4-5.

I think this is very interesting, because in 2011 - roughly a dozen years away from commissioning the first DDG-51 Flight III in a time everyone is talking about shrinking budgets and high operational tempos, all of a sudden the price of DoD fuel is now around 75% of the breakeven point for nuclear powered surface combatants with a high operational tempo. By the way, when you add nuclear power to surface combatants, it raises the price of those ships meaning Congress is likely to buy fewer ships - and at a high price already the Navy is going to have fewer ships anyway which also means it is very likely the operational tempo would remain very high.

The Navy has a serious energy problem, and it isn't just fuel. The question that everyone needs to be asking is "what should we be doing now?" It depends. If the Navy is serious about total cost of ownership when it comes to their new construction vessels, then the law that requires nuclear power must be part of the discussion. Alternatives to nuclear power should also be important parts of the discussion, after all there is something to say about not putting a nuclear reactor on a platform the enemy will be shooting at - although given we already have nuclear aircraft carriers, perhaps that ship has sailed.

No matter how one looks at it, any discussion of the DDG-51 Flight III must include an explanation why the price of oil will not go up only 25% more than the price of oil today, which by itself is an unbelievable proposition because any war requiring the United States to use the capabilities of the DDG-51 Flight III is almost certainly going to raise the price of oil by 25%! The issue I'm trying to highlight is that the rising cost of fuel must factor into the DDG-51 Flight III discussion, because we appear to be well past the red line for a legitimate nuclear power discussion for any platform that won't be fielded 10 years from today.

If total cost of ownership matters the way the Navy says it does, then it is time to start thinking about designing a future surface combatant that factors in total cost of ownership. The law today states new design ships the size of modern US surface combatants must be nuclear powered. I cannot say I have always agreed with that law, but in light of new information I think there was quite a bit of wisdom in the law and the Navy can no longer ignore nuclear issue when it comes to the next surface combatant. Besides, the necessity for Integrated Power in future surface combatants is an issue that makes the current plan for Burke Flight IIIs completely unrealistic anyway. Indeed, Congress should never fund a future surface combatant program that lacks integrated power, to do so would be a criminal act in the form of wasting taxpayer investments in seapower.

With all of that said, Congress cannot ignore that by buying nuclear surface combatants, they are budgeting cost of ownership for fuel up front in procurement - an upfront investment that suggests a transition period requiring higher investment up front for lower operational costs later. This is very important, because while it is unclear if the Navy has the foresight to make choices based on long term total cost of ownership investments - that concern regarding lack of foresight goes double for political leaders.

BORDALLO: Another question is, given the issues with the current computer-based training raised by GAO, the naval inspector general and the Balisle report, how has the Navy improved off-ship training for Navy personnel to ensure that sailors arrive at the ship with the necessary skills?

BURKE: Ma'am, we probably went a little too far on computer based training a few years ago. We have since shifted the pendulum back some, so we have a mix of computer-based training and as well as instructor-based training. And we have a very good instructor-to- student ratio in that instructor-based training. And we see benefits in both kinds of training, because there are some people that learn better one way than the other and there are some things that are better taught one way than the other. But the key point is it's much better to take apart a valve and put it back together in something, you know, where you actually put your hands on a physical valve and physically work on something. So we shifted too far. We've come back. And we think we've got the mix about right now. But we've heard from the sailors and heard from the Congress on this one and we've moved.

Shortly after the commissioning of USS New York (LPD 21), the ship was returning to Norfolk when all of a sudden there was this loud tapping sound coming from the main propulsion diesel engine. It turned out, nobody knew what to do. This scenario was apparently not covered in the virtual training program the crew had used to operate those big diesel engines in the LPD-17 class. The crew was supposed to turn off the engine having the problem, but that's easier said in hindsight.

The Navy has spent a fortune retraining sailors because of poor training given in the name of virtual instruction. Time will tell if the Navy has found the right balance between hands-on training and simulated training, but there is no question the Navy has taken a lot of strides to fix what was an enormous mistake in reliance on computer based simulation.

Of all the mistakes the Navy has made recently regarding their attempt to find efficiency in technology, the virtual training mistakes might be one I'm OK with as long as the lesson is legitimately learned. For a generation or two at least, my sense is that the Navy heaped upon itself a healthy dose of skepticism regarding the false promises of technology as a replacement for fundamental skills sailors require. It's an expensive lesson to learn, but one we are unlikely to see repeated. Large private organizations make these kinds of mistakes too, so the Navy is not unique when making mistakes attempting to incorporate new technological concepts into their organization.

As mistakes go, this was a big one, but in the case of too much reliance on virtual training - it is a problem that has been relatively easy to identify and has a known and easily applied solution. The Navy deserves all criticism for this mistake, but for me - I'm far more concerned with organizational problems that are hard to identify or don't have a known solution yet, for example, new surface force maintenance shore based support concepts. For me, integrating new support regimes for new ship types is a much bigger challenge than a virtual training software program that never lived up to expectations.

BORDALLO: Good. My last question, Mr. Chairman, is, based on the findings of the Balisle report, the Navy plans to take a number of actions in many interrelated areas such as training, maintenance, command and control, manning, etc. What's not clear, however, is who will be responsible for making sure that the actions are coordinated and implemented to avoid the problems of the past where the Navy wasn't looking at things holistically to see whether the changes it was making were compatible and did not have unintended consequences. The Navy will need to make accountability clear and have some kind of integration mechanism across the areas, whether it be one senior-level official who is the focal point supported by an interdisciplinary group or another approach. So how does the Navy intend to proceed from here in taking corrective actions, including establishing leadership and organizational accountability?

BURKE: Last summer, last July, I think it was, in front of this committee, Admiral McCoy and I were here in between us was Admiral Harvey. And Admiral Harvey was and is the commander at Fleet Forces down in Norfolk. Admiral Harvey said he was the responsible person to do exactly what you talked about. Now, he can't do that without Admiral McCoy and Admiral Architzel and me doing our jobs to support him. So in military parlance we see him as the supported commander and we are the supporting commanders. And as long as we do our jobs to give him the resources to do it, he will -- he will deliver.

BORDALLO: So he is the focal point.

BURKE: Yes, ma'am.

MCCOY: And if I could chime in, I'm on a regular every 60 to 90 day drum beat with Admiral Harvey. I also report to Admiral Walsh, the Pacific Fleet commander. I'm responsible to deliver the engineering and maintenance associated with the actions in the Balisle report. I can also tell you that the two surface type commanders are also held accountable by the fleet, Admiral Harvey and Admiral Walsh, for their pieces of manning, training and standards and things like that that were in the Balisle report. So we are on a regular drum beat. And so I think that's moving and being well cared for.

BORDALLO: Thank you very much. And I thank you both for service to our country. I yield back.

FORBES: Thank you, Madeleine.

Who is accountable? HE IS! Wouldn't it be nice if a ships CO could pass the responsibility on to the squadron commodore? I get it that there is a chain of command, but at some point every one in the chain has to take personal responsibility for what they are doing. McCoy and Burke were thrown slow fastballs over the center of the plate, and passed up the opportunity to swing.

I think it says a lot when the question of accountability is raised and leaders quickly point fingers in the direction of others. VADM McCoy's answer is slightly better, but still, I think the questions of accountability and the perception regarding what it means in the Navy only gets more murky when the shore based leadership is ready to fill the accountability void with the names of others under oath. Ms. Bordallo is right to ask about organizational accountability, because the problem is bigger than one person, even if both Vice Admirals are suggesting otherwise by pointing to one person.

Don't get me wrong, I agree ADM Harvey is the senior-level official responsible for coordinating everyone else, but "everyone else" includes both of these Vice Admirals they should have stepped up, but didn't.

I was impressed when Admiral Harvey took personal responsibility on under oath last year, but what I don't understand is how VADM McCoy can suggest that the accountability for this falls to one person - the Commander of Fleet Forces Command - when in fact Admiral Greenert was the Commander at Fleet Forces Command before ADM Harvey. Admiral Greenert's record is that he ran around apparently oblivious to readiness problems including the funding shortfalls for surface combatants claiming "we have plenty of money." How is it possible Fleet Forces Command is accountable today when Fleet Forces Command is not being held accountable for past activities when a promotion to CNO for Admiral Greenert is the reward for not getting on top of this issue a few years ago?

Ms. Bordallo, allow me to humbly suggest the answer to your question is exactly as the Navy testified - accountability only exists if your name is Admiral Harvey who, on his own, was willing to take responsibility for the problems himself.

And that is the problem sure to be ignored by the Senate come the CNO hearings, meaning Congress should expect the same low standards of accountability from the Navy because it is the standard they set with their low standards of accountability when it comes to oversight via the promotion system. Ironically, as COs get fired with increased frequency the Navy is rightfully being praised for holding commanding officers to high standards of accountability, but when someone like me questions the job performance of any Admiral, folks get real defensive fast and generally start naming the non-Admirals to shift blame.