The American Made Corvette

As most of us know, the US does build naval corvettes, just not for the US Navy. The first of four intended for Egypt is in the news. Here is a bit from the VT Halter Marine, Inc. press release.

VT Halter Marine, Inc. (VT Halter Marine), a subsidiary of VT Systems, Inc. (VT Systems), held a dedication ceremony for the first of four Fast Missile Craft (FMC) built for the Egyptian Navy at its Pascagoula shipyard. The keel for this first FMC was authenticated on April 7, 2010.

Chris Cavas has more at Defense News.

Construction of the ship began in a newly built fabrication facility at VT Halter in November 2009 under a U.S. Navy Foreign Military Sales program managed by the U.S. Navy's Naval Sea Systems Command.

The original contract for the program was awarded to VT Halter in November 2005. Since then, the U.S. has awarded the shipbuilder more than $800 million for the ships.

The Ezzat is expected to leave Mississippi for Egypt during 2012.

Construction continues on the other three ships: F. Zekry, M. Fahmy and A. Gad. The last ship is contracted for delivery in December 2013.

Something caught my attention here. The previously reported cost of this ship is off by over 100%, as the vessels were originally expected to cost $100 million each but have suffered a great deal of cost overruns.

If you ever wanted to know what ~$220 million in FY05 dollars buys, which is what the Littoral Combat Ship was originally supposed to be, this is what you get: 500 tons, 8 days at sea, 2000nm range, and even 41 knots.

SSNs for Canada - Potentially a Bargain

CBC News is reporting that the Harper Government is at least pondering the idea of cutting their losses with the Victoria class submarines and replacing them with nuclear submarines. The Victoria class submarines have been plagued with problems since being acquired from the UK, and despite being described as the "military bargain of the century" when purchased for $750 million in 1998, they have become anything but.

The submarines are currently all out of service, with HMCS Victoria the soonest to potentially return to service by late next year. The article describes the issues.

One of the subs, HMCS Chicoutimi, has been in active service of the Royal Canadian Navy exactly two days in the 13 years since it was purchased from the Brits.

The Chicoutimi caught fire on its maiden voyage from the U.K. to Canada, killing one sailor and injuring a number of others.

It has been in the repair shop ever since, and isn’t expected back in service for at least another two years and $400 million more in repairs and retrofits.

The article goes on:

The other three would remain out of service until at least 2013. One may not be out of the repair shop until 2016.

By that time, the submarines will have cost taxpayers an estimated $3 billion, almost enough to have bought all new subs in the first place.

But the real problem is that by the time the whole fleet is in active service for the first time in 2016, the submarines will already be almost 30 years old with only perhaps 10 years of life left in them.

High-ranking sources tell CBC News the government is actively considering cutting its losses on the dud subs, and mothballing some if not all of them.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay is hinting they might be replaced with nuclear submarines that could patrol under the Arctic ice, something the existing diesel-electric subs cannot do.

I'm not sure how the costs break out over a single budget year, but based on the article it sounds like Canada has already spent $1 billion and will spend $2 billion more by 2016, which suggests costs that average around $500 million over the next 4 years. That's a lot of money just to get 10 years out of four SSKs.

If we do the math, basically the Harper government is faced with the very real problem. The repair costs will earn Canada 4 Victoria class SSKs that are already old for an investment cost of at least $75 million annually per submarine, and at the same time India is leasing the significantly more capable and new Russian SSN K-152 Nurpa for $900 million over 10 years - $90 million annually.

Something tells me Rep. Joe Courtney (Conn) could come up with a few ideas here - just saying. What would it cost to refuel and refit a Los Angeles class submarine for a second time to add 15 or so more years to the submarine? In 2005 the cost was slightly over $200 million, so even if we estimate the total refit per submarine to be around $350 million (serious modernization), Canada would only be spending $1.4 billion for four SSNs with a service life of 15 years vs $2 billion for four SSKs with a service life of 10 years. Another big advantage for Canada would be they could use the rest of the money to put their sailors through existing US Navy submarine training schools and use existing US contractor services for upkeep, both of which would allow Canada to save a bunch of money.

The cost difference for the hardware would be $25 million per sub per year for SSNs vs $75 million per sub per year for SSKs. While it is true the operational, maintenance, and personnel costs will be higher for SSNs than it would be for SSKs, there are likely enough cost savings to be gained through existing US infrastructure that it's hard to believe the SSNs would be so much more expensive as to make it a bad deal.

I'm just floating this idea, but really trying to highlight that leasing Los Angeles class SSNs would likely be cost neutral (or perhaps even cost saving) for the Harper government given the big problems Canada is facing with the Victoria class.

I don't know if the US Navy even has four 688s that they would be willing to sell to Canada (although in a time of short term budget cuts impacting the Navy, now is the time to talk about this type of thing). I also don't know if the US and Canada can work out a realistic agreement that would give Canada the ability to utilize US Navy infrastructure for training and other services related to 688s. I do know that going down the road of supporting foreign SSNs would be good for either/both Electric Boat and Newport News, because when one looks at the trends they are having in Australia with their submarine industry - a deal with SSNs with Canada now would go a long way towards getting process and framework for this type of high end military deals in place so when our next very close ally comes along - we have a system and experience in place to support such agreements.

Seeking Feedback

This quote comes from the introduction of the Naval War College Review Summer 2011 article Why Wargaming Works (PDF) by Peter P. Perla and ED McGrady. The entire article is worth reading, and as someone who has an actual occupational history in professional gaming and the gaming industry - the content of this article has been swimming around in my mind for months.

Wargaming has a long history as an important tool for military training, education, and research.1 In its broader application to nonmilitary conflict situations (see, for example, the recent books Wargaming for Leaders and Business War Games), the technique is increasing in popularity, particularly among businesses seeking strategic advantages.2 (As a result, we will sometimes use the terms “wargaming” and “gaming” interchangeably; in the latter case, however, we mean what is called “serious gaming,” not the more general sense, like gambling.)3 Despite that history and popularity, however, wargaming’s record of success is uneven. Some games seemto succeed very well in preparing important decision makers for real-world environments in which they later find themselves. A prime example is the U.S.Navy’s series of games during the 1920s and 1930s, which helped train the commanders who won the Second World War in the Pacific. Other games do not do so well; for example, the game played by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in July 2004 did not seem to help that agency respond effectively to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall only two years later.

The reasons for the successes and failures of wargames of all types are as varied as the games themselves. Sometimes success stems from particular circumstances of subject matter and participants; sometimes failure flows from poor design or faulty facts. When it works, wargaming can appear almost magical in its power to inform and instruct; when it doesn’t work, it can appear almost childish in its oversimplifications and abstractions.

I've never - at any point over the last 4+ years - considered the blog publishing format as a viable platform for conducting a wargame. Today, I'm not so sure. I'm wondering if perhaps similar results towards provoking ideas can be achieved anyway. It is entirely possible if I attempt to write a wargame scenario on ID, I will look and feel childish, but I can't be certain without trying.

I observed with great interest the recent Crowdsourcing of ideas by CDR Chris Rawley. The original question produced well over a hundred insightful (and some not quite as insightful) comments. Even the follow up was interesting, if anything to see our own inherent biases.

One of the things I enjoy most about ID is the back and forth nature of this format that I enjoy when interacting with the readers. On many of the subjects I discuss here - the audience is often the expert, and I'm simply an informed non-expert who continues to get smarter and smarter through your insights, your feedbacks, and the experiences you share with me. While a lot of that feedback does happen in email, it also happens in the comments quite frequently.

The active participation of this community suggests to me there is a lot to be gained from more crowdsouring approaches on the blog. Before I act on it though, I'll get your opinion.

Did you find Chris's experiment valuable and worth the time, or a waste of time? Do you think we should try things like that more often? Do you believe posing wargame scenarios using this crowdsourcing model would be worth your time? Do you have any suggestions or ideas you'd like to add on this topic?

I appreciate the feedback.

Observing CO Contempt for Colleagues and Crew

The Navy has now fired 20 Commanding Officers this year, and with this list the number of high profile firings for 2011 is remarkable - and it's not even Halloween yet.

Part of me believes that 20 CO firings suggests the Navy is healthy as an organization because the organization is enforcing it's rules. However, another part of me has me very concerned about quality control processes in place regarding Commanding Officers.

Can the Navy explain how an organization that claims to have a competitive promotion system appears to have so many quality control issues with the people being selected for leadership? I am finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile the number of character related firings this year as opposed to the profession related firings, particularly when in the Navy - quality for both are required for success. Are both professional merit and a persons character measured at a level of sufficient quality? Navy leaders say people come first, but that is only true when people aren't put into the situations by a leader in the Navy as described in this Gidget Fuentes article on Navy Times.

Cmdr. Jay Wylie, 40, who commanded the Everett, Wash.-based ship until he was fired April 27, is scheduled to appear in a courtroom at Naval Base San Diego and has been charged with one count of rape, two counts of aggravated sexual assault, two counts of abusive sexual contact, one count of sodomy, two counts of maltreatment, three counts of conduct unbecoming an officer and four counts of violating general orders, according to the charge sheet.

According to the charges, the first incident occurred Dec. 31 in a bar during the ship’s liberty visit to the Seychelles town of Victoria. Wylie “became publically intoxicated, ... made unwanted sexual advances and engaged in an unwanted sexual contact with ... a junior officer,” the charges state.

Wylie had “unduly familiar conduct” and made “unwelcomed sexual advances ... and contact” with the female officer, according to the charges, by “rubbing her shoulders, leaning against her and pinning her to a bar, requesting that she kiss him, attempting to kiss her, putting his hand up her dress and inside her underwear.”

Wylie encouraged the junior officer “not to report” the incident, the charges state.

Four months later, on April 25 and while Momsen was at Naval Magazine Indian Island, Wash., a “publicly intoxicated” Wylie coaxed an enlisted woman into his cabin aboard the ship, according to the charges.

Wylie allegedly engaged in “unduly familiar conduct” and made “unwelcomed sexual advances ... and contact” with the sailor by “brushing his hand on her shoulder, requesting that she come home with him, placing his hand on the small of her back, escorting her to his cabin, grabbing her shirt, kissing her” and placing his hand and mouth on her genitals.

Two days after that alleged incident, Wylie was fired by Rear Adm. Mark Guadagnini, commander of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, due to “loss of confidence in his ability to command stemming from allegations of misconduct.”

It is hard to assume much without more detailed information, so I'm going to plow ahead - cautiously. First, it is hard to believe a 40 year old destroyer CO suddenly, after 18-19+ years in the Navy, discovered the combination of alcohol and sexual harassment at that stage of his life and career. I do not know if there are other cases of this type of behavior in this guys history, but assuming there are not is less believable than assuming there is. If we assume there is not, is it a legitimate concern that judgment can be tossed so casually overboard by a Destroyer CO?

Something in the system doesn't work, but it is also worth suggesting the system may also never work. Had the junior officer reported the first incident, the enlisted female would not have found herself in that situation. At the same time, had the JO reported the incident when it first happened, it probably would have been a he said/she said incident and destroyed her career. The second incident makes it easier for the JO to come forward regarding the first incident, and the promotion system that - for legitimate reasons - weighs heavily on the evaluation by the CO of the JO, seriously undermines the ability of the JO to act.

It is very easily to pass judgment on the JO for not acting immediately, but you aren't the fresh out of college young 20s O-1 who was placed in that situation by your 40 year old O-5 boss - the most important person in your career - who finds oneself potentially intoxicated and harassed while enjoying a New Years Eve liberty (after months at sea) in the context of being one of the most junior leaders of a warship patrolling the armpit of planet Earth. I'll stop there - the dynamics and complexity of this JOs situation doesn't lend itself to black and white - right and wrong answers without throwing rocks in a glass houses.

In the big picture, the Navy is lucky the big firing controversy that blew up in public this year is Captain Owen Honors and his poor judgment and antics with questionable motivational videos, because situations like this are much worse - and sounds even worse on the TV national news. The poor judgment of Honors was a self-inflicted wound, while this situation is predatory and has serious impacts on the lives of others.

East Africa Updates

A variety of interesting, though sometimes confusing news has emerged regarding Somalia in the past few weeks. What follows is an attempt to provide ID readers some insight into these developments and amplify Galrahn’s recent post.

Kenyan Offensive into Jubaland:
Kenya’s offensive into Southern Somalia under the guise of UN Article 51 (right to self-defense) began as retaliation for al Shabaab kidnappings in Kenyan refugee camps and coastal areas (more below on those). The Kenyan air force is dropping bombs, and ground troops have captured key coastal terrain and intend to push all the way to Kismaayo. Note, contrary to some reporting, the US is not supporting this offensive. There is no shortage of of interest and discussion on Somalia in US and European governments these days, but frankly, that interest hasn't translated into a desire for action, at least on the part of policy makers.

Unencumbered by bureaucratic paralysis, al Shabaab has already retaliated in Kenya with a series of minor grenade attacks in Nairobi. A future escalation of these attacks to include some of AS’s tactics regularly used in Mogadishu, such as suicide bombers, is certainly possible. However, if the Kenyans do take Kismaayo, this will be a huge blow to one of al Shabaab’s fundraising and facilitation hubs as a major revenue source disappears. Holding the terrain is a different matter, and probably best left to one of Kenya's proxies.

The political and diplomatic responses to Kenya’s incursions have been a little bit less straight-forward. On one hand are the TFG’s contradictory positions. On the other are those of pro-TFG militias Ras Kamboni and ASWJ, who have voiced their support to the effort. These pronouncements should not be surprising as they stand to gain significantly from a capture of Kismayo and the financial windfall it would bring either group. At least one US diplomat has publically discussed the potential of future support to the operation. Western countries should seriously consider immediate assistance to Kenya - logistics, intelligence sharing, ISR, and fires support, if needed. One idea is to provide airlift or sealift for a contingent of AMISOM and TFG troops (even a token presence) to Kismaayo to extend the reach of their governance into Southern Somalia and provide a means for Kenya to gradually withdraw. The longer Kenyan troops are in Southern Somalia, the staler their welcome will become, so anything Western countries can do to speed their victory and withdrawal will increase stability there and alleviate the millions of Somalis still suffering from the al Shabaab-exacerbated famine there.

Kidnappings: A series of high profile kidnappings/murders of European (and now an American) aid workers and vacationers in East Africa has occurred in the past months. At this point, these kidnappings appear to be a fundraising mechanism for various malign actors in Southern Somalia. Westerners have been valuable hostage targets for Islamic terror groups (see AQIM, AQI, AQAP, especially) the past decade. What we are seeing in East Africa seems (from my perspective) to be a mutually beneficial relationship evolving between various criminal/clan, al Shabaab, and pirate groups to capture and ransom Westerners in Somalia and Kenya. Al Shabaab has probably lost funding in the form of taxation as TFG/AMISOM have captured and held territory. Pirates are also likely seeing their revenue streams dry up as their attack success rate drops (primarily attributable to embarked armed security detachments, rather than the coalition naval presence). Larger shipping companies, which have better insurance and resources for paying ransoms, have shifted some of those resources to armed security. This leaves smaller, poorer shipping lines - and the handful of flag states who are still myopically failing to protect their crews - as vulnerable targets. Note, Somali piracy is non-traditional in that it is really kidnapping for ransom at sea, rather than cargo seizure. (The expanding piracy in West Africa is focused on profiting from captured cargoes, not crews.)

Developed countries’ inaction towards addressing shore-based pirate facilitators has left these networks intact and apparently some of them have moved onto new and potentially more profitable business. Until these actors are targeted - lethally, since there is no law enforcement reach into Somalia and mildly worded diplomatic press statements aren’t helping much - expect these kidnappings to continue, if not multiply.

Other Recent Related News:
- Al Shabaab in America Al Shabaab’s global facilitation network stretches throughout Africa, into Europe, Australia, and yes, even the United States. The tens of thousands of Somalis in America -- the vast majority of whom are law-abiding citizens -- create a challenge for law enforcement agencies who must sort out the small percentage (still probably hundreds) of bad apples in the diaspora.

- Finally, for the benefit of the random DOS person reading this blog, if I haven't already raised your hackles enough thus far - this - is a colossally dumb idea. Other agencies are still cleaning up the mess made from the last time do-good diplomats opened the floodgates to un-vetted refugees from “countries of concern.”

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Airpower in Libya

I was wondering whether my latest column on airpower and Libya amounted to strawman burning, but it turns out not. Michael Auslin, in the WSJ:

Moammar Gadhafi was killed last week by Libyan rebel forces on the ground, but his regime would never have met its end if not for the Western air power that targeted his troops from the skies. As Washington considers slashing $500 billion from the defense budget over the next decade, the lessons of Libya should give pause to anyone whose plans will reduce the U.S. military's ability to control the air. The United States cannot fight in the future with a hollow Air Force.

Allied air power saved the Libyan revolt from being crushed at least once, if not twice, this past summer. Nearly 8,000 allied strike sorties kept Gadhafi's forces on the defensive, destroyed their command-and-control network, and eliminated much of their supply infrastructure. Much of the direct air-combat activity was borne by the British and French but, as then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted, without U.S. air-refueling tankers, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, the NATO missions would have been severely hampered and largely ineffective.

Considering the broad range of U.S. interests and commitments around the globe, the capabilities offered by the U.S. Air Force will remain essential national assets. As Mr. Gates argued shortly before leaving office, in the post-Iraq/Afghanistan future, the U.S. is more likely than not to be unable or unwilling to commit large numbers of ground forces to overseas campaigns.

Note the two-step; in a conflict where the contribution of the USAF was important but far from the central, the chief lesson learned is that the United States needs to invest more heavily in Air Force modernization, implicitly at the expense of the other two services. As I argue in my column, the Libya intervention shouldn't be understood as a victory for the institutional interest of any branch, although it will inevitably be interpreted as such:

Moreover, the actual use of airpower in Libya highlights the fact that “airpower” is not necessarily the same thing as a country’s air force. Tomahawk missiles launched by American and British submarines “broke open the door” to the air campaign over Libya with a barrage on the first day of the war. The French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle subsequently proved instrumental for carrying out much of the campaign, launching a significant percentage of French strike sorties. U.S. Marine Corps Harriers undertook strikes from the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge. Finally, in order to carry out close air support missions, attack helicopters flew from the decks of the British assault carrier HMS Ocean and the French Tonnerre. Meanwhile, British and French special forces supplied expert advice to Libyan rebel commanders and targeting intelligence to NATO strike planners, allowing bombs to find their mark and facilitating combined arms offensives. Finally, American Predator drones scoured the country searching for targets of military and political importance. The NATO operation in Libya was very much a joint undertaking, both in terms of its multinational character and its organizational diversity.

It Was a Time Not Unlike Today

"I'd rather make ten major decisions a day and later have to reverse three, than to study issues to exhaustion and make one decision a week—often too late."

- ADM Elmo Zumwalt

Last month, by popular demand (and a bit of lobbying), CNA posted CNA Research Memorandum 93-22, On His Watch: Admiral Zumwalt's Efforts To Institutionalize Strategic Change (PDF), by Jeffery I. Sands, Jul 1993 on the CNA website. If you haven't read it, it is worth the time to read in full.

The study is too comprehensive to list all the various pieces of goodness, but the analysis does discuss the various concrete steps that can be taken in policy-making to institutionalize strategic decisions - and looks at it from a CNO perspective (Zumwalt's). It examines four basic stages in the decision-making process:

• Initiation, the first formulation of a proposal (or an agenda) to respond to and deal with a new need or problem
• Persuasion, the effort to build support for the proposal and formulate options to carry it out
• Decision, the phase where options are examined, approved, or vetoed by those with the authority to do so
• Execution, the phase in which policies blessed with legitimacy are carried out and sometimes adapted or distorted.

Near the end of the document, the analysis makes inferences from the Zumwalt experience leveraging the outline of the four stages in the decision making process - and in my opinion these conclusions are timeless. I've quoted in full (but you are really missing out if you aren't reading the entire analysis).

History of course cannot be used as a sole guide to the future. But if Adm. Zumwalt's style led to the results discussed, the lessons for today are clear, even given the different context of strategic and conventional force threats, economic and political conditions, and bureaucratic interplay.

Initiation

Be bold
Change can be evolutionary or revolutionary. To be institutionalized during a single four-year term in office, however, vectors of change have to be more revolutionary than evolutionary in nature. Otherwise, one's efforts could be overcome relatively easily by those opposed to the idea of change itself. Being bold is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for successful institutionalization. That is, evolutionary changes can become institutionalized, and revolutionary changes can fail, not only on military-technical grounds. But boldness can help ensure high-level consideration and thereby influence outcomes.

Be quick
Because four years is a short time, it is better to enter office with a clear idea of where one wants to go. Hence, the more one formulates ideas before becoming CNO, the more time there is to implement them. This is especially critical for new CNOs in their first few months in office as the Navy bureaucracy and leadership expects and probably is more supportive of a new agenda.

Be specific
If vectors of change are too vague or ambiguous to permit them to become a ready basis of task definition, the precise tasks are likely to be shaped by the incentives of those tasked rather than by the preferences of those doing the tasking. Hence, the greater the task specificity embodied in the change vector articulated, the greater the possible influence of the decision-maker over outcomes. Again, task specificity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for institutionalization, but it can influence outcomes.

ADM Greenert is off to a fast start. I have nothing but praise for the CNO Tenets already discussed, and I noticed the CNO's second move was his speech at the 20th International Seapower Symposium (PDF) to the international community. It is my sense that the next speech is going to be very important.

Persuasion

Get a mandate from above
A mandate from above is essential if broad change is to succeed. This includes more than support from Congress and the civilian chain of command from SecNav through SecDef to the White House. Because of Goldwater-Nichols, support from the Joint Staff, and especially the GJCS, may also be critical. The same may also be true of the Unified CINCs given their evolving role in setting requirements. The exact means of doing this will vary with the personality of the CNO and the senior naval leadership, but it needs to be done nonetheless. Direct, targeted personal attention by the CNO is an important part of any marketing strategy.

Find a hammer, and use it effectively
With the introduction of the CPPG/CPAM process, supported by the green-striper follow-up process, OP-96 became a critical element of Adm. Zumwalt's cross-mission, cross-platform prioritization process. Putting the responsibility for the process of internal analytic give and take under the direction of close allies in key decision nodes was critical to Adm. Zumwalt's efforts to institutionalize his agenda internally given the intra-service bureaucratic process. The responsibility for carrying out internal creative friction must be given to a trusted, independent body divorced to the fullest extent possible from parochial considerations.

Use a common language, especially one in vogue with OSD
It helped that Adm. Zumwalt's hammer was adapted from the process Secretary of Defense Laird was pushing from a DOD perspective. This helped ensure connectivity between the Navy and the larger DOD decision-making process. Given the emergence of a former systems analyst as SecDef, an "OP-96-like" capability may be important as much for external as well as internal strategy. More broadly, because the new SecDef is reshaping OSD, the Navy must be prepared to emulate whatever OSD process emerges and use whatever language emerges. Given Goldwater-Nichols, the same may also be true with respect to that of the Joint Staff.

Keep the focus clear and consistent
In sales, product recognition can be critical. Similarly, a clear moniker and consistent message can be critical to successful strategy institutionalization. Like in sales, trying to send too many messages at any one time can diffuse each discrete message and confuse the audience. Hence, narrowing one's focus can help strengthen the signal one is trying to send, thereby enhancing the prospects that it will be received, understood, and—by minimizing the possibility of misunderstanding or undermining—accepted.

Work the problem outside the Navy
Adm. Zumwalt spent a large amount of his own time - while he was CNO and since - trying to persuade people outside the Navy of the wisdom of his changes. Institutionalizing change will be far easier given — and far more difficult if internal opponents can gain - external allies.

This was where ADM Roughead was weak relative to his counterparts in other services. Part of ADM Roughead's challenge was that his external message was crafted for him in the form of The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Another problem ADM Roughead had was that he never developed a base of support outside the Navy that was willing and committed to working with him, while other services were busy building that support and finding allies among institutions like the think tank community, academia (See how the Army advanced COIN doctrine discussions into the public by leveraging academia), and established internet communities (consistent submissions to the Small Wars Journal, GO feedback to Foreign Policy blogs like Tom Ricks, etc).

ADM Greenert has an opportunity to change that. For example, does CNO Greenert know who Mike Few is? He and the Commandant should be briefed, and then they should call up various folks from shops like N3/N5, the NWC, NPS, and USNA and ask "Who do you have consistently writing for USNI?"

Decision

Balance top-down and participatory management
Getting a ball to roll can take a strong push—depending on the strength of the opposing force (s). Overcoming inertia alone, however, does not guarantee that the ball will travel as far as or in the direction that is desired. In a dynamic environment, ensuring that the ball comes to rest near a desired destination requires an understanding of the environment and how it may respond to intervention. It also requires an understanding of how the intervention itself may change the environment through which the ball travels. In other words, changing the strategic focus of the Navy may require not only top-down intervention coupled with an understanding of the Navy bureaucracy, but also anticipation of how the bureaucracy might respond to that intervention. This requires consensus building and continued attention to the evolution of your initiative.

Reorganize: half empty or half full?
Organization theorists have long argued that institutional changes are almost always required to make strategy shifts by large organizations more concrete. Adm. Zumwalt quite deliberately sought to vest the sea-control agenda into the OPNAV organizational structure. Further, he intentionally "de-linked" both the barons and the czars from leadership roles in the assessment process. But it was not until the July 1992 OPNAV reorganization that Adm. Zumwalt's preferred philosophical approach—deemphasizing the warfare communities and giving prominence to mission areas—began to be realized. Yet this reorganization preceded final publication of ...From the Sea. To ensure future success, the assessment process subsequently established in the fall of 1992 may have to be more fully "institutionalized"— that is, more fully integrated into the OPNAV organizational structure by de-linking those with remaining community responsibilities from leadership positions of the individual joint mission assessments.

Establish an independent review body
Further, it is not clear that an independent review by those not involved in the process is used today. Adm. Zumwalt had used the CEP and CNA to provide ongoing independent review before making major decisions, thus obviating the need for a post-decision review. The current process should include some external review of major decisions, be it pre- or post-decision.

It appears, based on limited reporting, the CNO is already doing some reorganization in OPNAV (and actually may have started this process while VCNO). A lot of ink could be spilled in comment on this topic, but I'll save my ink in quiet observation, for now.

Execution

Get a watchdog and follow up
Without sufficient intervention by an agent of change from outside—outside and above—the prior experiences and professional norms of rank-and-file bureaucrats resistant to change can lead them to hinder or otherwise misdirect vectors of change. This could occur even in the absence of dedicated opponents moved by honest belief or interested solely in the maintenance of things as they are with which they have become identified. Without such assistance from outside, decision-makers need to establish independent watchdog agencies with the power—directly or indirectly through referral—to enforce compliance.

Encourage innovation
Change requires agents of change; radical change requires risktaking. Perhaps the greatest challenge of all, therefore, is to encourage innovative thinking without unduly prejudicing career incentives. To the degree possible, innovation should be encouraged by rewarding those who dare try something different, even if the effort ultimately proves unsuccessful. This could be done, for example, through the SecNav instructions to promotion boards, or by encouraging experimental innovation such as the Mod Squad and Project Lawrence.

The budget process underway in Washington DC is an agent of change that is coming whether folks like it or not, so part of the challenge the CNO faces is how to deal with change forced externally on the Navy vice forcing change internally himself.

With that said, one of the reasons I have studied ADM Zumwalt so much recently is that he dealt with many of the same issues CNO Greenert and the Navy faces today. ADM Zumwalt became CNO during the last years of a long land war in Asia (Vietnam) and civilian leaders in Washington were making very large defense cuts. The Navy was also facing a unique challenge at the time, a rising maritime power (in early 70s was a rebirth period for the Soviet Navy). Sound familiar?

Zumwalt developed a maritime strategy based primarily around the Nixon Doctrine in effect at the time, and the result was increased budget priority for the Navy. It wasn't enough money to prevent a post-Vietnam decline by the US Navy, but Zumwalt did drive a process by which a maritime strategy was developed conceptually, and later that strategy was adopted but significantly adjusted by John Lehman leading to the 600 ship Navy goal in the 1980s.

"He would rather shoot 1,000 arrows at the target and have ten hit than only shoot two and the two hit"

Funny thing about innovation... it looks great on PowerPoint, but is hard because it involves the risk of not succeeding. Innovation rarely works on first effort, and lack of success today in the Navy too frequently translates into failure. Perception of failure impacts promotions in an officer community that is likely downsizing and is already competitive. I'd love to see more innovation in the US Navy, but I don't think the US Navy is organized in a way today that encourages innovation - rather it is my impression the promotion system is biased, even if only slightly in some cases, towards rigid consistency to pattern - not innovating new processes.

I don't want to imply that innovation doesn't exist in the US Navy, because it absolutely does - but I do believe it is fair to say the US Navy is not an organization that fosters and promotes innovation within their leadership community. I note that most stories involving innovation in the Navy begin in the enlisted community, and more than one person has noted that this is probably the case because folks in the enlisted community have less to lose from making mistakes.

Observing Why Flight 0 LCS Will Do Just Fine

As has been known to happen, an interesting back and forth took place in the comments this evening in a previous discussion topic that caught my attention, and I feel it necessary to comment in a new post. It began with this comment by phrank47:

My problem with LCS has always been we are building a ship before we have the weapons that will go on it. Not just a little but years before. We are building ship that seems so pointed toward one goal that I wonder what we give up. I look at the navy what they are building and the numbers and I see a navy that 1/3 of there surface combat ships will soon be LCS I fear.

Where ID contributor CDR Chris Rawley responded:

The Spruance class destroyer entered the fleet with not much more than two 5"/54 guns, ASROC, and BPDMS. By the time the class was decomm'd, they had 61 cell VLS with TLAM and VLA, 2 x CIWS, 25mm, 8 x harpoons, and RAM, plus a number of C4I upgrades. Obviously, adding capabilities to LCS would be a bit different in there are weight (and volume) constraints tied to her speed requirements. The point is that it isn't unprecedented to commission ships with minimal weapons systems and grow them.

Which Scott Brim, USAF Partisan replied:

On the other hand, the Spruance design was up to the task of handling the upgraded capabilities, once they were mature enough for deployment. Given all the criticisms that have been hurled at the LCS, is it clear today the LCS will be a suitable platform once the mission modules arrive?

What a great topic. Lots of good points all around.

First, it is too early to tell what the Navy will do with LCS after FY15. Until more ships start getting fielded, it is very unclear whether there will in fact be more than the 24 already funded. Yes, the Navy has stuck to the official line of 55 hulls, but I know for fact that LCS-3 is different than LCS-1, and LCS-5 will be different than LCS-3. What will LCS-21 and LCS-23 look like? Evolutions throughout the first block could make the second block look very different, and the second block will likely come after we see foreign military sales injected into the equation suggesting design investment and options can potentially influence the LCS in many ways. What happens if, for example, beginning with LCS-25 or LCS-26 the Navy drops the speed requirement for one or both versions? The combat system question still lingers as unanswered, among many unanswered questions.

Second, what does growth for a small ship like LCS look like, and what needs to grow? Some would immediately suggest the LCS lacks firepower, of which I believe every SWO in the US Navy would agree wholeheartedly. Both LCS can trade the speed requirement for VLS from a design perspective, so it isn't as if options don't exist. But when I look out over the next 10-15 years, adding more weapons to LCS isn't my top priority in the context of growth.

Which leads to the last question asked by Scott Brim, "is it clear today the LCS will be a suitable platform once mission modules arrive?" The answer to this question is - YES - ABSOLUTELY, as long as Navy leaders remain focused on continuing to develop capabilities the LCS is designed and intended to do.

The biggest challenge facing LCS has nothing to do with details of individual module systems, nor the lack of firepower included in the Flight 0+ LCS design - the biggest challenge facing LCS is the development of the LCS information system that is in the future intended to feed significant multi-sensor data into a larger battle force network information system.

Sense. Decide. Act. And do it all in a combat functional communication system.

That is the biggest challenge facing LCS, and it entails a series of lessons yet to be learned and processes yet to be developed that will likely take a long time to work out the kinks; very likely the entire life-cycle of the first Flight 0 ships.

Today sense, decide, and act functions of the information system are relatively contained in form and function to an organization no larger than a strike group, but more specifically often limited to a few sensor platforms, a few strike platforms, and either a Hawkeye or CIC. With additional capabilities like the Littoral Combat Ship and associated modules, P-8, BAMS, etc, and continued evolution of combat and communication systems - the US Navy hopes to extend interoperability in both scale and scope throughout the entire Navy battle force network.

But it is actually much more than a cross-system interoperability challenge or even a bandwidth challenge (both being significant challenges on their own), rather the Navy must solve the very real challenge of collecting vast amounts of data from a vast number of offboard systems concurrently and convert that data into useful information that can then be aggregated throughout the network quickly - not just on LCS but eventually throughout the battle force network. Basically, we are talking about the bridge between Sense and Decide, taking data from multiple sensors and making that data useful information, and doing so at a speed that supports the decision process necessary to be relevant during combat operations where actions and reactions measured in seconds can mean life and death.

There are a large number of human and engineering challenges just to get Sense and Decide nodes designed into the LCS network model to function properly. The LCS is moving the Navy into an entirely new level of autonomous and remote controlled sensor capacity that is intended to accumulate enormous amounts of data under, on, and over the sea spread over vast geographical areas in a largely autonomous information system that today is done by the US Navy at sea almost entirely with manned aircraft - each of which is trained to function as part of a small manned network that took many years to develop, or as it's own Sense-Decide-Act information system if necessary.

Can you conceptualize what many of the challenges facing the Navy are as they introduced vast numbers of unmanned systems into their existing organizational structures? Can you conceptualize what the product will be once we see numerous Littoral Combat Ships distributed throughout a region like the South China Sea, each deploying half a dozen or more individual systems? For some, the complexity of the challenges are ignored because very little respect is given the immense difficulty facing the Navy to operate a battle capable network potentially 50x larger and vastly more distributed than the existing Navy network today.

In the future Naval Battle Force Network saturated with unmanned systems - which is the network the Littoral Combat Ship is opening the barn door towards; the US Navy wants to be able to take data from an autonomous sensor deployed from a LCS, rapidly convert that data from that node into usable information like the track of a ballistic missile submarine, move that tracking data of the ballistic missile submarine immediately to a another platform like a P-8, and convert sensor data into track information for a torpedo strike without the P-8 ever needing to reveal itself with it's own sensors to the SSBN before the torpedo hits the water and is on top of the SSBN.

What sounds like a simple process will place the US Navy generations ahead of where the rest of the world is today, or even tomorrow, because no one else is even remotely close to being able to execute that type of networked combat capability. The US Navy is fielding Littoral Combat Ships today that leads towards that capability down the road, and yet, critics say cancel the LCS because the ship can't shoot the torpedo itself - even though the LCS will likely be hundreds of nautical miles from the autonomous sensor that detected the SSBN, too far away to shoot ASROCs even if it had them.

Today's US Navy flies no more than a handful of UAVs at a time over vast areas of ocean. Believe it or not, on a good day the US Navy has one UAV able to function in an anti-piracy role off Somalia. That is one UAV - on a good day - for that vast region of seas pirates operate in. If you assume the US Navy is flying one or more than one UAV on an average day over the Indian Ocean, you have assumed wrong. That is where we are today, but for some reason people have a completely different expectation.

Why do you think deploying 3 Fire Scouts on USS Halyburton (FFG-40) was a big deal? The disconnect between the expectation of today's US Navy UAV networks and the reality of those networks is enormous. When the Navy operates UAVs today (which they do), the Navy operates those UAVs over land. Why? Because almost all of the infrastructure that supports UAVs are used for supporting operations over populated land areas, not the vast unpopulated areas of sea.

Just developing towards coordinating the data of a dozen offboard unmanned autonomous and remote controlled systems deployed simultaneously from a pair of Littoral Combat Ships is a giant early hurdle facing the US Navy in the very near future. So when Scott Brim asks whether the LCS is a suitable platform to handle the challenges it faces when the mission modules arrive, which is basically the development of a functional battle capable information system that supports large numbers of unmanned systems at sea, my answer is ABSOLUTELY - YES.

The challenge facing LCS is not the "act" (weapons delivery) module of the information system even if the "act" module of the information system is the single most cited complaint of the LCS; the challenge facing LCS is the development of the "sense" and "decide" functions and processes and lessons towards the future networked information system intends to field over this decade, and the LCS hull is designed to support the engineering upgrades necessary to address those sense and decide challenges.

The Commercial Argument

ADM Willard has his own set of talking points in the context of budget cuts, and they appear to make other arguments seem feeble in comparison.

“We feel strongly that the decisions that we make should be strategy-driven, so how do you think of our global commitments - strategically - and where the priorities ought to be placed?” said Willard, in an interview Monday at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography in San Diego during a short visit to the region. “I think Secretary Panetta is like-minded in this. He is reviewing this within the Washington environment. We are going to have those discussions.

“And in that debate, I think the Asia-Pacific region does very well, because of the economic importance that is obvious throughout the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. interest in the region very strong,” he said.

“I can’t imagine...the Asia-Pacific region wouldn’t hold high marks in terms of any global strategic view of where U.S. interests reside,” he added.

Some $5.3 trillion of commerce transits the waters of the South China region alone, and “1.2 (trillion) of that is U.S. annual trade,” Willard said. “This is the center of gravity for the global economy right now, and PACOM is there to protect it.”

The defense budget debate is ultimately about fixing our governments finances to get the economy moving. Nice to see a military leader talking apples and apples in this discussion.

F-35B Costs

This is not perfect analysis by Bill Sweetman, but when your talking about a money target the size of the Joint Strike Fighter program, it doesn't need to be a bulls-eye to hit the target.

What Bill has done is break down an estimate for how much STOVL capability has cost the Joint Strike Fighter program. After long hand analysis, he is able to produce an estimate:

Total Pentagon investment for 340 F-35Bs, according to the program of record: about $92 billion, or $270 million per unit.

It's probably closer to $300 million per, because there are some commonality savings between F-35A and F-35C that cannot be calculated. The question I would ask is whether commonality with other variants of the JSF has cost the Marine Corps more than it could ever potentially save in the future? I think the safe answer is yes.

We really cannot afford to make these types of mistakes in weapons development in the future - the Joint Strike Fighter is the mother of all bad ideas by being Joint and International Acquisition. It is hard to believe any politician would allow that many hands into a cash filled cookie jar the size of JSF and think it is a good idea. Lack of wisdom and foresight is an understatement.

I will note one thing though. If the F-35B was a separate program today and not integrated with the rest of the Joint Strike Fighter program, during these times of budget cuts does anyone honestly believe a unique Marine Corps VSTOL stealth fighter aircraft would survive the accountants? As part of the JSF program, the F-35B will almost certainly will survive. As a unique program - even if it was less expensive, on cost, and on schedule - Congress would have probably canceled it today.

So while I think it is safe to say the Marine Corps paid more for STOVL by participating in the JSF program, I think it is also true to suggest the Marine Corps also paid the extra cost as a form of insurance from the politics of Washington.

No one has ever suggested watching the sausage get made in Washington DC was worth the price of admission.

Crowdsourcing Smart Defense Cuts: The Verdict

Thanks to all those posting and voting in the Crowdsourcing Smart Defense Cuts thread. A number of interesting recommendations ranging from reductions in strategic weapons systems to bayonets were discussed. Discerning any sort of consensus from the breadth of input there was difficult, but I’ll highlight a few themes:

1) Recommendations to pare back the LCS program or cut the class altogether received the most votes (again, this exercise was not intended to be a reliable survey; just an estimation of sentiment from the readers of this blog). Chuck Hill’s comments on an LCS alternative gained the most votes:

“Stop the LCS program at the 24 ships currently built, contracted or optioned--enough Boghammer-destroyers to meet any need.

Build a common hull for the remaining 31 LCS and 25 Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Cutters, Incorporate provision for at least one MH-60R and two UAS, a 5" Mk45 for NSFS, a towed array, and space for containerized mission modules.

Build down to price $250M each and incorporate diesel electric drive for fuel economy and long range; will also permit use of energy hungry weapons in the future."

Some of the LCS commentary overlapped in the Coast Guard realm, with El
Sid commenting , “$750m for a coastguard cutter is just getting ridiculous, the
USCG might be better off looking at something like the Floreal or BAM classes,
or the SIMSS concept recently discussed over at TD ."

2) Cancelling at least some some part of the F-35 program was also a popular choice. Cutting the A and C models has been previously mentioned on this blog by Rob Farley and me. The utility of the STOVL version to multiply the number of sea-based fixed-wing striking platforms using LHA/LHD ships seems to be a compelling argument.

3) Reductions in General/Flag officer staffs seem to be a perennial theme in these sorts of discussions. These reductions are already in progress, to a certain extent. Another factor to keep in mind is that service, combatant commander, and component staff sizes are somewhat determined from external requirements driven from political appointees and Congress. In my estimation, if cuts start at the top with OSD, other staff reductions will flow naturally.

Honorable mentions in the polling included reducing army airborne forces and other active duty combat brigades (and military bands); scaling back BMD, especially those forces in support of European allies; reforming DOD’s byzantine and inefficient procurement system, cutting or de-alerting SSBNs; and eliminating the “wars” (however one chooses to define and count those).

Decreases in existing and planned CVNs seemed to be a point of contention (no surprise there). Also controversial, but prescient, was this comment by “Nothing Much”:

“I think folks might be avoiding the elephant in the room... Defense can, if we let it, become a retirement and social services agency. American civilians will, in the near future, begin to experience a series of cuts in government services while their overall taxes will go up. There is no escaping this. If the military is going to remain a warfighting service it will have to track cuts to medical care, retirement, and other social services as those same services decline in the general American population. That's going to be rougher than any weapons program cut. However, it must be done.”

I did not by any means capture all of the thoughtful ideas in the above, and I encourage those interested to skim through the 100+ comments to find more insightful opinions.

Of course, the larger question in this debate is what percentage of impending federal budget cuts should fall on DOD? Commenter “J” noted historical budget trends when posting that “When defense gets anything less than 6% of GDP, they can pound sand and go squeeze savings out of the other 94%.” Once that strategic question is answered, the allocation of cuts within DOD among the services can be fairly decided.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Mitt Romney's Three Carrier Presence Model

On Tuesday, Nov. 15 the Heritage Foundation and AEI will join CNN in a Foreign Policy debate with the Republican candidates. I've largely avoided most of the previous debates by doing other things, but I am looking forward to this debate.

I have no expectation the debate will be some major moment in election politics for 2012, but I am hoping someone at Heritage or AEI is sharp enough to ask Mitt Romney about this part of his speech. This paragraph in Mitt Romney's recent Foreign Policy speech tells me two things that I am not sure Mitt Romney actually understands, but I welcome being wrong.

I will enhance our deterrent against the Iranian regime by ordering the regular presence of aircraft carrier task forces, one in the Eastern Mediterranean and one in the Persian Gulf region. I will begin discussions with Israel to increase the level of our military assistance and coordination. And I will again reiterate that Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon is unacceptable.

Today, the US Navy has a 1.0 carrier requirement in the Pacific and 1.0 carrier requirement in the Middle East - which has actually grown to something like 1.7 for various reasons. This requirement for US aircraft carriers depends strongly on all 11 carriers, and will not actually be possible once there are only 10 carriers after Enterprise retires next year.

Presumably Mitt Romney didn't completely forget the Pacific requirement when he gave his big foreign policy speech, so if we assume he did not, this policy would add a new requirement for an aircraft carrier in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. That is something altogether new, and by new I am speaking directly regarding a 3 hub carrier presence model vs today's 2 hub presence model for aircraft carriers that focuses only on the Pacific Ocean and Middle East/Indian Ocean.

Mitt Romney is basically saying, whether knowingly or not, that the US Navy needs 12 aircraft carrier strike groups, because in order to have 3 sustained aircraft carrier hubs, the nation needs 12 aircraft carriers. In the case of aircraft carriers, one means four (one preparing to deploy, one finishing deployment, one on deployment, and one in maintenance). In order to sustain 12 aircraft carriers, the nation would need to build 1 carrier every 4.1 years - which is different than the current schedule which calls for 1 carrier every 5 years and even better than the 1 carrier every 4.5 years the Navy was dealing with under the 11 aircraft carrier requirement.

Such a policy for three hubs of presence might also suggest the US is trading today's cold war era garrison force in Europe for a more offshore carrier force presence in the Mediterranean Sea. The US could certainly drop a number of bases and forward deployed stations throughout Europe and save a lot of money, particularly if we pulled the Army out of Europe, but would the savings legitimately add up to enough to pay for extra aircraft carriers? Is Mitt Romney even suggesting we move from garrison forces in Europe towards a different organizational model in Europe? It is unclear if he knows what he's even talking about, so more data is clearly needed.

Another, perhaps more legitimate question, would be whether the United States actually has a 1.0 requirement for the Mediterranean Sea? Today, I don't see it. Tomorrow? I'm not quite sure I see that either to be honest, no matter what unfolds politically in North Africa or the Western Middle East region. Aircraft carriers would not be my first choice of offshore naval capability desired, because if it was my choice - I'd want amphibious ships instead for their flexibility and utility for a range of operations from the sea.

I honestly have no idea what Mitt Romney has planned or if he even has a plan. I also do not know if Mitt Romney actually means anything he has said to date in his Foreign Policy speech.

What I do see though is that it appears to me that Mitt Romney is positioning himself to be a navalist candidate in the upcoming election. On November 15, that debate might flesh out some details of Mitt Romney's navalist vision - and I for one am interested (for the first time - ever) what Mitt Romney has to say.

Final Thought

Folks who claim President Obama's record on foreign policy or military affairs will help or hurt him in the upcoming election are ignoring all political history since the cold war. George Bush Sr. had two big military victories, the first in Panama and later in the most spectacular victory in modern US military history - the First Gulf War in Iraq. Bush Sr. still lost to Bill Clinton in 1992.

Bill Clinton suffered the disaster in Somalia and still went on to be reelected in 1996, and despite what was discussed as a victory over Kosovo, Al Gore lost in 2000.

Bush Jr. had what I would call the greatest strategic blunder in American history - fighting two ground wars in Asia at the same time, and was still reelected in 2004. Despite Iraq getting better before 2008, McCain got killed by Barack Obama in 2008 in an election that had nothing to do with wars or foreign policy - despite the US being 7 years into a war while also watching a rising China.

Obama faces the same reality. Despite pulling out of Iraq, or surging troops into Afghanistan, or killing Osama bin Laden, or starting a global drone war that includes bombing Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and even helping regime change in Libya - none of it will actually matter come election day. It doesn't even matter that Obama recently sent the Army into Uganda. The 2012 election will be decided almost entirely on employment rates and economic issues. That doesn't mean foreign policy and military affairs don't matter, only that those issues won't matter to the vast majority of voters relative to other pressing issues facing the American people right now.

For better or worse, the only military issue the Obama administration will be judged by is the results of the super committee that sets the amount of cuts for the DoD, and establishes military force structure for the future beginning in FY13 discussions. In today's political environment, more than anything else - that super committee result will be the military issue that gets the most attention by the average American voter in a political context heading into the election. I believe that for the candidates, their military policies will be compared opposite to the super committee budget result - a result that will be framed politically as the defacto Obama position on military affairs despite anything else listed on the operational side of the President's resume.

Food for thought.

So Stealthy the Libyans Wouldn't Even Have Known They Weren't There...

I'm just gonna come out and say that this argument hasn't aged well:

Employing a squadron of stealth fifth-generation F-22s along with other select capabilities would help reduce the need to expend significantly more resources while reducing operational risk. Coercive diplomacy backed by naval presence, decisive air power, and accurate weapons in the region would allow the U.S. and others to negate Libyan air defenses and air forces. The world-class capability inherent in the F-22 also bears a psychological-intimidation factor that sends a clear message that no Libyan aircraft will fly without consequences.

Simply talking about a no-fly zone should highlight the urgent need to recapitalize the U.S. Air Force with modern aircraft (in addition to upgrades of the legacy fleets). Using fifth-generation F-22 aircraft for a no-fly zone mission would allow the Air Force to operate above the Libyan skies with impunity. An F-22 Raptor does not need to destroy enemy air defenses first, because it is not vulnerable to this threat, unlike some fourth-generation aircraft.

I suspect that the four month grounding of the F-22 in the midst of the campaign might have made things... awkward. I wouldn't bother with this (obviously, replacement aircraft could have been found) were it not for the fact that the op-ed was such a bald effort to shill for the institutional interest of the USAF.

Kenya Gets Help From Mystery Western Air Force

The invasion of Somalia by the military forces of Kenya does involve western help, and no matter what the reporting to date has suggested - I am fairly confident the US was not surprised this action took place. No one wants to describe what kind of help Kenya is getting from foreign powers, nor who exactly is providing the help, but US officials have been quick to highlight what our help is not.

A Kenyan military spokesman, Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir, said that “one of the partners,” possibly the United States or France, had been behind airstrikes in the past few days, killing a number of Shabab militants. The French Navy has also shelled rebel positions from the sea, the Kenyan military said in a statement.

Two senior American officials in Washington said Sunday that neither the United States military nor the Central Intelligence Agency had carried out airstrikes in Somalia in recent days. One of the officials, who follows American military operations closely, said the Kenyan offensive had forced many Shabab fighters and commanders to disperse, making them easier potential targets, but emphasized that there had been “no U.S. military strikes in Somalia at all recently.”

All we really know for sure based on the very limited reporting of military activities is that the Kenyan ground and air forces have been operating at a level of effectiveness that exceeds their organic capabilities. The New York Times knows this as well, and mentions it in the latest reporting on ongoing events.

Kenya’s military — especially compared with those of its neighbors, like Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia — has scant experience. Several military efforts over the past 20 years by other external powers, from the United States to the United Nations, have failed to deliver a sustainable government in Somalia.

Kenyan military officials say their plan is to squeeze the port of Kismayu, one of Somalia’s biggest towns and a major money-earner for the Shabab, from two sides in a pincer movement with troops massing to the west near Afmadow and to the south in Raas Kaambooni. Heavy rains, though, have literally bogged them down, and after an initial burst of activity, the Kenyan advance seems to have slowed.

Major Chirchir said the Kenyan Navy had also positioned ships along the coastline from the Kenyan border toward Kismayu.

“Any vessel that is there with a militia we will take it down,” he warned.

On Sunday, Kenyan officials said that a French naval ship had shelled the city of Koday, south of Kismayu, and that casualty figures were not yet available. The French military has also launched small, covert strikes in Somalia in the past, aimed at terrorism suspects and pirates.

Kenyan military spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir confirmed to the Kenyan newspaper The Daily Nation that the port city of Kismayu was under persistent air attacks, but denied those attacks came from the Keyan Air Force.

“It is confirmed that Kismayu has been under aerial attacks, but it is not our troops, it must be one of our allies.”

This is believable, the only fighter aircraft the Kenyan Air Force has are F-5s, and it is hard to imagine they would be successful in precision target runs against terrorist fortifications in Kismayu.

So who is the mystery airpower bombing terrorists in Somalia? The US has two carrier strike groups - the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) and the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), and an amphibious readiness group - the USS Bataan (LHD 5), in 5th Fleet region that includes the Somali port of Kismayu. Until it is determined who is doing the airstrikes (and I am skeptical it is us, I think our role is ISR/logistics), the US is the obvious nation to be accused of conducting those strikes.

But if we assume it isn't the US military bombing targets in Somalia, and we also assume it is not the Kenyan Air Force, it makes more sense to presume the strikes are either French military or contracted out. One possibility is that the French are launching strikes from a few bases in the region, which is the most plausible scenario. There are a handful of private security outfits these days that operate UAVs for hire in Africa, which is another reasonable, but unlikely possibility.

Either way, this assault has the potential to be 'end game' for Al Shabaab. It does appear the US is playing a limited, supporting role in the background of these Kenyan military operations (mostly ISR and C2 it appears, but logistics is possible), and I for one support the US helping Kenya clean up their Somali backyard. None of Somalia's other problems will ever see the resources needed to build solutions until Al Shabaab is dealt with, and the unfolding situation in southern Somalia appears to be the first legitimate opportunity to deal the death blow to the organization in many years.

LCS PEO Updates

There's nothing wrong with LCS 2... I believe the fleet introduction of these ships is very important. When it comes to these ships, nobody cares like I care... LCS, in the press, has kind of gone sinker, and maybe we shouldn't have let that happen.

Rear Adm. James Murdoch - LCS PEO

Nearly 3 months since the interview where Rear Adm. Murdoch simply noted the absence of official LCS news, we are finally getting some official LCS news, including on Fort Smith which should start doing trials this week. Let's review the reporting around the Internet starting with Michael Fabey at Aviation Week.

“We’ve done a good job fixing problems we saw in the first two ships,” he says.

Water-jet propulsion systems drive corrosion concerns on both ship types. What the Navy has sought, according to Murdoch, was a “more robust design in shaft seals.”

He also has been paying particular attention to the ships’ waterborne mission area, “the heart of the operations’ package.”

For example, with LCS-1, built by a team lead by Lockheed Martin, the stern doors open and a ramp comes down with “waves washing in and out,” he says, inviting salt-water corrosion. When operations are done and the doors close, he says, what’s needed is a “tight seal and a dry space.”

Another improvement the Navy would like is the ability to deploy longer boats than the 5-meter vessels slated for LCS ships, he says. But the service has to always be concerned with weight — every pound added cuts into ship speed. “Either you want a ship to go 40 knots or you don’t,” Murdoch says

Rhetorical question? It shouldn't be...

We pick up the discussion on the Austal version of LCS with George Altman of the Alabama Press-Register.

"What the Navy has to do, first and foremost, to maintain confidence in Congress and with the taxpayer, is to demonstrate that we can get better and better," Murdoch said.

Part of that effort will entail addressing rust and corrosion problems in the first two LCS. Murdoch said changes to paint coatings, pipes and even air conditioning units were being made to minimize future corrosion.

The USS Independence — the first LCS built in Mobile — required "too many labor hours" to build Murdoch said, so the construction process for future ships is being tweaked to be more efficient.

"I give credit to Bath (Iron Works) and particularly Austal for using better modular construction techniques," he said.

LCS-1 changes are already being discussed, as noted in the Green Bay Press Gazette.

"With that longer underwater hull, the ship is a little more efficient, and just operating on the diesel engine alone, she's about a knot faster … than USS Freedom," he said. "And we're probably one to two knots faster on the gas turbine (engines) alone than Freedom was."

LCS 3's underwater hull structure has been lengthened compared with the USS Freedom, increasing fuel capacity by 10 percent and enhancing performance.

Carlo Munoz has two articles for AOL Defense discussing modules, sortof. This one discusses the Griffin missile that will not be fielded until sometime after 2014, and the Navy intends to replace anyway because it lacks range. Also it appears Marines and SOF are interested in LCS, at least according to Murdoch who also notes there is no actual program for supporting a Marine/SOF mission module that he is discussing.

Analysis

Rear Adm. Murdoch is the ship guy, and we get stories that mostly concentrate on a status update of the shipbuilding. All seems OK, but few details to address the big questions - like whether there are any increases to crew sizes. A little bit of efficiency appears to be gained in the Lockheed Martin version, but nothing similar to report on the Austal version. Overall, construction progresses.

The rhetorical question asked by Murdoch appears to be one of the best questions here - “Either you want a ship to go 40 knots or you don’t.” What is traded for 40+ knots? What is lost besides speed? At this point, isn't that the question heading into any future contract beyond the current contract for 20?

What is not reported is perhaps as interesting as what is reported. For example, it is unclear if Rear Adm Murdoch made a case for the Littoral Combat Ship, but what is clear is that the case made wasn't compelling enough to the reporters to end up in the stories written. Rear Adm Murdoch mentions the Griffin missile, but notes it's very serious limitations. That raises the question, why would the Navy spend money on a missile that it doesn't like? Aren't defense budgets too tight to invest in a system that has a limited future and undesirable metrics for range? Yes, LCS needs a missile, but an unmodified Griffin sounds like a waste of money to me.

As for the utility of Marines and SOF, it's too early to examine. LCS has utility as a basic function of the design, but with such limited armaments a module for Marines or SOF makes less sense up front than a module that supports the Coast Guard, for example, that can be leveraged in either maritime security operations or forward security assistance training. The ability to support the USCG for, drug related ASW or terrorist specific MIW, would appear to be more aligned with both role and mission of LCS in the specific maritime environment issues related to the wars we are in today than supporting Marines or SOF from offshore. It is likely the USCG doesn't have the resources to partner with the Navy on a LCS module though, which is a different - more political - issue than partnering with Marines or SOF.

Bottom line for LCS - improving the existing ship designs and keeping the ship portion of the program on cost and schedule is good, but the success of the LCS program now rests on the outcome of module development and investment.

Dan Goure on the "Asia-Pacific Pivot"

Heading out the door to watch UVA destroy NC State, but I thought I'd leave ID readers with an interesting blog post by Dan Goure.  Some ideas for consideration here.

Crowdsourcing Smart Defense Cuts - update

There is still time to make your voice heard on the Crowdsourcing Smart Defense Cuts post. So far, many thoughtful and interesting comments have been posted, with no shortage of discussion on specific platforms and programs. LCS and F-35 seem to be the hot topics. What about non-platform specific cuts? Are there some naval or military missions or capabilities that should be divested by DOD or can be filled in some other way? ‏ The “polling” will close on Sunday (or so) and I’ll post a compilation of the recommendations and how they fared sometime next week. (Please post on the original thread rather than replying to this one).

And really… can’t the “ditch the bands” idea get a few more votes?

CNO Planning OPNAV Reorganization

Admiral Greenert appears to be making some organizational changes within OPNAV. From Christopher Castelli at InsideDefense (subscription only).

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert plans to shake up the organization of his staff, reincarnating the role of a single baron overseeing warfighting programs, sources tell Inside the Pentagon.

The new plan would create a three-star leadership position for warfare integration, dubbed N9, to oversee the requirements shops that now report to the Navy's three-star chief for resources and requirements (NCool, industry and Navy sources said.

"Bottom line, N8 is so busy with budget drills and non-stop meetings, there is little time for oversight of warfighting wholeness," an industry source said. A Navy source echoed that sentiment.

Vice Adm. William Burke, a submariner in charge of the Navy's fleet readiness and logistics, is slated to move into the new N9 role, the sources said, noting the admiral is considered an honest broker for all warfighting capabilities.

Almost every CNO makes organizational changes in OPNAV intended to provide savings in one way or the other. Rarely does that work as designed The article goes on to discuss how we got to where we are today.

In some ways, the plan marks a return to the sort of organization that former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark introduced. Under that approach, the Navy's long-term modernization needs were the domain of the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and assessments (N6/N7). In creating that post, initially dubbed N7, Clark took from N8 its longstanding role overseeing the directorates that develop requirements for submarines, ships, aircraft and other systems. That left N8 -- the deputy chief of naval operations for resources, requirements and assessments -- with the responsibility for near-term investment decisions.

Clark sought a healthy tension between the two offices, but the arrangement did not sit well with his successor, Adm. Michael Mullen, a former N8 chief who ascended to the CNO's job in July 2005 -- and, years later, became the nation's top military officer.

Mullen rolled back Clark's organizational approach. In November 2005, the N6/N7 and N8 staffs of about 1,200 personnel, including contractors, were merged under N8 with an eye toward restoring the N6 post as a separate senior-level position.

First, if you are going to pick an Admiral to play Pentagon czar, hard to pick someone better than Admiral Burke. At minimum this change reflects solid judgement on the CNOs part.

A lot of this is musical chairs inside the box that doesn't really matter to anyone outside the Navy, but here is a short outsiders take. There is no guaranteed right way to organize OPNAV into a model of efficiency - although I'd love to be proven wrong about that. What we do know is that the Mullen model for OPNAV that has been in place has been ineffective at best, because N8 had become too ridiculously powerful making virtually everyone else a paper pushing nobody constantly seeking to impress N8. The results were that the shipbuilding budget, for example, was never the same from year to year and often could change more than once in a single fiscal year. For whatever reason, N8 has been unable to plan beyond a single budget cycle and everyone suffered - and that was before the problem was compounded by Congressional political games with the defense budget that has added even more instability.

So in my opinion, the CNOs reorganization is a net positive solely on the merit of changing the existing organization of OPNAV which has a record of being inefficient and ineffective. The way I see it, N8 has been too powerful, and the worst case scenario is that N9 becomes too powerful instead - which is also a nice way of noting it can't get any worse, only just as bad.

It does raise one question though - where does this leave N5?

US Launches a WTO Nuke Towards China's Great Firewall

While foreign policy experts in the United States are busy proclaiming the death of the Gaddafi family lineage as some big foreign policy moment, Wired News was quietly reporting what is - in my humble opinion - the single biggest foreign policy uppercut in quite some time by the US Government. With all do respect to the Arab world, the death of another jackass dictator ranks slightly higher than a can of beans in the big picture of United States foreign policy compared to this Texas sized sirloin.

In the emerging 21st century competition between China and the US, this political move represents President Obama ordering the Great Firewall of China nuked from orbit with a brilliant free speech, free economy WTO lawfare chess move. A MUST READ.

The Obama administration publicly admonished China Wednesday for its vast online censorship policies, for the first time officially complaining that blocking U.S.-based internet sites creates “barriers” to free trade.

The administration, citing World Trade Organization rules, is demanding that China explain its censorship policies. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk’s office made the demands after a three-year lobbying campaign by the First Amendment Coalition.

“This development is important because it signals the U.S. government’s implicit acceptance of FAC’s position that censorship of the internet can breach the international trade rules enforced by the WTO,” said Peter Scheer, the group’s executive director.

U.S.-based websites blocked in whole or in part by the so-called “Great Firewall of China” include YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Vimeo and even the Huffington Post.

In response, China on Thursday blasted the administration.

“We oppose using internet freedom as an excuse to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said.

This is a very big deal and the Obama administration is exactly right - this is a big boy money move to open up the Chinese market - and I can tell about ten great personal small business stories on how it will impact the US economy, but I'll focus in on one simple, specific example readers of this blog should be able to easily understand.

For as long as I have written on Information Dissemination, most pol-mil Blogger blogs have been blocked by China. For me - this was never good, because we talk a lot about China. I have many hundreds of Asian readers these days (India 800+ daily, Japan 500+ daily), far more than Europe actually, because believe it or not; it would appear rising maritime powers like to read and comment on websites that discuss maritime issues every day.

In June of 2009, I purchased the Domain Name for informationdissemination.net transitioning from the core Blogger server farm to a private host. The day the transition was made was the day before I attended the Current Strategy Forum in Newport, RH, and while I was getting some email from folks saying they were having website problems (caused by DNS host propagation among US ISPs), I was also seeing booming web traffic on this blog.

From my old Blackberry I was unable to really tell during that first day of the conference where all this web traffic was coming from. I figured maybe it was me passing out cards and mingling with a bunch of smart sailors and civilians at Newport. The real story was not as I thought.

That evening after the first day of the conference, I had accumulated over 2,000 unique visits from China, because for the first time ever - Information Dissemination was not being blocked and I was being ranked in Baidu. That lasted nearly a month until July 13, 2024 when Feng posted this article and ruined the party. Apparently, whether Feng knows it or not, he is blacklisted by the Chinese censors, because as of at least 3 months ago both his blog and mine apparently had a content block (vs the normal procedure of a total Chinese DNS block).

Oh well.

Some time passed and I didn't really think about it much, until last year when I got an email from a maritime attorney based in Hong Kong who works with the shipping industry there. He sent me a link, which was blocked by every US and European ISP I tried, that was basically a Hong Kong web host with an RSS feed of Information Dissemination republishing this blogs content using language translation software. Using a little network voodoo, I was eventually able to see the page - and I was pissed! One of the recent posts had 40+ comments - this Hong Kong thief had ads all over his site and was stealing my content!

After developing plans over a few days, what I ended up doing was purchasing one of the Flash advertisement spaces through the web ad company the Hong Kong site was using, and wrote my own Flash ad which passed their testing and was allowed In the advertisement, because it was Flash - I was able to embed a bit of code that basically tracked visit and hit counter information to another offshore server (accessible to all of China) from all (and only) IP addresses inside China so I could track how many Chinese users this Hong Kong thief was getting per day. To my surprise, and honestly to my frustration, the guy was getting an average of 6,000 Chinese viewers per day for my content.

Now for those who don't know, at bare minimum, 6,000 viewers per day would amount to well over $100 a month on the highly unoptimized ad service ID is using - Google AdWords (I'll start caring about my ads one day, just don't hold your breath). At the very minimum, this Hong Kong thief was basically stealing $1200 a year from me using his little RSS trick to supply my content to Chinese readers that I don't have access to. Earlier this year, my ad expired on that host - and after calling in a few favors, I used the data I had collected and forced that host to no longer host my content. To the best of my knowledge, today only a tiny handful of Chinese read my blog, and I can only presume those specific folks are somehow immune to the content rules of the Great Firewall.

For Information Dissemination alone, access to a public Chinese reader market is (potentially) worth, at minimum, $1200 a month - and potentially much more. That $1200 could potentially represent gross taxable income, and ID is but a rain drop in the cyber ocean in the context of the entire US internet - most of which makes far more money in far more productive ways than my horribly optimized use of Google AdWords.

So while this WTO move by the Obama administration may politically represent a nuclear attack against China's Great Firewall censorship of free speech, the economics of this move is not trivial at all in the internet driven economy of the US today. For years China has systematically attacked the United States with lawfare, including attacking the US Navy indirectly through maritime environment related lawsuits. It is really nice to see the US government turning the tables and now doing the same to China for a change. I want to send a heart felt well done to someone in the State Department!

Remember, the largest English reading nation in the world is China. While unlikely, an additional 5,000+ new Chinese readers interested in maritime affairs on this blog - particularly if they actively engaged in the comments - would be one very interesting open source experiment, and that experiment would likely be repeated throughout the US pol-mil web. If given that opportunity, ID will definitely attempt to support such an experiment in the global naval discussion. I don't know if the Obama administration can effectively get rid of the Great Chinese Firewall, but I do know that if they indeed do get rid of the firewall - we can expect an unpredictable, legitimate impact in the US-Chinese relationship. Social connectivity has proven again and again to be a very powerful cultural influence in 2011 - both here in the US and everywhere else in the world. There is no legitimate reason to expect social connectivity wouldn't also have a cultural influence on the Chinese people.