I Am Definitely Fallible. But I’m Not Wrong on This One.

As part of a continuing discussion on a recent news article covering the US Navy in the New York Times, the Honorable Robert (Bob) Work sends in the following contribution.

I totally agree with one thing that Bryan (and later Seth) said: I am not infallible. Believe me, I need no one to remind me of the fact. However, I am sublimely confident I am on the right side of this particular argument.

I have never said that numbers are irrelevant. What I have long said is that numbers alone no longer give an adequate measure of the true combat capability of today’s networked battle fleets, and that comparing the size of today’s fleet with the fleet of 1917 (or 1945 or pick a date) is irrelevant. When you compare one US fleet with a past US fleet, you must compare all things—numbers of ships, overall capabilities, and relative naval standings. If you follow Bryan’s argument to its logical conclusion, one would have to conclude that he would rather have the fleet of 774 ships in commission at the end of World War I, or the fleet of 6768 ships in commission at the end of World War II because, for him, fleet size seems to be the metric of merit that matters most. Well, here’s a news flash, and one that Bryan knows well: past U.S. fleets would stand little chance against today’s “small” fleet of 282 ships. Indeed, the only problem today’s fleet would have is keeping its magazines stocked as it put every one of those proud old ships on the bottom.

The fact is that we don’t build a battle force to fight past US fleets, and comparing our current fleet numbers to those of past US fleets is a complete waste of time. We build a fleet to accomplish contemporary national goals, and to prevail against contemporary potential adversaries.

So, the real questions are: how does our 282-ship fleet stack up against other world navies, and is it big enough to do what is asked of it? When comparing relative naval strengths among navies, I generally use four simple metrics:

• Aggregate fleet full load displacement, and average full load displacement by ship type. These are the best proxies for a fleet’s overall combat capability and capacity, as well as capabilities of major combatants.
• Aggregate fleet battle force missile capacity. This is the best proxy for potential fleet firepower.
• Total number of nuclear-powered attack submarines, the capital ship in contemporary navy-on-navy engagements.
• Total number of fleet aviation platforms, and the maximum number of fixed and rotary wing aircraft carried, a good measure of overall power projection capability.

Using these four metrics, and comparing our 282-ship battle force not against past US fleets, but against contemporary rest of world navies, there is no question that our Navy is the most powerful naval force on the planet, by a wide margin. In fact, today’s 282- ship battle force enjoys a degree of naval supremacy much higher than that enjoyed by the 450+ ship British Royal Navy in 1914 (this number includes just battleships, cruisers, and destroyers), on the eve of World War I, when the US was battling it out with the Imperial German Navy to be number two among world naval powers. That’s why the US Navy no longer worries about fighting a decisive engagement with an opposing battle fleet—because there are none (at least at this point in time).

But that still begs the question: is our battle force big enough to do what is asked of it? Bryan would say no; he clearly thinks we need more ships today. So let’s play his thinking out. Today’s battle force must provide a secure nuclear deterrent; operate forward to preserve the peace; project American power; and prevail in any potential combat scenario. A formal Force Structure Assessment determines the size of the battle force inventory necessary to accomplish these four basic tasks. The driving factor behind these assessments is the force-sizing construct dictated by OSD. Since the end of the Cold War, our battle force has been sized to provide forward deployed combat credible forces in multiple theaters, and to surge when required as part of a unified Joint Force to defeat two adversaries in different theaters. As verified in numerous Force Structure Assessments conducted under the direction of both Republican and Democratic administrations, this requires an average battle force of about 310 ships (the assessments have ranged from 305-323 ships).

Our new force-sizing construct requires the Navy’s battle force to help decisively defeat one adversary in one theater, and to prevent an opportunistic aggressor from accomplishing his goals in another (“defeat-deny”). Although we are still working through the analysis, we anticipate this new guidance will require a battle force of about 300 ships. We have 282 ships today. That is 94% of our desired inventory target (91% of the 2-war requirement). We will get to 300 ships in FY2019, and we have a plan in place to maintain this level over the next 20 years—although truth in lending compels me to say it will be expensive to do so.

Now Bryan may think—and I believe he does—that the battle force should be even larger than 300 ships. If so, then what Bryan is really saying is either that our Force Structure Assessment process is faulty, or that he thinks the Navy should be given more missions than those now assigned, which would require more ships. Which one is it?

Until he makes that clear, comparing today’s fleet with the 1917 US battle force is irrelevant.