MiG-29 Lands on INS Vikramaditya

India's carrier program takes a step forward.

Free Syria’s Nascent Navy

Whilst the world’s eyes focus on the fighting in Aleppo, the questionable security of Syria’s large WMD inventory, and Assad’s staying power, a group of rebels have formed a maritime force* to oppose the regime at sea. Like the Free Syrian Army writ large, the exact composition of the FSN is sketchy, but appears to be a combination of defected naval personnel and interested rebels with boats. Of note, last August, a Syrian Naval Colonel defected publically. Besides a social media campaign, the FSN appears to be developing several lines of operation:

Logistics support: FSN is urging participants to catch fish which will be used to supply hungry FSA fighters. Likely other missions will include coastal smuggling of weapons and fighters for the FSA.  This sort of maritime facilitation occured during Libya's revolution last year and is a key component of practically every insurgent movement in coastal areas.

Maritime Interdiction: The FSN wants to equip fishing and other small craft with armor plating and heavy weapons to take on Syrian patrol boats and stop incoming weapons shipments.  Boldly, the FSA has established some naval infantry composed of Syrian navy defectors, with intentions to threaten Russia's Naval presence at Tartus. "Many of our men used to work in the port of Tartous and they know it well," said Captain Walid, a former officer in the Syrian Navy."

Amphibious Operations: The FSN wants a fleet to support a “unified strike on Latakia to drive regime troops away from Aleppo.” Last August Assad's navy indiscriminately shelled Latakia, killing dozens.  Also interestingly, on 7 October, 1973, the seas off Latakia were the site of the world's first surface-to-surface naval missile exchanges during the Yom Kippur War.

As a point of reference, Syria’s naval order of battle is comprised of older Soviet-era fast attack and patrol craft, minesweepers, and some more modern ASCM’s, based at Latakia, Minat al-Baida, and Tartus.  In a possible attempt towards deterring against NATO intervention, earlier in July Assad's Navy publicized naval and coastal defense exercises (or at least some stock video of their weapons launches).

For those interested in irregular warfare at sea, the FSN should be an interesting case study. Stay tuned.

*Note, I have no idea if the linked blog is actually representative of the FSN, or made up from some guy wanting to fill out his paypal account, so would-be donors, beware.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Naval Presence Shifts Towards 2020

These slides from OPNAV were passed around several months ago as an example of the pivot to Asia. Some have identified these slides as representative of the slides presented at a recent CNO press conference. The first slide begins with the expected Naval Presence of 2013.

This is basically today. Note the gold ships are the sustained, forward deployed ships and the blue ships are the rotational CONUS forces. Noteworthy how the SSGNs are counted as steady state, forward deployed operational assets.

It continues with a slide of Naval Presence of 2017.

This is where the map starts getting interesting.

South America
Note that the Navy intends to move 10 PCs, many of which are currently in the Middle East, to the South American theater in support of SOUTHCOM by 2017. I am interested to see how that works with 1 amphibious ship and no combat logistics. In my opinion there looks to be a real opportunity for Navy/Coast Guard cooperation in that theater that is not getting a close enough look, for example, why wouldn't an AFSB for MSO and logistics not be very effective in that region? Everything has short legs, and having a place to move spare parts around at sea isn't a bad thing. It also doesn't hurt to have a UAV pad in the middle of the water. Just saying... that environment isn't likely to get better anytime soon, and has a real potential to get much worse - particularly if we start seeing more legit submarines instead of semi-submersables. It is worth noting the CG/DDG/FFGs in SOUTHCOM are replaced by 10 PCs and 2 JHSVs, not Littoral Combat Ships.

Europe/Africa
Rota is now a BMD base, and sailors will be lining up for duty on those ships. It is still very much unclear what ships the US Navy intends to station there. If it is me, I send 4 DDG Flight Is with BMD so I don't have to send and pay for RW (sorry guys!). Worth noting the full time amphibious ship is now augmented by 2 JHSVs assigned to Africa, which have replaced two large surface combatants. These ships almost certainly represent engagement work the Marine Corps is working on today towards tailored Enhanced Rifle Companies and other tailored Blue/Green assets for Partnership Station type of activity. What I find noteworthy, and useful, is that these platforms are retaining their RW capabilities, and all three ships are well suited for SOF activities if tasking is necessary. These are very flexible forces, but it means UAVs will be the only assured option to provide direct fires in contingency. That's OK, but I still think putting VLS in the San Antonio class amphibious ships for long range cruise missile capability remains an important omission in the modern force, and something the Navy needs to reconsider as an important capability as the large surface combatants move away from theaters that are traditional hotspots for SOF operations.

Middle East
Worth noting the 12 PC/MCMs has become 4 LCS, 4 MCM, and 2 JHSV. Note that the SSGN and 2 CG/DDGs that had been operating down in Africa in 2013 are moved up to the Persian Gulf region by 2017, basically suggesting an assumption that all naval activities off Africa today can be replaced in whole by two JHSVs. That is a remarkable assumption that I have a hard time believing has any merit whatsoever.

Pacific
Look closely and note that by 2017 the great pivot to Asia strategy being touted by Secretary Panetta will be the massive increase in naval forces of - four Littoral Combat Ships and two Joint High Speed Vessels. It is one thing to try not to provoke China into an arms race, but when this is the massive maritime shift towards the Pacific touted at the political level as national defense strategy, one has to wonder what our allies are truly thinking about our empty words policy. I'll also make a brief point - the reason I keep jabbing the Army with a stick and pointing to the Pacific is because it is plainly obvious the Navy is talking a big game but isn't doing anything significant there, and the force is not growing in the future, so the US Army needs to expect as an opening assumption that they will be left completely ineffective as a fighting force in the Pacific if they are dependent upon the US Navy, because the US Army will never get where they need to be unless the Army can figure out a way to make the islands of the Pacific a network of forward operating bases by which the Navy has no responsibility for their limited forces to defend, because every ship defending an island is one less ship to move the Army into the combat zone by force.

General Notes
The requirement appears to be around 1200 VLS in the Middle East in 2017, and 1500 VLS in the Pacific in 2020. Also, in my opinion, with the exception of SOUTHCOM this map looks to me what a "strategy of holding the line" looks like. You know what else bothers me about this map? It is a reminder that in 2017 US forces are basically organized in traditional heavy task forces like CSGs and ARGs, and with the exception of SSGNs and the 10 PCs in SOUTHCOM, nothing about this map sticks out as having a capability that is inherently disruptive for a bad actor in any specific area. LCS and JHSVs will be useful for their limited purposes, which is ISR and engagement respectively, but the US Navy has a shortage of assets that stand out as disruptive - punching politically and diplomatically above their weight.

It conclude with a slide of Naval Presence in 2020.

Pacific
The pivot to the Pacific has completed, and this major pivot ends up being 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 2 Joint High Speed Vessels. I am very unclear how the politics of the pivot to Asia somehow became a public diplomacy centered around the maritime domain with the US Navy doesn't even move a single major surface combatant or submarine to the Pacific as part of this touted pivot.


Europe/Africa/South America
Note that in all three places the major change the primary feature is the addition of a pair of Littoral Combat Ships. What I find very interesting is that for both Africa and South America the pair of Littoral Combat Ships is replacing the presence previously filled by an amphibious ship. This is the first document I have seen from OPNAV (that I can publish anyway) that supports the arguments I have made on this blog regarding how the LCS is more of an amphibious ship capability than a surface combatant capability it is usually generally referred to as. While that is an interesting side note, I'm not convinced it means anything other than how the numbers fit together in PPT.

General Notes
Note that the suggested plan according to this PPT is for 8 LCS in the Persian Gulf before more than 4 are in the Pacific, indeed 18 Littoral Combat Ships are specifically accounted for on this graphic, but only 4 in the Pacific. Obviously this is a moment in time look at what the Navy is thinking, but they are interesting moments and time, and interesting thoughts about future force dispersion.

The Expeditionary... Army

The cold war is over and the wars in southwest Asia are ending, so the Army is making moves as it prepares for the future. The New York Times has a few of the details.

Plans call for the brigade-size stock of armored fighting vehicles now stored in Europe to be brought home, although other infantry and support equipment would remain. A primary mission for the gear to be stored in Europe would be to supply multilateral training exercises among American and allied troops.

The Army wants to locate sets of equipment that could be pulled from storage for multilateral training exercises and other contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, most likely aboard ships and perhaps in Australia, officials say. Other Army storage sites around the world may see an increase in gear designed for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The Army emptied many of its overseas weapons warehouses to fight the wars of the past decade and is using the end of combat in Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan to analyze where the gear — officially called Army prepositioned stocks — should be located, and exactly what types of equipment should be included to carry out the shifting Army mission. 

This is noteworthy.

The Army is planning for a significant portion of the prepositioned stocks to be afloat, an effort that would include eight ships. Two vessels would be dedicated to munitions, with one assigned to the Pacific and one to the Middle East.

The other six ships, which could be sailed to conflict zones as required, would carry equipment for an infantry brigade with MRAPs, and a sustainment brigade. The vessels would carry equipment necessary for transforming a commercial port into a dock that could load and unload military equipment. 

This accounts for some wargaming as reported by other media sources that has revealed that the Army struggles to get ashore without a fully capable port.

I don't really have much to say on this because right now I am not impressed with the policies that are guiding the US Army towards the future, nor am I very impressed with the transformation plans of the US Army is executing heading into 2013. Here is the problem as I see it.

The US Army is organizing around 71 brigade combat teams and 212 support brigades by next year. 43 of those BCTs are in the active component, with the rest in the National Guard. If you look at the Pacific and the Middle East, and you accept that the long range, precision missile threat is the primary threat in both places, then one must ask what becomes a critical function of the US Army in that environment. When I ask these questions, the answer leads me towards the most important capabilities being Air Defense, Airborne, and Air Assault.

The future active duty Army is expected to be 15 Armored Brigade Combat Teams, 8 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, 10 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (light), 6 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (Airborne), and 4 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (Air Assault) for a total of 43 active duty Brigade Combat Teams. When I look at the first month of the next big war, without another nation successfully contributing significant force, only 10 of these Brigade Combat Teams are relevant in the first 60-90 days of the conflict (the 6 Airborne and 4 Air Assault) and nearly every bit of the Army's underfunded and low priority yet critical air mobility defense assets will be dedicated to those 10 brigade combat teams, and fixed locations necessary for the US Army to transit to the battle zone.

In other words, in my opinion the US Army is basically being structured to fight the next war exactly like the last war in Iraq with 15 Armored BCTs, 8 Stryker BCTs, and 10 Infantry BCTs that cannot enter the fight without counting on Saddam Hussein level of incompetence that allows for an Army buildup to occur, or more likely, a fully manned and equipped Marine Corps with enough ships to kick down the door - which for the record isn't something that will organize and happen any quicker than 60-90 days.

What strategic genius it is to pay homage to the parity of the DoD iron triangle when 75% of the standing, active duty US Army has to operate on Navy time to join the next war of significance. Tell me again why the major assets of the US Army, which will take 60-90 days to put in place under ideal conditions anyway, is in the Active Duty Army and not the Reserves? The US Army force structure organizational chart is written to insure the US Army is important to the US Army, but in general it really doesn't do anything meaningful for the nation.

When one looks at the size of an Army one needs for 21st century in both war and peace, it becomes clear the United States needs the US Army sized to at least 100 BCTs - roughly 30% larger than current plans. Yes, that means the Army will need to be bigger, and thus be more expensive to maintain, but I also think it is fairly obvious that only 25 of those BCTs are needed in the active duty force and the rest could be moved to the Reserves without any loss of options for the President of the United States in using the US Army.

The US Army reinvented itself for the war in Iraq in 2005, and reinvented itself again in 2009 in Afghanistan - and bought completely new gear both times specific to each conflict. This isn't new, the Army did the same thing in Vietnam and WWII. Relative to the Navy and Air Force, the US Army can be raised and reinvented very quickly when the money for war is provided.

However, all the money in the world isn't going to help industry invent new ships or aircraft faster, much less allow either service to reinvent themselves in the next war. For the Air Force and Navy, what you have when the conflict starts will likely be all you will have to decide conflict. This theory of naval war was true for WWII, if you believe the results of Midway decided the conflict at sea in the Pacific.

Why rant on all of this based on a news report on prepositioning forces? Because, all of these topics should be discussion points for the upcoming debate of consequence facing the DoD over the next 5-10 years - the recapitalization of the DoD following the conclusion of two wars in southwest Asia.

Is There Anything Strategic About 4% of GDP to Defense?

Below is the transcript of a Twitter conversation our Bloghost Galrahn and I had earlier today, in which I took issue with something he Tweeted.  For those of you who don't know what Twitter is, just pretend we were real people who have actual conversations: 

Galrahn: Romney is right, defense cuts aren't guided by strategy. But Romney's defense spending increases aren't guided by strategy either, so wtf
 McGrath: @Galrahn re: Romney no strategy. Have you read the White Paper the campaign issued? Not called a "strategy" per se, but certainly strategic
Galrahn:  @ConsWahoo Sir, there is nothing strategic about penning defense spending to 4% of GDP. That idea is an obscenity to strategic thinking.
 Galrahn:   @ConsWahoo when strategists make spending money on defense the "ends" of defense policy, strategic thinking is on holiday.
 McGrath:  @Galrahn answer my question. Or have you read his book "no apology"? You sir, are underinformed.

Galrahn:   @ConsWahoo i have read the paper, not the book. 

Galrahn, in my opinion, dismissed a good deal of interesting (dare I say, strategic) thinking about the role of the US in the world and a military that would pursue it with his 140 character swipe at the 4% notion.  Should you be interested, some of that thinking was laid out in the Romney Campaign's White Paper,

and in his book, "No Apology".

Putting aside Galrahn's dismissive attitude about Romney's defense and foreign policy (based seemingly on the 4% figure), he raises an interesting point--is there anything "strategic" about the 4% figure.  I'd never thought about it in those terms before today, but now that I have, I would like to make an argument that it is indeed strategic, but probably in terms that are unsatisfying to most military strategists.

1.  All defense strategies ARE SHAPED BY  resource decisions.  We purists wish that it were not so, but it is.  Sometimes those decisions are specific (as in "cut $487B from what you were previously planning to spend and shape a new strategy to do it), some are not specific at all.  But the REASON you have a strategy in  the first place is to lend priority to the money that you ARE given.  Strategy would be unnecessary with infinite resources, right?  You'd just buy everything you need and as many as you could man.  So if EVERY strategy FOLLOWS a resource decision, the question then is how is that resource decision made? 

2.  Some portion of our national treasure must be allotted to defense.  Sorry to sound like a Tea Partier folks, but providing for the national defense is right there in the Constitution as a DUTY of those who swear an oath to it.  This of course, makes it somewhat special in the pantheon of things upon which national treasure is lavished, but I digress.  What then, is not "strategic" about selecting a number in that range that serves the political purpose of setting a floor "investment" (love that word) in national defense?  Such a tie sends a (strategic) message to the Congress that states "here is my minimum"--just as it announces to the world the political will of the Executive to continue to tend to our globally dispersed knitting.  Additionally, setting a 4% (or 5, or 10, or whatever) sends the "strategic" message to one's own administration about what your priority is when it comes to OMB's juggling of the books each year.  Setting a floor and making it stick TIES THE HANDS of the bureaucracy.  

3.  Something is strategically better than nothing.  The Royal Navy's late 19th century strategic approach was to be larger than the next two navies combined.  My mentor and sage Frank Hoffman has suggested that we peg our defense spending overall to the spending of the next two highest nations combined, which in the present would be Russia and China.  He's not a fan of the GDP peg either.  I find his approach reasonable, and moderately strategic--but no more so than relating spending to the wealth of the nation.  In fact, there's a case to be made that his approach is LESS strategic, as it to some extent lets other nations dictate our spending rather than having our interests drive it.  And what is GDP but a rolled up measure of the national interests we have, visualized in economic terms? 

I think I would be far more worried if someone suggested there be a "ceiling" figure to peacetime defense spending, as that would tend to divorce such spending from a measure of our interest.  

So in the aggregate, and as someone who has earnestly dabbled in strategy, I find no offense in strategic political guidance from the Executive that sets a lower bound on thinking.  And please, save the 'you're just carrying the water for Romney" stuff.   Galrahn raised an important question, and I felt it deserved an answer.  Take issue with my logic (or lack of it) as you will.

Bryan McGrath

Why Sequestration Will Not Happen...

Tens of thousands of layoff notices, days before the Presidential Election.  The President cannot let this happen and still hope to win.  The defense contractors are likely to err on the side of caution, and issue their notices even earlier.  A deal will get cut by 15 October.

UPDATE:  It seems the Department of Labor is responding to defense industry speculation about layoffs by issuing a statement that layoff notices would be "inappropriate".  The plot thickens....

Bryan McGrath

Olympic Politics

Nick Sarantakes of the Naval War College and I talked Olympic politics on the latest episode of Foreign Entanglements.  Here we talk about the 1980 embargo:

 And here we talk about the difference that a Cold War makes:

Somali Warlords Jockey for Position

Via the Somalia Report, we learn (unsurprisingly) that Somali militias ASWJ and Ras Kamboni each have their eyes on the strategic prize of Kismayo.  This blog has repeatedly discussed the importance of this port as a revenue source for al Shabaab and to whomever controls it next.   The Kenyan Defense Force set the goal of capturing Kismayo following their incursion into southern Somalia nearly ten months ago.  After halts due to weather and other factors, the KDF (now operating notionally under the writ of AMISOM) campaign has picked up momentum again and it appears likely this objective will be achieved within the two months or so following Ramadan.  I still subscribe to the expectation (see comments here) that al Shabaab will fade away without much of a fight, and stick to the hit and run tactics we've seen since they vacated Mogadishu last year.  A desirable, but probably unlikely outcome would be for the TFG to assert governance and maintain order at this vital port once al Shabaab is defeated there.  However, as long as this key territory and revenue source is wrestled from al Qaeda's East African brothers, the situation will be an improvement over the status quo.

German-made blasting caps intercepted by PSF

With the impending loss of Kismayo, al Shabaab is on the ropes in the South, but continues a migration northward towards sanctuary in the mountains of Puntland.  Last week, Puntland Security Forces intercepted a boat carrying military-grade IED precursors and other weapons, likely intended for employment against AMISOM forces.  This successful interdiction represents the tip of the iceberg of munitions and fighters flowing from al Shabaab's militant partners in AQAP.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Final Ship Naming Report to Congress

For those looking for the report, you can download it from here.

052C and beyond

In 2003, the first two 052C class destroyers were launched in JiangNan shipyard. These two ships (170 and 171) were commissioned into the South Sea Fleet in 2004 and 2005. Since then, they have been the most advanced and powerful warships in service with PLAN. After these ships joined service, we have been waiting for the next evolution of destroyers to join PLAN. Russia delivered a couple of Type 956 EM battleships shortly afterward, but they really are not as advanced as 052C. After that, 2 051C destroyers were launched in Dalian and commissioned into North Sea Fleet, but they do not have the advanced combat system, multifunctional radar, long range anti-ship missile and more streamlined hull of 052C. As a result of Shanghai World Expo in 2010, JiangNan shipyard was moved to ChangXing Island. We were waiting to see new photos from ChangXing Island to see new DDGs to come out. Finally in 2010, we started seeing photo of a new 052C at the JiangNan shipyard at ChangXing. The third 052C was finally launched in late 2010. We looked carefully at the pictures and did not see any major external change compared to the first two.

After almost 2 years, the third 052C is finally ready to join East Sea Fleet as 150. We see a photo below of what appears to be its last sea trial. The number has yet to be painted, but everything should be set. These will be using the new QC280 gas turbines as opposed to the GT-25000 on the first two 052C.

We also had a boatload of pictures coming out of JiangNan shipyard over a week ago. First, we can see the current status of the 4th and 5th 052C. The 4th 052C might have had its first sea trial already, but it still has plenty of scaffolding, indicating the additional work needed. Both of these ships should join East Sea Fleet in the same flotilla as 150 before end of 2013 (as 151 and 152).



The 6th 052C also launched recently at the shipyard. It looks much further away and launched without much installations. I think it was only launched because newer warships had to be moved into the dry docks (which can only handle two warships of 052C size at the same time). This will probably join ESF as 153 by early 2014. We will have to wait a little bit to see if 5th and 6th 052C have any external differences from the earlier ones.

A little less further along, we have 3 more destroyers under construction in JN shipyard. There are two destroyers in the dry docks as shown below. We can also see the modules of a third one outside. At this point, we don't know if these ships will be like 052Cs or of a new class. It could be the 052D class or a whole new designation.


We have a seen a couple of development on experiment ships that may carry forward for the newer ships. First, we have this new type of multifunctional radar being tested on 891. It looks like an improvement over the current type on 052C.

Another interesting development are these launchers for what appears to be the naval version of CJ-10 LACM. It's quite possible that 052D and future variants will be using tube launched LACM. There have been words on Chinese version of MK-41 in development, but it might not be able to launch something the size of a LACM.

On the Naming of Ships, Part II

A few months ago, I wrote a piece here entitle "On the Naming of Ships".  In it--and against the backdrop of the naming of an LCS for Gabrielle Giffords--I argued against the practice of the Secretary of the Navy exercising the sole authority to name ships, as the tendency has been (from Secretaries throughout history, irrespective of party affiliation) to mix in with solid, appropriate names, names that were clearly calculated for political advantage and/or to reward constituencies. 

There are reports today of a new study on this issue by the Naval History and Heritage Command in response to a Congressional request.  In it, NHHC has come to the quite even-handed conclusion that it is historically inaccurate and  incorrect to view these politically motivated names as abuses of the system; rather, they are and have been routine elements of the system since the birth of the US Navy.  Put another way, for a culture that reveres tradition, the tradition has been the practice of political influence in the process.

The study makes distinctions between what it calls "Orthodox Traditionalists" and "Pragmatic Traditionalists", and while I'm not sure I like the choice of terms (what's not pragmatic about sticking to convention?), it is clear that the Pragmatic Traditionalists have the historical leg up.

At the end of the day, we still come back to the question of propriety; is the historical norm of political influence one we wish to continue to indulge?  My instincts as a political conservative tell me "leave well enough alone".   But I find the notion of "the other guys do it so why shouldn't we?" to be intellectually disappointing.  As Einstein used to say, "I need to have a little tink..." on this. 

BZ to Bob Work for putting NHHC on this job, and to everyone involved for a highly readable and complete treatment of the subject.

Bryan McGrath

A Myth, A Man, A Legend, A Navy PAO

Today Captain Cappy Surette will retire from the US Navy, indeed this blog post is intended to run an hour and a half before his retirement ceremony. I often get invited to promotion and retirement ceremonies, and I try to make the ones close enough to drive to, but I truly regret not being able to attend Cappy's ceremony today. DC based retirements are hard for me to make.

Many, if not all of you, likely saw the profile of myself and Information Dissemination on Wired Magazine's Danger Room. Like all profile articles in media, it cannot possibly tell the whole story, indeed journalists write articles for publications, not books. From my point of view, it is difficult to tell the story of Information Dissemination without mentioning Cappy Surette.

The first Navy public affairs officer to reach out to me as a blogger was Cappy. A few years ago CDR Salamander told me Cappy was one of the first to reach out to him as well. This was long before social media was popular, long before the Navy integrated social media into their own activities, and long before the trends in news information were notably trending towards social discussions. On more than one occasion, Cappy found ways to convince me that I needed to attend certain events, and he was very convincing.

I met Cappy in Durham, NC at the last of the Conversations with the Country tour of CS-21 in 2008. He wanted me to have lunch with Frank Thorp, CHINFO at the time, and wanted me to see what CS-21 was from their perspective. Later that year, he was who pushed for me to get on USS Freedom (LCS 1), basically making me the first 'blogger' the Navy treated like media. Keep in mind that this was still at a time where I was writing under a pseudonym - the world still only knew me as Galrahn, but to Cappy I was Raymond.

Like every interesting sailor, Cappy has great stories. For those of you who run into Cappy as he moves on to the next chapter of his life, should you see him - ask about the picture above. Yes, that is a beret. The ship is off Iraq in 1994, and the number of stories he can tell about that tour are likely endless, and can lead to any number of stories related to job, love, and life.

I wish Cappy the very best. This blog would never be what it is today if it wasn't for people like Cappy, who pushed experience, offered credibility my direction, and enabled my exposure and learning process with the US Navy in ways that the information highway simply can't do. The popularity of Information Dissemination is a manifestation of a lot of circumstances and people. USNI has had a huge influence in promoting the Navy online and Information Dissemination in particular, but indeed people in the US Navy are responsible as well - and it is in part because public affairs folks like Cappy Surette did little things along the way like elevate a small blog with an anonymous author by lending it the credibility of the Navy Information Office, and treating the blog and author as an equal among established media.

Have you ever seen a blog post in CLIPS? If you have, thank Cappy Surette, who long before the Navy dominated military discussions in non-news social media, argued for the inclusion of blog articles in a CHINFO establishment that didn't care much about social media at the time.

In the complex fabric of social network design and how that impacts the credibility of information sources, what Cappy did for Information Dissemination and the greater Navy social media community dating back to even before I met him in 2008 was at least as important as everything we the community were trying to do, and I hope he understands how much I truly appreciate his efforts, because in my opinion he deserves a tremendous amount of credit for the active visibility and engaged community the Navy has today through social networks like Information Dissemination that he helped promote as part of the Navy Information establishment. It may not have been his intention, but the results are what they are.

Congratulations to Captain Cappy Surette on a very successful career. You have long been a visionary among Navy PAOs and based on the results of my research into the subject, and you should be rightfully credited as the first Navy PAO to truly challenge the Navy on issues related to the impacts and benefits of social media, and the PAO who engaged the Navy online community in a meaningful way. The Navy enjoys a very strong traditional information market because of folks like United States Naval Institute and news magazines like Navy Times, but I also believe the US Navy enjoys a very healthy online discussion other services do not, primarily because of the work Captain Surette did to develop and foster opinions related to social media inside the Navy, even when they weren't necessarily being accepted by his superiors at that time.

USNA 2002: In the Shadow of Greatness

On 9-11, several hundred men and women were going about their business at the U.S. Naval Academy, when their lives changed in a tangible way.  They would be the first Naval Academy class to graduate into a state of war since the Vietnam era.



This book is their story, a story of coming of age, valor, and confronting a new reality.  I had the great honor and pleasure of serving in USS BULKELEY (DDG 84) with two of the authors of this book, John Ennis and Pat McConnell, and I could not be more proud of them.

Bryan McGrath

RIMPAC 2012 Order of Battle

PACIFIC OCEAN (July 16, 2024) An Air Force A-10 Warthog assigned to Air Force 47th Attack Squadron, flies past the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) during training as part of exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012, the world's largest international maritime exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Jonathan A. Colon/Released)

Australia

HMAS Darwin (FFG 04)
HMAS Perth (FFH 157)
HMAS Farncomb (SSG 74)
Autonomous underwater vehicle
Explosive ordnance disposal detachment
Mine countermeasures detachment
S-70B-2 Seahawk
AP-3C Orion
E7A
Infantry company

Canada

HMCS Algonquin (DDG 283)
HMCS Ottawa (FFH 341)
HMCS Victoria (SSK 876)
HMCS Yellowknife (MM 706)
HMCS Saskatoon (MM 709)
HMCS Brandon (MM 710)
Fleet diving unit (EOD & MIW)
CP-140 Aurora
CF-18 Hornet
Sikorsky S-61
CH-124A Sea King
KC-150T Polaris
KC-130T Hercules
Infantry company

Chile

CS Almirante Lynch (FF-07)
HH-65 Dolphin
Mine warfare dive team

Columbia

Commander, Combined Task Force/component staff contribution

India

Commander, Combined Task Force/component staff contribution

Indonesia

Infantry platoon

France

FS Prairial (F 731)

Japan

JS Myoko (DDG-175)
JS Shirane (DDH-143)
JS Bungo (MST-464)
SH-60J Seahawk
P-3C Orion


Mexico

ARM Usumacinta (A-412)
Mi-17 Hip
Infantry platoon

Malaysia

Infantry platoon

Norway

Commander, Combined Task Force/component staff contribution

Netherlands

Fleet diving unit

PACIFIC OCEAN (July 11, 2024) Ships from a variety of nations steam together during exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Twenty-two nations, more than 40 ships and submarines, more than 200 aircraft and 25,000 personnel are participating in RIMPAC the world's largest international maritime exercise, (New Zealand Defence Force Photo by: LAC Amanda McErlich, Photographer, Defence Communications Group. RELEASED)

New Zealand

HMNZS Endeavour (A11)
HMNZS Te Kaha (F77)
Mine countermeasure team
Autonomous underwater vehicle
Operational diving team
SH-2G Super Seasprite
P-3K Orion
Infantry platoon

Philippines

Commander, Combined Task Force/component staff contribution

Peru

Commander, Combined Task Force/component staff contribution

South Korea

ROKS Nae Dyong (SS 069)
ROKS Yulgok Yi-I (DDG 992)
ROKS Choi Young (DDH 981)
Super Lynx Mk.99
P-3C Orion
Infantry platoon

Russia

RFS Admiral Panteleyev (BPK 548)
RFS Fotiy Krylov
RSF Boris Butoma

Singapore

RSS Formidable (68)
S-70B Seahawk

United Kingdom

Commander, Combined Task Force/component staff contribution

Tonga

Infantry platoon

Thailand

Commander, Combined Task Force/component staff contribution

PACIFIC OCEAN (July 13, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) launches a Standard Missile (SM 2) during a missile exercise. Paul Hamilton is participating in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012. Twenty-two nations, more than 40 ships and submarines, more than 200 aircraft and 25,000 personnel are participating in RIMPAC exercise from June 29 to Aug. 3 in and around the Hawaiian Islands. The world's largest international maritime exercise, RIMPAC provides a unique training opportunity that helps participants foster and sustain the cooperative relationships that are critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world's oceans. RIMPAC 2012 is the 23rd exercise in the series that began in 1971. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Raul Moreno Jr./Released)

United States

USS Charlotte (SSN 776)
USS Cheyenne (SSN 773)
USS North Carolina (SSN 777)
USS Nimitz (CVN 68) *
USS Essex (LHD 2)
USS Lake Erie (CG 70)
USS Princeton (CG 59) *
USS Chosin (CG 65)
USS Chafee (DDG 90) *
USS Port Royal (CG 73)
USS Chung Hoon (DDG 93) *
USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60)
USS Crommelin (FFG 37)
USS Gary (FFG 51)
USS Reuben James (FFG 57)
USS Stockdale (DDG 106)
USS Higgins (DDG 76)
USNS Yukon (TAO 202)
USNS Henry J. Kaiser (TAO 187) *
USNS Matthew Perry (T-AKE 9)
USNS Salvor (T-ARS 52)
USCGC Bertholf (WMSL 750)
Unmanned underwater vehicle
Explosive ordnance disposal unit
MH-60R Seahawk *
MH-60B Seahawk
MH-60S Seahawk *
MH-53 Pave Low
F/A-18/C/E/F Hornet *
E-2C Hawkeye *
EA-6B Prowler
C-2A Greyhound
P-8A Poseidon
P-3/C Orion
CH-53E Super Stallion
Command, ground and logistic combat elements
F/A-18D Hornet
AH-1W Super Cobra
UH-1Y Venom
KC-130 Hercules
C-17 Globemaster III
B-52 Stratofortress
KC-135R Stratotanker
E-3B/C Sentry
A-10 Thunderbolt II
F-16 Fighting Falcon
F-15C Eagle
HH-60G Pave Hawk
Boeing KC-707

The * denotes a US Navy Vessel or aircraft participating in the Secretary of the Navy's Green Pride Parade.

Driving Down Cost per Target

Constant questions on the cost of future military acquisitions and operations are inevitable given the current fiscal environment. Ultimately, the effectiveness of systems we buy is determined on the battlefield. A rough way to measure this effectiveness is the cost of destroying a single target with a munition. In July’s Proceedings the CNO provides some examples of these ratios:


“In modern warfare, precision standoff weapons such as Tomahawk or the joint standoff weapon are now more cost-effective in many situations than short-range gravity bombs such as the joint direct attack munition (JDAM). A Tomahawk missile, for example, costs about $1.2 million, while a JDAM is about $30,000. To strike a single target, however, the total training, maintenance, and operations cost to get a manned aircraft close enough to deliver the JDAM is several times higher than the cost of launching a Tomahawk at the same target from a destroyer, submarine or aircraft operating several hundred miles away.”

The comparison isn’t perfect; however, as the same article discusses how many aimpoints per sortie today’s aircraft carrying precision munitions are capable of destroying compared to their predecessors. Furthermore, ignoring other variables, such as the total lifecycle and DOTMLPF cost of these aircraft/weapons systems combinations introduces error into these costs per aimpoint calculations. Still, the concept is worthwhile for macro-comparisons.

As another example, during Iraqi Freedom, the magnificently deadly CBU-105 sensor fused munition enabled half century old B-52s to decimate Republican Guard tank divisions rather economically. Each cluster bomb cost about $500,000 and carries 40 infrared guided explosively formed penetrators. Today, a B-1 bomber can carry enough CBUs in a single sortie to destroy 1,200 armored vehicles. Although the data isn’t readily available to prove the supposition, I’d venture a guess that a B-1 sortie is a lot cheaper (and less risky) than destroying the same armored division with an Army HBCT and the huge logistics, security, and infrastructure tail associated with  that formation.

BLU-105 Sensor Fused Weapon

Asymmetry at Sea

In naval engagements, cost ratios appear to favor the asymmetric attacker. The majority of US Navy combat damage sustained since 1950 was the result of cheap, mostly antiquated mines. Increasingly, this type of asymmetry is available and preferred by non-state actors. The attack against USS Cole killed 17 Sailors and resulted in a quarter of a billion dollars worth of damage from a suicide boat which probably cost a few thousand dollars to acquire. Clearly, insurgents and terrorists can achieve a disproportionate amount of damage against a modern navy compared to their investments.

In the future, we must find ways to reverse the asymmetry. Delivering ordnance to an air, ground, or sea target in a more cost effective manner should be a goal of future weapons acquisition programs and in the development of operational concepts. Many variables are at play including the type and importance of the target, whether or not the electromagnetic spectrum and air supremacy are challenged, etc. In simplest terms, engaging a mobile target generally consists of three steps: 1) finding and positively identifying the target; 2) fixing or tracking the target, and 3) delivering ordnance to achieve the desired effects (destruction, mission, or mobility kill). In the maritime realm, the platforms that execute these three steps vary broadly and may include air, surface, and subsurface platforms, both manned and unmanned. In some cases, a single platform finds, tracks, and engages a target, while in others, the detect-to-engage sequence is performed via combination of organic and non-organic assets. These concepts date back to the days of WWII and before, but as we’ve migrated to singularly more expensive aircraft, ships, and weapons systems, cost parity has declined relative to likely future enemies.

Distributed maritime operations using smaller, relatively less expensive platforms or units (such as NSW, NECC, unmanned vehicles, or offshore patrol craft) cueing precision stand-off weapons launched from a centralized platform, such as a ground battery, SSGN, or other “arsenal ship” from over-the-horizon are one way to shift the cost factor back to something more sustainable. Drone swarms are another concept with the potential to disrupt current targeting models as discussed here and here. Although these smaller drones may not sink a modern naval combatant, achieving a mission kill is entirely possible. What else can the Navy do to economize the DTE sequence going forward?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

On Feedback

I very much appreciate the replies to the request for feedback I made before the Virtual Conference in June, and I have not ignored the content in those emails even though I apologize that after the first one hundred or so I quit replying to each individually. I really do appreciate folks speaking up and giving us a better understanding of what works, what doesn't, and how we can improve things on ID.

Some of the site specific changes are now in QA (yes, I actually run a QA blog for ID to test stuff out) and I'm still working out the kinks, like the new Disqus version for example. What was noteworthy was that there seems to be interest in more authors - particularly foreign authors and guest authors, and there seems to be a desire to see more interaction between the blog and uniformed leaders in the US Navy. I'll do what I can.

But I thought I would just throw this out there and see what happens. I am looking for people who can write about the Indian Navy, someone who would be interested in writing about the Pacific from an Australian naval point of view, and someone who can bring a more European/NATO uniformed maritime perspective - preferably - but not mandatory - someone active or retired in the Royal Navy or French Navy.

Basically, needles in a haystack, but it never hurts to advertise.

Also, I'm always looking for authors who are active duty in the US Coast Guard or US Marine Corps who don't work in their news and information shops, and are equal or below the rank of Captain or Colonel.

Incompetence and the Great Green Fleet

A must-read here from Noah Shachtman at Wired's Danger Room, detailing Navy Secretary Mabus' difficulties in executing his signature alternative fuels effort.  Secretary Mabus' problems on this front are entirely of his own making, and stem from his failure to effectively advocate for American Seapower.  While some of the most consequential discussions on strategy and force structure were ongoing in the Pentagon, the Secretary chose to stress (repeatedly) Green Fuels, Science-Technology-Engineering-Mathematics Education, and Sexual Assault in his speeches--important subjects all, but not the stuff around which to build support for Seapower.  Had the Secretary been a vocal proponent of the Navy and Marine Corps' unique and irreplaceable contributions to national defense, and had he been seen to be going the distance to save ships from the chopping block--it strikes me that he would likely have raised fewer eyebrows in his pursuit of a Green Fleet.  He did not, and many in Congress tired of having to take on Navy advocacy for him.  And now we will have a smaller fleet (than that of the FY 12 plan) and the Green fuels plan is in jeopardy, clearly a sub-optimal outcome.

Bryan McGrath

China's foreign policy under Deng

This is the second part of my blog entries on Deng Xiaoping based on the book by Ezra Vogel. Next time, I will explore Deng and June 4th student movement, but this entry will look over his foreign policy works. Ezra Vogel did a great job exploring the major foreign policy decisions faced with Deng at the time of his reign. They included the normalization of relations with USA, Japan, USSR, war with Vietnam and negotiations with Taiwan and Tibetan exile government.

When looking at the normalization of relationship with USA and Japan in the late 70s, it's really interesting to see how weak China's negotiation positions were. At that point, China needed the west for investments, technology, education and support against USSR. In fact, Mao decided to approach US only after he realized China badly needed America to help fend off the Soviet threat. It's probably hard for someone from Deng's generation to imagine the West needing China for money to bail out.

When Deng came back to power in the late 70s, China was facing not only overwhelming Soviet threat to the north and West (the backfires could bomb Beijing and fly back to their bases without escort), but also a superior trained and equipped Vietnamese side to the south. Even North Korean support was not guaranteed. China was faced with a full encirclement and was weak economically and militarily. First, Deng made sure to firm up China's relationship with the North Koreans to reduce threat from East. Then, Deng decided China had to break the encirclement by attacking Vietnam. Of course, China was facing the threat of Soviet retaliation, so it worked hard to speed up the normalization of relations with both USA and Japan. America and its allies feared USSR hegemony over continental Asia, so both USA and Japan were willing to extend hand to China for cooperation against USSR. Deng recognized a window of opportunity to show a new and stable China to the rest of the world and normalize relations with Western powers. In 1972, China had already officially normalized relations with Japan, but a more comprehensive treaty needed to be signed and China wanted an anti-hegemony clause for support against USSR, Before Deng visited Japan in October 1978, Japan had been reluctant to accept such a clause that was so blatantly pointed at USSR. China was limited by time constraint of its impending invasion into Vietnam, so eventually gave in by allowing a mitigation clause saying the anti-hegemony was not aimed at anyone. When Deng visited Japan, he put a lot of Japanese at ease about Chinese intentions and focused on future cooperations rather than the past. By not bombarding Japan with past guilt, Deng won a lot of support from Japanese business in investment and modernization. When I read this, I think that the current generation of Chinese leaders also have better options in negotiations with Japan than only trying to push forward with hard power. They can have less aggressive foreign policy toward Japan without appearing to be weak at home.

By the late 70s, high level discussions were under way for normalization of relations between China and USA. Deng realized that he not only needed US to counter Soviet threat, but also to modernize and invest. Deng's biggest pitch to USA was the threat of Soviet ambitions and hegemony in Asia. He labeled the Americans as too soft on USSR. There was the one major problem of Taiwan. Deng would not normalize relations with US unless US broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan, ended US/Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and withdrew its military from Taiwan. Deng expected Taiwan to be forced to reunify with China once this happens. Deng would allow Taiwan to still have its own autonomy and even keep its army, but take down its flag. US basically agreed with all the conditions, but insisted that it reserves the right to sell Taiwan selected weapons of defensive nature. Deng eventually gave in to that demand allowed normalization to continue. i think Deng realized that China did not have enough leverage on Washington to stop all weapon sales. They had a narrow window of opportunity to negotiate the normalization of relation due to the political climate in Washington and the Taiwan lobby. Deng and the US negotiators at that time believed that weapon sales would eventually stop completely as American public accept mainland as the only China, which would pressure Taiwan into reunifiction talks. I think Deng held out hope that Taiwan would cave and reunify with China during his life time, but that obviously did not happen. Two important events happened to stop this. Taiwan ended martial law and human right abuses and adopted democracy. The June 4th student movement was crushed in Beijing and stopped China's move toward greater political reform. After that, Mainland became the evil dictatorship and Taiwan became the democratic underdog seeking liberty. It would be hard to imagine American public supporting ending weapon sales at this point. At the same time, the Chinese leadership have not given up the hope that America would stop weapon sales to Taiwan over time due to these early discussions. So if you wonder why China makes a big deal out of each weapon sales to Taiwan, it is because China expected USA to stop selling weapons to Taiwan several years after the normalization. We've seen many change of leadership in America since 1979, but the Chinese leadership still adopts the same position taken by Deng over 30 years ago. Of course, the normalization has helped China far more than USA, so Deng was correct to conceed on the weapon sales even if he was accused by some as too soft in negotiations. More importantly, Deng impressed his American counterparts with his directness and provided a look of reason to the American public during his visit. He did not appear as a hated communist but rather someone looking to improve the lives of his people. That's someone the Western world can sympathize in. He managed to have a successful trip even though he told Carter that China is about to attack Vietnam. The current generation of Chinese leaders are a bunch of lifeless technocrats who always stick by the script. I don't think any of them could have pulled that off without widespread condemnation.

Once Deng came back from America, China launched its war against Vietnam. The elite PLA troops were left along the Soviet border for possible retaliations, so only secondary tier of troops were attacking Vietnam. The conflict concluded in less than 30 days without Soviet intervention and PLA claimed to have achieved its primary goals before withdrawing with a "Scorch Earth" policy. However, PLA suffered serious casualty, because it was still recovering from the Cultural Revolution and was simply not ready to fight. Looking broadly, Deng did achieve his goal of reducing Vietnamese power in ASEAN region and enhancing China's standing amongst countries fearing Vietnam/USSR hegemony. The Scorch Earth policy seriously damaged infrastructure/countryside in North Vietnam and severely reduce the offensive capability of Vietnam along the border. By demonstrating to Vietnam that it is willing to attack, Vietnam was forced to keep more than half a million soldier to protect itself from China. Vietnam eventually could not afford to keep that many soldiers along Chinese border while also occupying Cambodia, so it had to give up its dream of regional hegemony. This conflict basically removed the Soviet encirclement allowing China to have peace and fully pursue economic development. Even so, I tend to think the last part could have been achieved without attacking Vietnam. Not only did China suffer 20,000 to 60,000 causalities, it also diverted precious resources that should have gone toward improving the economy. Unlike the current American model of financing war on debt, China had to run a relatively balanced budget at that time. On top of that, the invasion and earth scorching policies have left deep distrust and resentment toward China from Vietnam. And after Soviet Union got bogged down in Afghanistan in the 80s, China no longer faced the same level of encirclement dangers from the Soviets. We will never know if the Soviet encirclement threat was so great that China had to loose so many young lives and money to ensure peace and stability.

Deng's approach toward USSR as a whole was quite effective. By the 70s, the security threat facing China from USSR was so strong that even Mao decided to turn to the much hated Americans for support. PLA combat capabilities significantly weakened during the Cultural Revolution as it focused on class struggle and political thoughts rather than training and improvement. And America was receptive toward Chinese overtures because it was concerned that USSR would take over China and dominate all of Asia. Deng faced the same threat when he took over, which is why he made such a strong presentation to Japan and America about the threat of Soviet hegemony in Europe and Asia. He repeatedly pointed out American weakness and labeled SALT II as American appeasement toward Soviets. Deng himself took a very hard stance toward Russians. He attacked Vietnam to show that Russia was not prepared to be drawn into a land war in East Asia. This was an extremely gusty and risky move, because PLA really would have a hard time stopping Soviet advances had a retaliation come. Deng felt that Soviet concerns in Europe and China's new found friendship with USA and Japan would prevent Soviet retaliation to the north. He turned out to be right. After he felt the encirclement threat was gone, he reached out to USSR again for normalization of relations. He felt that USSR would eventually exhaust from arms race with America and its war in Afghanistan, so he gave them three conditions for normalizing relations. He demanded that the Soviets had to pull out of Afghanistan, remove troops from China's northern border area and the Vietnamese had to leave Cambodia. He stuck by those conditions all through the 80s until the Soviet leadership gave in to normalize relations. Gorbachev came in 1989 on Deng's terms and even offered to sell China its most advanced Su-27 fighter jets.

Deng, like Mao and Zhou before him, had hoped that Taiwan would reunite with China during their lifetime. In 1683, 22 years after remnants of Ming troops fled to Taiwan, their leaders agreed that Taiwan would again become part of China. Deng hoped that Chiang Ching-Kuo would also rejoin Taiwan to China. He proposed that Taiwan could keep its own social system for 1000 years and even keep its own army, but have to take down its flag. Chiang was defiant and maintained that the Republic of China represented all of China. Deng wanted to isolate Taiwan in the international stage to pressure them into voluntarily rejoining China, but the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act provided all the support that Taiwan needed. It was a huge blow for Deng, who felt that that the conditions of normalization would lead to reduction of arms sales to Taiwan. Deng believed at that time that US would eventually stop selling all weapons to Taiwan, which would pressure Taiwan to rejoin China at some point down the road. 15 years after Deng's death, US and China still have the same position toward Taiwan. On one hand, Taiwan has drawn closer to China with business integration, increased trades, direct flights and increased tourism. On the other hand, the majority of Taiwanese now consider themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Deng had said that China is willing to wait a century and even a millennium to reunify with Taiwan. You can see that the current Chinese leadership is still trying to slowly increase its leverage over Taiwan until Taiwan takes down its flag. The negotiations over Hong Kong was also quite interesting. Britain was coming off the highs of Falkland Islands victory and Thatcher came into the negotiations thinking that Deng's positions were negotiation tactics. Thatcher came out of the meeting with Deng so shaken by Deng's tough stance that she slipped and fell to her knees. Over the next year, Deng made it clear that China is not Argentina and would send in the troops to take control of Hong Kong if needed. China's forceful position eventually persuaded the British to sign the declaration for handing over Hong Kong in 1997.

Deng's positions toward Tibet was not as inflexible as some may think. Back in the 1950s, Mao had achieved relatively good relations with the Tibetans by allowing Dalai Lama to have relative autonomy over the Tibetan Autonomous Regions (TAR). Tibetans accepted Chinese sovereignty, but was granted the right to administer TAR, keep their own currency and even maintain their own army. China would be in charge of foreign affairs, military affairs and border controls. The problem happened due to the communist reforms in areas outside of TAR, where half of the Tibetans lived. The Tibetans in Sichuan rioted and then fled to Tibet after they were beaten. Of course, we had more conflicts on TAR in 1959, which led to Dalai Lama moving the Tibetan exile government to India. When Deng came to power, he had to reconcile with Tibetans who had suffered the wrath of Cultural Revolution when the red guard destroyed a lot of Tibetan culture. Deng really tried to make amend when he first came to power, but he also was unaware of the true alienation of Tibetans against the Han population. When Tibetan exile delegation visited TAR, they became more critical of Chinese treatment of Tibetans. Hu Yaobang and Deng tried to take a much softer approach in TAR to satisfy the Tibetans. However, their position was still not good enough for Dalai Lama and also increased Tibetan belief that they can become independent. The two sides did try to reconcile their positions, but at least one Tibetan condition is too much even for the most reasonable and leniant Chinese negotiator. Tibetan exiles wanted the boundaries of Tibet to be extended to include the Tibetan minority areas in other provinces including Sichuan, Ginghai, Gansu and Yunnan. Now, Tibetans are the minorities in these area (and have been so for quite some time), so I think this is probably the most unreasonable condition. Now, the softer approach toward Tibetan led to to Tibetan revolts for full independence in the late 1980s, which were crushed. Since then, China has practiced a much more heavy handed approach in Tibet while trying to promote economic growth to stabilize the region. Through the negotiations in the 80s, I think Chinese leadership concluded that although Dalai Lama himself may accept autonomy and return to rule in Tibet, the rest of the Tibetan exile movement are more extreme and would not allow Dalai Lama to take a middle approach. I think the Chinese leadership would've been okay with granting Dalai Lama the same level of autonomy that he had in the 1950s (if not more) for TAR, but there have been too much bad blood built up in the recent years for Tibetans to accept that. The positions from both side have not really changed since the 80s. Unless Chinese leadership is willing to apologize to the Tibetans and push local officials to be more lenient in TAR, I don't really see things moving for the better. On the overall scheme of things, Deng never regarded Tibet as important as Taiwan, Hong Kong and foreign relations.

I think the most impressive part is that Deng knew what he could extract from each country that he dealt with. He knew which countries he needed to visit to build up support for his agenda. He also had a clear understanding of the geopolitical situation around the world and waited for the right time to strike. He also appealed to other world leaders with his directness and honesty. During normalization of relations with USSR, he told American counterparts that negotiations were going on and assured them that relations with America would remain strong. Deng formulated the theory that China should "adopt a low profile and never take the lead". Simply put, Deng knew how to reduce tension and build relationships without caving into foreign demands. After Deng, I think the Jiang Zemin + Zhu Rongji administration also did a good job, but the current Hu Jintao administrations just seem to bundle one situation after another. The other interesting thing he did was allowing large numbers of Chinese students to travel abroad to study (compared to Soviet fears of brain drain). He thought that those who go abroad would help China even if they did not return to China right away. That's one assessment that he had great foresight in. An ever increasing number of former students that settled abroad have now brought back their knowledge and expertise to improving China. I see this in my parents' generation. Many of them are living comfortable lives in the Western world, but still talk of doing something to help their home land. Overall, I think Deng should not have attack Vietnam. Other than that, I think his policies were spot on.

So.....Numbers Don't Matter?

Raymond quite rightly informs us in the post previous to this one of the extended deployment lengths that are becoming far too easily digested without comment. 

And so, the emptiness of the "numbers don't matter" argument is exposed for all to see.  Thank you for raising this issue, Raymond.  Numbers do matter, they matter in the real operational world in which we live, rather than in the Powerpoint world of OV-1's and lightning bolts; they matter in kitchens across the country where families face the prospect of nine-month deployments as a matter of routine, rather than as a response to an emergency/extension (as is the case with the IKE GROUP); and they matter in the main machinery spaces of a fleet that is wearing out its ships at a rate that present shipbuilding numbers does not come close to replacing, undercutting the confidence anyone can have in projections of fleet size in the out-years.  One only has to look at the FY13-17 budget, in which we build 41 ships but do not grow the fleet by a single hull.  At this rate, we will not even do that well (hold even) in years to come as tired ships reach the premature ends of their programmed service lives, denied the maintenance and upkeep so vital to their health in order to meet operational demands or worse, sacrificed on the altar of "efficiency". 

One of two things is true, and perhaps they both are:  our Navy is not big enough, or it does too many things.  It really is that simple.   I believe the former, that the Navy is too small for the objectives with which it is tasked.  Some believe it should be asked to do less out of a desire for the US to do less overall.  I do not sign up to that.  That is the road to second place, and it is the action of a nation whose interests are contiguous with its landmass, as ours are not. 

 In my view, the Navy doesn't do enough; it should shoulder additional responsibility as it and the Marine Corps take up the primary, enduring peacetime deterring and assuring missions for which they are irreplaceable.  Vital American Seapower is the necessary predicate for any desire to be influential on a global basis, especially in an era of land force contraction.  To do so, the Navy must be larger.  Considerably larger.

The strategically short-sighted response of criticizing the Combatant Commanders for insatiable appetites may be initially satisfying, but ultimately destructive.  Theirs is the role of tending our far flung interests, nose to nose with those who wish to see us diminished.  Of course there are superfluous requests, and we must rely on SECDEF to smoke them out.  But the request of the CENTCOM Commander for the presence of 2 Aircraft Carrier Groups cannot be blithely disregarded as excess appetite.  His judgment is not the issue here; the Navy's capacity to satisfy the requirement is.

Bryan McGrath

Pushing the Fleet to the Breaking Point, For What Exactly?

US Navy Photo

This is not how we should be celebrating the early retirement of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Bold emphasis by me.

The Navy will deploy the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis and its strike group four months early and shift its destination to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, DOD officials said here today.

The deployment late this summer is in response to Central Command’s requirement for an extended carrier presence, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little said. The move affects 5,500 sailors aboard the Stennis and the Aegis cruiser USS Mobile Bay.

Last week, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta approved a request from Central Command commander Marine Corps General James N. Mattis to accelerate Stennis’ deployment. “The decision will help support existing naval force requirements in the Middle East and reduce the gap caused by the upcoming departure of the USS Enterprise Strike Group,” Little said. “It is in keeping with our long-standing commitments to the region.”

Aircraft carrier strike groups provide commanders with ample and flexible air assets to enhance interoperability with partner nations and maintain strong military-to-military relations as well as respond to a wide variety of contingencies, Little said.

The Bremerton, Wash.-based Stennis strike group was due to deploy at the end of the year to U.S. Pacific Command. The group returned from duty in the Middle East in March.

The accelerated deployment to the Central Command area of responsibility is not aimed at any specific threat. “In keeping with Centcom’s requirements, this is a very important region for our defense strategy,” Little said. “We’ve had a presence in the region for decades and we have a range of interests that this extension of our capabilities will support.”

Nor, he said, is the deployment a direct response to tensions with Iran. The U.S. military is “always mindful of the challenges posed by Iran, but … this is not a decision based solely on the challenges posed by Iran,” Little said.

Currently the USS Enterprise and USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike groups are deployed to U.S. Central Command. The USS Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group is due to relieve the Lincoln group shortly. The Stennis group will relieve Enterprise.

The Navy continues to operate at a high operational tempo in order to meet U.S. security needs around the world,. “Our deployment strain is as great as or greater today than it has been at any time in the past 10 years,” a Navy official said.

Sailors and their families have been informed of the change, Little said. Navy officials looked at a wide range of options to ensure Navy commitments and combatant commander mission requirements are met and to lessen the impact of schedule changes.

The carrier strike group will be ready to deploy even given the accelerated timeline, Little said. “The U.S. Navy is well-equipped to ensure our sailors are trained and ready for this deployment,” he said.

Navy leaders understand the operational and personnel impacts this accelerated deployment will have. These include training cycle adjustments, crew and family uncertainty and reductions to quality of life port visits.

As more information becomes available, the Navy will release it, officials said, noting defense leaders are “committed to keeping sailors and their families informed about current and future deployments to the best of our ability.”

The Stennis will be deployed for eight months, meaning the original 6 month Western Pacific deployment scheduled for later this fall is now an eight month deployment in the Middle East only a few weeks away. And for a reason the DoD can't explain, except to say it's not specific to Iran, Navy families get screwed over yet again. If it really is not specific to Iran, something is very wrong.

The Kearsarge deployment last year was eight months. The Bataan deployment last year was eleven months. The Lincoln, to be relieved any day now, departed Naval Station Everett on December 7, 2011, and won't arrive in Norfolk until mid-August; eight months. Eisenhower, which will relieve Lincoln, is on a nine month deployment. Now Stennis, leaving four months early will be on an eight month deployment. I'm sure I forgot a few long deployments among those...

Someone needs to tell the President no, or maybe the President needs to tell General Mattis no. The very real issue is, if the United States is not about to fight a war with Iran, the US Navy is going to wear out their equipment pretending to fight Iran, and the toll on people is very real.We are reducing the number of carriers and amphibious ships at a time we are clearly pushing them at an operational tempo higher than at anytime ever, including the cold war? WTF? The Bataan, which returned in February, has the second longest deployment by a US Navy ship since World War II!

Hey Congress, wake up! That's a red flag!

What exactly is the Navy killing itself for? If these long deployments aren't a domestic political agenda to avoid a public spat between the President and General Mattis, then the answer must be these deployments are intended to prevent war with Iran. There really is no middle ground here, because there really can't be any other justification for this type of persistent operational tempo where Admirals are constantly bitching in public (rightfully, good for them!) about the high operational tempo - but when it comes time to just get back to a normal operational tempo, those same Admirals refuse to stand up to someone and push the fleet further down the dark path.

Bottom line, those Admirals are only saying yes for one of two reasons: either because the need for the CVN is a legitimate reason of state specific to the prevention of war, or the reason is specific for the sake of their own job - in other words they lack the guts to say no to a politician, and that probably goes double in an election year where saying no would have a political amplification impact. I guess it's better the sailors and their families bend over backwards so Admirals don't have to strain themselves, or something like that.

Or maybe we really are legitimately on the brink of war with Iran, and General Mattis is keeping the peace in the Middle East one extended aircraft carrier deployment at a time. I suppose it's possible - color me a skeptic, but that is scary if true. Either way, at what point are the tens of thousands of Navy sailors going to find a single DC reporter with the guts to ask a tough question?

Dangerous Business

PACIFIC OCEAN (March 17, 2024) The Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) pulls alongside the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) for a replenishment at sea. Boxer is the flagship of the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group, which is underway with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (13th MEU) on a deployment to the western Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Trevor Welsh/Released)

In case you were wondering, the .50 Cal on the US Navy oiler USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) does work.

An embarked security team aboard a U.S. Navy vessel fired upon a small motor vessel after it disregarded warnings and rapidly approached the U.S. ship near Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates today.

In accordance with Navy force protection procedures, the sailors on the USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) used a series of non-lethal, preplanned responses to warn the vessel before resorting to lethal force.

The U.S. crew repeatedly attempted to warn the vessel's operators to turn away from their deliberate approach. When those efforts failed to deter the approaching vessel, the security team on the Rappahannock fired rounds from a .50-caliber machine gun.

The incident is under investigation.

An Oiler in a dangerous part of the world monitoring a threatening approach by a vessel ignoring the warnings of the force protection team on the ship? That wasn't going to end well. It becomes a damned if you do, damned if you don't situation for well trained folks who have seconds to make a decision. Tough call.

We want people who can make the right decision. We don't want people who can't make a tough decision. The investigation will reveal where within those categories this incident falls.

According to local reports in UAE, the incident left 1 dead and 3 wounded.

A bit of a historical note - if you have seen photo's on the internet of the M/V Hyundai Fortune incident, those photos were taken by the crew of the HNLMS De Zeven Provincien (F 802). For that incident, the French Navy aircraft carrier FS Charles De Gaulle (R 91) was where the crew of M/V Hyundai Fortune were evacuated to. The US vessel that responded to that incident was the USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204). As of a few years ago, there were still folks on the ship who remember M/V Hyundai Fortune. I bet they remember that incident today.

Foreign Entanglements: South China Sea

Chris Van Avery and I talk a bit about AirSea Battle, among other things:

We also talk about tensions in the South China Sea.

Seapower in Culture: Battleship

So, a few weeks ago I saw Battleship at a Monday matinee.  Surprisingly, there were eight other people in the audience.

Plot and Execution


Ne'er do well is given reason to live by attractive woman; at brother's advice joins Navy. Aliens invade, hijinks ensue. Battleship Missouri is put back into service in A-Team style montage, defeats aliens with assist from F/A-18 Super Hornets. All is well.

Yes, that's more or less it. There are also some Japanese. Peter Berg directed a script written (to be generous) by Erich and Jon Hoeber. Reportedly, Berg agreed to the project in order to win studio support for Lone Survivor.

Remarkably, foor a film that culminates in a World War II era battleship engaging in combat against aliens, the least believable part involved the notion that Alexander Skarsgard and Taylor Kitsch could conceivably be brothers. Along with Liam Neeson and Rihanna, a pleasant selection of B level TV personalities filled out the cast, including Landry from Friday Night Lights (itself a Peter Berg creation) and Turtle from Entourage.

Berg isn't a hack, and has a good sense of the history of cinema; Battleship included nods to such maritime classics as Gray Lady Down and Titanic. In terms of action, it bears mention that Berg can handle big, technically impressive action scenes with considerably greater skill than Michael Bay. At no point did I become confused as to which side was which. He certainly allowed himself to slip into Bay-esque nonsense at a few points, including the extended opening sequence and most any interaction that involved Brooklyn Decker. The alien "peg" technology was also reasonably clever, even if it made no sense whatsoever.


The appearance of USS Missouri in the finale reminded me of nothing so much as the dogfight between Zeros and Tomcats in Final Countdown. I was mildly surprised to read that Missouri could conceivably be restored to service, although I suspect it would take a good deal longer than 15-20 minutes (in an empty Pearl Harbor) to get the battleship operational. I also wonder whether 16" shells and bags of gunpowder are regularly stored aboard ship, but then that's nitpicking. That 16" shell that a handful of crew moved from one end of Missouri to the other would have been fully 1900#, by the way. 


Theory of Seapower 


Battleship has no noticeable theory of seapower, apart from the observation that warships might be useful if aliens landed near the Hawaiian Islands and lost their communication equipment en route. Oh, and also that extremely advanced military organizations (such as those presumably maintained by aliens) should invest in elementary reconnaissance and detection technology. Here are some additional thoughts. 


Broader Observations

The biggest disappointment of Battleship (which we were aware of well before the film hit the screen), was the need to craft a scenario involving combat against space aliens, rather than against a terrestrial opponent. News of this decision emerged early in the production cycle, to the derisive howls of those with an interest in maritime affairs. Battleship is, after all, a symmetrical game. Each side has an identical fleet of five ships, based broadly on the major ship types of World War II. The game would work just as well if it were titled "Jutland" and the aircraft carrier became a Super Dreadnought, the battleship a battle cruiser, and so forth. Given the expectation of symmetrical fleets, any Battleship movie would invariably abstract from both history and the game; if you want to make a movie about Midway or Philippine Sea or Jutland, you call that movie Midway or Philippine Sea or Jutland, rather than Battleship. Nevertheless, the prospect of a film depicting naval combat between the United States and China would have been considerably more interesting than another iteration in the Effects Filled Alien Invasion genre (maritime edition). To be sure, the political difficulties associated with the making of Tora Tora Tora, for example, would undoubtedly emerge in the context of trying to produce any major film about a war between the United States and China.

But Hollywood popcorn films now depend on foreign receipts for financial success. That Rocky IV or Red Dawn wouldn't make it past the Soviet censors (and might not play well with the Soviet public in any case) was irrelevant in the 1980s. Today, it is very difficult to imagine a film with a US-China war plot that would not offend one audience or the other (not to mention the Chinese censors), and so we get such nonsense as a Red Dawn with North Korean antagonists.

Then again, films depicting direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union were relatively rare, even in the Cold War. In part this was surely because the cost of plausibly depicting modern combat with the cinematic technology of the second half of the twentieth century remained prohibitively high; however, there also appeared to be a degree of reticence about pitting the US and the USSR against each other, such that films like Red Dawn somehow felt like violations of a taboo. Even Top Gun relied on Soviet surrogates, as if the Libyans would be granted access to the most recent, sophisticated equipment that the USSR had to offer. To be sure, Cold War cinema relied heavily on the persistence of tension with the Soviet Union; many spy flicks used this tension to excellent effect, and the Cold War had a broader effect on how cinema depicted American life.

Conclusion


There's just not much here. It's a maritime film insofar as it happens to occur at sea; it was made because the studio was concerned about losing the rights (which would have been a major tragedy, given how much money the film lost). Battleship was not well suited for Hollywood. As an advertisement for seapower, it works rather less well than Final Countdown and isn't even in the same league as Top Gun.