Driving Down Cost per Target

Constant questions on the cost of future military acquisitions and operations are inevitable given the current fiscal environment. Ultimately, the effectiveness of systems we buy is determined on the battlefield. A rough way to measure this effectiveness is the cost of destroying a single target with a munition. In July’s Proceedings the CNO provides some examples of these ratios:


“In modern warfare, precision standoff weapons such as Tomahawk or the joint standoff weapon are now more cost-effective in many situations than short-range gravity bombs such as the joint direct attack munition (JDAM). A Tomahawk missile, for example, costs about $1.2 million, while a JDAM is about $30,000. To strike a single target, however, the total training, maintenance, and operations cost to get a manned aircraft close enough to deliver the JDAM is several times higher than the cost of launching a Tomahawk at the same target from a destroyer, submarine or aircraft operating several hundred miles away.”

The comparison isn’t perfect; however, as the same article discusses how many aimpoints per sortie today’s aircraft carrying precision munitions are capable of destroying compared to their predecessors. Furthermore, ignoring other variables, such as the total lifecycle and DOTMLPF cost of these aircraft/weapons systems combinations introduces error into these costs per aimpoint calculations. Still, the concept is worthwhile for macro-comparisons.

As another example, during Iraqi Freedom, the magnificently deadly CBU-105 sensor fused munition enabled half century old B-52s to decimate Republican Guard tank divisions rather economically. Each cluster bomb cost about $500,000 and carries 40 infrared guided explosively formed penetrators. Today, a B-1 bomber can carry enough CBUs in a single sortie to destroy 1,200 armored vehicles. Although the data isn’t readily available to prove the supposition, I’d venture a guess that a B-1 sortie is a lot cheaper (and less risky) than destroying the same armored division with an Army HBCT and the huge logistics, security, and infrastructure tail associated with  that formation.

BLU-105 Sensor Fused Weapon

Asymmetry at Sea

In naval engagements, cost ratios appear to favor the asymmetric attacker. The majority of US Navy combat damage sustained since 1950 was the result of cheap, mostly antiquated mines. Increasingly, this type of asymmetry is available and preferred by non-state actors. The attack against USS Cole killed 17 Sailors and resulted in a quarter of a billion dollars worth of damage from a suicide boat which probably cost a few thousand dollars to acquire. Clearly, insurgents and terrorists can achieve a disproportionate amount of damage against a modern navy compared to their investments.

In the future, we must find ways to reverse the asymmetry. Delivering ordnance to an air, ground, or sea target in a more cost effective manner should be a goal of future weapons acquisition programs and in the development of operational concepts. Many variables are at play including the type and importance of the target, whether or not the electromagnetic spectrum and air supremacy are challenged, etc. In simplest terms, engaging a mobile target generally consists of three steps: 1) finding and positively identifying the target; 2) fixing or tracking the target, and 3) delivering ordnance to achieve the desired effects (destruction, mission, or mobility kill). In the maritime realm, the platforms that execute these three steps vary broadly and may include air, surface, and subsurface platforms, both manned and unmanned. In some cases, a single platform finds, tracks, and engages a target, while in others, the detect-to-engage sequence is performed via combination of organic and non-organic assets. These concepts date back to the days of WWII and before, but as we’ve migrated to singularly more expensive aircraft, ships, and weapons systems, cost parity has declined relative to likely future enemies.

Distributed maritime operations using smaller, relatively less expensive platforms or units (such as NSW, NECC, unmanned vehicles, or offshore patrol craft) cueing precision stand-off weapons launched from a centralized platform, such as a ground battery, SSGN, or other “arsenal ship” from over-the-horizon are one way to shift the cost factor back to something more sustainable. Drone swarms are another concept with the potential to disrupt current targeting models as discussed here and here. Although these smaller drones may not sink a modern naval combatant, achieving a mission kill is entirely possible. What else can the Navy do to economize the DTE sequence going forward?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.