CNO's Position Report

Last week, the CNO released his "Position Report" to describe the progress made toward the vision laid out in his "Sailing Directions".  The document describes itself thusly:  "Similar to what we do at sea (for example, the Eight O’ Clock Report), this Position Report “takes a fix” on where we are today and identifies “course and speed”ch anges to keep us on track and counter the effects of “set and drift” - emerging challenges that will tend to take us off our track."

The piece is straightforward and descriptive, without a lot of chest thumping.  In essence, CNO is saying, "this is what I said we'd do, this is how we're doing, and here's where we need to do more."

A couple of things caught my eye:

1.  "With the other sea services we will revise our maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”, to address the challenges and threats facing us in the near future."  This is a good thing, as I've written here before.  The 2007 strategy was suited to its time and environment, but seems too general for the clarified threat set and the obvious turn to Seapower in the offing.

2.  "We will develop concepts to guide future amphibious operations, building on the ongoing “Single Naval Battle” effort with the Marine Corps."  Pay close attention to "Single Naval Battle".  I think the discussion surrounding it could be one of the most interesting ripples in the maritime strategy field in some time.  If it is done right, rice bowls will shatter, cultural norms will fade, and the two services will integrate to degree that none of us have ever experienced.  What will the costs be?  Shattered rice bowls and faded cultural norms.  Stay tuned for this one--could shape the next two decades of the Department of the Navy like no other development.

Bryan McGrath

Re-visiting Fleet Size

Chris Cavas' interview with Romney surrogate John Lehman last week brought up the fleet size debate once again.  And again, a chorus of observers leaped to their feet to assert that comparing fleet size across the years is irrelevant, pointing to (as this article demonstrates) the increased range of influence a single ship today can exercise, largely through its long range precision weapons.

There is no disputing this.  I give up.  I agree.  Count me in. 

To a point.  And that point is, when one considers a fleet in combat--actually killing people and wrecking things--this comparison has merit.

The problem as I see it, is that our Navy spends the overwhelming majority of its time not killing people and wrecking things.  It spends most of its time trying to convince some of the folly of conflict, while convincing others of the certainty of our response in their defense.  In this effort, the range of weapons and sensors--while not irrelevant--is far less relevant than in actual warfighting.  Networks don't scare anyone, and they don't assure anyone.

These functions are most effectively carried out by the presence--seen and inferred--of ships and submarines.  In this pursuit--numbers matter more than networks and CEP.  There has been a good deal of work done recently in assessing the ingredients of conventional deterrence, and what comes up time after time is the preponderance of force levels IN THE REGION in question.  Ships in Norfolk matter less than ships in the neighborhood, just as troops at Fort Drum matter less than troops in the region.  This is the entire premise upon which forward presence is built.

If one values forward presence, then fleet size MUST matter. 

Bryan McGrath

This is Stealth?

DDG 1000's composite deckhouse was revealed this week down in Gulfport. The uniquely angled 48.8m long, by 21.3m wide, by 19.8m high balsa-wood core carbon fiber super-structure is designed to provide the Navy's newest guided-missile destroyer a low radar and infrared signature.  The deckhouse, combined with a low-profile tumblehome hull will likely achieve this goal, but is it truly fair to say that this design is "stealthy?"  Today's enemies will not operate long range maritime patrol aircraft and radar satellites like the Soviet Union did to locate U.S. fleets on the open ocean 30 years ago.  They will, however, use a network of tattletale fishing dhows equipped with satellite phones, cheap tactical UAVs, and HUMINT networks in nearby logistics ports with twitter accounts and smart phones to find ships operating in narrow seas such as the Arabian Gulf.  A singulary-unique profile 14,000 ton combatant is not likely to be able to hide from these intelligence platforms, no matter how innovative her design may be.  One hopes that the three staggeringly expensive DDG-1000 destroyers will validate many new naval technologies, but how to hide a ship in the littorals during 21st Century irregular warfare will not likely be one of them.

Ingalls Photo of the Week: Ingalls shipbuilders at the Gulfport Composite Center of Excellence watch as the DDG 1000 deckhouse begins its journey from the factory to the barge that will deliver it to Maine. Photo by Steve Blount.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Foreign Entanglements: Libertarians in Our Foreign Policy

I dunno how many people will be interested in this, but given Bryan's comments on libertarian views of foreign policy there might be a few takers. On this week's episode of Foreign Entanglements, I chatted with Jason Sorens of Pileus about varieties of libertarian foreign policy views:

 
 Also, if you haven't read Chris Cavas' excellent interview with John Lehman, do so as soon as convenient. Some very interesting stuff that I'm sure both Bryan and Galrahn will be commenting on soon.

On Categorical Statements...

This is the worst post on naval affairs ever to appear on the internet. Some additional thoughts here.

Vanguard CEO Bullish on America

Why?  Seapower!

And we still have the most powerful military. Again, these are real macro factors. But if you look at 200 years of history, sea power — the correlation between who controls the seas has a huge impact on economic growth and prosperity. Because when you think about it, still 94 percent of all trade occurs over the oceans. So us having the most credible navy is a positive factor. 

Bryan McGrath

ROKN

For this week's Diplomat contribution I discussed the impressive growth of the ROKN:

South Korea’s robust shipbuilding industry (the world’s largest) helps support and underwrite the ROKN’s expansion and modernization. Four Dokdos and six KD-IIIs are planned, although actual construction may not match these numbers. If it does, however, this would represent one of the most potent naval warfare squadrons in the world, potentially capable of conducting many different missions in the region. The KD-IIIs and Dokdos are supported by a force of nine modern large frigates (designated destroyers), all displacing from 3500-6000 tons and specialized for surface and sub-surface warfare. Another fifteen 3000 ton frigates are in the ROKN’s plans 

Much like the PLAN, the ROKN has taken advantage of every opportunity to develop experience with distant, long-term deployments. South Korea is a regular participant at RIMPAC, as well as other significant multilateral exercises. Also like the PLAN and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), the ROKN has maintained a continuous presence in support of CTF 151’s anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. All of this suggests that the ROKN is built for exigencies well beyond war on the Peninsula.

As one reader suggested, the gap between South Korea and Brazil, a state seemingly well-positioned to take on a larger maritime role, is huge.

The Army Joins AirSea Battle

As AirSea Battle moves ever closer to a "void of meaning buzz-phrase" rather than the substantive approach to A2AD challenges that it is, there is news here of the US Army getting onboard with the concept, soon to sign on to an MOU and presumably provide full-time staff at the requisite level within the ASB Office.

This is excellent news, but not an unconditional good.

If the Army is joining in as a means of bureaucratically monitoring and potentially impeding the progress of the effort, then obviously this is not a good thing.  I don't believe that is their aim, but stranger things have happened, and declining budgets create opportunities for mischief.'

If the Army is joining in as a means of finding a means to marry a vision of increased maneuver battalions in each Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to the DoD "latest thing", then I fear bureaucratic stalemate and inefficiency.

But if the Army is joining in order to truly advocate for and understand better the role of ground forces in Joint Operational Access, then this is a very positive development.  Essential to putting this foot forward however is recognition at the very top of the Army that there are many Army capabilities of great value to AirSea Battle and Joint Operational Access--but the BCT writ large is not necessarily among them.

Army Air Defense Artillery--probably the part of the Army in greatest demand from the Joint force in countering A2AD capabilities--must rise in Army priorities if the Army's participation in ASB is to be taken seriously.  Put simply, Army ADA capability and capacity to defend critical assets in the "pre ASB/JOA" world was questionable; in order for ASB and JOA to succeed, more, better and different ADA will be required.  It must become more mobile--not just able to move quickly with land forces on the march, but in its ability to be tactically useful in the maritime environment of the Pacific (this point applies to the entire Army, but especially to ADA).  It must develop new interceptors, so that expensive missiles are not wasted on modest targets. It must work with the other Services toward fielding effective directed energy weapons.  It must begin to think more deeply about cover, concealment, and deception in order to make the interceptors it has go farther against opponents that outgun us--concepts that ADA has moved away from in the post-Cold War Era. It must re-evaluate its hostility to elevated, netted sensing (JLENS).  And it must think about C2 approaches in comms denied environments and across vast expanses of maritime space. 

None of this will occur if the Army does not recognize the moment.  If the Army fails to see the strategic value of this under-valued and under-resourced capability, it will be incumbent upon the Joint community and OSD to point this out.  This is an area where the AirSea Battle office can be influential.

Bryan McGrath