Nomenclature

In my latest at the Diplomat I call for a more standardized vocabulary of naval affairs:

Navies do a poor job of developing such a nomenclature, in part because they have good reasons to avoid standardized ship designations.  Civilian policymakers don’t like to hear that they’ve devoted a substantial portion of the government treasury to building a buying a light carrier (CVL); they’d prefer to think that they’ve invested state funds in an aircraft carrier comparable to those operated by the United States. On the other hand, the terms “aircraft carrier” and “destroyer” can have idiosyncratic negative political implications, pushing navies to refer to ships as “frigates” or “helicopter destroyers.” Whatever its other merits, the Washington Naval Treaty and its follow up agreements established an international standard for ship types. By defining the terms battleship, aircraft carrier, heavy cruiser, and light cruiser, the treaty system created a warship typology that allowed relatively easy comparison across states.  Giving the typology legal and normative substance surely created some odd incentives, including aJapanese effort to build fleet carriers of less than 10,000 tons and a multinational “light cruiser” competition involving ships bristling with 6” guns and displacing in excess of 10,000 tons.  Nevertheless, it resulted in a system of de facto standardization, and consequently of defense acquisition transparency.

This Week in Aircraft Carriers

What a wonderful week for the navalist, no?  The Middle Kingdom has taken its aircraft carrier to sea and operated jet aircraft on it.  Not to be outdone, the King of Aircraft Carrier Navies (the U.S.) is pictured loading a UAV for deckspot testing.  As we say in the world of TACAIR close control, "Fight's On".


Some random thoughts on these events, if you will.  First on China.

It has been interesting to read the varied reactions to China's accomplishment this week.  Those who believe the military threat from China is overblown tend to downplay the news, citing myriad operational issues they will have to overcome in order to become proficient, not to mention the clear overmatch the US holds in both numbers and proficiency.  On the other hand, those who believe the threat from China is real and mounting point to these events as the latest evidence of a nation whose ability to bend learning curves to their will is something to behold. 

I tend to come down closer to the latter crowd.  The plain truth is that for seven-ish decades, the US Navy has made much hay from the peacetime presence, deterrence, and assurance roles that its aircraft carriers play.  And while (for the time being), I see the Chinese carrier as a big, fat, target for US attack submarines, that advantage accrues only when the shooting starts.  In the meantime, China begins to add to its toolbox of regional persuasion.  It is not difficult to see how this capability could change the steady-state regional security picture, especially if China fits out several of these ships. 

As for the United States, the photos of the X-47B being loaded onto the HARRY S. TRUMAN are occasion for great anticipation.  We are watching the future of naval aviation play out before our very eyes.

The relevance of the aircraft carrier has been much bandied about lately.  It is unfortunately, a misplaced discussion.  The aircraft carrier is no more rendered irrelevant by threats to it than are tarmac and airstrips by threats to them.  The CVN is a means, not an end.  The combat power of an aircraft carrier is a function of several things, including its size and sustainability.   But no factor is more important than the configuration of the airwing.  The blithe assumption of Sea Control made for the past several decades drove our airwings to evolve into short-legged sortie generation machines.  As presently configured, a modern aircraft carrier and its airwing DO appear increasingly obsolete.  But the photos we saw in the past few days of the X-47B show the way forward into decades of additional relevance.

This relevance will be built along two lines--one will be long(er) range strike, and the other will be sea control.  The X-47B is a hint of the future of long-range, strike; stealthy enough to be difficult (but not exquisitely stealthy) and armed with long range stand-off weapons.  CNO's "payloads, not platforms" mantra in action.

Where I don't see similar progress is in the evolution of the airwing to act as a part of a grander Sea Control CONOPS.  The ability to project power from the sea depends on the capability to control the seas one wishes to operate in.  It grows increasingly clear to me that Sea Control must rise in the priority of Naval Aviation planners, even if it means privileging Strike less handsomely.  An airwing that can strike at range while contributing to the dominance of its own environment is critical to the nation's ability to project power from the sea, something it appears to still value. 

The P-8 will play a large role in Sea Control from the air, but organic (to the battle group) capability will still be required. 

First flight of J-15 off Liaoning

It has finally happened. We finally have news confirmation from Xinhua and also have pictures of J-15's first take/off and landing from Xinhua. The news of first landing came a couple of days ago, but this is the first time we have seen the photos.

Here is a timeline of China's naval flanker program just to give you an idea:

• 2001, Assemble the T-10K-3 prototype that PLAN purchased from Ukraine. Use this for long term technical study.
• January 2007, AVIC1 and PLAN’s major program (J-15) research work started.
• July 2007, AVIC1 SAC had a large program tackling meeting
• January 2008, blueprint work finished, start prototype research & production stage
• August 31st 2009, J15-0001 had maiden flight
• May 6th 2010, maiden take-off flight from the simulated jet-ski at CFTE. Continued production of single digit number of prototypes for future testing
• August 10th, 2011, China’s first aircraft carrier went out for sea trials. J-15-0005/CFTE-554 and J15-0008/CFTE-556 prototypes made numerous fly-overs, low altitude touch and go landing along the way.
• July 2012, Finished certification test flights, given permission to product single digit number of batch 0 J-15s for initial testing/trials works
• September 25th, 2012, PLAN first aircraft carrier was named Liaoning and had its first sailing after commissioning in October
• November 3rd, 2012, J-15S-0001 had maiden flight
• Early November, 2012, Liaoning had second sailing after commissioning
• November 20th, 2012, a PLANAF pilot made the first carrier landing trial.
• November 23rd, 2012, Two PLANAF pilots flying 2 J-15s finished carrier op controlled first official takeoff and landing trials. This marks successful completion of first stage of the Carrier aviation project.

Farley and McGrath on Bloggingheads

This time with the whole show, and with Rob's name spelled correctly.

Patterns of Defense Spending in East Asia

A couple of my recent posts at the Diplomat have concerned defense spending patterns in East Asia.  On general trends:

There are at least three potential interpretations of the increase in Asian defense spending. The first is straightforward; Asian powers are beginning to transform post-Cold War economic growth into military power, producing more modern, competent, and capable military organizations (especially at sea and in the air). The broad trend of defense growth suggests that these increases represent balancing against one another, perhaps with a focus on China.

A second interpretation, however, implies that the great powers of Asia feel relatively secure, and have not yet begun to engage in the kind of defense buildup that would suggest real concern about their safety.  In American political culture, dire warnings about the paucity of the defense budget are common, and yet few-to-no Asian countries devote nearly the same resources to defense as the U.S. In this interpretation, the absolute increases represent simply the results of economic growth, perhaps looming larger in the imagination because of simultaneous cuts to European budgets. 

A final interpretation is that the atmosphere of relative security in Asia depends on U.S. military hegemony, and that this hegemony depends on the willingness of the United States to spend and the willingness of potential competitors not to spend. U.S. military capability does not yet appear so threatening that enemies have balanced in response, and the potential for U.S. intervention in any given conflict holds down expenditures.

And on the character of the arms industry specifically:

An arms relationship represents both an economic and a political commitment. What’s at stake in making such a commitment? While Sino-U.S. competition likely won’t descend into the kind of alliance structure that predominated during the Cold War, some navies could nevertheless find themselves on the “wrong side” of political competition in the Western Pacific, which could leave them vulnerable. Committing to one supplier creates a relationship of dependency, with the client needing to stay in the good graces of the patron in order to maintain access to spares, munitions, and modernization kits. The smaller navies of Southeast Asia need to decide how best to develop force structures in a future which may see competition between the United States and China. 

On this last, see also this report (which is considerably better and more in depth than my post).

MLP Unveiled

General Dynamics-NASSCO launched the Navy's Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) in San Diego today.  NAASCO is on contract to build two of these "piers at sea" for about $372 million a piece.

The ship will be a key node in future sea-to-shore operations for the Military Sea-lift Command, with the ability to launch three LCAC's from side ramps.  More and more, the design and employment lines between pre-positioning and amphibious shipping seem to be  blurred.

The idea of using the MLP as a future afloat forward staging base to replace USS Ponce has also been tossed around in Navy circles.  Ponce earned her keep in the Arabian Gulf this summer as a mothership for international mine-hunting forces during IMCMEX 12.  She remains deployed hosting an interesting range of capabilities, including embarked ScanEagle UAVs and riverine craft. 

Looking at the huge amount of flat deck space on Montford Point, one immediately thinks flight deck.  What are some other ways the USN could employ these new ships?

UPDATE: One of our astute readers has pointed out that the Navy is not just considering the MLP as a future AFSB.  In fact, the Navy’s FY13 budget submission proposes building third and fourth MLPs modified to serve as AFSBs to replace Ponce in FIFTH Fleet, with the other AFSB to serve in a different theater.

 U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Oct. 26, 2012) U.S. Navy Sailors assigned to Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) 2 prepare to conduct patrol operations in the Arabian Gulf while aboard Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15). RIVRON 2 is deployed with Commander, Task Group (CTG) 56.7, which provides maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jamar Perry/Released)


The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

What does J-31 tell us about China

There have been many articles written about the recent first flight of J-31. If you go to sinodefenceforum where I moderate, you can see pages and pages of analysis by amateurs like myself over what we think the roles of this aircraft is along with its capabilities. If you read enough online articles, they will start repeating themselves over how close J-31 resembles to F-22 and F-35. And while this fighter looks to have stealth shaping, there are much more to achieving stealth than just resemblance to shaping of F-35. As usual, the one article that did peak my interest was the one by Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins. They looked at the growing Chinese aerospace industry and its increasing threat to Russia’s export markets.

I think that should be the general take away from this. In this year alone, Shenyang Aircraft Corporation has done first flights of J-31, J-16 (a fighter bomber along the lines of Su-34/F-15E) and J-15S (twin seat variant of J-15). In this past 2 years, China has flight tested 2 different 5th generation aircraft. The rumour is that the Y-20 heavy transport project will also make maiden flight this year. I personally consider Y-20 project and the associated WS-18 and WS-20 (or maybe WS-118) turbofan engine to be PLAAF’s most important projects because of its use in force multiplication and power projection. China desperately needs a platform like Y-20 that can be used for strategic lift, aerial refueling, AEW C&C;, other C4ISR missions and as ABL platform. Regardless of how one would view Y-20s importance vs J-20/J-31, these are definitely the 3 most important PLAAF projects over the next few years. The short duration of 2 years between the maiden flights of these projects shows how much China’s aviation industry is growing. Each of these projects is also worked on by one of AVIC 1’s three largest aircraft companies (Shenyang, Chengdu and Shaanxi/Xi’an AC). In their civilian business, each of these companies is involved in the production of parts for numerous airliners for COMAC and Western aircraft manufacturers. When we include their military projects, we can see the amount of R&D; that these companies are doing.

A while ago, I read about how Chengdu AC is now employing a whole new generation of engineers that learnt the entire fighter development process from J-10 project. This group of engineers has since developed JF-17 and J-10B. They are now the brains behind J-20, numerous new J-10 variants and UAV projects. I think they have also recruited foreign engineers (especially from Russia and Ukraine) that have really contributed in all the military projects. These companies are paying increasingly competitive wages to recruit capable engineers and employing modern Western design practices. 20 years ago, one would question whether or not China can actually develop a 4th generation fighter jet let alone a 5th generation fighter jet even if they received all of the necessary funding. With the experience from J-10 project, JH-7A project and indigenization of J-11 project, they now have the capability to develop modern fighter jet if given time and money. In comparison, Russia will be increasingly facing the question of whether or not it can develop modern aircraft due to a dwindling and aging engineering force from 20 years of brain drain. In the export market, Russia is still reliant on upgraded versions of flanker and fulcrum series of aircraft for most of revenues. With T-50 still years away from being available for export outside of India, Su-35 and Mig-35 are what Russia will be able to offer for its traditional markets. Once J-10 finally starts using domestic engine, China will be able to offer J-10 and JF-17 to compete against Russia in those markets. From the recent test flights, it looks J-31 will be available for export as F-60 not that far after T-50 becomes available. Until then, J-10B, future JF-17s and Chinese UAVs will be competitive against Russian exports. By the time J-31 becomes available, China will have something capable of taking serious market shares in the very lucrative fighter jet market. This has already happened to a degree in the naval export market, where the rapidly improving quality of PLAN ships have let to more capable ships available for exports. Chinese shipyards have been quite busy building smaller battle ships, FACs and OPVs for countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand and African countries.

There are still many lingering questions about China’s aerospace engine industry. As we saw, J-31 made its first flight with RD-93 engines which are clearly not intended to fit the production versions of J-31. All of J-10A and JF-17 production aircraft are equipped with Russian engines. The first batch of Y-20 and H-6K will be equipped D-30KP2. However, it looks like FWS-10/A mass production has finally reached reliable stage. All of the recent batches of J-11B/S have been using FWS-10. J-15, J-15S, J-16 and J-20 prototypes have also been using FWS-10. In a recent photo, it looks like the first production J-10B may also be using FWS-10A. If that is the case, the majority of front line Chinese aircraft will soon be using Chinese engines instead of Russian ones.

Directed Energy and Electric Weapons Systems (DEEWS)—Serial 5: The Psychology of Directed Energy

Let us engage in a thought experiment.  The year is 2033 and the USS ROBERT O. WORK (CG 76) is steaming in company with USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 80).  Cruiser WORK is equipped with the latest version of the AMDR radar, 150 surface-to-air missiles suitable for engaging air breathing threats and ballistic missiles, a rail-gun, and a 500kw laser.  Both the rail-gun and the laser have capability against air breathing and ballistic targets.

The United States is in a state of hostilities with China, and ENTERPRISE is operating in the Sulu Sea in support of an USA/USMC operation to seize airfields on the Northeastern portion of Borneo.  Ownship missile and rail-gun rounds have been depleted by 1/2 neutralizing a series of submarine-launched cruise missile attacks, and there are surface ship- and bomber-launched ASCM threats still to be encountered.  Thirty-six additional hours are required on station to complete this aspect of the ENTERPRISE mission, before the two ships can retire further east. How the conflict started is unimportant, and the logic of the operation underway is irrelevant.  The thought experiment is tactical in nature.  I am asking you to put yourself in the place of the CO/TAO of the WORK and think through the psychology of the following problem.

The threat you face is an incoming raid of three Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles.  For the purpose of our thought experiment, the best missile you have onboard to neutralize this threat has a probability of kill against the ASBM threat of .7 in a salvo of two missiles at a range of 40 miles.  Working our way inward, the rail-gun presents a probability of kill against the ASBM of .75 at a range of 20 miles.  The 500kw laser presents a .9 probability of kill for the raid at a distance of 7 miles from ownship.  Obviously, soft kill capabilities can and would raise these probabilities (or more to the point, lower the Chinese probability of hit), but for the purposes of this experiment, let us assume hard kill only. 

We can assume that the Chinese hold a considerable advantage in the missiles vs. interceptors available equation, and that the U.S. Navy has made only modest gains in industrial base capacity for the re-supply of interceptors, and this includes rail-gun rounds.  Re-supply of missiles at sea is still problematic. 

Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that there would be fleet guidance governing how a ship would husband its assets in a detect-to-engage scenario like the one posited here.  In essence, this experiment is designed to get you (the reader) to think about what that guidance might be.  I leave room for the possibility that the numbers selected above by a liberal arts major might be chewed up and immediately spit out by an Operations Research practitioner, resulting in a mathematically provable answer.  But what I’m trying to get at here is the psychology of the shooter.  We have a limited number of kinetic interceptors, with a reasonable Pkill against these weapons at tactically significant ranges.  And we have a laser with a higher Pkill against these weapons at ranges that would make even the stoutest of heart nervous against a supersonic, maneuvering, ballistic target.

What should we as a fleet do?  How should we think about this sequence?  Are we asking too much of ships to hold fire with traditional kinetic weapons in favor of a close-in laser engagement? 

What if the incoming raid were not ASBM’s?  What if we were targeted by a coordinated raid of ASCMs—a mix of both sub-sonic and supersonic?  And what if the “raid” consisted not of missiles, but of UAVs?

Put another way, is a “hybrid” mix of missiles and a laser a tactically useful arrangement, if one is designed to deepen the magazine capacity of the other?

Now, bring soft kill back into the equation.  Would useful soft-kill measures in company with laser engagement raise your feeling of comfort/confidence in holding fire with missiles or rail-gun?

Finally, assuming the capabilities I describe are mature and effective in 2033, what are the steps we need to consider NOW in order to bring about this future---programmatically, operationally, and bureaucratically? 

I do not know the answers to these questions, and I do not know if they are answerable.  But I am interested in what you - an informed community of readers - think about them.  Please do not “fight the scenario”.  Press the “I believe” button and think about the tactical ramifications of this question.

Asymmetry

SMS Scharnhorst: "Battle of the Falkland Islands," Panu Hakkarainen

Battle, for the most part, depends on asymmetric expectations.  Combatants engage because they have different expectations about likely outcomes. While combatants often share tactical level expectations (a kamikaze pilot versus an anti-aircraft gunner on USS Franklin, for example), the terms of the tactical engagement are often shaped by asymmetric expectations at the operational, strategic, and political levels. When antagonists share expectations at all levels, they tend not to fight; one side retreats or yields rather than being destroyed. Asymmetric expectations arise both from asymmetric information and from bias in assessment of that information; the Battle of the Falkland Islands happened one side was unaware of the presence of certain enemy forces, while Kursk and Leyte Gulf happened because one side had a wildly optimistic assessment of available information.

These general propositions vary according to technological and geographic considerations.  On land, combatants can often force combat on an unwilling foe through surprise, because of difficulties associated with mobility, and because of the critical nature of some landmarks (although the determination of "critical" depends on operational, strategic, and political considerations).  Concerns about the relative strength of offense and defense also shape expectations. Moreover, asymmetric expectations exist within organizations and alliances, as leaders often have incentive to deceive followers on the probabilities of victory and defeat.

Historically, naval forces have been more capable of avoiding unwanted conflict. Anti-access technologies give the defender a major advantage that both sides acknowledge, meaning that fleets can avoid conflict by remaining behind their "walls." Major engagements happen through surprise (forcing the enemy to fight against his will), disagreement about the basic conditions of battle (possessing greater knowledge of the capabilities and numbers of deployed forces, as well as atmospheric factors), or both. Nelson's victories tended to involve elements of both; the audacity to force combat in unexpected situations and in unexpected ways, combined with great confidence in his own capabilities.  Togo won Tsushima through complete confidence in the qualitative superiority of his own ships to those of the Russians.  Jutland happened because both sides misjudged the size and position of the enemy.  When faced with superior enemy numbers, the German, Austrian, and Russian navies simply refused to engage their foes.

Even following the development of strike-capable naval aviation, anti-access technologies (land-based air) could provide sanctuary for a weaker force.  In the Mediterranean, the Regia Marina and the Royal Navy avoided unfavorable combat situations so effectively that the combat power of the former was in large part intact when it surrendered to the latter in 1943.  After a series of relatively symmetric battles (most of which pitted relatively equal forces that both had a chance for victory) in 1942, the USN and the IJN avoided each other for most of 1943 until the advance of the former forced the latter to engage under risky, adverse conditions. Of course, by the end of the war (in both theaters) Allied strike superiority was so great that the remaining major Axis units were destroyed at anchor; you can only run for so long.

Why discuss this today?  We have an interesting electoral situation in that both Republican and Democratic partisans seem virtually certain of victory tonight.  It will surprise no one to find that I'm with the Democrats on this one, both as a partisan and on in assessment of the electoral situation.  In a similar situation eight years ago, I was optimistic about the chances of John Kerry, who on objective measures certainly had less of a chance at winning the popular vote than does Mitt Romney.  The electoral vote is a different story; I think that Mitt has a very tough hill to climb. In any case, an election isn't quite like a battle, because of course it happens at a specified time whether the antagonists want it or not.  Nevertheless, asymmetric belief plays an important role in how elections play out, because such beliefs affect the behavior of party actors (how many resources to devote to a particular race or particular state), of activists (whether to commit themselves to various difficult and unpleasant tasks in support of a candidate), and of voters (whether to drag themselves to the polls).  Just as in battle, leaders have incentive to deceive followers as to true prospects, whether in order to maximize chance of victory or to prepare the post-electoral space. Both leaders and followers are subject to motivated bias, the belief that the necessary is possible (or even likely). If there's a difference between now and eight years ago, it's that it seems that the institutional apparatus of the right (the major media organs in particular, but also the GOP itself) have gone more "all in" on an a favorable interpretation of the available data, but it's hard for me to say how valid that impression is.

In any case, make sure to vote and have a safe election night!

The Emerging Politics of U.S. Naval Power

Started writing this post in July. Since it expires tomorrow afternoon, time to get on it...

Having played some role in formulating the question, I must confess that I was a bit disappointed in the responses of both John Lehman and Richard Danzig during June's maritime seminar. Over the last month things have improved, especially with Chris Cavas' interview of John Lehman that laid out some details for the Romney campaign's vision of naval power. I wasn't particularly impressed by Governor Romney's comments on fleet sizing, but at least they spurred some national discussion of maritime affairs.

This election will not turn on fine distinctions between theories of maritime power.  Nevertheless, both campaigns have expressed more interest in naval affairs than any Presidential campaigns since the 1980s.  Given the stakes, the impressive amount of intellectual firepower on either side, and the audience, I think that we could have expected more sophisticated discussions of how each campaign understands the relationship between political commitment and maritime strategy.

While Secretary Lehman invoked a vision of naval power that is broadly grounded in Mahanian lines, he didn't connect grand political strategy with naval power in terms more complex than a request for more resources. Perhaps because he felt the need to respond to Secretary Lehman, Richard Danzig similarly offered little in terms of a genuine appreciation of naval strategy. In particular, I would like to have seen the two responses grapple in some fashion with the difficulties presented by the Cooperative Maritime Strategy.  I have argued elsewhere that elements of the Obama administration (primarily Secretary of State Clinton) appear to have understood and fully adopted the cooperative framework of CS-21, although whether they have sufficiently linked the framework to a progressive understanding of America's role in the world is a different question.

In his latest book (The Future of Power) Joseph Nye invokes the Cooperative Strategy as an example of "smart power," within context of an argument about America's place in a liberal internationalist order.  Given Dr. Nye's association with the Democratic foreign policy apparatus, the idea that the principles of the cooperative strategy might find their way into a detailed Democratic foreign policy vision is hardly absurd.

What grand strategic role would Mitt Romney's Navy play? Apart from the potential addition of more ships, I have no idea.  There are certainly many good conservative accounts of what the Navy ought to do, as compared to what it's doing right now; our own Bryan McGrath has developed a strong critique of the Cooperative Strategy, and various other voices have also argued that the Cooperative Strategy represents a fundamentally wrong-headed approach to the current international environment.  I don't know what Secretary Lehman thinks of these critiques, and I certainly don't know what Governor Romney thinks of them. On the other hand, I don't think it's too much to suggest that the Romney campaign has developed an embroyonic (or perhaps atmospheric) critique of the cooperative strategy that mirrors the critiques posed by many of the campaign's supporters (including Bryan).

Again, we shouldn't expect too much from what amount to campaign statements.  However, in context of the audience that reads Information Dissemination, of the relevance of maritime security to the foreign policy positions of either campaign, and of the expertise of the authors in question, we should have expected a bit more than what we got.

First flight of J-31

Shenyang Aircraft Corporation's stealth aircraft project J-31's prototype made its first flight yesterday. Here are some of the better photos that I saw online:


This is probably the best photo I've seen of J-31


This one has J-31 prototype with J-11BS chase aircraft


At this point, I'm not sure what the exact plan for this project is. That's something we will find out further down the road, but speculations include a future naval fighter jet or form part of hi-lo combo with J-20 or as a aircraft that will eventually be up for exports.

I've read numerous people who believe that this is result of China hacking into Lockmart computers. This is due to the fact that J-31 resembles F-35 from front profile and F-22 from side profile. I think that's complete nonsense. I've seen the struggles of SAC trying to indigenize flankers (which they received full blue prints + production line in the license production deal). It's very hard for me to believe that SAC can reproduce F-35 from stolen files without access to the same engines or the material or the complicated computer code that controls the whole aircraft.