National Security Policy

Today is the first day of the Autumn 2012 iteration of National Security Policy. Blog here, syllabus here, podcasts (will be) here. In addition to a host of smaller changes, I plan to run through a "strategic problem" at the end of each lecture, which should be part of the podcast.

The Army Gets Seapower...

...or, at least one reserve Lieutenant Colonel in Missouri does.  Although I've spent nearly half of my career working in the joint and interagency environment, I am unabashedly parochial when it comes to the importance of spending on the Navy in comparison to the other services.  Fortunately, Wayne Bowen doesn't share my parochialism towards his service.  He's written a remarkably concise and powerful piece outlining the value of a strong navy and the perils of a large standing army that deserves wider dissemination.  BZ Army...

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

O'Hanlon and Steinberg on AirSea Battle

A balanced and insightful piece on AirSea Battle.  

On the Firing of CO's for Misconduct

News of yet another conduct-related firing of a Navy commanding officer causes me to think about the subject again.  Most of the time, I find the news of firings to be a cost of doing business, one born of a culture that demands much from its leaders. But sometimes--and this is one of them--I find myself thinking that the Navy is not doing something right; that these firings are the result of systemic issues.  Most of the time though, folks who look for systemic clues to these issues advocate looking into the front-end of command, that is, the selection process.  Presumably, some feel that with a better process including 360 degree feedback and other tools, we will be able to weed out the raging narcissists that seem to be spoiling it for everyone else.  Perhaps; but I would like to focus on the other end of the issue.  That is, the Navy needs to make it fundamentally more painful to be removed from command.

Truth be told, this view is one I'm borrowing from a retired two-star friend of mine who wrote in a recent email linked to the above story with this approach. Now--neither he nor I is a JAG, so this might not be implementable.  But here's the bottom line:  no more administrative punishment for misconduct in command.  No more "removals for lack of confidence" followed by quiet retirements.  If the failure of personal conduct coincides with a UCMJ violation, it will be handled judicially (in addition to removal from command).  Reduction in grade, fines, and confinement--in addition to discharge PRIOR TO THE ATTAINMENT OF RETIREMENT STATUS--all are on the table. 

I realize this is a bit "Old Testament" for some, but I think the Navy needs to make the prospect of disgrace and punishment more real for those who attain the position of trust that command represents. 

Bryan McGrath

Freeze Pentagon Spending?

Last month, in an interesting example of politics making strange bedfellows emerged when the following happened: 

"In July, freshman congressman Mick Mulvaney (R-S.C.), along with Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), introduced an amendment to the House’s 2013 defense appropriations bill freezing defense spending at 2012 levels. Though it merely eliminates a proposed $1.1 billion increase in defense spending, the Mulvaney-Frank amendment was an acknowledgment that the endless military-spending hikes since 9/11 cannot continue. The legislation passed the House 247-167, with 88 Republicans in support, and the Senate will take up the bill this September."

I'm not a Congressional scholar, so I'm not sure how closely Mulvaney's and Frank's positions were correlated on other issues.  But this was an interesting development.  The story was picked up again yesterday in the Washington Examiner with the headline "Serious About Cutting Spending? Start With The Military".  I became aware of it through the tweeting of the redoubtable Chris Preble of The Cato Institute, for whom reducing the defense budget has become the Great White Whale of his libertarian master plan cut the U.S. down to size. 

So--let's unpack this issue, shall we?

I think the first question to be considered is whether cuts to the defense budget (or in this case, a freeze) should be considered at all.  That this unholy alliance between Frank and Mulvaney is the stalking horse for the question is immaterial; the question is an important one, and I find myself believing that all things considered, freezing the defense budget at its 2012 level was worthy of consideration.  Which raises the second question--why should it be considered?

There are a range of answers to this question, and I think where you stand depends on where you sit.  I believe such an idea was worthy of consideration  (note:  I am not saying I advocate this position), but only as part of a larger effort that reduced ALL government spending, including entitlements.  Clearly, this is consistent with my ideology.  For Barney Frank, cutting the defense budget is simply part of his ideological approach.  I mean no disrespect--as I find ideology to be a very positive thing.  But liberal, Massachusetts Congressmen see the defense budget as a great big sow from which countless social program piglets are excluded from suckling.  For Mulvaney, cutting the defense budget arises from a different motivation.  He's a fiscal hawk, he concludes that the 2012 budget was sufficient, and that there was some strategic, psychological advantage to be gained by offering up cuts to the defense budget, as a way of incentivizing Democrats to do likewise in programs dear to them.  For Preble--as I've alluded--cutting the DoD budget is not so much a fiscal question as it is a means to an end.  He wants to spend less on the military and make it smaller so that it is capable of doing fewer things, in fewer places.  This is the business end of his ideology (again folks, I have a great affinity for ideology), one that believes the U.S. mucks around in far too many places, spending its treasure to support rich allies who then pump their own money into ultra-progressive social welfare architectures--freed from the inconvenience of seeing to their own defense.  This is an honorable position--and is at the heart of HIS approach to offshore balancing.  Which leads then, to the next question--why FIRST?  Why consider cutting the defense budget FIRST?

Again--this gets to ideology.  Frank supports it because it is pain free--what's not to like?  He gets a smaller defense budget without having to give on any social spending.  For Mulvaney, there's a bit of a Boy Scout approach at work.  Maybe, just maybe, if we give the liberals an inch on defense spending, they'll be willing to sit down and deal with us on other non-defense discretionary spending and entitlements.  Preble's approach is the mirror image of Frank's--his "big issue" is for the U.S. to mind its knitting, and because he (and others like him) aren't winning the strategic argument about U.S. power and influence around the world, the best way to get his way is to "starve the beast".  Now I realize freezing at 2012 levels is hardly "starving" anything--but it would be a start.

I am sympathetic to Mulvaney's approach, but I think it somewhat telling that it was a very junior member of the GOP caucus who reached across the aisle on this one.  I think his heart was in the right place, but I don't believe there is much evidence to suggest that the TACTIC would ultimately be successful--that is, give something without getting something in return.  Put another way, cutting defense FIRST is a non-starter with me.  Cutting defense alongside other cuts?  Perhaps.  The other problem with Mulvaney's approach is that at the ideological level, I have a sense that HE believes that cutting the defense budget would provide money for two and only two outlets--addressing the debt and deficit, and returning the money to the taxpayers.  I have no confidence that Barney Frank--or the other 150-some Democrats who voted for the freeze--see the savings going to either of those two purposes.  This is exactly the criticism I had of the Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force two summers ago, another interesting case of strange bedfellows in which Barney Frank teamed up with---you guessed it--Chris Preble (among others) to put forward a plan for a reduced defense budget.  Upon its release, I had a talk with Dr. Preble in which I questioned the wisdom of teaming up with someone who both of us KNEW had very different aims in mind for savings from the defense budget than he (Preble) had. Preble granted me that possibility, but (rightly) asserted that the work was important enough to go forward on.

The U.S. continues to face economic stagnation and mounting debt.  We MUST at some point, realize that what we spend on defense is not the cause of these conditions, even indirectly.  Our long term solvency is threatened by exploding entitlements at the Federal and State level, and monkeying around with the defense budget---while initially satisfying to those who want to "show that we get it"--represents a rounding error in the the totality of the problem.  Seeking to cut the defense budget first, is simply not a serious approach.

Bryan McGrath

Dog Days of Summer

I'm on vacation from the computer for two more weeks, unless I'm not - which is unlikely. Regardless I don't expect to post again until well after Labor Day. Have a great end of summer, and good luck Navy against Notre Dame.

Foreign Entanglements: Russia, Syria, and R2P

Dmitry Gorenburg and I chat about Russian foreign policy on the latest episode of Foreign Entanglements:
Unfortunately we lost the last forty minutes of the video, which included discussions of Sino-Russian relations, Sino-Indian relations, Russian views of the US election, and Russian rearmament.

Midrats Today

This afternoon I'll be on Midrats with EagleOne and CDR Sal.  We'll talk politics, strategy, AirSea Battle, what not, and so forth.  Coincidentally, I just read this excellent Harold Winton article on Army-Air Force collaboration 1973-1990.  Key points:

The relative cohesion and strength of the Army-Air Force partnership from 1973 to 1990 can be attributed in rough priority to:

• the unifying effect of the NATO defense mission;

• the close cooperation of personalities at or near the top of each service;

• a leadership shift in the Air Force that put fighter rather than bomber pilots in the majority of influential positions; and

• the clarity of the Army's vision of how it intended to fight a future war that tended to pull the Air Force in its wake.

...There was, however, also a set of forces that tended to pull the services in opposite directions. These included:

• the operational differences between the media in which they fight;

• the cultural implications these differences engender;

• varying institutional structures for doctrinal formulation; and

• the capabilities of emerging technology.

Worth thinking about in context of USN-USAF cooperation in the Pacific.

Back to the Future - Targeting the New TASM

Raytheon’s Tomahawk is arguably one of the U.S. Navy’s most storied and well-employed weapons systems.  Over 2,000 missiles have been launched in combat in seven or so countries since 1991 with another 500 successful operational tests launches.  The Navy recently ordered 361 of the latest variant (BLK IV) at a cost just short of $1 million apiece, so clearly the weapon is valued by the Combatant Commanders.

While the Navy has enjoyed strong success with this strike weapon, our surface-based ASuW capabilities have atrophied.  The subsonic LRASM-A (the supersonic LRASM-B was canceled in January 2012) in development by DARPA offers promise, but will not see fleet service for quite some time, if ever.  SWOs old enough to have served in the 1980s and 1990s aboard ABL or VLS-equipped ships will remember the RGM-109B, or Tomahawk Antiship Missile (TASM).  The problem with this fire-and-forget weapon was that we had no good way to cue and target the missile.  As a young TLAM engagement officer, I recall that doctrine for its employment was rather squishy and we tended to either wish away or just ignore the over-the-horizon targeting problem which would be required to successfully employ this missile at its maximum range of more than 200 NM, especially if neutral shipping was present.  Complicating the targeting problem was the weapon’s early 70’s era Harpoon active radar seeker and subsonic speed, which would enable an enemy ship traveling at thirty knots to move more than twelve miles from when the TASM was launched. Because of these limitations, the TASM was withdrawn from the fleet later in the 1990s.  Many of the TASMs in storage were modified to the BLK III version to meet the growing demand for strike weapons.

The requirement for a surface-based launch range ASuW capability has recently reemerged. NAVAIR has awarded Raytheon a contract to update the BLK IV Tactical Tomahawk with maritime interdiction capabilities to be deployed by 2015.  This upgrade will be a tremendous step up from the old TASM in targeting and takes on the BLK IV’s 900 NM range.  As a point of comparison to other long range anti-ship missiles, the subsonic Russian 3M-54 Klub ranges about 1350 NM while the new Indian BrahMos travels about the 160 NM, but at the blazing speed of Mach 2.8.

As seen in Raytheon's recently released concept video above, the new "TASM" will use advanced targeting features including ESM and an Active Electronically Scanned Millimeter wave radar seeker.  More important is the two-way UHF SATCOM data link which will allow for cueing and updated tracking of targets in conjunction with naval drones, manned ISR, or SOF during the missile's long flight.  These improvements will mitigate some of the challenges in firing the missiles over-the-horizon, especially against targets in crowded litoral seas.  Also critical is the flexibility of these missiles to still be employed in their traditional strike mission, saving space in surface and sub VLS magazines.  Now is the time to start developing the operational concepts and experimenting with TTPs for employment of these missiles. 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Friday Morning Musings

It's summer time. Some of us here on ID are on vacation, while others (like me) are spending evenings on the deck enjoying the dog days of summer with a glass of wine and good book. Yeah, there are plenty of things to write about, but I'm OK taking a few slow weeks on the blog hanging with the family until school starts. I hope many of you do the same.

But things are happening...

First, last night I listened to this past weekend of Midrats - a full hour with Chris Cavas. Bottom line, best hour of naval discussion you are going to find anywhere in audio. That show has a sweet spot in my opinion, because when the discussion becomes a sharp guest who discusses naval history in the context of current events, that show becomes solid gold interesting. I highly encourage you to put the headphones on and listen, I think you will find yourself enjoying it quite a bit.

Chris Cavas says many interesting things, but specifically something I thought was very thought provoking - something I never gave much thought about until last night. Chris Cavas suggested it's possible that DDG-1000 could be a HMS Dreadnaught or Monitor. The way he proposes this suggestion in the discussion was very interesting, and absolutely thought provoking. It really is a great hour of radio.

Second, Secretary Mabus is good at making headlines, whether it is ship names or green energy, but most of the attention he gets is little more than political attacks. More legitimate attacks in my opinion are things like the breathalyser tests - small things with huge impacts that understandably piss people off. The breathalyser test in particular - rightfully in my opinion - will mark Secretary Mabus negatively and it will likely be a policy that is discarded in the future, because if my employer gave me a breathalyser test every day I showed up for work, I'd file a lawsuit. Breathalyser tests are issued as a punishment handed out by judges to folks who commit crimes, for example you may have to blow in one to start a car. It is also used in law enforcement, but only for people who have demonstrated suspicious criminal activity related to alcohol. The implication of the Navy policy is that serving in the Navy is a crime because it requires such punishments, or being a sailor makes you a suspicious person related to alcohol. Talk about an unfair stereotype. That policy strikes me as one of the most blatant abuses of government power specific to military professionals enacted since the civil rights era, and it is shameful how politicians stand in silence on the issue.

But something else has happened under Secretary Mabus that no one really highlights. The ship has been righted regarding shipbuilding, as there is very little happening right now that is obviously a huge shipbuilding issue. LPD-17 is stable. LCS is stable. DDG-51 Flight IIA is stable. MLP is stable. DDG-1000 is stable. LHA is stable. Sure there is always risk, but nothing on any of those programs we can point to as being highly risky from a shipbuilding budget perspective. CVN... I think it's stable, but no question that's where the biggest risk is today. All in all though, shipbuilding is in better shape today than it has been at any point in the 21st century.

While the Breathalyzer test is a policy that is flat out unforgivable in my eyes and will mark Ray Mabus's record as being the SECNAV who treated the sailors under his watch as drunkards, there are other aspects of leadership under his watch that are truly excellent. He will not be remembered for those good things, but that's his problem.

Third, the US Naval Institute has put out a video trailer on YouTube regarding a book to be released soon - The Aden Effect. The Naval Institute has published plenty of historical fiction over the years, but there are only a few examples of fiction as contemporary military thrillers. The last two times the Naval Institute Press published contemporary fiction, I am pretty sure the two books were Flight of the Intruder and The Hunt for Red October. I am really looking forward to reading The Aden Effect. Check out the trailer. Pretty cool.

Fourth, speaking of USNI, what a brilliant post and discussion over at the USNI Blog by RDML Foggo as he takes on tough topics like strategic communications and branding. If any PAOs want to jump into that discussion with a professional opinion and engage a professional discussion specific to your profession, you know I want to post it!

My short take is this - I think RDML Monyihan was one of the most successful Navy leaders of his generation, because it is blatantly obvious to even the most casual observer how much the Navy Information Office changed on his watch. The Navy built and developed their entire social media space, developed policies and standards, and their activities on Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr are truly excellent. The new Navy.mil website has worked out some initial kinks and looks great - even on mobile devices. The Navy's Official Blog has really evolved and is nothing short of fantastic (for example from yesterday), and if you aren't checking it every day I think you might want to think about doing so. The transformation of Navy Information under RDML Monyihan was remarkable, and in hindsight I think it is very fair to say that the amount of positive change he put into action under his Command rivals any Flag officer tour in modern navy history from an "omg that's obviously a huge and positive difference" perspective.

But as CHINFO, RDML Monyihan focused on infrastructure from which RDML Kirby can build the Navy Information community from. Don't get me wrong, RDML Monyihan empowered people, but the changes in Navy Information were mostly at the technical, policy, and tool level of information distribution. The PAO as a professional didn't evolve much under RDML Monyihan, even as all the tools available to the PAO absolutely did.

The question is - where does and where should - the Navy Information folks go from here - and I think the question is specific to topics of people, service, responsibility, and role. RDML Foggo has a very interesting take on the evolving role of professionals in public affairs, at minimum a discussion I think worth having.

The tools are in place, the policies have been refined through experience... now it's time for the ideas and people to put the tools to work. I believe RDML Foggo has started the right conversation, and the time is now for PAOs to push new ideas as it relates to their profession, and one way to do it is to join the discussion RDML Foggo is trying to kickstart. I hope several of you decide to make ID that place to have that discussion, because I think my audience would find that discussion very interesting and engaging.

PAOs as the Navy's strategic action officers? In the information age - the CO, XO, and PAO might be the right team for exactly that in every AOR.

Fifth and finally, by now I am sure all of you have read the personal account by a sailor on USS Porter posted on CDR Salamander. In that account is is noted that sailors spent the first night sleeping on deck in a ship deemed uninhabitable due to ACs being down. It's a single data point, and may not be a defining one, but when a ship takes damage at 1:00am, struggles the rest of the night and into the next day to get to shore, then has to sleep on a ship in a foreign port in the open on deck in the desert air - that pretty much sucks. The personal account also notes that a bunch of resources for the ship - technical and otherwise - has arrived. These are mixed results, and can't possibly inform us of the whole story.

But history advises us what to watch for when a ship takes damage and/or casualty, and 5th fleet has a history. In the 1987-1988 tanker war, both the USS Start (FFG 31) and USS Samuel B Roberts (FFG 58) incidents demonstrated that 5th Fleets support for the sailors was ultimately inadequate to the task in supporting the crew. In both cases sailors persevered - as great sailors do - but the lessons learned was that disaster recovery and contingency planning by 5th Fleet needed to be better. USS Cole (DDG 67) in 2000 was a reminder that those plans had not evolved much, and that ship was on it's own for way too long before the fleet was able to offer quality support.

I think this issue is very important. The very same waters where the USS Porter incident occurred is where the next war at sea might occur, and that war could legitimately occur as soon as next week. It is my hope that as part of the response to this incident 5th Fleet makes the disaster response to ship casualties and damage a top priority, because while it would be a major tragedy to lose a US Navy warship, it would be an unforgivable, incalculable tragedy of epic proportions to unnecessarily lose sailors as part of that event because 5th Fleet wasn't prepared to support ships and sailors fighting for our nation. War at sea is historically a war of attrition, planning for ship casualties and damage is the most historically obvious planning effort necessary as part of any war planning effort in that AOR, even as we all hope those plans are never needed. For better or worse, this incident with PORTER was a good data point towards informing whether the disaster response plan in that AOR worked effectively or not.

Australia's Maritime Imagination

On Tuesday night, Australian time, Dr Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, gave the annual Vernon Parker Oration to the Australian Naval Institute (ANI) in Canberra. There are some remarkable aspects to this year’s oration.

Firstly, these speeches typically are given by people with firm connections to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and/or the ANI. Dr Wesley has neither and, as a Councilor of the ANI myself, this was part of the attraction in inviting him to provide this year’s oration, which was titled ‘Pacific Visions: America, China and the Contest for the Pacific.’ It is obviously a very topical issue for Indo-Pacific Asia, Australia included.

The central theme of the speech is that power rivalry between the two major Pacific powers is rooted in history, culture and values. It contains some sobering analysis:

Unlike during the Cold War, when the aims of the United States and Soviet Union were largely a mirror image, the contest for the Pacific has Washington and Beijing playing different games, with different objectives and different rules, on the same playing field.

The speech has attracted a little media interest, focused solely on the Pacific contest which is prominent in Australian defence media reporting. While you can read the speech for yourself here, I’d like to highlight the other remarkable aspects that have not been picked up by the local media so far.
Dr Wesley’s opening thoughts contained some unexpected observations:

Despite the fact that modern Australia was founded as an act of maritime strategy, and so much of our history has been shaped by sudden shifts in maritime power, Australia has not crafted a strong maritime culture at the core of its sense of self.

And I worry that without a well developed maritime imagination, Australia will struggle to comprehend the challenges it will face in the coming decades.

These views from a prominent foreign policy specialist were music to the ears of the predominantly Navy-associated audience. Yet, it should not be assumed that ‘maritime’ means ‘naval’ or ‘navy.’ In my mind, the notion of maritime imagination is a grand strategic issue. I believe that this is what Dr Wesley is hinting at and his views come at a timely cross road in Australian strategic thinking.

The US has initiated its rebalance towards the Asia Pacific region, the US Secretary of State observing that the maritime nature of the region suggest that maritime forces will play a central role. The Australian government has announced the results of its own force posture review and committed to bring forward its next Defence White Paper by one year, to mid 2013.  The government is also about to accept a White Paper examining ‘Australia in the Asia Century.’ Meanwhile, the defence budget has been cut by $5.4 billion over the forward estimates, amounting to some $25 billion since the 2009 Defence White Paper’s ambitious force structure plans.

With this as background and current regional tensions in mind, hark back to January when the three service chiefs spoke at the Sea Power Conference in Sydney. Their speeches reflected a reasonable degree of convergence in thinking on the importance of maritime strategy in Australian defence policy, and of their services’ roles in that strategy.

Time will tell whether the importance of maritime strategy in defence policy, acknowledged in Defence White Paper 2009, will survive the recent defence cuts and be given some deep analysis in the forthcoming Defence White Paper. Dr Wesley’s remarks are a clear call to revisit Australia’s maritime imagination.

This blog post represents Justin's own views, not official policy or the position of the Australian Government, Department of Defence, the Australian Defence Force or Royal Australian Navy.

Commanding Officers and Personal Misconduct

This is written by Captain Mark Light in the Summer 2012 Naval War College Review: The Navy's Moral Compass Commanding Officer's and Personal Misconduct (PDF).

The U.S. Navy has an integrity problem in the ranks of its commanding officers (COs). Consider these headlines: “Cruiser CO Relieved for ‘Cruelty.’” “CO Fired, Charged with Solicitation.” “CO of Attack Sub Fired for ‘Drunkenness.’” These are just a few cases in a recent deluge of early reliefs of “skippers.” In 2010, twenty-three Navy COs were relieved of command and “detached for cause,” an enormous increase over previous years. The trend continues: twentyone commanding officers were fired in 2011 as of the end of October. Even more worrisome is the fact that a large and increasing percentage of those dismissals are due to personal misconduct, such as sexual harassment, drunkenness, and fraternization. Although (as far as we can tell) over 97 percent of the Navy’s commanding officers conduct themselves honorably, the increasing number of those who do not raises concerns that the Navy must address. Alarms should be sounding at the highest levels of Navy leadership, but a review of recent literature reveals only a trickle of discussion on the subject of personal misconduct by military commanders. Instead of calling the service to action, a Navy spokesman said in January 2011 that there was “no indication that the reliefs are the result of any systemic problem.”

This was one of many paragraphs that asks good questions.

Fundamental problems with today’s fitness report system in identifying behavioral shortcomings are its lack of explicit evaluation with respect to ethical standards, the tendency of senior officers to reward mission accomplishment and performance regardless of personal failures, and the fact that all officers from ensign to captain are evaluated on the same criteria. The fitness report grades seven quantitative performance traits: “Professional Expertise,” “Command or Organizational Climate/Equal Opportunity,” “Military Bearing/Character,” “Teamwork,” “Mission Accomplishment and Initiative,” “Leadership,” and “Tactical Performance.” Military bearing is the trait widely considered to be the category for documenting issues concerning physical fitness and body composition (i.e., body-mass index), although by regulation (and as indicated on the form itself) it also includes character, appearance, demeanor, conduct, physical standards, and adherence to Navy core values. The core values include honor, and honor (as the admiral quoted above noted) implies integrity. But should we have to dig three levels to evaluate integrity, and should it be masked in the block regarded as concerning physical fitness? Not if we think it is important. In comparison, the Army’s Officer Evaluation Report requires input on all seven of the service’s core values as part of the character evaluation of the officer, including integrity and selfless service. Such specific evaluation of character is required to emphasize the priorities we desire in commanding officers.

When 97% of the Navy's commanding officers are conducting themselves honorably, does the Navy really need a new conduct cop measurement system that applies an ethical and moral standard towards character evaluation that isn't already present today? Obviously everything can be improved, but the question I have is whether anything is actually broken at all? When a Commanding Officer gets fired for personal misconduct, isn't that representative of the Navy having the right policy in place, a policy that appears to function properly?

In my opinion the evidence of a high standard for Command in the Navy is evident with each new examples by which a Commanding Officer is fired - a process that tends to demonstrate a remarkably high level of transparency btw. I can't remember the last time someone was fired and the cause was questionable. Captain Owen Honors tried to play the role of the martyr, but it was blatantly obvious to everyone except apparently Captain Honors that he did not demonstrate a professional standard that would be acceptable by professionals in private industry, much less a public service profession that demands higher standards like the US Navy.

So 3% of Commanding Officers fail to maintain the very high personal conduct standard of the US Navy. Am I the only one who looks at that number and thinks "wow, that's all?" I know one thing, the percentage of personal misconduct problems commonplace at the higher management levels of American business in society is higher than 3%, particularly in jobs where lots of travel and time away from family is involved.

Sorry, but the statistics in the article suggest to me the Navy's current system of evaluating personal misconduct is pretty good, and is pretty effective. It also suggests to me the Navy's evaluation of people is really good, because in any other industry that number would normally be much higher.

I thought this was a very interesting paper to read. Well done to Captain Mark Light for taking on a tough topic and asking good questions.

Update: Latest incident related to this topic is being discussed at Bubblehead's shop.

Collision in the Strait of Hormuz

The following is the official US Navy release on the collision of USS Porter (DDG 78) and the Japanese owned bulk oil tanker M/V Otowasan.

No one was hurt Sunday morning when a U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer and a large Japanese owned merchant vessel collided near the Strait of Hormuz.

The collision between USS Porter (DDG 78) and the Panamanian-flagged bulk oil tanker M/V Otowasan occurred at approximately 1:00 a.m. local time.

Porter transited under its own power to Jebel Ali, UAE and is now pierside for assessment and repair.

The incident is under investigation.

USS Porter is on a scheduled deployment to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts.

5th Fleet has released a short video on YouTube of the damage. More pictures are here. That second picture appears to show some water being pumped out, some sort of flooding control from broken pipes maybe?

Check this out from AIS.

That has to be about the location of the incident, but that is very odd considering the damage on the destroyer was on the starboard front. The last AIS report before it pulled that Crazy Ivan maneuver above was 14.1 knots heading 74 degrees at 12:51am. At 12:55am the ship was slowed to 9.7 knots heading 122 degrees, so presumably the collision had already occurred? If you zoom in you can see see the track where a small box forms, which may be the area where the destroyer came to a full stop and the tanker circles around the ship passing behind, across the port side for a bit, then circles around and passes in front of the destroyer before resuming course.

The destroyer is underway under her own power. USS Porter (DDG 78) is one of the few east coast ballistic missile defense capable AEGIS destroyers and is scheduled to be homeported in Rota, Spain in the future. Neither the destroyer nor the tanker is reporting any leaks as a result of the collision.

This was the weather forecast, but I am not sure where to find reliable weather data for that point and time. Depending upon conditions visibility can get rough this time of year there at 1:00am in the morning.

I am very curious if there was Iranian small boat activity at the time, whether there were any squalls, and if the surface search radars on the ship were functioning properly. The lack of situational awareness in hindsight of this incident suggests some explaining is necessary, because one would think a modern US Navy AEGIS destroyer could avoid ramming a 300,000 ton super tanker that reportedly has 95% of her 2 million barrels of fuel loaded and is apparently using AIS.

It is a great thing no one was injured. It is also worth pointing out that if a 300,000 ton ship rams a 9000 ton ship that isn't as well built as a US Navy destroyer, there is a very good chance that other ship probably sinks.

PLAN's new type 056 class

I've talked about the Type 056 class before, but this is a more in depth look at it now that we are seeing mass production across numerous shipyards. Ever since we first saw 022 and 054 class in the middle 2000s, we've speculated about a new class of ship between 1000 and 1500 ton to fill in the middle and replace the patrolling duties of the Type 037 class and Jianghu class light frigates. As early as 2008, I put an entry where I talked about this. In the recent years, we've seen the expansion of China's civilian maritime surveillance force with the induction of many new cutters. A lot of the cutters built for CMS and FLEC fleet are already taking up the role of patrolling South China Sea and East China Sea in the disputed regions. It certainly raises tension when warships are patrolling the disputed regions. When we saw a Type 056 model presented by the deputy commander of the PLA Hong Kong Garrison in late 2010, discussions about the number, the role and the capabilities of this new Type 056 class started again. It seemed like at least four of the first batch 056 will be replacing the 6 Type 037 currently assigned to protecting Hong Kong. Outside of that, I saw heated discussions in forum over whether these ships are needed when the cutters are already such a big part of China's near shore security force. But the recent grounding of Jianghu class 560 shows that PLAN is still a very large part of the patrolling effort in China's surrounding waters. In fact, 6 Jianghu class frigate (558 to 563) were upgraded in 2010 for the very purpose of patrolling South China Sea so that the more advanced Type 054A and 052C class ships can be used for blue water operations. After all, these civilian ships (with maximum speed of 18 to 20 knots) aren't likely to be too useful if a real conflict breaks out with Vietnam. Over the few months, we've seen the Type 056 program exploding in four different shipyards around the country. We've seen at least 2 056s in HD shipyard, which also produces 054A and 071 amongst many other naval ships.



We've also seen at least 2 056s in HP shipyard, which also produces 054A, cutters and rescue ships.



We've also seen one 056 launched in WuChang shipyard with possibly more under construction. WC typically produces conventional submarines and large cutters.


Most surprisingly, we've also seen one 056 launched recently in LiaoNan shipyard in Dalian. This is not the Dalian shipyard that has done all the works with Varyag and 051C, but a smaller shipyard more known for repairing ships. Although, it did build some Type 022 class FACs.


The 056 class itself is probably most comparable to the K130 class of Germany (although smaller and probably has less endurance). It features a rather stealthy hull like most modern ships of its class. At front, it carries 1 AK-176M main gun and two of the new 30 mm CIWS on each side of the foremast. It uses Type 360 radar for volume search and type TR47 FCR for the CIWS. At back, it carries a 8-cell HQ-10 SAM with its accompanying FCR. In the middle, it carries 2 dual-pack YJ-83 launchers for ASuW. I was one of those that thought Type 056 would carry S-100 UAVs in its small hangars like the K130 class. As it turned out, the space that I thought were hangars are actually carrying torpedo tubes. Along with its sonar suite (including bow mounted sonar) and possible helicopters for short patrols, these ships should provide for ASW with conventional submarines in near water. The first launched Type 056 ships are not equipped with Tow Array Sonar. My guess is that the torpedo tubes can easily be removed to provide for hangar space for UAVs for the variant of Type 056 built more for SAR, patrolling and ASuW in mind. I think we are already seeing some minor differences between different 056s hulls, which could point to different variants of 056s.

"Wired" Gets it Wrong, Again

Wired's online reporter David Axe, in a post largely devoted to Navy options regarding LCS, manages to slip the following easy/breezy, "we all know it is true so I can't believe I am even writing it" statement into the mix for some important reason, I'm sure:  "But only Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney believes America can afford to buy more ships."  Not only is the statement not true with respect to who believes it (I believe we can afford to buy more ships), but it is also not true that we cannot afford to. 

We've covered this ground before, but it is worth covering again.  What we spend on defense in general and on shipbuilding in specific--is a choice.  It is a political choice.  The suggestion that we as a nation could not DOUBLE the shipbuilding account (add another $15B) out of a total national budget of $1.3T simply doesn't hold water.  The money could come entirely from within the DoD, it could come from cuts to other non-defense discretionary spending, and it could come from the inaptly named "non-discretionary" spending by which past Congresses attempt to tie the hands of future generations on entitlement spending.  Or it could come from adjustments to all three.  Axe's throwaway line speaks to the commonly held but easily dismissed notion that we are spending as much as we possibly can on shipbuilding, and that more ships would somehow bankrupt us.  Because he--and others who believe as he does--would not like to see cuts in other popular programs, does not in any way inoculate those programs from cuts. 

If "only" Mitt Romney believes America can afford to buy more ships, how is it that the SAC-D mark (note:  Democrat-controlled Senate) added an SSN, and additional DDG/LPD-17 to the budget?  I haven't seen our credit rating take another hit from that, have you?

Bryan McGrath

HASC Seapower Subcommittee to Get New Leadership

Irrespective of which way the election goes in the Fall, the HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee will be under new leadership, as current Chairman Rep. Todd Akin (R, MO) has won his state's Senate Primary.  Should Republicans retain control of the House, there are several folks I'd like to see be considered for the Chair, but none more than Randy Forbes of Virginia.  I've worked with him and his staff off and on over the past year and I've come to respect his mind and his dedication to American Seapower.  He's currently Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee.  

And if HASC Chairman Buck McKeon is looking for someone to take Forbes' spot on the Readiness Subcommittee, he could do a lot worse than Todd Young of Indiana (USNA, USMC). 

Bryan McGrath

Foreign Entanglements: Civil-Military Relations in China

Taylor Fravel and I talk a bit about the impact of civil-military conflict on Chinese foreign policy:

Directed Energy and Electric Weapons Systems (DEEWS)—Serial 4: Navy Directed Energy Oversight

During Information Dissemination’s June 2012 Fifth Anniversary Month, an article by Megan Eckstein in Inside the Navy (18 June 2012—behind the firewall) detailed the December 2011 formation of the “Navy Directed Energy Steering Group”, constituted in order to provide “‘strategic goals, guiding principles, missionary priorities, roles and responsibilities and overarching objectives regarding the acquisition and fielding of DEW across the Navy and the Marine Corps,’ said David Stoudt, senior director of naval capabilities and readiness, and the executive secretary of the steering group.”.  Stoudt further explains in the Inside the Navy piece: “By bringing in OPNAV and headquarters [of the] Marine Corps and the warfighters and the fleets and all that, that’s where you go through the process of identifying what kind of military gaps are out there, and then we help the technologists identify where their capabilities could land should they be successful," Stoudt said. “So that’s kind of the marriage that’s happening right now with the steering group." 

There appears to be more to this than just a bureaucratic initiative.  The integration of disruptive technology is never easy…hence, the name.  Institutional interests align in order to protect the status quo, the psychological impact of “sunk costs” seem overwhelming, upgrades of existing technologies suddenly appear at a fraction of the cost of the emerging modalities, and timelines become ever-extended as science and technology/research and development investments chase safer and more easily fielded technology.  Steering Group Executive Secretary Stoudt put it this way in the Inside the Navy piece, with my emphasis added: “These capabilities are going to have to earn their way onto the battlefield, meaning if they don’t bring something new to the warfighters that they can’t do either more cheaply some other way or by some pre-existing capability, it’s going to be very difficult to get these things on the battlefield."

There is in this statement, something of an acknowledgement of the difficulty Directed Energy and Electric Weapons Systems (DEEWS) face.  That is, if one were to survey current validated Navy capability requirements, it is difficult for DEEWS to displace current approaches to servicing them, given the development costs necessary to bring DEEWS to the point of maturity.  So in this case—there is little reason to aggressively pursue them.  When requirements officers are then presented with operational capabilities that current systems cannot possibly achieve—but which are tailor-made for DEEWS, one often hears, “well, we don’t have a requirement for that.”  And so, absent a requirement, the development costs necessary to mature the disruptive technology are applied to technologies servicing validated military requirements.  This vicious cycle reinforces the view often heard from DEEWS critics that “lasers have been just around the corner” for decades. 

We live in austere budgetary times, and the tax-paying American public has a right to expect its Navy to question expenses and to manage the budget in a way that provides required current readiness and acceptable future capability.   This often drives smart, visionary people to adopt short term mindsets when faced with tough budgetary questions.  After all, a Requirements Officer has a two or three year tour in the Pentagon, and he/she makes their bones by presenting leadership with balanced programs.  That balance is at most, a POM measurement, and is more precisely, a next-year’s budget target. 

I believe the primary value in the new Directed Energy Steering Group will be in its capacity to think beyond the requirements/cost cycle that frustrates the both the introduction of DEEWS technologies and the THINKING that invariably must precede their introduction.  At an action officer level, the Steering Group can help break the cycle by gathering a cross-section of the community of interest—to include CONOPS developers, requirements officers, technologists, acquisition professionals, and operators, and perhaps generating concepts enabled by emerging technologies. 

Ultimately it will take leadership at the policy and oversight level to plant flags on the battlefield and say “We need to get here, and we need to get here by a certain date.  We understand the near-term costs, but the future capabilities and efficiencies more than justify the short term pain.”  This vision then can begin to take form through the annual POM process that defines where Navy is going and the fundamental strategy it will follow to get there.  This is the opportunity to express the need that will eventually become the kind of formal requirement that a future weapon system development would respond to.  Engaging and overcoming the “requirements gap” is a function the new Directed Energy Steering Group should consider; it will make all the difference in the long-run.

Bryan McGrath

China and Rare Earths

Here's an interesting story about China and the rare earth metals market. The continuing development of domestic rare earth metals mining is encouraging, and something for political leaders to watch carefully.  I become increasingly convinced that a comprehensive national security strategy must encompass the themes with which we are all familiar, and (as in the case of energy and rare earths) ones that are less familiar.

Bryan McGrath

RIMPAC and China

I have a piece up at The Diplomat on RIMPAC, China, and ASW:

As a regularly scheduled biennial exercise, RIMPAC happens regardless of the extant political situation in the Pacific. However, the absence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy - and the participation of Russia and India for the first time - combined with new tensions in the South China Sea, leaves the unavoidable impression that these exercises are geared towards managing the increasing naval power of China. This year’s RIMPAC exercise took place against the backdrop of an unusually open debate about the future of U.S. maritime strategy in East Asia. The Obama administration’s “pivot” pledges a redistribution of U.S. military effort to the Western Pacific. The development of AirSea Battle, at least at tactical and operational levels, promises to enhance the ability of assets from different organizations to cooperate. China has viewed these debates with considerable concern.

Used Cars and F-35s

The following guest contribution is from Jonathan Jeckell.

Knowing and using your Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) to your best advantage is a fundamental skill in negotiations.  Your BATNA determines the point where it is in your best interests to walk away when your interlocutor pushes for more concessions from you, while up to that point you still have room to accommodate an agreement.  If your interlocutor knows your BATNA, they have the substantial advantage of knowing how far they can push you before you walk away…if you can walk away.

Consider the US Air Force’s position with the F-35A. The F-15 Silent Eagle program continues to quietly reach new milestones and spawned from one of the most successful aircraft in US Air Force history.  The F-15 Silent Eagle seems to provide highly advanced and competitive features at a reasonable price.  It might seem that the F-15 Silent Eagle would be just the leverage they are looking for to provide a credible alternative to the F-35 and the limited quantity of F-22s.  Theoretically, the US Air Force could threaten to abandon the project and go with a safer, more evolutionary pathway, like the US Navy did with their F/A-18E/F “upgrades” rather than suffer a risky transition to a whole new platform with commensurate new technological S-curves.  Technological S-curves require higher degrees of engineering effort and money to improve performance at the beginning, when the technology is immature and experimental, and at the end, where mature technologies begin to reach fundamental limits, than the middle where advances come relatively quickly.  Such radical jumps to new S-curves often promise major shifts in performance, but also require enormous engineering effort and entail substantial technological risk.  Meanwhile, others may continue to squeeze performance from the older platform.  Clayton Christensen contrasted IBM’s aggressive moves to new disk drive technologies and Hewlett-Packard’s heroic engineering efforts with supposedly obsolete technology to get almost the same performance and cost. (pages 10-14, “Innovator’s Dilemma”, and “Exploring the Limits of the Technology S-Curve,” Production and Operations Management, Fall 1992)

Consider also the comparable performance of the US Marine Corps UH-1Y Venom and AH-1Z Viper, based on platforms long abandoned by the US Army for the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache respectively. Different types of technology improve at different rates and a system may be capable of accommodating the most rapidly changing parts through modular upgrades and remain competitive (Kopp, Technology Strategy, Joint Forces Quarterly).  Likewise, while the US Air Force pursued the F-22, a completely new platform, the US Navy convinced Congress to spend money on “upgrades” to the Hornet fleet to produce the F/A-18E & F fighters. They also positioned the EA-18G electronic warfare aircraft to compensate for lack of stealth airframes in the rest of the air fleet.  Radical jumps are risky when the operating environment they were designed for changes, which is particularly important with long development times.  Their key technologies could lead to a dead end, or enemies they were designed to fight adapt to make their capability moot. 

So could the US Air Force credibly use the F-15 Silent Eagle, either as a negotiating tactic, or as a gap-filling purchase to lower risk while waiting for the F-35A?  No.  The US Air Force is caught in conflicts with two negotiating partners, not just one.  The US Air Force is counting on the capabilities promised by the F-35A, to them, the F-15 Silent Eagle would be a disappointing replacement if Congress took their threat seriously.  Moreover, allied buyers and the US Air Force have had their purchases cut as costs soar and budgets plummet. All the F-35 buyers are locked into a high-stakes game of Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Each cut in the number of aircraft purchased increases the cost per aircraft each remaining F-35 buyer must pay to amortize fixed costs, such as research and development. Any defector for another platform or reduction in purchases could trigger a stampede.  The US Air Force, as the single biggest buyer, could trigger such a stampede merely by acknowledging the possibility alternatives.  Unlike the US Air Force, many value minded F-35 buyers find other aircraft, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafael, used F-16s, Su-30, or the Saab JAS 39 Gripen, just to name a few, quite competitive alternatives.  Early defectors would beat the crowd to get these alternatives early, while laggards either get stuck footing the bill, or get put on the waiting list.

Meanwhile, the US Marine Corps is just as desperate.  F-35B performance setbacks, costs and delays threaten the Marine Corps Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) triad of maneuver, artillery and aerial support by devouring a disproportionate share of the budget.  Yet the Marine Corps has enormous sunk investments in the doctrine and infrastructure supporting Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL), and has no viable STOVL alternatives to turn to as age forces AV-8B Harrier airframes into retirement.  This begs the question…how much of the Marine Corps, and what proportion of their budget are they willing to sacrifice to acquire this aircraft?  What kind of radical alternatives could the Marine Corps get for that kind of money?  Rotary wing platforms, like attack helicopters lack the payload capacity, speed, altitude and survivability to completely replace a manned CAS platform for the Marines.  Losing the F-35B would mean that Marines would be tied to land bases or US Navy carriers capable of supporting the F/A-18 or other high performance jets.  All this, while the F-35B itself isn’t particularly good at what a Marine Corps aircraft fundamentally exists to do…provide close air support to Marines on the ground.  The F-35B has a tiny payload capacity, both in terms of weapons in the bay or on the wings, and the magazine capacity for the gun.  Deck plates on ships and tarmacs on land bases had to be modified to keep the engine from melting them or starting them on fire from the engine exhaust.  What will F-35B exhaust do to AM2 matting in a forward aerial rearming and refueling point (FARP)?  Will the F-35B’s high strung engine be able to survive ingesting all the dust and debris kicked up landing at such a forward site?  Even aircraft designed to facilitate operations on dusty, unpaved airfields, such as the C-17 and the V-22 Osprey cause additional damage to their purposely robust engines when they do this.  If it cannot, the very purpose of the F-35B’s STOVL capabilities are moot.  Could the US Marine Corps use an aircraft like the Super Tucano or modified T-6 Texan II’s, or even a purpose-built remotely piloted aircraft (aka drones) with support from existing Marine Corps aircraft to fulfill the other tasks proposed for the F-35B?  These aircraft have ideal characteristics for CAS and could still launch from Marine Corps assault ships and have proven ability to land on rough forward airstrips.  This would have the side benefit of maintaining commonality among US Navy and Marine Corps high performance aircraft aboard their carriers for training and limited space for repair parts.

But if the US Marine Corps gives up on the F-35B, the Royal Navy is royally screwed.  If design changes in the Queen Elizabeth II carrier class have been finalized, closing the door on CATOBAR and committing them to STOVL, they have even fewer viable alternatives than the US Marine Corps.  The Royal Navy has no other high performance, multirole or support aircraft to fall back upon and don’t have the luxury of a sister service providing deck space for Catapult Assisted Take Off Barrier Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) aircraft to make up for lost high end capabilities on their ships.  Either the Royal Navy would be forced to undergo an outrageously expensive development program of a new aircraft by itself, or go back and convert the QE IIs back to handle CATOBAR aircraft and chose from the small palette of options in this class.

The US Navy alone has the leverage to sit on the sidelines and watch the show with the satisfaction of being able to walk away.  The Chief of Naval Operations clearly signaled as much in an article recently at Proceedings.  His post downplayed the importance of stealth and the advantages brought by this technology over a range of other options available to the US Navy, including the electronic warfare capabilities of the EA-18G Growler in support of various aircraft as “trucks” for payloads. The Super Hornet is also a large aircraft with lots of internal capacity for modular upgrades and modifications to facilitate rapid adaption against emerging threats, balancing the best qualities of standardization and variety. But is a modular, adaptable aircraft good enough to compete with integrated high-end fighters like the F-22?  I don’t know. But the US Navy has the breathing room to make that decision deliberately and calmly.  The US Navy alone has avoided painting itself into a corner and now has the intellectual bandwidth free to focus on new ways to use its payloads and platforms in new ways by focusing on the interaction among its systems and doctrine, rather than fixating on making a particular technology work. 

Thanks to @Jscottshipman, @CJSchaefer, @Jeffemanuel and especially @NC_Prime for their thoughts on this topic on Twitter on 2 August 2012.

Jonathan Jeckell is a US Army officer specializing in logistics, planning, and technology. His opinions are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or its components. Jonathan Jeckell can be reached on Twitter at @jon_jeckell.

Time To Talk Lasers

This photo was running around on the Internet on Monday.

Click to enlarge photo. That dome looks to me to be protecting the Navy's LaWS technology demonstrator, a 33 kW laser that has been successfully tested many times and is on pace for IOC in 2017 if the Navy chooses to go with the program. This laser would be a replacement for CIWS or RAM. The per unit cost is estimated at $15 million, and it doesn't have the logistics tail for ammunition that CIWS and RAM have.

I see generators on the flight deck, and what looks like a laser designator mounted on the back of the flight deck. I am very curious to know if there is additional equipment in the hanger bay for cooling, or if it is all contained in the equipment of the dome. Keep in mind this is one of the smaller lasers the Navy is looking at for fielding to the fleet, which is why the CNO is being very smart about the DDG-51 Flight III development and making sure those who are pushing that design are thinking clearly about what the next major combatant really needs in terms of space, power, and cooling for future weapon systems.

This whole system looks very big for back-fitting on DDG-51s, but there is a US Navy vessel out there that can take on all this kit (and more) and field a larger laser - both versions of the Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS may never field ESSM as some advocate it should, but I won't be surprised if LCS fields laser air defenses by 2025, although I hope it is something bigger than this.

If you are looking to learn more about the US Navy's developments with lasers on ships, I highly recommend Ronald O'Rourke's Congressional Research Service report Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress (PDF).

I have been advised the DoD will be discussing this in more detail on Tuesday, hopefully including more photography. While the DoD may say this has some association with RIMPAC 12 or some other ongoing activity, I'm thinking they would be smarter to note this is timed with the 25th Anniversary of Star Trek: The Next Generation celebration, because as you know - that's a big room full of nerds outside the Pentagon that would probably appreciate this development.

Is India Creating a Problem for Itself?

This isn't actually new, but it's worth talking about:

Taking a cue from its first indigenous aircraft carrier programme, India is now envisaging construction of its largest warship yet - a 65,000-tonne aircraft carrier named INS Vishal (literally meaning ‘huge’) with the latest fighter jets and choppers onboard. The warship is scheduled to enter the Indian Navy’s flotilla by 2025 and is presently in its design phase. “Taking a lesson from delays faced in the construction of the first Indigenous Aircraft Carrier INS Vikrant, we have already begun working on the design of the next one with an added tonnage of 25,000 tonnes,” sources told Express. Where this sea leviathan will be constructed is yet to be finalised.

Assuming that the time frame is correct (and it doesn't sound overly ambitious), in 2025 India will be operating the 45000 ton former Soviet Vikramaditya, the 40000 ton Vikrant, and the 65000 ton Vishal. Vikramaditya will obviously have radically different maintenance requirements than the two domestic carriers, notwithstanding Russian construction advice and material transfer. We can imagine that the Indians will do their best to ensure co-operability of as many systems as possible between Vishal and Vikrant, but a 65000 ton ship is of necessity going to be different than a 40000 ton ship in consequential details.

Far from achieving economies of scale, it looks as if India is buying itself three separate carrier programs, each with distinct maintenance and operational requirements. Pilots cleared for landing on Vishal may be at peril if they try to land on Vikramaditya or Vikrant. In some sense this echoes the experience of the early naval aviation in the RN, IJN, and USN, where each new platform was considerably different from the last.  Projecting forward, though, I don't see this as a very good system for emulation.

Sea Shepherds’ Expanding Fleet and the Militarization of Maritime Eco-activism

Could this be the Sea Shepherd's new ship?

As their leader flees to an undisclosed location from his house arrest in Germany, the Sea Shepherds have begun fitting out a new addition to their fleet, courtesy of a generous donation from cartoon king, Sam Simon.    Captain Paul Watson notes that the identity of this new ship, a former German government-owned vessel is “classified,” although we know she will be named after her donor.  According to another article, the ship is a former German icebreaker.  From this source, the ship is likely the ex-East German Stephan Jantzen.  Although slow, the ship would bring the ice hardening and endurance to make it useful in Antarctic waters.  And with modifications, the ship could carry a second helicopter, which according to Watson, will enhance the fleet's scouting capabilities.  Another possible candidate - my guess - is this former North Sea search and research vessel, which features a helo deck, a stern ramp for rapid launch of a RHIB, and a powerful fighter fighting system for "offensive" use against the Japanese whalers. We will have to wait until the next Southern Ocean counter-whaling campaign kicks of to find out for sure.


Season 5 of Whale Wars, a key element of SSCS' clever media campaign, wrapped up earlier this summer.  I only watched a couple of episodes, but it seemed that the level of aggression and potential for injury had increased on both the side of the Shepherds and the Japanese.  This escalation is a natural progression in this sort of direct action campaign, and not only drives cable ratings (and donations to the cause), but results in each side innovating and improving their TTPs. 

Paul Watson isn't only conservationist busy this summer acquiring new vessels.  Former SSCS Ady Gil Skipper Pete Bethune is expanding his organization’s own portfolio and fleet.  What is most interesting from an irregular warfare perspective is the way that Bethune, who is currently in a legal kerfuffle with Watson, portrays his organization.  His website discusses their testing of a FLIR-equipped  "amphibious assault craft," a new UAV (see previous posts here on Sea Shepherd's pioneering use of unmanned aircraft), and the use of combat-experienced advisors.  Also note the crews sporting aquaflauge in the UAV test video below.

"Pete Bethune, who will captain ‘Sealegs’, brought in several members of his unit who have served in the US Navy Seals to help develop the craft. "These guys have been in many maritime combat situations, and they were invaluable in developing the vessel to make it tactically more effective. We changed the vessel layout, the masthead, the electronics, levels of redundancy. The result is a real beast that we believe sets a new benchmark for amphibious assault vessels."

These developments appear to reflect the growing militarization in language, tactics, and equipment, of maritime eco-activists.  By my count -- with Greenpeace, SSCS, and Earthrace -- three maritime conservation organizations are now involved with direct action.   In spite of their well-intentioned motivations, one of the many features these groups have in common with terrorist groups is that they adapt and often splinter-off from each other.  To wit, SSCS founder Paul Watson broke off from Greenpeace as he felt they weren't aggressive enough and now Bethune is taking Oceanrace in his own direction.  The line between these conservation organizations and non-state maritime actors with more malign intentions will likely continue to blur. 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

"It Would Accelerate Until it Blew Up"

If you haven't read Bill Sweetman's piece on US-owned and operated MiGs, do so now. The comments on flying the MiG-21 and the MiG-23 are particularly worthwhile.   See also David Axe's post.

Weekend Movie Night

I thought this panel was very interesting. I enjoyed watching this very much. The story of the French frigate off Libya is one I had heard, and one I was thinking about earlier this week when I was reading how Syrians are using the iPhone to do all kinds of very interesting things that someone will eventually reveal once Assad takes a hike. Enjoy!

What is the relationship between terrorist groups and illicit networks, including proliferators? How do they use illicit networks to move money, goods, weapons, and people? This panel explored existing gaps in institutional responses to the growing nexus between these organizations.

David Asher, Former Director, The National Security Council's North Korea Activities Group
Brian Dodd, Director DEA Operations Center on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime
Andrew Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense, WMD
David Kilcullen, CEO of Caerus Associates

Moderated by:  Chris Isham, Vice President and Washington DC Bureau Chief, CBS News

WaPost Aims for ASB; Hits CSBA

I received this article via email from several people today, each of whom probably thought that what would get my interest is the reporting on the continuing objections from the ground force community to AirSea Battle.  I must admit to being somewhat interested that the Washington Post would take time for a serious analysis of AirSea Battle, to the extent that any serious analysis can take place in an unclassified setting.

Instead, what unfolds is a timid hit-piece, full of innuendo and with a whiff of score settling. Careful only to land glancing blows, Greg Jaffe traces the conceptual evolution of AirSea Battle back to its Pentagon roots, and in the process, questions the Director of the Office of Net Assessment's (Andrew Marshall) integrity in the awarding of contracts by inferring that  he distributes resources to his favorites, and no one is more favored than the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, run by a Marshall protege, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich.  Citing the proportion of CSBA's revenue generated by ONA contracts, Jaffe gives us Krepinevich's salary, reporting that it is twice what others in his position make.  The horror. 

So, not only is AirSea Battle subject to (generally useful) criticism from land-power advocates, it now should be looked at askance because of its birth from a dubious marriage between ONA and a think tank?   I'm not convinced.

CSBA is one of the most professional organizations I've worked with, and I've worked with many of the DC think tanks and war-gaming shops.  Quibble if you will with their revenue, but if you've ever worked with them, you'll find a couple of very obvious facts.  First, they don't occupy a Taj Mahal office complex, so your government dollars aren't going to that.  Second, their staff is ridiculously small for the complex and important work that they take on.  So your government dollar isn't going to the overhead support of Writers in Residence, Non-Resident Scholars, Resident Fellows, Non-Resident Writing Fellows and the like.  You get world class analysis, professionally done, by a staff of experts who work like dogs--and produce their findings quickly, a rarity in Washington sometimes.  

Additionally, if ONA money goes to firms that have connections with Marshall, maybe it is worthwhile to look at the quality of the people who have earned his confidence.  I am familiar with probably ten people in the DC area who worked closely with Marshall, who learned his methods, who trained at his knee--who then went out into the thinktank and wargaming worlds to make their way.  These are not Junior Varsity people--they are some of the smartest, most analytically rigorous thinkers I know, and the the work that they do for Marshall and every other customer who seeks them out is superb.  If Marshall goes to the well, it is because he knows he can get quality work from people who know what they are doing.

I guess Mr. Jaffe was unable to get his editors to buy off on a straight story about the legitimate questions surrounding AirSea Battle, that he had to "sex it up" a little bit by hinting about corruption and playing up class envy.  Maybe next time.

UPDATE:  I'm in the midst of an interesting Twitter conversation with Gulliver, of the Blog Ink Spots .  He tweeted "I haven't seen one single human who read that piece suggest that it was "insinuating favoritism."

I've asked him/her for permission to post their Tweet in order to get a sense of how much of an outlier I am on this.  Am I wrong in stating that the WaPost article hinted at ONA favoritism in the awarding of contracts?  Please respond with your views. 


Bryan McGrath

An Unwise Cut from the SAC-D: VIRGINIA Payload Module in Trouble

A story here outlines opposition in the SAC-D to the Administration's plan to build the VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) into downstream versions of the world's best attack boat.  VPM would help soften the blow of the retirement of the SSGN's, in theory distributing the considerable number of land-attack launchers contained therein across a larger number of VIRGINIA boats.  Additionally, the adaptabilty of the VPM could lead to employment of weapons and sensors other than Tomahawk, to include other land-attack weapons, UUV's and other more highly classified uses.

VPM is an example of the wisdom of the CNO's "payloads, not platforms" appraoach to gaining capability increases.  This is a short-sighted mark by the sub-committee, and I urge lawmakers to reverse it as the FY13 budget process unfolds.

Bryan McGrath

The Hollow Force is Here

Navy leadership needs to be very blunt and very honest about how this happens.

Over the past six months, the service has instituted measures to address gaps in critical positions, offering cash and other perks to compel sailors to head back out to sea. While those measures are still taking hold, Navy officials said last week that more must be done to address the at-sea manning issue -- including involuntary measures -- as nearly one-third of its total enlisted ratings are currently unfilled.

As a result, existing programs are being expanded and new measures implemented to ensure these billets are staffed properly, according to a Navy news release.

“As our Navy is in ever-increasing demand around the world, filling these gap billets at sea has become more critical,” Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Adm. Scott Van Buskirk said in the release. “These actions should reduce the short-notice actions to man high-priority billets, such as cross-decking and diverts.”

The Navy is separating nearly 3,000 midcareer sailors this year in 31 other fields that are overmanned.

This is data specific to the hollowing of the force. It isn't the cost of building ships that is shrinking the fleet, it is the cost of manning ships that is shrinking the Navy. Those costs aren't coming down, and the fiscal environment for the Navy isn't getting better anytime soon. In my opinion the Navy needs to be very transparent on this issue.

In the end, hollowing the force is not necessarily the worst option, and can be done selectively as the Navy gets over small hurdles. The problem is that without more transparency from the Navy, we have no idea what size the hurdle is, and whether the measures being taken are to simply stop the bleeding or fix the problem.

More likely, the measures Vice Adm. Scott Van Buskirk has put into action are simply intended to stop the bleeding, because the sense I get talking to folks in those units and on those ships with serious manpower shortages is that the problem isn't going to be solved quickly.