What to make of speculated deals for Su-35/Lada?

In the past week, there have been a lot of speculations regarding a deal where Russia would export 24 Su-35s and 4 Ladas to China.  Now, there have been official denials from Russian government and sukhoi has also not put this on their website.  That would indicate this deal is definitely not done yet.  I normally would ignore these su-35 rumours from Russia, but there have been enough support reading through the Chinese sources for me to think that there are serious discussions for this.  In addition, Chinese sources also indicate that there could also be sale of S-400 and IL-476 as part of a large deal.  Obviously, this would be the largest sale package from China to Russia since probably 2002.  I will just look at the individual parts of the deal and whether they make sense from a Chinese point of view.

Back in 2008 when the su-35 rumours first came out, it made sense for China to buy 2 or more regiments of Su-35.  As time went on, it seemed like the domestic flankers produced by SAC have been more or less satisfactory for PLA.  I often read on Western/Russian news sources about how they are shocked to see Russia is still willing to sell such an advanced aircraft to China even after China “cloned” Russian fighters, but those articles really do not seem to have a good grasp on reality.  We know that China has two “stealth” fighter jet programs under development that will probably achieve IOC sometimes toward the end of this decade, so it doesn’t make sense for China to buy and then “copy” a large number of su-35s.  Shenyang AC is actively developing and producing naval and fighter bomber versions of flankers in J-15 and J-16.  Su-35 is mostly an air superiority aircraft, so it’s not going to help those projects.  At the same time, China is also not exporting any of its flankers to other countries, so this export deal will not threaten Russia’s other export markets.

One of the reported reasons from Chinese side for purchasing Su-35 is the coming end of production of J-11B.  They have requirement for 1 regiment (24 aircraft) of air superiority version of flankers before the more advanced 5^th generation fighters can enter service.  While that is possible, I think su-35 will create a logistical problem in the future like the Sov destroyers with the Chinese navy.  They will need to maintain a new type of aircraft, a new engine, a new generation of Russian avionics and Russian missiles.  That would seem to be a lot of trouble for just one regiment.  That would lead to my conclusion that they are purchasing this strictly to get their hands on the 117S engine.  Russia made it clear to China early on that they would only be willing to sell 117S to China as part of a Su-35 order.  I think 24 is probably the minimum number of Su-35s that Russia would be willing to sell to China to allow Chinese access to 117S engine.  China does have the largest MRO plant for AL-31F outside of Russia.  All maintenance work for AL-31 is done inside China.  I would assume 117S maintenance and life extension work would also be done there.  Despite improvements in the reliability of WS-10A, I still read about problems found in deployment.  If there is one problem that can cause real delay in J-20, it would be not having a reliable engine solution in its development and early deployment.  117S would also be possible options for J-10 and J-15/16 projects.  If China does choose to purchase Su-35s, access to 117S engine would be the primary motivation.  And Russia would benefit by exporting su-35 and possibly large numbers of 117S engine later.

The deal for 4 Lada submarines is more interesting.  Many PLAN followers have asked why China would be interested in purchasing so many units of a submarine that Russia has not even accepted into its own service (its AIP system is not going to be ready until later).  Typically, China chooses to only purchase mature systems that it can quickly induct into service.  On top of that, it seems to some that Chinese submarines seem to have reached the technology levels of their Russian counterpart with that mysterious new conventional submarine in 2011.  The reality is that Chinese submarines still have a way to go in stealth.

As part of this deal, China will be getting transfer of technology along with local production for 2 of the 4 submarines.  On top of that, some unreported Chinese subsystems will be going onto these submarines.  So, the question is what is China providing as part of this submarine and what is it interested in?  The currently mass produced 039B submarine are already equipped with AIP system that can be installed on the Chinese version of Lada submarine.  On top of that, China could install its own sonar system and combat systems onto Lada.  The latter part should not be surprising since China has also installed its own sonar on kilo submarines.  What China seeks as part of this deal is the Russian’s design of Lada submarine and its noise insulation technology.  From Lada, China could learn how to design and build a single hull submarine with conformal sonar.  If we look at China’s new submarine that came out in 2011, it seemed to adapt numerous features from Lada submarine.  This submarine is supposedly one of a kind built to replace the old Gulf class ballistic missile test bed.  It is probably too large and expensive to be mass produced.  Based on their experience from this submarine and Lada project, it’s quite possible that China’s next series of submarine would look somewhere in between (possibly single hull) and have many of the features currently on Lada class.  Russia also has a lot to gain here, because it needs a new submarine for export to replace kilo.  Regardless of whether Russia chooses to use any Chinese subsystems for Lada in the future, Chinese involvement in this project will ensure that the export version of Lada becomes fully developed and commercially viable.

So while I’ve read numerous panic articles online about how this deal will significantly improve China’s capabilities and shift the cross strait balance of power even more toward China’s favour, I think those articles really show very little appreciation of China’s current military industrial complex.  While these purchases will help and speed up PLA development, they are by no means game changers.  However, these purchases will improve ties between the two countries at a time where Russia constantly complains about the trade imbalance.

Context Reveals a Reckless CVN CO Got His Revenge

This New York Times article is incredible. A lot of people are talking. Read it all.

Comment:

No one in the Navy can survive a five month investigation, so whenever that happens the officer being investigated is going to get hit hard. Doesn't matter who it is. The SECNAV will have the last word on this, so I'll wait to see what the ultimate conclusion is. And yeah, FOIA will tell all, because everyone and there mother wants to know if the Navy is jumping the shark with all these firings. Is the Navy upholding a high standard for leadership, or an unrealistic standard and simply using the firing of COs for PR purposes now? Time will tell.

Be warned, the "racially insensitive remarks" are not going to be what you think it is, unless you get offended when a strike group commander is encouraging the 5000 person crew of an aircraft carrier to be vigilant and intelligent when protecting the ship from the beeping beep Iranian mother beepers. The context is going to be interesting, and it will be very interesting to see how Ray Mabus sees this.

Here is what is really fascinating to me though. The New York Times just told the American people that the CO of the only CVN in the 7th Fleet today is a vengeful, reckless asshat. As outlined by the New York Times, the CO is so reckless that he will "fly" a 100,000 ton nuclear reactor waving the US flag through the most congested sea lanes in the world, and when the CO was called out for his reckless behavior at the time it was occurring, the CO reacted by getting his superior shipped off the CVN through the IG process, and ultimately ruined the career of the Admiral with a FIVE MONTH IG investigation - an investigation which no one of any rank in the Navy can possibly survive. When process is weighed with result, the IG process is looking less credible, and when the CO is still in command the Navy loses credibility.

The aspect of the New York Times story related to the CO is shocking when everything is examined in context. The behavior demonstrated by the CO is dangerous. It is poison to the institution when commanding officers must be that cautious when witnessing incredibly dangerous behavior, deadly behavior even.

Kirby may think he doesn't need to comment on the IG report, but when the New York Times undermines the CO of a deployed aircraft carrier in a way that tells a very specific and detailed story of a CO on a power trip, that issue cannot simply be ignored. I find it incredible that the Navy has looked the other way on the CO here, because this is clearly not an issue of a whistle-blower, this is an issue of a CO abusing professional processes for purposes of person revenge being told to America through the New York Times.

Putin Goes Hollywood

From Defense News:

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday ordered unscheduled military exercises involving thousands of troops and dozens of ships in the Black Sea region to test their battle readiness, the Kremlin said.

The order was presented to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in a sealed envelope at 4 a.m. (2400 GMT), his spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told Russian news agencies, adding that the exercises would involve 36 ships and up to 7,000 troops.

Peskov indicated that the surprise order by Putin was aimed at testing the battle readiness of the Russian armed forces and said Moscow was not obliged to warn its partners of the plan.

“Today at 4 a.m. the president of the Russian Federation and supreme military commander (Putin) gave the order to the defense minister to begin major military exercises in the Black Sea region,” Peskov said. “We are talking about major exercises, intended as a check.”

Maybe Marko Ramius is trying to defect? Or maybe Putin is answering the call for BRIC nation assistance by Cyprus. The Black Helicopter crowd is going to have a field day with news like this.

My only question is: what would Connor Stark do?

Naval Aviation: An Evolutionary Apporach

My latest at the Diplomat takes a look at China's approach to naval aviation:

Ranging from the Colossus class carriers distributed across the world at the end of World War II, to the Spanish Dedalo, to the modern Hyuga class Helicopter Destroyer, the USN could and can depend on allies to conduct escort missions. The USN could also rely on access to airbases worldwide in order to support land-based sea control aviation. 

China has none of these advantages. No Chinese ally is likely to devote treasure to the construction of sea control ships in the near future (Pakistan might be the best long term bet), and China lacks access to good bases for counter-sea aviation.  For sea control beyond China’s littoral, the PLAN has few, if any, good options. 

In a structurally similar position to China (although much less dependent on foreign trade), the Soviet Navy started with what amounted to Sea Control Ships, in the form of the Moskva class helicopter carriers and the Kiev class “heavy aviation cruisers.” Although these ships weren’t designed specifically with commerce protection in mind, they were specialized for anti-submarine warfare, with allowance for air superiority and surface warfare in the Kiev class. Moreover, Soviet naval aviation evolved over time, with new platforms benefitting from experiences earned with older vessels. 

China has been determined to leap several stages, with consequences for training that are already becoming apparent. But perhaps more importantly, by skipping ahead the PLAN has left itself bereft of the kind of low cost, medium size platforms that can support sea control operations at a distance from home.

I'm curious if Feng has any thoughts on this. The PLAN's approach to just about everything apart from carrier aviation seems to have ben evolutionary, with knowledge gained from older platforms feeding into the design process of new platforms, and (importantly in this case), the older platforms still have relevant roles to play in general PLAN strategy. The leap to a full (if skijump) carrier seems outside normal practice.

On LCS: What's Really Bothering You, Blackshoes?

The Littoral Combat Ship has engendered a considerable amount of discussion since it was announced as part of the 21^st Century Family of Ships in the Fall of 2001.  Since then, the debates have often been heated, with the interlocutors on both sides among the smartest folks writing and thinking about naval issues.  It is hard for anyone—let alone someone with a deep background in fleet design and naval architecture (which I don't) —to grind things down to ground truth. 

Yesterday, I got to thinking that maybe, just maybe, many of us are having a collective case of what some of you may recognize in the day-to-day business of child-rearing.  That is, the great likelihood that when your child is acting out, the cause is often not what the child articulates, and it takes a bit of calm talk and good parenting to eventually get to the “real issue”. 

Please, I am not trying to ascribe parent/child roles here, only to raise a point.  What if the strength and emotion of the objections to LCS are only partially a reflection of the merits of those ships?  What if a good bit of the anxiety is due to something else?  If so, what could that be?  I think I have an idea.

I believe that there is growing anxiety within (primarily) the Surface Navy, that when it comes to ship on ship warfare, we are dramatically “out-sticked”, and the problem will only get worse in the future.  We see the combatants currently being built and note that none have a surface to surface missile (SSM) capable of killing another ship beyond the radar horizon.  Let’s face it, LCS is not the only “outsticked” ship we are building.  It has been 14 years since the United States built a ship capable of engaging enemy surface forces over the horizon—USS PORTER (DDG 78).  All TICONDEROGA Class Cruisers and ARLEIGH BURKE Destroyers 51-78 were equipped to fire the Harpoon Missile.  Not one of the DDG’s built since PORTER was so equipped (and this includes the DDG 1000’s under construction).  I would hazard a guess that there are many readers of this blog who cannot fathom the fact that our modern, sophisticated “Destroyers” cannot destroy another ship.  But this fact is never far from the hearts and minds of those serving in our surface forces.  The fact that our “pacing threat”—China’s PLA-Navy—continues to field ships capable of long range over the horizon engagements—is also not lost on the surface force. 

 

Graphics by Delex Systems, Inc.  Data from Jane's Missiles and Rockets.  SM2 range is radar-horizon limited.

But it gets worse—not only are we are not building ships equipped with OTH surface to surface missiles, but every CG and DDG that is decommissioned between now and when USS PORTER decommissions (roughly 2034) will take with it the capability to employ the Harpoon, meaning an ever-increasing percentage of our fleet will lack OTH SSM capability. The Navy is studying this issue, and a new ASUW weapon is working its way through myriad acquisition hoops, with one authoritative briefing from N96 projecting IOC in 2024.  Should this new weapon meet this IOC date, it would likely at best represent holding the line on the diminishing fleet ASUW capability.  We need to move faster to arrest and reverse this decline, and we need to stop thinking the Carrier Air-Wing is going to be there to save our bacon when it comes time for a fight.

First, in the spirit of the much ballyhooed “Copeman” memo that Chris Cavas wrote aboutlast week, LCS must be improved if it is to be built in the numbers suggested.  No fewer than half of all LCS built should be altered to fire the Harpoon missile; if this means some trade-off with respect to other capabilities, so be it.  The rest of the world is lousy with crappy little boats with significant SSM capabilities, while LCS waits on future iterations of the LCS SUW Mission Module.  This is unacceptable. 

Second, the Navy should immediately begin a program to enable vertical launch of the Harpoon Missile, with a goal of not more than one year from program announcement to test firing.  In order to guarantee the most “bang for the buck”, the newest DDG’s in the fleet should be altered first, working backward to DDG 79. 

This is not a manhood issue, this is a fleet design issue.  Solve the “out-sticked” problem for the fleet, and LCS will not stick out like the sore thumb some see it as.  

Bryan McGrath

Israel's Maritime Strategy

Interesting piece at Foreign Affairs on Israeli maritime strategy:

Ever since Israel first faced the trauma of a ground invasion by its Arab neighbors in 1948, its military planners and strategists have focused chiefly on land-based threats. The country's armed forces and security doctrine were designed to deter such attacks or bring them to a swift end should they occur. And as expected, the wars that Israel has fought since its birth have been mostly ground-based. 

To this day, Israel’s maritime strategy remains largely an afterthought. For many years, Israel’s navy has been the country’s least visible military service. The country’s most recent effort to craft a new national security strategy, in 2006, did not include a significant maritime component. As a result, Israel has no comprehensive vision, goals, or policy for maritime and naval issues.    

This is a problem. As a small country hemmed in by adversaries on all of its land borders, Israel should realize that its security and economic prosperity are intrinsically and directly linked to the open seas. Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, understood that well. "Anyone who understands our geographic reality and its economic and political implications,” he said in a 1950 speech, “will immediately grasp the value of our sea power for our existence."

A couple brief thoughts:

• Good start to the article, but reading through it's not obvious to me that the Sea Corps isn't already doing what the authors request. The Sea Corps already conducts interdiction, shore bombardment, patrol, etc; the call for a "maritime strategy" seems mainly to be an argument for a budget increase.
• As Ben-Gurion said, Israel's prosperity and survival depend on access to the sea. However, apart from the few missions noted above, Israel is by virtue of its size and position much more likely to be a consumer of maritime security than a producer. Israel's maritime security depends on the willingness and capability of NATO and the USN to ensure access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; attempting to provide that access at any range beyond the immediate littoral is both redundant and probably more than Israel is capable of managing over the long haul. 

March Madness and the Fleet

Ok, a break here from my usual stuff.

There are very few places in the world it is better to be,  than to be part of a US Navy Wardroom during NCAA Basketball Tournament time.  The same madness that pervades other workplaces across the country applies, but is then multiplied by a surplus of just out of college knuckleheads (a.k.a. Ensigns) from across the country and the usual shuck and jive of wardroom life.

I miss the Navy only a little bit, but this time of year, I miss it a lot.  As a CO, the wardroom TV was never on during meals--except during the tournament.  In fact, it was on most of the day on Thursday and Friday.  Earlier in my career, a CO had us snug up against the Virginia coast so we could get the VHF feed from the local CBS affiliate. 

To all those folks with duty tonight on pier 5 in Norfolk, or who are watching through TV-DTS at sea--enjoy.  It really doesn't get any better!  Please feel free to share any good tournament stories you may have in the comments.

Bryan McGrath

Five Things on Friday Morning

Where is the one-stop shop for all things tactical in the United States Navy? That's a good question being asked at CIMSEC today. Really interesting post, but as I am not in the Navy, what I really enjoyed was reading several of the links.

I've been waiting to read David Axe's article discussing the CNAS paper by Captain Hendrix. David always takes a unique perspective on things, and that's one of the things I appreciate most about his writing. In his article he's offering up three big flattop alternatives: America class smaller carriers, MLP commercial style carriers, and a radical shift towards underwater long range strike. It did get me thinking about something, if the Navy took long range precision strike out of naval aviation, what kind of platform would you build to field naval aviation at sea that focuses on fleet support? This is a fictional "what if" not a "what I would do" question.

Ray Mabus is a complicated guy, and even after 4 years I can't decide if I like him or not. He is stubborn as hell though, and I admit I do admire that about him. I keep hearing that Ray Mabus was repeatedly told that if he backed away from biofuels, he was going to be offered more opportunities in the Obama administration. From what I hear, he basically told the President "thanks, but no thanks" and has stuck to his belief that alternative energy really is an important issue and something the Navy needs to continue working on as a function of long term reserve planning. Today it is somewhat hard to believe the investment is worth it, but in 20 years we may all look back through the sands of history and describe him as the guy in the room who was legitimately thinking ahead. Either way, the Senate is allowing the Navy’s ‘green fleet’ to sail on. While this topic gets a lot of attention, even his Republican opponents know that the amount of money involved in the more riskier investments really isn't enough to get too worked up over. True, money is tight, but there is some evidence indicating that some of his alternative energy investments in things like solar and advanced batteries does become, at worst, cost neutral over time.

Freedom is having problems. The ship has already lost a Fincantieri Isotta-Fraschini ship service diesel generators (SSDG), and a seventeen degree roll (which really isn't a big roll in my opinion) to port knocked out power the other day. According to Aviation Week the ship has now lost power three times since departing Pearl Harbor. I am standing by what I have always said, the Navy will not build more than 12 of each of either ship without significant design changes.

Today is Bob Work's last day as Under Secretary.

What Land Power Sounds Like

Dr. Maren Leed at CSIS is anchoring a fascinating series called The Ground Forces Dialogue.  Her latest guest (today) was Major General H.R. McMaster, Commander of the Army's Maneuver Center of Excellence.  As many of you know, McMaster is famous both in and out of the Army.  He's a warrior King--author, scholar, fighter.  Tough as nails, and smart as anyone.

But now and again, he gets things wrong.  Or at least, wrong enough to be challenged.



If you have an hour, spend it with Dr. Leed and MG McMaster, and listen to one of the most articulate spokesmen for Land Power do his thing.

I invite your attention also to a couple of things that any navalist should consider:

1.  MG McMaster cites core competncies in Land War as practiced by the U.S. Army--combined arms maneuver and wide area security.  These are cited in the Army Operating Concept of 2010, and defined thusly: "Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action and exploit success.  Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals."  McMaster's (and the Army's) view of the world seems to me to enshrine ever-war.  It isn't enough to just fight and win in war (combined arms maneuver), but we must also take as a core competency in the Active Duty Army all of the functions of occupation.  To me, it isn't a question of whether or not our Army needs to do both, but more a question of how it prioritizes them and where the skills sets reside. The argument to size the Active Army to do both of these things is a strikes me as worthy of criticism.

2.  MG McMaster is asked to speak about lessons we may have improperly learned from 12 years of conflict.  He raises in his answer, the concept of "raids" vs. "war", and his sense that many policy makers have begun to confuse the two.  I may have been hearing a dog-whistle, but what I heard was a dig at the Marine Corps in particular and American Seapower in general. Put another way, a new generation of arm-chair strategists--as they view the future security environment--have come to confuse what is required to conduct "raids" with what is required to conduct "wars".  And in McMaster's view, wars are what the Army is for.  The problem I have with McMaster's view is that all conflict is not war, and our garrison-force Army is not as useful as other forces at our disposal to deal with the span of conflict that does not include war (and its almost by definition self-licking Army ice cream cone, wide area security).  After more than a decade of land war, I believe the country is moving toward a posture of reliance on its deterrence and "raiding" forces and de-emphasizing its "war making" forces.  This is natural, and it is understandable given our fiscal environment.  It is not "eliminating" its war making capability--quite the contrary--it will spend billions to re-set it. 

Bryan McGrath

Soccer, the Suez, and Irregular Sea Denial

I'm back from a little vacation in the Sahel...

Sea denial might be described as the obverse of sea control, where a weaker force is able to achieve an operational objective at sea by thwarting a superior fleet, even if only for a short duration.  History is rife with examples of irregular conflicts ashore threatening freedom of navigation. Straits, channels, and other narrows are particulary lucrative targets for insurgents striving to deny the sea to conventionally-stronger opponents.

On the low end of the scale, irregular forces or angry populations have attempted to blockade or disrupt port traffic with various levels of success.  These mostly unorganized efforts tend to fizzle out or be crushed by overwhelming force when maritime law enforcement or navies get involved.  The Indian Coast Guard had to intervene in 2011 when local fishermen distraught over the recent destruction of their houses parked fishing trawlers at the mouth of Goa’s major port used to export iron ore.  In the United States, Occupy protestors temporarily forced the closure of the port of Seattle in 2011, then the following year, longshoremen strikes closed Southern California ports for over a week, sending shockwaves through global supply chains. 

Egyptian security forces keep watch as protesters burn tires in Port Said,
east of Cairo, Egypt, March 9, 2013. (MSNBC)

Earlier this year, fallout from soccer violence (amplified by Arab Spring reverberations) threatened the Suez Canal. Media reporting indicates a variety of tactics were used by approximately 2,000 protestors to disrupt shipping near Port Said. Rioters tried to block car ferries from crossing, lit tires on the piers on fire to prevent ships from mooring, and set supply boats adrift in an attempt to block the channel.  Egyptian naval forces were deployed to ensure this vital shipping channel remained open.  Although unsuccessful, these efforts indicate the potential for localized unrest to impede global commerce afloat. 



14 March 2013- A Bahraini anti-government demonstrator was set on fire
when a shot fired by riot police hit the gasoline bomb he was holding.

The introduction of modern weapons into irregular conflicts amplifies the seriousness of these threats. Guerrilla fighters have laid mines (Tamil Tigers) and terrorists bombed oil export terminals (AQAP/AQI).   During the 2006 Lebanon war, Hezbollah attacked navy and merchant shipping with advanced ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles. 

Of potentially more relevance and importance to the U.S. Navy is the ongoing low-level insurgency in the island kingdom of Bahrain. The home of COMFIFTHFLT, base to forward-deployed American and British mine-sweepers, USN/USCG patrol vessels, and USS Ponce is potentially vulnerable to disruption should this conflict spill over from attacks on exclusively on Bahraini government forces to the US Naval presence. Some observers have accused Iran of meddling in this revolution, which is largely based along Sunni/Shia fault lines. It wouldn’t be a stretch for malign Iranian actors to someday prod their proxies into disrupting allied naval operations or supply insurgents with more lethal and effective weapons as they have done in Syria, Yemen, and the Levant.
 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency. 

Each a Half Century of History

USS Midway

This is the first in a series of posts inspired by the recently released paper at the Center for New American Security titled At What Cost a Carrier by Captain Henry J. Hendrix, USN (Ph.D). Full disclosure, I consider Jerry Hendrix a good friend, although to be honest we talk about the sports our daughters are involved in about as often as we talk about the topics we both enjoy writing about.

Ordered in 1942 and laid down in October 1943, USS Midway was launched in March of 1945 and commissioned later that year on September 10, 1945. Originally a straight deck carrier, USS Midway served with distinction all over the world before receiving an enclosed hurricane bow, an aft deck-edge elevator, an angled flight deck, and a steam catapult beginning in June of 1955. After extensive modernization the carrier returned to service just over two years later in September of 1957.

Upon returning to service in 1957, USS Midway operated in the Pacific and conducted military operations in South Vietnam in 1965.

Following that deployment, USS Midway went back into drydock in 1966 for another massive modernization that expanded the flight deck from 2.8 acres to 4 acres and adjusted the angle of the flight deck out to 13.5 degrees. The elevators were upgraded to support larger aircraft, and everything from catapults to air conditioners were replaced. The planned $88 million modernization suffered a massive cost overrun, with the final cost coming in at $202 million. Upon returning to sea in 1970, it was discovered that the modernizations had created problems with the seakeeping of the big carrier, and the ship had to go back into dry dock for further modifications.

Once back to sea USS Midway conducted operations in Vietnam in 1971 and 1972, and in 1973 became the first US aircraft carrier forward-deployed to Japan. USS Midway returned to Vietnam conducting military operations in 1975.

From 1975 until 1990 USS Midway spent time at sea patroling the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf regions where, in August of 1990 USS Midway found herself in the Persian Gulf after Iraq invaded Kuwait. USS Midway stayed on station and served in Gulf War I throughout the air and ground campaign before departing the region in March of 1991.

At 74,000 tons USS Midway was decommissioned on April 11, 2024 having served the nation for just over 46 years.

On the evening of February 3, 2024 I attended a banquet for members of the United States Naval Institute hosted on the USS Midway Museum in San Diego. After arriving to the party, CDR Salamander and I met up with UltimaRatioReg to form our own band of bloggers with beer for a stroll along the flight deck. Upon arriving on the flight deck, our band of brothers was joined by Norman Friedman, and the four of us spent the next hour double-fisting the prizes of our drink tickets as we strolled USS Midway discussing the history of the aircraft on the deck of the USS Midway Museum.

Our little band of brothers took our time as we enjoyed the comfortable mid 50s winter evening San Diego style and inspected the restoration of each aircraft. The aircraft we inspected both above and below deck included the EKA-3 Skywarrior, the A-4 Skyhawk, the H-34 Seabat, the H-46 Sea Knight, the T-2 Buckeye, the F9F Panther, the SBD Dauntless, the F9F-8P Cougar, the F/A-18 Hornet, the F-8 Crusader, the C-1 Trader, the E-2 Hawkeye, SNJ Texan, the A-6 Intruder, the A-1 Skyraider, the A-7 Corsair II, the S-3 Viking, the SH-2 Seasprite, the SH-3 Seaking, the F-4 Phantom II, the RA-5 Vigilante, the Huey Gunship, the F-14 Tomcat, and the TBM Avenger.

At the end of our top side tour, Norman Friedman broke ranks from our group and the three of us stood at the bow of the flight deck enjoying our perfect evening, CDR Salamander noted that every single type of aircraft we had just visited on the ship had, at one point or another, landed and taken off from USS Midway in the service of our nation.

That was when it hit me. USS Midway isn't simply a Museum, rather it is a time capsule that accurately reflects the essence of what every modern aircraft carrier in the US Navy is - a strategic investment for a half century of service to the nation. Over a period of over 46 years, USS Midway flew over two dozen aircraft off her deck, conducted operations all over the globe, fought wars in Vietnam and Iraq, served in function as a humanitarian, a diplomat, and a symbol of American power and influence during times of peace or crisis in the service of the nation.

Commissioned in late 1945 USS Midway began service at a time when aircraft carriers were unquestionably the most important seapower capability in the world. USS Midway is the only military asset of the United States that served as a relevant capability for the entirety of the Cold War, with the Iowa class Battleships being the only other platform to serve intermediately from the beginning to the end of the Cold War in a relevant function. If we suggest military anti-access and area denial capabilities that target carriers began development in the late 1990s, then we can say with a high degree of certainty that the service life of the USS Midway represents the period by which aircraft carriers were the dominant military capability at sea.

Today aircraft carriers have become extremely expensive to build, operate, and maintain. Today aircraft carrier air wings have become extremely expensive to build, operate, and maintain. Today the high end surface force and by assignment at least part of the attack submarine force serves the fleet today to protect the US nuclear powered aircraft carrier. The title of Captain Hendrix's paper asks At What Cost a Carrier, but the substance of Captain Hendrix's paper asks "What is the carriers value?"

While USS Midway may represent one of the most important national military capabilities of the second half of the 20th century, as budgets get tighter I believe it is important for the Navy to question long standing assumptions like whether aircraft carriers remain one of the most important national military capabilities for the United States heading into the 21st century. When we study aircraft carriers, either in the past, present, or future; the "value" of carriers must be thoroughly examined and explored because that "value" is bigger than budget, bigger than function, and is not easily measured through a price tag or statistical analysis. USS Midway served 46 years, but even if we use the broadest definition for sorties, USS Midway flew on average less than 40 sorties per year in wartime over the entire life of the great carrier. Statistics can tell the truth and can tell a lie, so over the next few weeks I intend to dig deeper into the questions regarding the value of aircraft carriers, and question assumptions that for too long haven't faced enough objective consideration in public.

What Carl Vinson Can Teach us about American Seapower

The following contribution is written by Congressman J. Randy Forbes from Virginia's fourth district, Congressman Forbes is chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee and founder and co-chairman of the Congressional China Caucus. 

The United States has suffered from an extended period of economic distress, prompting large segments of the public to question the need for a robust American military. During this time, the U.S. Navy has been allowed to atrophy, falling below its minimum requirements in numerous classes of ships, underfunding maintenance, and allowing many ships to age past their service-life. The incumbent President has demonstrated little interest in the Navy’s role and seems content with a diminished fleet. Meanwhile, threats to American interests grow steadily, with a disarmed Europe uninterested in maintaining international security and a distracted United States easily ignored by powers intent on re-writing the international order.

While the above may sound like a description of the international environment in 2013, instead I am describing the conditions which prevailed in the early 1930s. As Germany and Japan expanded their military capabilities at rates that continually defied the predictions of Allied analysts, the Hoover Administration, absorbed by its futile efforts to restart the U.S. economy, resisted all attempts to resource a U.S. Navy capable of upholding American interests abroad. It was left to the House of Representatives’ Committee on Naval Affairs, under Chairman Carl Vinson of Georgia, to champion the cause of a modern, global fleet.

Carl Vinson, a lawyer from landlocked rural Georgia who left the Continental United States only once in his 97 years, was an unlikely advocate for American Seapower. Yet it was Vinson who, in the words of Admiral William Leahy, “contributed more to the national defense (from 1935-1945) than any other single person in the country except the president [Franklin D. Roosevelt] himself.” Vinson’s contribution was one of both advocacy and action - he was the strongest public voice in favor of naval preparedness throughout the 1930s, stressing the importance of a modern fleet to a maritime nation like the United States and calling attention to the threat of aggressive powers like Germany and Japan. But Vinson’s most lasting contribution was legislative, in the form of successive bills authorizing the size and scope of the U.S. Navy and thereby laying the foundation for the fleet which prevailed in World War II and secured the peace during half a century of Cold War.

Vinson’s principal legislative achievements were the Navy authorization bills of 1934, 1938 and 1940. In each instance, Vinson’s legislation dramatically increased the Navy’s authorized size and made important statements about the fleet’s future composition, directing resources to aviation and submarines at a time when the service was still enamored with big-gun battleships. Vinson’s handling of the Navy’s authorization bills was marked by careful attention to the international security situation, Working with the Navy’s leadership, he celebrated his authorized increases to the real-world threats of his day. As Germany and Japan continued their aggressive policies and military modernization, Vinson also successfully used the megaphone of his committee chairmanship to raise public awareness of the threat while taking substantive measures to increase fleet preparedness.

Each of Vinson’s three signature Navy authorization bills increased the fleet’s size and capabilities in ways uniquely suited to their particular moment. Beginning in 1934, Vinson authorized successively larger increases in size of the fleet, with special attention paid to the cutting-edge technologies of his day - aircraft and submarines. Working with astute Navy officers and calling upon his own sense of the changing face of modern warfare, Vinson ensured that his authorization bills invested in formidable undersea and aviation forces rather than just the Navy’s traditional surface combatants. As the 1930s advanced and the international security situation deteriorated further, Vinson’s authorization bills became steadily more ambitious. With the passage of the Two Ocean Navy Act in 1940, over a year before the Pearl Harbor attack, Vinson secured authorization for a fleet large enough to maintain American dominance in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. It was the vessels created by Vinson’s 1930s legislation that served as the nucleus of the fleet that secured victory during World War II.

As today’s policymakers grapple with a shrinking defense budget and destabilizing security environment in the Western Pacific and Middle East, we would do well to remember the legacy of Chairman Vinson. His farsighted vision in laying the groundwork for a modern, global Navy at a time of public disinterest and preoccupation with domestic concerns saved countless American lives and did much to bring about Allied victory when the Nation was forced into war. Furthermore, by insisting on investment in the “game-changing” technologies of his day, Vinson ensured that the United States would not be left behind in emerging warfare domains. His success in using the power of his chairmanship to fundamentally alter the Navy’s posture and composition is a lesson in the power of Congress to positively shape American security policy and to think holistically about the challenges our military faces.

As Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, I am humbled to carry on the work of my able predecessor. As in Chairman Vinson’s time, we face tremendous challenges to our naval strength at home and abroad. Once again, we will rise to the occasion.

Comparing Type 056 to LCS

With the recent induction of 056, a lot of comparison has been made between 056 and LCS.  The comparisons are understandable.  Both are just entering services.   Both are expected to be built in large numbers and are also considered to be the lower end ships of their respective navy.  In many ways, their comparison stops there, because Type 054A would be more comparable to LCS just based on the size and dimensions of the ships.  I want to break this down to two sections: the differences in capabilities/cost between the two classes of ships and what that tells us about the two navies.

First of all, despite both ships are designed for littoral operations, one is designed to operate in its own waters, whereas the other is designed to operate in enemy waters.  056 is supposed to replace 053 and 037 in the role of patrolling coastal waters.  It's equipped with enough strike power to conduct ASuW against other regional navy.  With some modification, it can also be useful in ASW operations in the littoral waters.  On the other hand, LCS is suppose to be faster, stealthier, far more modular and capable of operation in other country's littoral waters.  USN has no need for something like 056, since it faces no foreign naval threat within its coastal waters.  For any issues like smuggling, piracy and drug trafficking, it should be up to coastal guard to protect.  At the same time, China has no need for a littoral ship as large or fast as LCS, because it really has no need in the near future for a ship built specifically to fight in the littoral waters of a non-neighbouring country.  While most of the mission packages for LCS have yet to finish development, LCS will be capable of ASuW, ASW, MCM and special ops once that does happen.  You might see more dedicated ASW or ASuW variants of Type 056 coming out, but each ship is really not expected to be doing more than one task.

As a result of this difference in roles and size of the ship, there is also a large gap in the cost of the ship.  Each LCS cost over $400 million to build and equip.  That's about twice as much as the cost of a Type 054A.  Type 056 is expected to be a much cheaper ship than Type 054A, since it's much smaller.  My current estimate for Type 056 is around around 60 million just based on the cost of Type 022, Type 054 and equivalent sized cutters (which run for about $15 to 20 million each).  The relatively low cost of this should explain why China is able to build so many units in such short time while also build numerous other classes at the same time.  If this cost more, China would not be able to use it to replace all of the old Type 053 and 037 ships.  Despite the recent austerity in USN and the higher cost of American shipbuilding, USN still has a far higher budget than PLAN, so it could afford more expensive ships.

The size of crews also show us interesting things about the two navies.  I think the crew size for LCS is supposed to be at most 75, whereas the much smaller 056 is expected to have 60 to 70 crews (even that is a reduction to 1/3 of Type 053).  Even though Type 056 is far more complex and automated than the ships it is replacing, it's probably safe to say that it still lags modern Western ships.  I think a large part of that has to do with the greater number of service personnels at the disposal of PLAN.  Even with the rising labour cost in China, I think it's safe to assume that the compensation for a USN sailor is far higher than that of a PLAN sailor.  Another part to look at is the huge leap facing sailors who are accustomed to operating a low tech ship like type 037 (I was told no training is required to be on that ship) to type 056.  It's simply unrealistic to expect someone who has operated on Type 037/053 for their entire life to be able to be competent on something like LCS.  As PLAN continues modernization, this expected improvement in software is often overlooked when one looks at the new ships that are coming out.  The cost of training crew members will also go up as ships become more and more complicated.

Another interesting thing is the choice that the two navies made in developing these two ships.  LCS is a ship expected to be modular enough to be able to easily reconfigure for different roles by changing to different mission packages.  I expect different variants of Type 056 to come with each variant built with specific role in mind.  Similary to Type 037, I would expect to see a Type 056 emphasize more toward ASW and one more emphasized toward patrol and another more emphasized toward ASuW.  At the same time, LCS had the requirements to be able to travel at faster than 40 knots and also be extremely stealthy.  It certainly pushes the technological envelope, whereas Type 056 does not.  LCS is not only a new ship design but also requires new weapon system.  Whereas PLAN rarely builds a shipping class that requires leap in both the ship design and its weapon system.  I think this shows the background of both navies.  USN always had a lot of money to spend, so it is willing to press for that additional performance on the newest ships in the face of budget overruns and delays.  In comparison, PLAN had very little money back in the days and most of its programs was canned in the 80s and 90s due to lack of funding.  So as a result of this, it has always been more conservative in incorporating improvement from one shipping class to the next.  Compared to USN, PLAN is more frugal in the development of new ships and the management of its existing fleet.  As an example, Type 052 underwent modernization recently, but the old HH-7 SAM was kept around instead of being replaced by more advance HQ-10 SAM.  PLAN has a large stock of HH-7 missiles in stock and did not want them to go to waste by removing them from the ships undergoing modernization.  It will be interesting to see how the perspectives of the two navies change in the future as PLAN continues to get more funding whereas USN starts to face austerity.