Navy leadership, as a community, doesn't like it much when these type of upper level debates get out through the press. The reality is, Flag officers in the Navy have debates and discussions internally all the time, so it doesn't necessarily mean anything that different Flag officers will promote different ideas in a private discussion and there will be disagreement in those discussions. What does mean something is when the discussion goes public, because that suggests there is a legitimate split in the surface warfare community on what the best way ahead is.
Each topic mentioned in the Defense News article is a unique subject, so I intend to treat each topic as such when discussing. The first big topic is the debate over the way ahead for high end surface combatants. I've been discussing for years the split, which is actually into two main groups and a third minor group. The first main group is the DDG-51 Flight III crowd who prefers to continue the evolution of the existing Arleigh Burke class destroyers because it is suggested to have the least cost risk and can presumably be fielded the fastest. The second main group is the new destroyer crowd who sees the Arleigh Burke class as lacking the growth margin necessary to stay competitive for the next 50-65 years the new ship class would be expected to serve. By 50-65 years I mean a new Flight III built later this decade would be delivered around 2025 and be expected to serve until 2065, and if the Flight III is still being build in 2030 the ship would be fielded in 2035 and serve until 2075 - 62 years from now.
The third crowd, which is small and not really a legitimate option, advocates using the DDG-1000 hull for a new destroyer. Let me be clear, DDG-1000 as a three ship class is great for keeping the industrial base solid and has some great new technologies that will have significant, positive long term impacts to the US Navy, but the hull is not a model for the future. Let the DDG-1000 be a class of three, my bet is long term no one in the Navy will regret having built three ships and no one in the Navy will regret the decision to build no more than three ships.
I'm in the second crowd that believes the Navy needs a new destroyer. As things already are, a Flight IIA DDG-51 built in 2017 is going to be fielded in 2022, and be expected to serve as a relevant capability until 2062, meaning the DDG-51 will serve the US Navy at least 70 years - longer than any other US Navy ship than the USS Constitution. It is possible DDG-51 will still field a relevant combat capability in 2062 when the last of the ships are retiring. It's also unlikely. Those who believe DDG-51 will be relevant must first point to a ship commissioned in 1943 that would be relevant today. The counter argument to that is USS Iowa (BB-61) and USS New Jersey (BB-62) were commissioned in 1943, and both would be relevant today. All I will say is when a piece of equipment is absurdly unaffordable, it is not relevant.
The Navy needs a new surface combatant, and this is my argument why.
SWOs, take this as a compliment. As a community you only really care about what you can see, touch, hold, handle, etc.. yourself. If you don't have it and don't use it, it's a powerpoint slide and you couldn't care less about it. Good quality to have. DDG-1000 is both a blessing and a curse. It is going to be a mess, and will also be fantastic. The electric drive of DDG-1000 is going to change the way the Navy thinks about power on warships, and once SWOs have the capability to use power in a dynamic way, they will never want to be without that capability.
So my first key for the future of surface warfare is the development of a roadmap for electric drive, and DDG-51 Flight X doesn't do that.
The Navy must get operations and maintenance costs down. As much as people bitch and moan about the cost of ships, anyone who actually looks at defense budgets knows that procurement of "stuff" in the Navy budget is not where the future cost growth or the big expenses are. Reducing operations and maintenance costs of new ships is the key to sustaining a fleet large enough to be responsive to the demand signal of politicians leading a superpower. As much as the LCS is hated upon by people, even in profiles where the ship races around the world at high speed with a tanker in tow and has contractor maintenance all over the word, the CBO and Navy numbers both show today that LCS is still less expensive than the current FFGs over the life of the ship, and every LCS that replaces a FFG saves the Navy money - even with additional crew on LCS.
So my second key for the future of surface warfare is the development of a roadmap that reduces the operations, manning, and maintenance costs of large surface combatants over the life of the ship without allowing quality degradation of the ship over time, and DDG-51 Flight X doesn't do that.
Finally, technology is rapidly changing best practices. Admiral Greenert's single most important contribution to the US Navy so far as CNO is to get everyone thinking about the future in a platform/systems context. It's not a new idea to the Navy, see how Spruance/Ticondoroga shared a hull, for example. What is new on top of this concept however is the integrated reliance of CEC, and several of the advances we are seeing in networked ASW sonar tech. Now Navy has Hawkeye 2000, AMDR, AESA radars, new sonar tech, P-8, unmanned sensor capabilities, etc.. all being integrated to enable AEGIS to be a legitimate theater level networked combat capability unlike anything ever fielded before. Modern Surface Warfare executes US political policy in what I call the four primary domains US Policy depends on for Strategic Dominance; Sea, Air, Space, and Cyber. For the air and space picture, getting AMDR right and insuring the ship can support (via power) a radar for the duration of the life of the ship is critical for the future of surface warfare.
So my last key for the future of surface warfare is the development of a hull sized to support power capacity and sensor equipment that will remain relevant to the battlespace environment AEGIS is being fielded in, and DDG-51 Flight X doesn't do that.
To me that means Navy needs a new large surface combatant hull form at between 10,000 - 12,000 tons (not named DDG-1000), and needs a plan to fill the gap of time it will take to develop a new 21st century warship. In my opinion, if the Navy designs the large surface combatant hull form right, the hull should be able to support different variants that field different types of payloads (systems). My thoughts are heavily influenced by the work and opinions of many others, a great source for those who want to understand the primary issues is Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress by Ronald O'Rourke (PDF). Allow me to suggest the bottom 2/3s of Page 41 is required reading for all.
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