First Four Thoughts

I recommend taking a look at all 33 slides in this document, but these four in particular stood out to me.

 The 1970 list above doesn't count China, and as such 8 of the top 10 nation defense spenders in 1970 were treaty allies of the United States. In 1980, only 4 of the top 10 defense spenders were treaty allies. In 1990 and 2000 six of the top 10 nations are treaty allies of the US, but by 2010 the number is back down to 5.

Noteworthy, 2010 is the only year listed above where 2 of the top 10 national defense spenders in the world aren't facing off against each other in a power struggle. In 1970, 1980, and 1990 above the US and Soviet Union could be suggested to be in such a struggle, and in 2000 China and Taiwan were. In 2010 the closest to anything like that is Japan and China, and it would be a stretch to call their relationship in 2010 or even 2013 a cold war.

 What will that chart look like in 2020? I wonder where the EU block will rank relative to rising nations. I also wonder if Japan will still pace China, because I won't be surprised if they do, even though nobody sees that possibility in June of 2013.

The US Navy hasn't claimed to need more than 375 ships since the end of the cold war, but never dipped below the stated requirement for total ships until until Admiral Clark revised the total force requirement up in 2002. Ironically, it was under CNO Admiral Clark's watch the Navy dipped below 300 ships, and to this day the Navy still lacks a credible plan to actually get back to 300 ships.

Worth noting, over the last 4 decades, the only time the Navy fleet has increased significantly, and by that I mean by more than 10 ships to the total force number, it involved a political partnership between DoD and Navy civilian leaders. Until the day the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy are speaking about increasing ship force totals together, there is no reason to believe the number of Navy ships will go up. That is basically what history tells us. Over the last four decades, it appears the CNO has very little influence on whether the fleet size increases, the CNO only decides how it increases, or more commonly... decreases.

I found this slide to be one of the most interesting in the entire series, because it demonstrates in decent detail why 2001-2010 is the worst decade in US naval history. How many times have you heard someone in the Navy decry the decade of the 1990s? Play with the numbers between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010, and explain to me how the post-cold war decline was managed worse than the first decade of the 21st century, at a time the nation was at war.

What is the most remarkable thing about this slide is that it notes how much efficiency was gained within the Navy's various communities, and yet how badly the Navy was also managed. The entire air wing was consolidated around the F-18 platform, Navy RW was consolidated around the H-60 platform. Every new submarine funded in the decade was a Virginia class. The Navy funded the second pair of Littoral Combat Ships and all 3 DDG-1000s with the SCN budget for decade 2001-2010, and the rest of the surface combatants built were the efficient cost DDG-51s. Noteworthy, the first two of each LCS design was not funded with the SCN, but is counted in the chart above anyway.

This slide reveals how even though the Navy was achieving remarkable efficiency within the various communities of the Navy, and even though the budget for the 2001-2010 decade was significantly higher than 1991-2000 decade, the Navy ultimately built fewer ships in the 2001-2010 decade than the 1991-2000 decade. To add insult to injury, factor in the Balisle report on surface force readiness that declined significantly over the decade.

The decade 2001-2010 featured six first in class designs: Ford class nuclear powered aircraft carriers, Zumwalt class destroyers, San Antonio class Landing Platform Dock, Freedom class Littoral Combat Ships, Independence class Littoral Combat Ships, and Lewis and Clark class dry cargo ship.

The Lewis and Clark class dry cargo ships were the only programs to stay on cost and schedule. The success stories of 2001-2010, like the Arleigh Burke class multi-year procurement and the Virginia class submarine program plan, were products of the previous decade.