The Liberation of Naval Intelligence Collection

Although I am not an intelligence officer, I’ve been privileged to work closely with many bright, talented intel professionals across the services and government over the past two decades.  It goes without saying that the Snowden espionage case has been a shock to many who serve in the intelligence community.  I won't/can't discuss the implications of that egregious breach, but what is overlooked in discussions surrounding it is that the insider threat is only one of the current dangers facing state run intelligence organizations.  What might be more threatening over the long term to those who work in in this field, including naval intelligence, is the ongoing erosion of their monopoly of the use of high-end collection capabilities.

The availability of various tools and techniques to non-state actors such as terrorists, activists, and insurgents to acquire, analyze, and collect intelligence on the disposition, tactics, and intentions of naval forces will require adjustment in how navies do business and maintain operational security.  Some of these tools include:   

IMINT - Twenty years ago, only a handful of governments had access to high-resolution satellite imagery.  Now, commercial imagery services, and processing/analysis tools such as Google Earth, are becoming better, cheaper to access, and easier to use every day. Moreover, for less than $1000, someone can build or buy a rudimentary tactical UAV capable of flying pre-planned search patterns on autopilot, while collecting and streaming real-time imagery to smart phones or tablets.  Imagery that can then be disseminated over-the-horizon, and coordinated with other collectors.  We have seen eco-activists use this capability at sea and it is only a matter until other maritime non-state actors use the same aircraft for more nefarious purposes.

HUMINT - There are commercially available vehicles that can now provide superb human intelligence on denied areas in many cases more timely, just as accurately, and much more affordably than the government agencies chartered with that task.  These platforms are enabled by the same technologies that have increased productivity elsewhere - ubiquitous internet and smart phones, which coincidentally are increasingly found in regions of the world where the rest of the infrastructure is extremely austere.  The crowd-sourcing of HUMINT via social media is another interesting emerging field.

Computer Network Exploitation - For some time now, private hackers and other miscreants have become quite proficient at socially and technically engineering our credit card numbers, accessing corporate networks, etc.  It stands to reason that as more naval data networks come on line - especially those in the RF spectrum - they will eventually be targeted by non-state actors.

Other capabilities, such as online tools for tracking ships’ AIS signals, home-made unmanned underwater vehicles, and unattended maritime sensors round out the portfolio of the non-state naval intel collector. Though some capabilities are still out of the reach of these actors for now, expect more and more collection tools, especially those that listen to and make sense of the crowded electromagnetic spectrum, to come online.

The implications of this democratization of intel collection will be long-term and wide-spread.  “Friendly” ports calls may actually be filled with unfriendly collectors, armed with hand-held collection tools disguised in the form of smart phones.  EMCON and encryption remain important, just as they are to shield against collection from state foreign intelligence services. The forgotten art of naval deception should be revisited and balanced in light of friendly navies' increased propensity for strategic communications transparency via social media and public affairs.   

MINERVA works to expose Iran's clandestine smuggling routes.

Not all of these non-state actors should be viewed as threats, however.  In some cases, their interests may be aligned with friendly navies.  An interesting example is the Maritime Intelligence Network and Rogue Vessel Analysis (MINERVA) system.  This group uses a variety of the above-mentioned techniques focused on exposing Iran’s attempts to circumvent sanctions, especially oil smuggling.  A useful adjunct to this work would be to begin collecting and illuminating the more dangerous aspects of Iran’s clandestine maritime rat lines, especially weapons smuggling to insurgents involved in conflicts of interest in places such as Syria and Yemen.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.