The Opportunties of Yesterday and Tomorrow

 The following slides come from The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, December 2011 pages 19-20.

This slide describing the 1970s might as well be describing today. Build up and rely more on alliances and partners? Check. Accept less than victory in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Check. Avoid "another Iraq" or "another Afghanistan?" Check. Deter and plan against North Korean attack on South Korea? Check. Maintain Arab-Israeli Middle East peace while balancing our support for Israel and key Arab states? Check. Ensure western access to oil? Check.

Noteworthy the US role regarding stability in the Gulf is different today. Stability at sea? Check. Stability in the Gulf states? Hmm. Constraining the influence of radical extremists in the Middle East and Africa? Lets be honest, we are not doing very well in that regard. Prevent spillover into Latin America? The convergence threat between radical extremist groups and narcotics traffickers is an issue SOUTHCOM is monitoring every day. The leaders of Greece and Turkey are dealing with so many internal problems today they don't really have time to worry too much about the other right now.

Equivalent shares among the services (“1/3-1/3-1/3”). Sad to say, but that's the only defense strategy the United States military has derived from evolving national security policy over the last 4 decades. The socialist model for redistribution of resources conquered the Pentagon long before the Communists fell in the cold war. When your national defense strategy is based on a fraction, of course you are going to accept less than victory in war. One might even observe that when defense strategy starts with a fraction, the result might end with a fraction - for example a nation might do strategically questionable things like fight a land war in Asia in pursuit of questionable strategic objectives for over 2/5s of the last half century.

And yet, in the 1970s, when the nation was struggling with economic issues related to energy costs and other factors, while the Soviet Navy was increasing in capability and strength, while the military was suffering a post-Vietnam decline in both force and resource allocation, and despite little interest in naval power at the higher levels of defense as the focus shifted towards the Red Army in Europe scenario of war planning...

The Navy developed a few new toys.

Nimitz class aircraft carriers, Ohio class ballistic missile submarines, AEGIS surface combatants, F-18s, H-60s, the Trident missile, the Tomahwak cruise missile, VLS, LCAC...

In other words, despite major funding cuts by Congress - a process of cutting defense that was done much smarter than today's Congress that leverages sequestration - the US Navy developed the capabilities that remain - 3 decades later - the foundation of American seapower.

Here is what is even more interesting. If the President can actually step up (very unclear) and get Congress to manage defense more responsibly (just as unclear), the list one might create based on current plans for the decade 2011-2020 will look something like this:

MLP, AFSB, LSD(X), SSBN(X), Virginia class SSN, UCLASS, EMALS, AMDR, Ford-class CVNs, DDG-1000s, LCS-1s, LCS-2s, DDG-51s, LPD-17s, LHA(X), LH(X), F-18E/F, F-35B, F-35C, EA-18G.

With a miracle... and by that I mean somehow government leaders fix the sequestration mess we are in, the Navy may also field Rail Guns, LDUUVs, and Lasers, but honestly none of that is not likely to happen this decade. I have hopes the LCS MIW mission module works out well enough it would get included on the list, but time will tell.

That's really not a bad decade if you think about it. Sequestration obviously makes the current plan the list above is based upon very uncertain. What is certain is that with 7 years of the decade remaining, things can still get better or worse, and my glass is half full.