Choosing War

Johnson, McNamara and Rusk

Obama, Rice, and Power

Logevall's Choosing War

Today’s news would seem to point to a Congressional shift in favor of supporting President Obama’s request for nation’s legislative branch to sanction military action against Syria. The President has gone to great lengths to state that operations against Syria would not be like those undertaken against Afghanistan or Iraq, and that they would not involve the commitment of American ground forces. In this assessment Obama is correct. His drift toward military action in Syria does not resemble recent conflicts but instead is eerily similar to President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s choice of war in Vietnam in the period from the beginning of 1964 through the March 1965 deployment of the first U.S. combat troops. A short analysis of the similar Johnson and Obama reactions to potential conflict abroad should tell lawmakers that inaction in Syria need not harm wider U.S. interests. Avoiding direct military involvement would in fact give the U.S. more flexibility and international credibility in dealing with the Syrian civil war.

     Lyndon Johnson was not interested in waging a war in Southeast Asia. In fact, he was desperate to avoid a conflict that might compete with the funding requirements for his expansive domestic agenda. His national security team, primarily composed of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly urged or at least did not dissuade the President from pursuing an aggressive stand against North Vietnam. These advisors were concerned that if the U.S. did not respond to North Vietnamese aggression, the nation would lose credibility in its dealings with the Soviet Union, China and other communist threats. Johnson was concerned about his own credibility as a national security leader and did not want to be perceived as soft on communist aggression. The U.S. public was supportive of military action to deter communist aggression, but close NATO allies like Great Britain and France were unconvinced that military action was the best solution to the Vietnamese civil war. Ultimately, largely for reasons dealing with his own credibility vice that of the nation, Johnson chose to fight a war he did not want that eventually cost 58000 Americans their  lives. The Swedish historian Frederik Logevall details this active “choice” of war in his 1999 book Choosing War. Johnson’s own credibility as a foreign and domestic policy leader, rather than actual national interest was in Logevall’s opinion the tipping point for what became a long, costly and ultimately a failed attempt to control the political situation in Vietnam.

     The march toward war in Syria is similar to Lyndon Johnson’s dilemma with Vietnam. President Obama, like Johnson is more committed to domestic rather than foreign policy efforts. His national security team of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, National Security Advisor Susan Rice, Secretary of State John Kerry and United Nations Ambassador Samantha Power also seem to either be at best not hindering or at worst propelling the President toward war as Johnson’s advisors did. The President’s declarations of a “red line” involving Syrian use of chemical weapons have made the issue of his administration’s credibility, rather than that of the nation on the whole at stake in whether or not to join hostilities. As in the mid 1960s, many close U.S. friends and allies are wary of direct military involvement in the Syrian Civil War without a defined end state. Potential adversaries/competitors like Russia, China and Iran have the potential to exploit unilateral U.S. involvement in the Syrian civil war in many of the same ways the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea exploited the U.S. situation in Vietnam. Ultimately U.S. resolve in Vietnam led to the worst defeat for U.S. interests in the Cold War, not so much from the physical loss of South Vietnam, but instead from all of the rather undemocratic tools and methods the U.S. was increasingly forced to employ in order to defeat communist insurgents and North Vietnamese forces. Despite defeat in Vietnam, the U.S. ultimately salvaged much of its reputation as a defender of democratic principles. The U.S. example of democratic government rather than its direct military success was a significant determining factor in winning the Cold War. Today even Vietnam seeks U.S. friendship and could even be an ally against Chinese expansion and aggression in the Pacific.

     President Obama and U.S. legislators would do well to consider the lessons of both Vietnam and the more recent war in Iraq before embarking on a slow slide toward direct involvement in Syria. President George W. Bush was pilloried at home and abroad for the 2003 invasion and subsequent long war in Iraq, but unlike Johnson, Bush entered war with a concern for national and not personal interests, and an exit strategy of a free and democratic Iraq. When methods in use could not produce U.S. success in suppressing Iraqi insurgents, he was willing to radically change the nature of U.S. involvement including large infusions of troops in the 2007 “Iraqi Surge”. President Bush also had greater U.S. financial resources to use in the Iraq conflict. Long years of war and budget shortages make a similar big effort in Syria much more difficult.

     In summation, personal credibility is a poor starting part for convincing a democracy to join a civil war. The U.S. can better preserve its own interests and those of the peoples of the Middle East by remaining clear of direct military involvement. Civil wars are almost always more violent and destructive then traditional wars. Nothing however unites opponents in a civil war better than the intervention of an outside force, particularly that of the world’s most powerful military state. Humanitarian aid, continued involvement with United Nations efforts, and perhaps hosting a Syrian government in exile which could be carefully observed and vetted to ensure its democratic bona fides would allow the U.S. to retain its impartiality and improve its chances for success in ensuring a favorable outcome. As long as the Syrian regime is not directly threatening U.S. friends in the region as Saddam Hussein once did, or terrorist elements do not take over the Syrian state, there is no compelling strategic reason for the U.S. to become militarily involved. More likely, U.S. direct involvement will result in another broken “pottery barn” state for the U.S. to rebuild. U.S. lawmakers should reject calls for direct military involvement in the Syrian civil war. We cannot afford another long drawn-out war and unlike more recent conflicts in Afghanistan or Iraq, there is as of yet no U.S. strategic need for direct action.