![]() |
2002 ONA Publication |
![]() |
Andrew Marshall |
The U.S. method of
creating grand military strategy is very different from that of other great
powers of the recent past. Imperial Japan and Imperial Germany were dependent
on small, elite military staffs to provide concepts of grand strategy to even
smaller groups of military or civilian leaders. Nazi Germany and the Stalinist
Soviet Union relied too on military staffs but reserved final decisions for a
single dictatorial ruler. The British Empire for a long period of its history
relied on a fairly large professional national security organization of
appointed departmental civilian permanent undersecretaries. These powerful
individuals advised (and in many cases) moderated or controlled the
decision-making of elected officials. This system created a relatively constant
British foreign and defense policy over decades rather than just over the
tenure of one leader. One such official, Royal Marine Lieutenant Colonel
Maurice Hankey became the powerful Secretary to the Committee for Imperial
Defence, and held that position for the next 26 years. He advised numerous
Prime Ministers including his near-contemporary Winston Churchill and
eventually left government as Lord Hankey. These non-political officers
constituted what British Imperial historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher
referred to as “the official mind” and they gave it credit for the remarkable
stability in the management of the British Empire from the 1860s through the
1930s.
![]() |
Maurice Hankey |
The United States is
unique among global powers in that the vast bulk of national security
decision-making authority is vested in elected civilian leaders and their
political appointees, whose authority extends deep into the organization
structure of the Department of Defense. This arrangement began after the Second
World War with a need to manage the awesome power represented by nuclear
weapons, and a desire to ensure firm civilian control over both this technology
and the military officers who would wield it on the battlefield. It has
continued and grown over the last sixty years with a much expanded civilian
presence in the business of national security. Military advisors such as the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide strategic advice and geographic Combatant
Commanders manage battle plans for their theaters of operation. The U.S.
however has no “General Staff” of long service professional military officers
devoted to the creation of grand strategy, nor a powerful staff of professional
defense civilians capable of resisting political pressure to sea changes in
defense or foreign policy. There have been positive proposals for a U.S. system
of “national security professionals”, most recently through the now defunct
U.S.-based Project for National Security Reform (PNSR), but these appeals have
fallen on deaf ears. U.S. politicians enjoy their power over the U.S. Defense
Department and prefer to choose from sources of additional advice rather than
be forced to accept them from unelected bureaucrats.
Many of these come
from the vast “unofficial mind” of the U.S. in the form of its large number of
defense-oriented think tanks. These organizations, both government and
privately funded, are staffed with knowledgeable public intellectuals and
provide an array of analysis and opinions for politically-appointed defense
officials. Think tanks also have professional and in some cases partisan
divides based on their expert staff and funding sources. A U.S. presidential
administration may rely on think tank advice and appoint its experts to
defense-related positions, but it is not required to accept advice contrary to
its own position. Multiple think tanks united around a single cause can apply
significant pressure to change administration policy. This happened in the
early 1980s when several of these institutions combined forces in support of
the defense reorganization reform movement that culminated in the Goldwater
Nichols Act of 1986. This is a rare occurrence however and administrations are
usually quite effective in pursuing their own course in defense policy. The
legislative branch is usually required to intervene in a bipartisan fashion in
order to affect change as occurred at the end of the Vietnam War. Given this
situation, a presidential administration and its political appointees in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense might easily create a poor climate for truly
efficient national security decision-making by surrounding themselves with too
many people and opinions in direct agreement with their own.
This situation is why
the retention of the Net Assessment office and its direct access to the
Secretary of Defense is so vital. This is one independent institution within a
very political defense establishment. Mr. Marshall is the closest equivalent
the U.S. has to a “permanent undersecretary”. He and his staff of experts owe
no allegiance to a specific party or ideology. Since 1973 a succession of
thirteen Defense Secretaries has been beneficiary of ONA’s academic,
research-driven insights and analysis. The office has not always been correct,
but its presence as an independent source of national security thinking must be
maintained. Anyone who has worked in an office or organization that resists
outside influences or advice is aware of the dangers such behavior presents to an institution and its mission. Without the check
of an independent Office of Net Assessment, the Pentagon establishment is even
more in danger of such “group think” mentality. It is vital to retain the ONA in its present form and reporting arrangement in order to ensure
that at least one independent voice is heard in an increasingly partisan
Department of Defense.
No comments:
Post a Comment