Net Assessment of Net Assessment

I got to my garage office this morning all fired up to put a few thoughts down on the growing din surrounding the rumors of the closing of the Office of Net Assessment.  Lazarus' piece this morning makes a solid run at defending the Office, and joining a growing list of defenses (a flavor of which can be gotten here, here) from across the community of defense thinkers.  As of yet, I have not seen a single attempt to lay out why the office should be closed.  This imbalance alone is troubling to me, and I wonder whether or not the rush to defend ONA isn't simply an example of the "groupthink" mentality that Lazarus would have us believe ONA is essential in combatting.

I have no special insight on this subject, save only that of someone who has participated in ONA run war-garmes and who has a circle of very close friends who are vehement defenders of the status quo.  That said, a few questions present themselves:

1.  Has the function of Net Assessment and the Office of Net Assessment become conflated?  Reading defenses of the status quo would lead one to conclude that the current organization, its structure, independence, and leadership is the ONLY way in which DoD could generate quality net assessment.  I find it hard to believe that this is true.

2.   In times of serious budget cutting, is the "ONA only costs $XXM a year" defense defensible?  This is the logic of the rice bowl and the sacred cow, and taken to its absurd limit, would result in very few cuts to the defense budget. 

3.  How WRONG has ONA been?  This is perhaps the most interesting question of all.  The literature of the defense of ONA is littered with the triumphs of the organization, which are trumpeted by an ever increasing cadre of acolytes who move on from ONA to populate the defense and strategy shops of the most well-known think tanks and consulting firms in Washington.  These organizations then compete for ONA's coveted studies and analysis funding.  Over the course of 40 years, this group has grown in number and influence, and it represents the front-line troops in the battle to defend the current structure and organization of ONA.  Yet no one ever talks about the "mistakes" ONA has made.  Surely after 40 years, an organization with as free-ranging a mandate as ONA has made some mistakes?  Perhaps even some profound mistakes.  What have THESE been?  What influence have THEY had on Secretaries of Defense and Service Secretaries? 

As a sentient being I do not have enough information to lead me to conclude that ONA should remain in its current form and/or is as valuable as its defenders would have us believe, because all I have ever heard is HALF the story.  Nor do I have enough information to lead me to conclude that it should be altered.  What I have is a growing number of defenses of an organization that has nurtured a salutary relationship with an influential group of thinkers who can be called upon to rise to the defense of that organization when under fire.

I am ready to believe that bureaucratic infighting and jealousy are the only reason that ONA has been predictably and reliably attacked irrespective of the party in power.  I just haven't been convinced of it.  Smart, dedicated people over the years have looked at ONA and determined that the "juice wasn't worth the squeeze."  These people have not been heard from.

Bryan McGrath