AQAP's Continuing Seapower Strategy

A civil war in Syria, nuke deals with Iran, and a Chinese air defense zone have dominated the attention of national security watchers and policy makers.  Even so, al Qaeda's network continues to quietly operate and plot terror in its multiple safe havens dotted across Africa  and the Middle East.


Balhaf Terminal exports up to 12.5 billion cubic meters of gas per year. 

A few years ago, I wrote about how al Qaeda has deliberately employed sea power as part of its strategy against the West.  In short, this unwritten strategy contains three elements: 1) facilitating the movement of men, money, and munitions in support of AQ's operations; 2) earning revenue to sustain operations via taxation of ports; 3) disrupting SLOCs and oil infrastructure in order to raise the cost of energy and hurt the global economy.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its predecessors in Yemen have operationalized this strategy more than any other affiliate, with sea-borne attacks on USS COLE and MV LIMBERG, maritime facilitation to supply Somalia's al Shabaab, and a couple of amphibious-like operations along Yemen's southern coast.

Last week, AQAP again went to sea in support of the third line of operations when they attempted an attack against the Balhalf liquefied natural gas terminal, apparently foiled by Yemen's small navy.  Completed in 2010, the $4.5 billion Balhaf Liquified Natural Gas terminal exports gas from the Marib field to the coast via 320km of pipeline. The terminal and its surrounding pipelines have been the focus of a number of attacks the past few years, but this is perhaps the first water-borne attempt.

These activities may seem like small potatoes in the greater naval spectrum - and they are to a certain extent.  But taken with other irregular maritime threats proliferating globally, they represent vacuums in sea power that when filled with non-state actors have greater implications for modern navies. Is protecting oil infrastructure and defeating pirates a job for a handful of multi-billion dollar warships, or flotillas of more numerous, more affordable small combatants?  Might distributed maritime operations using both manned and unmanned vessels be a better force construct against irregular threats than CSGs and ARGs?  What is the best way for Marine Corps, joint SOF, and Navy teams to get after these rogue maritime elements in a discrete footprint, politically palatable manner?  How can naval aviation detect, track, and engage threats that blend in with local fishing and commercial traffic? When does it make sense for the US to unilaterally and quickly deal with these threats versus enabling our partners or deferring to our allies?

The views in this post are those of the author alone, presented in his personal capacity.