The problem with Paine's piece is that there are glimmers of insight, enough to trick the uninitiated into thinking that this was an authoritative piece. He appropriately identifies the strategic communications difficulty that the US Navy has, and the challenges of explaining to policy makers (and the public) why it should maintain such a powerful and globally deployed force. Every generation of Navy leaders faces this question and it has ground down some very good thinkers. What seems self-evident to some represents unprovable assertions to others.
Additionally, he cites a number of very positive things about the Navy, which in some fashion comprise at least part of a good argument for maintaining one, including this little gem that points to the flexibility of aircraft carriers: "When the United States attacked Afghanistan in 2001, for
instance, the lack of available airbases within striking distance of the
landlocked country led the army to use aircraft carriers as forward bases for
its helicopters."
The meat of his argument (presumably the "lost its way" part) rests on two main thrusts. The first is that if our Navy is designed to protect our merchant fleet, it hasn't done a particularly good job of it; and the second is what seems to be his discomfort with the Navy engaging in humanitarian and disaster relief missions.
"Early
advocates for a U.S. Navy considered protection of the nation’s foreign trade
as the primary rationale for such a force, and so do their modern counterparts.
Yet today, this close identification of naval strategy with maritime trade has
changed beyond all recognition. Foreign-flag ships carry 98 percent of U.S.
imports and exports. Moreover, the U.S. merchant marine -- the nation’s
commercial shipping fleet -- usually fares poorly in major wars, in large part
because protecting the nation’s trade is not foremost in the navy’s thinking."
Where to begin...while a properly sized American flag merchant marine is in our interests, the fact that our trade moves on ships flagged by other nations in no way diminishes the requirement that it be protected. Freedom of the seas is the aim, so that our goods and the goods of others can move unmolested from place to place. The second assertion, that the U.S. merchant marine usually "fares poorly" in major wars, is supported by the following statistics:
"Things
did not improve much in World War I, when the United States lost 197 merchant
ships but only 97 warships" and "Worst
of all, however, was the horrendous loss of merchant ships during World War II.
The United States lost more than 1,500 freighters and passenger ships, but less
than half as many warships."
There are lies, damnable lies, and statistics, and I frankly cannot make sense of this one. That in the two World Wars, the enemy preferred to attack lightly or unarmed merchants as opposed to armed warships by a two-to-one margin, seems to me to be more of an indication of the sensibility of the opponent than the disregard of the US Navy for our merchant Fleet. It is also perhaps, a reflection of the target density. It is not however, indicative of something more sinister.
As for the discussion of the Navy's role in humanitarian relief efforts, Paine does a good job of defining the benefits of the mission as seen by Navy officials:
"There
is little doubt that the navy is often well positioned to assist littoral
states facing emergencies, and that its organizational skills enable the rapid
deployment of precious resources in difficult situations. This humanitarian
role is considered good for the morale of active duty personnel and, to the
extent that they are aware of it, the general public. Supporters of the program
cite practical benefits such as improved operational preparedness, a heightened
appreciation of U.S. intentions among foreign nationals, and the opportunity to
work with military counterparts in other countries."
Paine however, takes us in a different direction, asking, "If the United States wants a forward-deployed humanitarian
assistance program, why doesn’t it develop one under civilian control and with
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance as its actual priorities? Blurring
the lines between military preparedness, “soft-power” diplomacy, and
humanitarianism may “improve foreign opinion of the United States” on the
ground, but it is unlikely to influence a government’s policy objectives. On
the domestic side, this mission creep is indicative of a growing tendency to
militarize and centralize U.S. foreign policy.
If his fear is the "growing tendency to militarize...U.S. foreign policy", I don't think he would get much of an argument these days. We hear the same kinds of things from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others who argue vocally for sufficient resources for diplomacy and development. But if his argument is that we should develop some kind of civilian run entity with the "...organizational skills" to "...enable the rapid deployment of precious resources in difficult situations....", then I would ask him just from where those resources would come? Would he duplicate some portion of Navy force structure to enable this new organization? This would prove prohibitively expensive. Would he cut the Navy's budget in order to fund this activity? He would find that very little of the Navy's budget actually funds these activities, as they are carried out by forces already forward deployed with the primary mission of credible combat response. Would he turn over Navy force structure to this new civilian organization? He would diminish the nation's security posture.
Mr. Paine can't seem to figure out what he wants from the Navy, and in writing about it, he unknowingly raises the bigger and more important point that many of us wrestle with every day, that of clearly and coherently articulating the value of American Seapower. Mr. Paine's piece does not advance this goal.
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