Foreign Entanglements: Able Archer 83

On this week's episode of Foreign Entanglements, Nate Jones and I go over the latest from National Security Archive...
 
For more on maritime aspects of the exercise, see here.

A Bad Morality and a Bad Philosophy

This is fascinating stuff, as much for the blood and gore of Age of Sail naval warfare as for the legal complications associated with impressed Americans in the War of 1812:

At Plymouth we heard some vague rumors of a declaration of war against America. More than this, we could not learn, since the utmost care was taken to prevent our being fully informed. The reason of this secrecy was, probably, because we had several Americans in our crew, most of whom were pressed men, as before stated. These men, had they been certain that war had broken out, would have given themselves up as prisoners of war, and claimed exemption from that unjust service, which compelled them to act with the enemies of their country. This was a privilege which the magnanimity of our officers ought to have offered them. They had already perpetrated a grievous wrong upon them in impressing them; it was adding cruelty to injustice to compel their service in a war against their own nation. 

But the difficulty with naval officers is, that they do not treat with a sailor as with a man. They know what is fitting between each other as officers; but they treat their crews on another principle; they are apt to look at them as pieces of living mechanism, born to serve, to obey their orders, and administer to their wishes without complaint. This is alike a bad morality and a bad philosophy.

Long Range Navy ISR - Smart Choices

General Atomics Mariner

I had started a reply to a comment from Hokie_1997 in Galrahn's post below, but it became too long, so I'm using the blogger's prerogative to reply here.

The Triton's flight is a very positive development towards filling current and projected gaps in long range Navy scouting. That said, despite the significant money and time the Navy has put into this program, I'm not sure it's the right choice.  Here are the 4 primary reasons I like a maritime variant of the MQ-9 over the Triton:
1) Capability - The range delta between the Reaper and Guardian is fairly significant, but the MQ-9 is no slouch; compare about 4,000 NM/20 hrs endurance for the MQ-9 vs. 11,000 NM/31 hrs for Triton.  At one point, General Atomics was developing an even longer-ranged maritime variant for the Navy's BAMS competition that had a 49 hour endurance.

Hokie pointed out that extreme range was imperative for operating in the Pacific.  Yes that ocean is vast, but between Japan, Guam, Hawaii, Midway, Australia etc. we have enough friendly airfields to cover that water with the shorter-ranged platform (not that the mid-Pacific is very important in any sort of foreseeable fight).  Moreover, pure range/endurance isn't necessarily the most desire trait for maritime ISR (see #4).  In addition to an acceptable range for most maritime ISR scenarios, Reaper has about twice the payload, including:
2) Weaponization - Finding a target in the middle of the open ocean is great.  But during combat, if we don't have enough ships, subs and long range missiles to engage the target the Triton finds (and we don't), then so what?  The Reaper can find, fix, and finish a maritime target with one platform.  The ability to drop a dozen Hellfires or 2 ship-killing 500 lb precision guide munitions would be of value in both low and high end war-at-sea scenarios.
3) Compatibility - The military has so many combat-proven General Atomics planes flying now that we have developed a huge supporting infrastructure.  In addition to just platform acquisition costs, for any given beyond-line-of site unmanned aircraft system, there are costs associated with satellite bandwidth, ground control stations, launch and recovery elements, maintenance, and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) systems for the intelligence the aircraft collects. Furthermore, the Reaper is a much more tactically friendly aircraft able to beam down full motion video and other sensor data to distributed tactical forces, performing much more like a current P-3 is able to tie a theater asset to tactical surface/ground units.  The Tritons are designed to provide ISR collection to theater and higher level staffs, but don't do much for individual ships at sea and Marines operating far ashore.
4) Maybe the most important attribute for any program these days: Cost - the Navy can buy more than ten MQ-9s for the cost of one MQ-4C.  Capability is one thing, but one airframe can only do one patrol at a time.  We can cover more ISR orbits while achieving efficiencies in training, PED infrastructure, and maintenance with more vehicles.  Interestingly, the Eurohawk project was recently canceled for cost reasons.

Bottom line: I hope Triton is a success, and I hope we don't bust the airborne ISR budget in the process of acquiring it.  But if the program falters technically or runs over budget, the Navy should quickly shift fire to a marinized MQ-9B or C.  As an added bonus, the Sea Avenger is designed to be operated from the land or carriers (it's one of the contenders in the Navy's UCLASS competition).  The Navy is essentially broke and it's time to make tough, smart choices with positive long term consequences. I'm just not sure the Triton passes that test.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Camo Gray and Never Underway

USS Freedom (LCS 1) in what is becoming a rare sight - somewhere besides a pier or dry dock.

On May 21, 2024 USS Freedom (LCS 1) got underway from Singapore but was forced to return to Changi Naval Base approximately eight hours later due to an engineering casualty.

The new casualty is related to the incident in late April when ship's force detected a seawater intrusion in the port combining gear. Ship's force suspected a failed reduction gear seawater cooler as the source of the intrusion. At that time the ship had requested that an outside activity (shipyard) be made available to inspect and repair the port combining gear lube oil seawater cooler and either repair or replace the seawater cooler tube bundle.

On Tuesday evening ship's force inspection revealed rust on two of the reduction gear casings.  Bearing temperatures remained normal, and downstream lube oil samples remained clear during system operations.  The Navy is working to re-clean the sumps with hot oil, replenish filters, and resume operations.

When I heard about the first problem back on April 29th, it was suggested I should probably consult EN 1&C. Good advice, from 4-3 here (PDF).

EFFECTS OF WATER AND ACID IN OIL.—Water in the oil is extremely harmful. Even small amounts soon cause pitting and corrosion of the teeth. Acid can cause even more serious problems. The oil must be tested frequently for water, and periodic tests should be made for acid content. Immediate corrective measures must be taken when saltwater is found in the reduction gear lubricating oil system.

Occasionally gross contamination of the oil by saltwater occurs when a cooler leaks or when leaks develop in a sump. The immediate location and sealing of the leak is not enough. Additional steps must be taken to remove the contaminated oil from all steel parts. Several instances are known when, because such treatment was postponed—sometimes for a week or less—gears, journals, and couplings became so badly corroded and pitted that it was necessary to remove the gears and recondition the teeth and journals. Saltwater contamination of the lubricating oil may also cause bearing burnout.

Water, in small amounts, is always present within the lubrication system as a result of condensation. Air which enters the units contains moisture. This moisture condenses into water when it strikes a cooler surface and subsequently mixes with the oil. The water displaces the oil from the metal surfaces and causes rusting. Water
mixed with oil also reduces the lubricating value of the oil itself.

When the main engines are secured, the oil should be circulated until the temperature of the oil and that of the reduction gear casing approximate the engine room temperature. While the oil is being circulated, the cooler should be operated and the gear should be jacked continuously. The purifier should also be operated to renovate the oil while the oil is being circulated and after the oil circulation is stopped until water is no longer discharged from the purifier. This procedure eliminates condensation from the interior of the main reduction gear casing and reduces rusting in the upper gear case and gears.

Generally, lubricating oil will be maintained in good condition if proper use is made of the purifier and settling tanks. However, if the purifier does not operate satisfactorily and does not have the correct water seal, it will not separate the water from the oil. You can check for the presence of water by taking small samples of oil in bottles, and allowing the samples to settle. These samples should be taken from a low point in the lube oil system.

Samples of lubricating oil should be tested at every opportunity for acid, water, and sediment content at a naval shipyard (or other similar activity). With continuous use, lube oil increases in acidity, and free fatty acids form a mineral soap which reacts with the oil to form an emulsion. As the oil emulsifies, it loses its lubricating quality. Once the oil has emulsified, the removal of water and other impurities becomes increasingly difficult. When the formation of a proper oil film is rendered impossible, the oil must be renovated.

Sometimes, when a ship from the reserve fleet is placed back in commission, the rust preventive compound is not removed completely. The residue of this compound may cause serious emulsification of the lubricating oil. Operating with emulsified oil may result in damage to the bearings or the reduction gears. Since it is extremely difficult aboard ship to destroy emulsions by heating, settling, and centrifuging, you must make sure that emulsions do not occur. At the first indication of an emulsion, the plant should be stopped and the oil renovated.

Finally, because all I can do is laugh, or cry, at this point, the following talking points on the USS Freedom (LCS 1) deployment to date have been provided by a friend whom shall remain nameless.

"Due to her reliance on contractor maintenance, combined with additional and unexpected opportunities to repair equipment well before the expected maintenance intervals, FREEDOM is actually stimulating the American marine repair industry. Further, due to the travel costs involved with sending technical support teams from the United States, FREEDOM is further supporting the American airline industry. I don't like to think of things breaking as a bad thing - but rather as an opportunity to support our partners in industry and the American economy writ large."

It is going to be very difficult for LCS to prove itself in an overseas deployment if the ship can't get off the bleeping pier.

MQ-4C Triton Takes Flight

ALMDALE, Calif. (May 21, 2024) Two Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicles are seen on the tarmac at a Northrop Grumman test facility in Palmdale, Calif. Triton is undergoing flight testing as an unmanned maritime surveillance vehicle. (U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman by Chad Slattery/Released)

From Danger Room.

The MQ-4C Triton took off today for the first time from a Palmdale, California airfield, a major step in the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program. Northrop Grumman, which manufactured the 130.9-foot-wingspan drone, said the maiden voyage lasted an hour and a half. The Navy even announced it via Twitter.

“First flight represents a critical step in maturing Triton’s systems before operationally supporting the Navy’s maritime surveillance mission around the world,” Capt. James Hoke, Triton’s program manager, said in a statement.

If the Triton looks familiar, it should. It’s a souped-up version of the Air Force’s old reliable spy drone, Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk. The Navy’s made some modifications to the airframe and the sensors it carries to ensure it can spy on vast swaths of ocean, from great height. (It’s unarmed, if you were wondering.)

The idea is for the Triton to achieve altitudes of nearly 53,000 feet — that’s 10 miles up — where it will scan 2,000 nautical miles at a single robotic blink. (Notice that wingspan is bigger than a 737's.) Its sensors, Northrop boasts, will “detect and automatically classify” ships, giving captains a much broader view of what’s on the water than radar, sonar and manned aircraft provide. Not only that, Triton is a flying communications relay station, bouncing “airborne communications and information sharing capabilities” between ships. And it can fly about 11,500 miles without refueling.

Read the rest at Danger Room.

The Navy has taken a very patient approach to large unmanned systems, too slow for some. With the MQ-4C Triton the Navy decided to go with a mature hardware design and take on the risk with the software. Despite the June 2012 crash in Maryland of a Global Hawk used for developing the Triton, I think everyone can agree the Navy has done a great job with the BAMS program.

Some will cite how the US Air Force has stepped back from the Global Hawk in favor of the U-2. That makes sense when the vast majority of US Air Force Global Hawk missions were being flown in dedicated missions to monitor specific targets, something the U-2 has been doing effectively for decades - and is still capable of doing at less cost. But over vast oceans, that 11,500 mile range at ten miles up role is much better suited for an unmanned aircraft because the platform's role is constant surveillance of a broad area, not dedicated surveillance of a specific area.

Thus the name: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS).

Between X-47B carrier launch and MQ-4C Triton, the US Navy has achieved major successes with two of the most important new Navy programs being worked on today in a span of just over a week. Northrop Grumman is having a good month.

When you count the first vertical takeoff of the F-35B earlier this week, the Department of the Navy is having a good month too.

House FY14 Mark

From here.

Congressman J. Randy Forbes (VA-04), Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, released today the legislative language of the Seapower Subcommittee’s mark of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member Mike McIntyre (NC) led the Seapower Subcommittee in producing a mark (PDF) which designates essential funding and sets priorities for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.

Everyone in the news is probably going to talk about the CVN part of the mark. I'll be focusing on a few other highlights that caught my attention.

Page 8: Multiyear procurement authority for E-2D aircraft program. This is a pretty big deal, and a good deal for everyone. The big five programs in Naval Aviation today that give the United States the big jump on the rest of the world are, in order, the EA-18G, the E-2D, P-8, MH/SH-60, and UCLASS. I believe the US Navy can screw up everything else in naval aviation, but if they get these five programs right, naval aviation will own the future.

Page 12: Annual Comptroller General Report on the Amphibious Combat Vehicle Acquisition Program. I had the opportunity a few years ago to really get to know the EFV up close and personal. No question, it is the most amazing piece of ground equipment ever built for the Marine Corps. It was also completely unaffordable. With that history in mind, having the GAO watch the new program like a hawk with an annual report is likely a very healthy thing for the program and for the Marine Corps. Marines don't like publicity, but respond well to it. The GAO will serve as a useful public spotlight for this program.

Page 15: Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration Testing Requirement. Basically Congress is making a law that forces the Navy to conduct an inflight refueling of the X-47B from a tanker aircraft. With all due respect to Congress and the Senate, but if you seriously have to write this into law, isn't it time to be a bit more diligent with your responsibilities when it comes time to approving Flag Officer promotions? Seems to me there are other, more effective ways, to send a clear message to the naval aviation community. Naval aviation leadership must be running a shit show when Congress has to use direct language to tell that community how to test their most promising technology.

Page 16: Limitation on Milestone A Activities for Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike System Program. Quoted in full:

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics may not award a Milestone A technology development contract with respect to the Unmanned Carrier-launched Surveillance and Strike system program until a period of 30 days has elapsed following the date on which the Under Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that the software and system engineering designs for the control system and connectivity and aircraft carrier segments of such program can achieve, with low level of integration risk, successful compatibility and interoperability with the air vehicle segment selected for contract award with respect to such program.

This is such a big topic. I really need to write about this topic.

Items of Special Interest

These are some of the general issue requests included in the Mark. Some are very interesting.

Air and Missile Defense Radar deployment on naval vessels

The Navy has reported that the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) suite is being developed to fulfill Integrated Air and Missile Defense requirements for multiple ship classes. This suite consists of an S-band radar (AMDR-S), an X-band radar and a Radar Suite Controller. AMDR would provide multi-mission capabilities, simultaneously supporting long-range, exoatmospheric detection, tracking and discrimination of ballistic missiles, as well as Area and Self Defense against air and surface threats. For the ballistic missile defense capability, increased radar sensitivity and bandwidth over current radar systems are needed to detect, track, and support engagements of advanced ballistic missile threats at the required ranges, concurrent with Area and Self Defense against Air and Surface threats. For the Area Air Defense and Self Defense capability, increased sensitivity and clutter capability is needed to detect, react to, and engage stressing Very Low Observable/Very Low Flyer threats in the presence of heavy land, sea, and rain
clutter.

According to the Government Accountability Office report “Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs" (GAO-13-294SP) from March 2013, “the Navy plans to install a 14-foot variant of AMDR on Flight III DDG 51s starting in 2019. According to draft AMDR documents, a 14-foot radar is needed to meet threshold requirements, but an over 20-foot radar is required to fully meet the Navy's desired integrated air and missile defense needs.”

The committee supports the continued development of the AMDR capability, but is concerned about the physical limitations associated with the future deployment of this capability on the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Flight III. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2014, that addresses the following:

1. The capability requirements associated with the AMDR;
2. Required space, cooling and electrical distribution upgrades necessary to support AMDR on the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Flight III;
3. An assessment as to whether the limitations associated with the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Flight III will negatively impact the deployment on AMDR;
4. An assessment of the deployment of AMDR on other naval platforms including the San Antonio-class Amphibious Transport Dock; and
5. An assessment of the expansion capacity of the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Flight III to support further spiral development associated with future weapons.

What a great idea. Congress is basically saying they see that there appears to be some disagreement on how to proceed with AMDR, and is basically telling the Navy to make their case for the platform they want to field AMDR. Very smart - pass the popcorn. The thing is, and it is apparent someone in Congress must know this already, the Navy has actually been doing these assessments regularly, and those assessments are critical of DDG-51 Flight III as the way ahead. Bottom line, Navy needs a roadmap for a new major surface combatant. Everyone knows this. SWO leadership is worried about this though, because a new design is expensive, and would likely end up reducing the total ship numbers at the high end of surface warfare.

Littoral Combat Ship radar capabilities

The committee is concerned that the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) radars are not being optimally used to provide maximum protection. The USS Independence variant’s radar can rapidly and accurately detect and track small, fast moving targets at all altitudes; small surface targets in severe clutter; and rockets, artillery, and mortars launched from shore-based threats. The radar also can perform air and surface surveillance, target identification for weapon systems, and high-resolution splash spotting. The radar has successfully demonstrated simultaneous detection and tracking of air, surface (swarming small boats) and mortar targets in the world’s most challenging littoral environments. To ensure that the LCS program fully leverages the various capabilities of its modern radar technologies to protect this new class of ship, the committee encourages the Department of the Navy to fully utilize the capabilities provided by the current LCS radar suite and ensure that the embarked crew is fully trained on the radar's capabilities. Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by March 3, 2014, on the steps the Navy has taken to enhance LCS sailors’ training on the radars full range of capabilities.

The radar in question here is made by SaaB North America. This looks and smells like a lobbyist has told Congressman Dan Maffei to add this nonsense into the mark.

Saab North America has a problem. They supposedly have this really great radar - just ask Congressman Maffei, but it really doesn't matter. The problem isn't the radar, the problem is the radar is tied to the combat system on the Austal variant of the LCS, and that combat system has a fatal flaw typical of software development in government. The UI is terrible.

The idea this is some training problem for the Navy is a hilarious load of lobbyist spin. The surface warfare community has a user interface into the combat system that is standard across the entire AEGIS line of warships. The Freedom class version has a combat system that uses a very similar interface to that of AEGIS, so when a sailor comfortable with the AEGIS system goes to work on a Freedom class ship, they pick up the combat system without any problems. But when a sailor goes to work on the combat system of an Independence class LCS, the combat system user interface is completely different. The DDG-1000 has a similar problem (but it's actually much worse!). Instead of making the combat system user interface look and feel like every other combat system in the fleet at the User Interface level, the LCS-2 combat system insists their user interface is better.

If I was the EADS lobbyist, I would meet with Dan Maffei's and deliver the fastest desktop, fastest laptop, and fastest smart phone on the market, but instead of mainstream operating systems - and the good Congressman is probably very comfortable with Windows XP or Windows 7, all those super awesome machines should all be loaded with Ubuntu OS. I would bet Congressman Maffei would decide to go back to his old computers before the meeting was over, because UI matters to users. Just like combat system UI matters to sailors.

AEGIS is government owned. These folks who complain about Lockheed Martin's monopoly in the Navy on the combat system are given chance after chance to compete, but they fail every time because no matter how good the technology is under the covers - and sometimes it is really fantastic - they lose to Lockheed Martin because they refuse to imitate the user experience of AEGIS that every sailor in the Navy is comfortable with. As an IT guy who develops enterprise systems for government, I laugh when observing a classic mistake contractors do far too often, and all I can say is these companies get exactly what they deserve when they get nothing. It isn't the Saab North American radar. That radar might be legitimately great, but it doesn't matter at all. The real problem is the software folks who insist their way of doing user interfaces for the US Navy is better than the way everyone in the US Navy does it. That's just stupid!

OK, so that is likely NOT what the Navy's report will say, but it is the real background on what this item in the Mark is all about. If you want confirmation, all you have to do is talk to the SWOs who have worked on combat systems on AEGIS ships and have seen both LCS combat systems. While there is supposedly a competition between the two combat systems, the Navy would be crazy to pick the combat system on the Austal version of LCS, because the UI has nothing in common with the UI of the combat systems used throughout the rest of the fleet. The capabilities are relatively the same, but the UI is not.

As a New Yorker, I was very amused when I saw this in the mark, because to be honest very smart politicians like Dan Maffei are exactly the kind of politicians we like, but in this case his constituent is trapped in a software nightmare scenario because the SaaB radar is integrated with the wrong combat system. Training issue? You bet, but it isn't the Navy who needs the training, it's the IT contractors responsible for UI of any combat system that wants to compete with Lockheed Martin who need training.

Long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels

Pursuant to section 231 of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense provided the annual long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels on May 10, 2013, as informed by the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for fiscal years 2014-18. The Secretary also indicated that a force structure of “about 300 ships” would be necessary to support ongoing naval operations. The Secretary further highlights the “resourcing challenges outside the FYDP largely due to investment requirements associated with the SSBN(X) program”. The Secretary acknowledges that these ship construction pressures will precipitate higher fiscal requirements in the mid-term planning period (fiscal years 2024-33) requiring an annual investment of $19.8 billion per year in fiscal year 2013 constant dollars.

The committee believes that there will be significant pressures on the ship construction accounts that will result from the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarine program, while concurrently supporting the balance of ship construction requirements. The committee also believes that a significant increase to the ship construction accounts is unsustainable in times of budget challenges. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the average ship construction investment over the last 30 years, in current dollars, is $16.0 billion. Therefore, to better understand the significance associated with even sustaining the current ship construction investment throughout the long-range plan, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the congressional defense committee by March 1, 2014, that provides an update to the long plan for the construction of naval vessels based on $16.0 billion across the entirety of the long-range plan and to assess the corresponding reductions in the shipbuilding plan. The Secretary of the Navy should also provide an assessment of this investment in terms of the health associated with the industrial base. 

This is another very smart idea. Basically, the House is taking Eric Labs $16 billion shipbuilding budget average and telling the Navy to deliver a theoretical shipbuilding plan using that number and include everything the Navy thinks they need.

Bob Work's probably sitting in his new CNAS office wondering why the House never gave him this opportunity! In all seriousness, every think tank with an interest in US naval power in Washington, DC should put together a report based on this request. Why not? If you read Ronald O'Rourke's shipbuilding reports for CRS, you would know he loves including those kind of reports for data point comparisons. On that note, maybe Bryan and I should write our own report too. Anyone seriously interesting in sponsoring that can send me an email.

Integration of high-energy laser weapons on surface combatants

The committee supports the Navy’s ongoing efforts to develop and field a high-energy laser weapon for surface ships, but is aware of significant challenges presented by integration of such a weapon into a surface combatant because of power and space limitations. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Navy to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2014, on the Navy’s plan for addressing the challenges of power generation, storage, and delivery associated with the integration of high-energy lasers, electro-magnetic rail guns, high-power radars, electronic warfare systems, and other such energy-intensive technologies. 

Vice Admiral Hunt once suggested to me he believes LCS is an interesting candidate for fielding a laser or rail gun because of the power that can be generated by the turbines while the ship was underway on diesel engines. Now, LCS isn't exactly designed for that, and I don't know how either variant would redirect that power to a weapon system, but I wouldn't be surprised if both Austal and Lockheed Martin haven't thought about it. Seems to me that both companies would find a way to have their ship represented in this report, if indeed leveraging that turbine power for weapons systems is in fact feasible from a small design change perspective.

A Fleet Design in Decline

Following the release of the Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the Navy almost immediately tied budgets to strategy when John Morgan, as part of telling the story of 21st Century Seapower, claimed every budget is a strategy. Six years later under CNO Roughead and now CNO Greenert, it should be fairly obvious to everyone that strategic thinking in regards to Naval force structure is almost exclusively a military political strategy for dollar and industry share. Strategic guidance and thinking manifest as plans towards what a community can buy to build upon what a community already has.

I'm sure there is a sophisticated process behind how the Navy designs the future US Navy, but I'm also convinced that sophisticated process wouldn't survive a single debate with many competitors outside of OPNAV. If one stays with the same plan long enough expecting a different result, even a layman will eventually be able to point out the problems. In the case of the Navy's current fleet design under the plan released with this years budget, the math and real numbers suggest to this layman that the fleet as designed has peaked and is now in decline, indeed the Navy's own numbers highlight this very well.

I don't care about 30 year projections when it comes to shipbuilding. Short, Medium, and Long term trends and activities to me are measured in 5 years, 10 years, or 15 years respectively. Anything projected beyond 10 years is probably unreliable, and anything projected beyond 15 years except for ship retirements is surely fiction. For those playing at home, Military Times has all the PDFs you need to see the Navy's new plans. As I look at the new plan I am primarily focused on the next ten years and the last ten years, since the fleet numbered 297 ships in 2003 and is expected to number 297 ships in 2023 based on the Navy's own plan. I will also look at retirements beyond 10 years where applicable. As of May 20, 2024 the US Navy has 284 ships.

This link is the USN Plan for FY2014 (PDF), and this link has all the slides nice and neat (PDF). A lot of what I am about to discuss can be found there, with the rest of the details explain in future blog posts over the next few days.

The US Navy's Big Plan FY2014

The Navy makes clear the following planning assumptions.

• Battle force inventory of the "2012 Navy FSA" will remain the objective of this plan.*
• In the near term, the Annual budget for Navy shipbuilding will be sustained at the levels of the FY14 President's Budget (PB14) through the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). In the mid-term, annual budget will remain at appropriate (higher) levels,; and in the far term, be sustained at appropriate levels (slightly higher than current historical average).
• All battle force ships serve to the end of their planned or extended service lives. **
• The DoN will continue to acquire and build ships in the most affordable manner.

* FSA means Force Structure Assessment.
** Except for those that don't

I cannot explain the third point, except to say it is insulting. How can all battle force ships serve to the end of their planned or extended service lives when the Navy, down on page 21 of the same report, retires 7 CGs and 2 LSDs before their service lives are up? Glad you asked. Basically the Navy is moving these ships to a reserve status so the Navy can say those ships aren't technically retired early.

The unspoken planning assumption is that the President's budget completely ignores sequestration. We'll see how that turns out.

By 2023 the fleet will look different than today

The fleet increases the number of CVNs. The Navy had 12 CV/CVNs in 2003, has 10 CVNs today, and will have 12 CVNs in 2023. The Navy is sending a clear signal with this budget that the Navy will field 11 aircraft carriers (which is the legal requirement) until at least 2040 under current plans. I personally found it just a little ironic that the 11 aircraft carrier law is just about the only law that the Navy actually seems to care about in the entire shipbuilding plan.

The fleet increases the number of large surface combatants from 85 today to 87 in 2023, but by replacing CG53s with DDG51s, the overall number of VLS cells drops by over 500 by 2023. Even as the numbers of large surface combatants remain relatively constant throughout the 2020s, the number of total VLS cells will decline by 880 throughout the entire fleet by 2028. It is also worth noting all the DDG-51 Flight Is and Flight IIs that make up the bulk of the current ballistic missile defense fleet of the US Navy will apparently be retired from 2028-2034. To sustain this, the Navy expects to build either 2 or 3 DDGs at the cost of a DDG-51 Flight IIA ship from FY15 until forever.

The fleet decreases the number of attack submarines from 55 today to 48 in 2023. The total will actually fall to 42 by 2029 and never recovers to above 50 throughout the rest of the plan, and the plan never reaches the requirement of 52. The VLS payload module for Virginia class SSNs is not included in the budget, and will cost about $400 million per submarine. The SSGNs will retire without replacement in 2027 resulting in a total loss of VLS capacity of over 600 from the submarine force.

The fleet of 31 amphibious ships today will decline over the next few years but recover to 31 by 2023. There are only three amphibious ships built over the next decade until 2023, 2 LH(X) and the LSD(X), meaning two first in class ships. Noteworthy the 31 ship amphibious force could legitimately be 33 ships if the 2 LSDs weren't placed in reserve in FY15. Also noteworthy that with the upcoming retirement of USS Denver (LPD 9) and USS Peleliu (LHA 5) the Navy has two legitimate chances to convert amphibious ships into more AFSBs of different types. If you add Ponce (AFSB1) that gives the Navy 36 amphibious ships plus the MLP squadron, which in my book is a legitimate 2 MEB force. But too much wishful thinking, because in the end it's only 31 amphibious ships according to the plan on paper.

The combat logistics force of 31 ships in 2013 will reduce to 29 ships from now until forever, and under current plans the combat logistics force will be the smallest it has been in about a century. I have never heard a compelling reason articulated why the Navy would shift to the Pacific Ocean, and in doing so would reduce the size of the combat logistics force. I am sure there is a complicated reason for this well beyond the understanding of this layman observer.

All of the frigates and dedicated mine ships either already have been or will be retired by 2023, and the featured new additions to the fleet since 2003 and until 2023 will be 38 Littoral Combat Ships.

And for the record unless all public data on the F-35C, including that of GAO and CBO, is wildly incorrect, there is no math on the planet that suggests the Navy can field 10 carrier air wings in 2023 that are identical with 10 F-35Cs squadrons and 30 F-18E/F squadrons unless naval aviation gets a considerable increase in funding. I haven't seen this discussed anywhere, but the numbers for a little basic math and historical comparison is there to do some estimating. The Navy is going to fall billions short, unless flight hours are going to be down considerably on existing Super Hornets (which may be the plan?).

The current US Navy plan narrative goes something like this.

Naval Aviation
The Navy will pay to maintain the 11 big deck carrier requirement. UCLASS will be ISR only through at least 2025, and as such has joined the E-2D and EA-18G in N2/N6. N98, with their current "all in" approach to the F-35C and "your out" approach to UCLASS, has effectively sucked all the money out of every other community in the Navy. The CVN carrier air wing is on the verge of remarkable cost efficiency with five different models of aircraft using only five different engines; specifically the F-35C, the F-18E/F and EF-18G, the E-2D, UCLASS, and the MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters. At the same time, the entire platform and system model has become so expensive that today the Navy can only fully maintain 7 carrier air wings, with 2 carrier air wings suffering from training restrictions - 9 total today. How the Navy ever expects to afford 10 identical carrier air wings for 11 aircraft carriers in the future is a feat of financial magic yet to be revealed, and will almost certainly require a significant increases in funding. It is hard to see a scenario where the CVN of the future will ever be as efficient as it has been over the last decade, because that simply isn't ever going to happen with F-35C. As a result, the CVN force will almost certainly decline in capability over the next ten years relative to today.

Submarines
The attack submarine force will decline to far below requirement just as the ballistic missile submarines are being built. The SSGNs will be retired without replacement resulting in a loss of over 600 VLS cells from our submarine force over the next ten years. The payload module for the Virginia class submarine is apparently not in the budget plan, meaning to sustain current VLS capacity in the submarine force the Navy will require a significant increase in funding per attack submarine to fill the gap. As a result, the SSN force will almost certainly decline in capability over the next ten years relative to today.

Large Surface Combatants
The retirement of the CGs and by replacing those large surface combatants with DDGs will result in a net loss of almost 900 VLS cells throughout the surface fleet over the next 10 years. All new construction DDGs are priced at the remarkably efficient price of the Flight IIA, despite the need to add the new AMDR radar and despite Sean Stackley all but conceding in testimony that all new DDGs in the Flight III configuration will lack the power necessary to field the advanced weapons like lasers and rail guns currently in development for the surface force without major modifications, indeed often coming at a trade off for even more VLS cells or hanger space. As a result, the major surface combatant will almost certainly decline in capability over the next 10 years relative to today.

Amphibious Ships
The fleet of 31 amphibious ships today will decline over the next few years but recover to 31 by 2023. By every standard the amphibious force of 2023 will be more advanced and more capable than the amphibious force of today, but just because the Navy gets the ship portion of the amphibious force right doesn't mean the Marine Corps will get the ship-to-shore connector part right. I am a believer that the F-35B and MV-22 is a legitimate 21st century capability, but this need for speed requirement in AAV replacements has me wondering if the Marine Corps is too stuck on old ideas to come up with a 21st century way of war from the sea. I've never heard of such a thing as littoral warfare without Marines, and yet instead of building 21st century capabilities on land and sea, the Marine Corps seems stuck on the idea of a 2 MEB Okinawa style invasion. The littoral property that is going to require a 21st century Marine Corps isn't the beach, it's the oil platform and the 300,000 ton VLCC that if sunk, instantly creates the 2nd largest environmental disaster in recorded human history in some neutral powers fishing spot. In 2023 the US will have a 21st century amphibious force, but it is still unclear if it will be fielded with a Marine Corps stuck in a 20th century mindset.

Mine Warfare and Small  Vessels
Over the last ten years the Navy has retired 12 MCHs and over the next ten years the Navy will retire the rest of the original 14 MCMs. It could be suggested these 26 dedicated mine ships are being replaced by 24 Littoral Combat Ships with 24 MIW mission modules.When the latest SAR comes out (hopefully Thursday) we'll look at the lifecycle costs of this in detail, but until then I'd just point out that based on FY12 numbers it would appear the LCS + MIW module as a mine warfare replacement for these two vessels is going to cost the Navy almost $1 billion a year.

Now obviously the LCS + MIW module is not the same as coastal minehunters or minesweepers. LCS can sweep a larger minefield, can self-deploy to the minefield threat, is much better armed and defensible than mine ships, doesn't require sailors to be in a minefield, and in theory the ship can be used for something other than mine detection and clearance.

In 2023 the Navy will have 38 LCS, each with 2 crews and it is likely several of these ships will be forward deployed to Middle East and Pacific region areas. It is still very unclear how effective the LCS will be in any role, or what exactly the ship will bring to the fight. The LCS does not add combat power to the fleet, and the degree to which LCS is a legitimate networked sensor capability is still very unclear.

Theory Meets Reality
I see all the promise of increased capability in the FY14 Navy plan as evidence that the Navy plan is a theory of advancement that fails to cloak the reality of decline. In theory, mission modules are great. In reality, mission modules are still very far from a real capability today. In theory, UCLASS is the future of naval aviation strike and the savior of the CVN. In reality, UCLASS is in N2/N6 and isn't even seen by the N98 crowd as a naval aviation strike platform yet. In theory, Large Diameter UUVs will pick up the slack of the reduced SSN force and impending loss of SSGN strike capacity. In reality, LDUUV is a PPT slide. In theory, five engines for five platforms and EMALS and greater efficiency and stealthy F-35s all makes for a great CVN capability. In reality, if you buy 10 CVNs, the answer to how much the CVN capability costs is simple - the cost is ultimately less of everything else in every other Navy community from now until forever, and that is a neverending decline with no evidence anywhere the CVN is capable of picking up the slack of what is being lost. In theory the surface combatant force is getting better radars and better missiles and can shoot down ballistic missiles. In reality, fewer VLS means less offensive strike by the SWOs who are being relegated to defending HVUs, and in my read of naval warfare, playing defense at sea in the missile era is a long term loser.

In theory, everything in the Navy is great. In reality, the current fleet design has apparently peaked, and from here going forward everything under the current fleet design is more expensive. The Navy is trading advanced ISR capabilities for strike capabilities, and in fact every community is significantly increasing ISR while legitimately decreasing strike. It's the trend of the current fleet design, and only through PPT promises does that trend look any different at some distant future point.

Finishing the Kill Chain
The only areas the Navy Plan is actually advancing seapower is with total CVNs, overall amphibious force capability, and the Littoral Combat Ship. Unless the combined capability of the CVN in 2023 and the LCS in 2023 is superior to any combination of networked systems fielded today, this Navy Plan is a course towards irrelevance for the US Navy.

The proof is in the numbers. The proof is in the math. Ultimately, the proof is the plan provided by none other than the US Navy. This plan needs lots of money just to be executed as is, even more money to make the adjustments necessary to fix the obvious flaws, and in my opinion it needs lots of work and critical thought to fix some areas that are consuming limited resources with limited, marginal, or altogether unclear advantages.

The current fleet design is one of naval decline because it favors doing the same thing the same way and expecting better results after a decade period where efficiency in fielded capability peaked, and is now slowly declining with the addition of new evolved solutions. To make matters more complicated, all competitors to the US Navy are building capabilities that specifically attack the weak links of the current fleet design - weak links like the CVN which is numerically limited but consumes an overwhelming percentage of total fleet capabilities and investment, and weak links like a numerically challenged logistics force.

Less offensive capabilities on and under the sea has made the Navy even more reliant on the limited number of aircraft carriers, and can anyone in the Navy explain why the F-35C is the only platform in the 3 major communities that is adding a new strike capability to the fleet? The proposed Flight III sure doesn't advance the surface community towards the future, the payload module for Virginia is unfunded, the LCS surely isn't adding notable combat power, and the UCLASS is ISR only?

Sorry, but my read of Wayne Hughes is that we need to strike effectively first, and while I agree winning the information/communication battle in any environment is a critical enabler, it also means Navy must be capable of putting warheads on foreheads at the point of contact. That second part is not evident in the current fleet design based on what I see in the Navy's latest plan.

CNO and CSAF on Air-Sea Battle

The uniformed heads of the Navy and Air Force recently placed a piece in Foreign Policy entitled "Breaking the Kill Chain--How to Keep America in the Game When Our Enemies are Trying to Shut Us Out."  I recommend reading it to gain additional understanding about what the two services mean (and don't mean) when they talk ASB.  I don't know what General Welsh's long term plan is, but I do think we navalists are particularly fortunate that Admiral Greenert seems to like to put his thoughts on paper.  I don't know CNO except by reputation and the company he keeps (Submariner).  But I would not have predicted he would be so publicly engaged--it is a good decision and he is doing it well.

A few things about the piece:

1.  It continues to boggle my mind that ASB has created the anti-bodies that it has, though I should not be surprised.  We are become an expeditionary military, meaning that the preponderance of our war fighting force is and will be CONUS-based.  When we need to protect far-flung interests, that power must be employed far from home, against capabilities that seek to deny us entry and freedom of maneuver (A2AD).  If you don't get there, and if you can't maneuver there, if you can't project power from there, you can't win there.  It really is that simple.

2.  The fact that Greenert and Welsh acknowledge that A2AD threats are not new is notable.  We cannot forget that during the time of our Superpower status, A2AD was the order of the day.  The Soviets fielded a powerful array of capability that sought to deny us the ability to project power.  We did not then cower from preparing to meet that challenge, nor should we now.  It should be remembered that the Maritime Strategy of the 1980's took as an entering assumption that war with the Soviets would remain conventional, and that conventional strikes on the Soviet homeland (especially in the NW Pacific) would be pursued.  Those who take to their sedan chairs with fear of nuclear conflict with rising powers, if we pursue options that include conventional strikes, do not remember their history.

3.  Although I admire the thinking behind the highly networked force advocated in the article--and believe it should be pursued--I continue to believe every single exercise of note should contain significant operations in a comms denied/satellite denied environment, and long periods of emission control (EMCON) operations.  Additionally, we should continue to work to field robust networks that are comm path agnostic, in order to quickly reconfigure from one pipe to another.

4.   The best thing about ASB (to me) is that it seems to signal a Navy on the offense.  I'd like to see this continue, and I'd like to see budgets that reinforce this.  Keep the narrative focused on offense.

5.  China.  There, I've said it.  I was in a session recently with one of the Deans of Modern Seapower who tried to make the case that the US was being insensitive (my word) to Chinese sensitivities in the way we talk about ASB.  Two thoughts here:  first, the Chinese are wont to take offense where none exists, so metering our policies and approaches against their institutional paranoia seems unwise to me.  Secondly, we shouldn't forget that ASB is at least in part a counter to a military strategy pursued by the Chinese designed to keep us from defending Taiwan or interfering with any other matter the Chinese deem their business. We need to keep pointing this out.

Update:  This just in....

Bryan McGrath

A Good Week for Navy

This week's launch of a UCAS demonstrator (X-47B) was a good week for the Navy--a really good week.  To the extent that anyone pays attention to what the Navy does these days, this achievement has captured imaginations and has helped to reinforce the notion (fact) that the Navy is indeed moving forward with important technologies even in a time of scarcity.  Whether this continues or not is an open question, but for the moment, we all have something to nod approvingly about. 

Here's something you don't read often from me--I am going to give the Secretary of the Navy credit for something. 

He has made investing in unmanned technologies a priority of his term from day 1.  He has set aggressive--yet achievable--goals for integration of unmanned capability into the Carrier Air Wing.  He has--through this prioritization--been able to fence off a number of important unmanned initiatives from cuts that some in the Navy would have gladly administered in order to keep their pet programs more fully funded.  And while I remain convinced that he has squandered much of his term in the pursuit of side-shows that don't meaningfully contribute to American Seapower, his emphasis on unmanned systems in all domains will be something upon which he can stake a legacy someday. 

Bryan McGrath

Land Power in the Asia Pacific

Spend a few moments with this piece from Armed Forces Journal entitled "Back to Reality:  Why Land Power Trumps in the National Re-balance Toward Asia."  Although I am not persuaded that the author makes the case for land power "trump"ing anything, there is a considerable amount of impressive thought here about the role of (U.S.) land power in Asia, and some really insightful thinking about AirSea Battle, conventional deterrence and escalation. 

Anyone who thinks conflict with China in the Asia-Pacific will leave out ground forces is mistaken.  If such a conflict comes, China will almost certainly seek to extend its defensive perimeter against U.S. power projection forces, and this will almost certainly involve the PLA seizing land from nations with which we have treaty obligations or with which we are increasingly friendly.  Land power--and a lot of it--will be needed.  But it won't get there unless the Navy and Air Force can create operational seams in the A2AD environment, and it won't survive long without the ability to neutralize PLA advantages in the missile bombardment campaign. 

Major Chamberlain also is insightful about the role of land based air and missile defense forces in shaping the operational environment. I was particularly gratified to read his advocacy of increased air and missile defense force structure within the Army TOA.  Hopefully this thinking will catch on.

Bryan McGrath

LGM Podcast: Canadian Security and Defence Policy

A couple days ago I sat down for an LGM Podcast with Dr. Paul Mitchell of the Canadian Forces College to talk Canadian military and procurement policy. We went on a bit about general issues of Canadian strategy, followed that up with a long discussion of Canada's relationship to the F-35 project, moved on to a discussion of the future of naval aviation, and concluded with a few words about Canadian perspectives on the "Pacific Pivot." All images courtesy of Wikipedia. Here's a link to the .mp3 version of this podcast.

Let's All Emote Together!

For this week's Diplomat column I delve into (gasp!) actual political science:

But what if even the leaders of states don’t know how they’ll react to certain events? A recent International Organization article by Jonathan Mercer investigated the role of emotion in decision-making. Although the theory is somewhat complicated, the argument boils down to the idea that we use our own emotional reactions to events as evidence of our interests and preferences. A classic experiment along these lines involves a coin flip, with heads deciding one course of action and tails the other. By flipping a coin, you determine whether you’re happy or sad about the outcome; accordingly, you know which path you really prefer. 

Mercer argues that the leadership of the United States sent costly signals of disinterest in the fate of South Korea, withdrawing all forces and de-emphasizing the possibility of intervention in case of a North Korean attack in 1950. When the attack came, however, U.S. leaders had an unexpected emotional reaction of alarm, which led to concern about how the rest of the world would interpret inaction.  As Mercer points out, U.S. policymakers used their own sense of shock and alarm as evidence that the world would see the United States as weak.  Consequently, the United States intervened in contravention of its own expectations.

Disclosure: Mercer was my dissertation advisor at UW. It's interesting work, and I recommend reading the full article. The focus on emotional response has some fairly interesting implications for decision-making, especially in disputes prone to brinkmanship. The framework also suggests that messaging and prediction are more complicated than we often allow for; as Mercer argues, "Strategy depends on imagining not only how another feels, but how another will feel as a result of one’s policy."

Thoughts on Benghazi

The Benghazi hearings are today, and I'll be paying attention. I'm not sure yet if today will turn out to be anything other than a political circus. Time will tell.

Today we are going to learn who is serious and who is a clown. There will be opportunities for both Democrats and Republicans to pick a side. A Democrat today will prove themself a clown if they become overly defensive to the point they push the idea that the Federal government cannot be held accountable for anything. It will be a defensive political reaction on behalf of leaders who are responsible, but may not be holding their agencies accountable. Republicans will identify themselves as clowns if they are simply seeking political blame, because there is nothing productive to find if that is the objective.

Leaders will be the elected politicians who try to figure out what went wrong, and what needs to be fixed.

I have a few theories, but the one specific thing I will be looking for is not new, rather it is a problem that has always existed but has, in my opinion, become worse under Obama. Dan Drezner highlighted this very well just before the election last November.

the most troubling element of Barack Obama's first-term foreign policy legacy -- his management of the foreign policy process.  As my Foreign Policy colleague Rosa Brooks has written about in agonizing detail, the dysfunction that was talked about in Obama's first year in office hasn't disappeared along with Osama bin Laden. 

Indeed, the aftermath of Benghazi puts this on full display.  To be blunt, for all the GOP efforts to make the lack of pre-attack planning an indictment of the White House, consulate security in Benghazi is not the kind of decision that rises to the White House level.  The aftermath of the attack is another story, however.  In the past 24 hours alone, report after report after report after report shows Obama's foreign policy agencies defending their own turf, leaking to reporters in ways that heighten bureaucratic dysfunction, and revealing the White House's national security team to be vindictive and petty.

That's the key in my opinion, inter-agency cooperation is at an all time low, and it is never really very high. It is not just CIA, State, and the DOD - indeed we have to add DoJ and DHS to the mix, because we saw manifestations where the lack of good inter-agency cooperation allowed one of the terrorists involved in the Boston marathon bombing to slip through the cracks.

And that is another reason why unserious politics will be very unwelcome today. Benghazi was the first attack, but with Boston we now have a trend of successful terrorist attacks. Are we learning the right lessons? Are decision makers asking the right questions? Assigning blame to Hillary Clinton or someone else isn't going to help resolve why we have similar breakdowns in both Benghazi and Boston, and if no one in Congress is seeking to address the roots of those issues today, the next successful terrorist attack that kills Americans leaves blood on the hands of Congressmen as far as I am concerned.

I don't want to hear about some State Department dweeb who thinks four SOF guys who were on the other side of Libya when all-hell broke loose, with no situational awareness at all in Benghazi, could have swooped in and saved the day with M-4s. That's not even credible and represents the tactical expertise of a paper pusher in State, even if cable news reports it as if it is some important revelation. The issue isn't what four SOF dudes were doing, it was why NOTHING, NO WHERE, was being staged for contingency. The DoD leaders watched and sat on their hands - HOUR after HOUR after HOUR, knowing Americans were probably being killed. Two of our top Army Generals, one of which is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It's hard to believe, but that's what happened. Secretary Panetta was taking advice from the top General in the United States military, who was in the same room. It was supposed to be the best advice one could possibly get on a military action like that. Clearly it was not.

I very much would like to know why the COCOM requirement for a ARG in the Mediterranean Sea was being unmet during most of the Arab Spring, including late last year. There is a reason the Marines want 38 amphibious ships, and yet Congress is only willing to fund 33. Only a forward deployed and ready Amphibious Ship with a blue/green team could have produced the necessary intelligence and situational awareness, and fielded at the scene of action a combat ready force to rapidly respond to the attacks on our facilities in Benghazi. That is fact. That is a mission Marines are trained to do, and why we keep ships forward deployed. There was an unmet COCOM requirement for amphibious ships there. DC politicians have to date completely avoided that part of the issue.

So we have CIA security at a State Department facility without any DoD situational awareness whatsoever. Within two months we have the Department of Justice intentionally leaking evidence from an investigation that takes down General Petraeus, the top CIA man. We have Russia telling the CIA that Tamerlan Tsarnaev is a suspected extremist, information that comes not long after Tamerlan Tsarnaev is being examined by the FBI and DHS knows he leaves the country. FBI's investigation at Benghazi is so thorough the very first group of journalists to actually go to the battle location finds all kinds of sensitive information at the scene. Seriously? The agencies aren't talking, and are clearly not working very hard for each other. The agencies are all doing their own thing, and events continue to unfold where Americans are being killed in terrorist attacks - foreign and domestic. We elect leaders to insure taxpayer money is not being wasted. Right now  at least 5 federal agencies appear to be completely out of control.

Now lets ask the hardest question of all - is it time to start asking whether this the inter-agency cooperation issue has become much worse as a result of the Bradley Manning effect. We knew there was going to be fallout in information sharing between agencies because of what Bradley Manning did - a member of the Department of Defense stealing accessible data from the Department of State and exposing that sensitive data to the public. Anyone with any experience in the real world knew that was going to come back and hurt the data sharing process, and create friction in inter-agency information sharing capacity. B2B experts know how easy it is to share data - hell most Americans wouldn't believe the kind of data sharing about Americans that takes place in states that do background checks for firearms purchases, but the Bradley Manning effect has created all kinds of hurdles to sharing intelligence information in the federal agencies; an effect one might suggest is integrating into the culture of inter-agency business.

My starting assumption, based on information that I have read to date, is that both Benghazi and Boston represent acts of terrorism that manifested because of communication and cooperation breakdowns between federal agencies, and the reasons for those breakdowns are many - but were influenced in no small part due to the cultural changes in federal agencies insiders and keen observers noticed taking place after Bradley Manning released those diplomatic cables. American people are dieing. Two attacks is a trend. Who is part of the solution, and who is part of the problem?

Benghazi is a tough issue, maybe too difficult and complicated for serious people to score any political points. So today, if it becomes about scoring political points, expect another successful attack. If it becomes a serious issue where political points are scored on accident rather than intentionally, it means suddenly some elected officials decided to be leaders for a change, and do their job.

The result of all of this should, most likely, be a lot of work for the President. 

PLAN amphibious development

For PLAN followers, the past couple of months have brought some really interesting developments for PLAN amphibious warfare. The first Zubr was handed over from Ukraine to China on April 20th and the construction of the second one is well under way. The original contract called for 2 to be built in Ukraine and the other 2 to be built in China. It remains to be seen whether or not PLAN will see the need to procure more than that.

Last year, we were introduced to a LHD design that Chinas was offering for export. A couple of months ago, we’ve seen this LHD design displayed for export to Turkey and also at Abu Dhabi. This mysterious design is said to be 211 m long, 32.6 m in beam and 26.8 m high for a displacement of 20,000 to 22,000 ton. It’s a little wider than Type 071 and has a flat top, so it can hold 8 helicopters with the hangar space for 4. This is an increase over Type 071, but I would imagine the first Chinese LHD (let’s call it Type 081) to be much larger than this (30,000 to 40,000 in displacement) and able to hold carry more helicopters and armored vehicles. I personally think PLAN has studied USMC long enough that it would also want the LHD to be able to support STOVL fighter jet. Such a ship would be much more complex than Type 071, but is well within the technical capabilities of Chinese shipyards.

More than anything else, the most interesting development for me to watch recently is the recent exercise involving 999, the second Type 071 ship, launching attack and overtaking a defended island in the South China Sea. While I’m sure this development scared a couple of people in the Phillipines and Vietnam, it was interesting seeing all of the news report videos talking about what they tried to do in that exercise. It was also interesting to see that Type 071 can carry more hardware than I previous thought. Its hangar is said to be able to carry 4 helicopters of Z-8 class (the main helicopter used with Type 071 right now). Its well deck can hold a maximum of 4 Type 726 LCAC. Although in reality, we’ve never seen more than 1 Type 726 and several fast attack boats in the well deck due to the fact that only 2 Type 726s have thus far been commissioned. Each of the Type 726 is said to be able to carry 2 IFVs and one tank. It can also apparently transport 80 soldiers. It can travel at 50 knots and can reach 55 to 60 knots. So, it’s an impressive hardware if China can build enough of it. In front of the well deck, there is also a door to a large compartment of 2 floors holding armored vehicles and other heavy machineries. We’ve also seen numerous photos of well deck holding 1 Type 726 along with 15 or more amphibious IFVs. Depending on the number of Type 726 and boats it carries, a Type 071 could hold different numbers of IFVs and tanks based on the mission. According to news report, Type 071 has allowed PLA to launch assault 40 nm from the beach.

In this recent exercise, we can really see PLAN practicing different kind of maneuvers and learning how to really use Type 071. Z-8s were used in flanking maneuvers to attack the rear along with Type 726 sometimes later. This is used to soften the opposition while amphibious IFVs and fast attack boats are storming the beach. The first Type 071 was commissioned at the end of 2007 and this was the first time we’ve heard about this type of exercise. Maybe this would have happened sooner if Type 726 was available earlier, but I think this also shows how long it takes PLAN to learn to start using a new ship like this. They still have a shortage of Z-8s and Type 726s when we consider how many Type 071 they already have. So they will have to ramp up the production of those assets if they want to continue training and developing more advance doctrines and tactics in storming a guarded coastline. They will also need more of those if they want to build a much larger LHD. Attention has been shifted away from PLAN’s amphibious build up over the past year due to the development of CV-16, but it remains an important part of PLAN modernization.

Seapower History Bleg

Does anyone know of any good work on competition/conflict between the Army and the Navy in either the Civil War or the Spanish-American War? Most of the extant work on inter-service conflict treats it as a 20th century phenomenon, generated by the expansion of warfare into the third dimension, but it seems likely to me there were instances of conflict in prior wars. Would appreciate any suggestions in comments.

Syria: Go Little, Go Big, or Stay on the Sidelines?

Calls for U.S. intrusion in the Syrian civil war seem to grow louder each day, especially from people in positions of authority within the polity.  This talk of no fly zones, providing lethal aid to rebels, etc. must be realized for what it is - a call for a U.S.-sponsored regime change.  Policy outcomes must be measured against the complex ramifications of choosing sides, taking a limited approach, or continuing to let events play themselves out.  Despite its noble origins in the Arab Spring fervor of 2011, fundamentally the war in Syria is now a proxy conflict between two of America's adversaries: al Qaeda's foreign jihadists on one side and Iran's surrogates on the other.  Why would the U.S. want to get stuck in the middle of that steaming mess? 

But Chris, Israel just entered the Syrian war with airstrikes in Damascus.  Haven't they made a decision to support the rebels against Assad and shouldn't the U.S. do likewise?  No, Israel just targeted a weapons facilitation node of one of its primary antagonists, Lebanese Hezbollah. Despite the "Allahu Akabars" from Sunni rebels, the world shouldn't believe that Israel's strikes represent a vote for one side or another in the fight, but should understand that they were conducted in a way that supports defense of Israeli territory by defanging LH's increasingly modern Iranian-provided arsenal.

Should America help these gentlemen?  If so, how? (AP Photo)

Unfortunately, history tells us that time and again decisions to go to war are often based on emotion, political expediency, or perception, rather than rational reasons founded on national interests such as the calculus demonstrated by Israel.  That being the case, if the U.S. inserts itself into this war, will half-measures such as up-arming the rebels be enough to finish the job and defeat Assad?  Recall that the U.S. intervention in Libya two years ago began with a no-fly zone notionally enacted to protect the population and ended with a targeted UAV strike on Gaddafi's convoy that enabled a Libyan kid in a NY Yankees cap to shoot the colonel-for-life in the face.  The lesson is that incremental approaches in war usually fail and mission creep in these sorts of interventions are more common than not.

Will a more comprehensive unconventional warfare plan be required to depose the Syrian regime?  Or does it even matter if any sort of kinetic action we undertake works if it meets the three "feel good" criteria above? Regardless of the reasons for an entry into the Syrian conflict, if this ill-advised road is taken, what's the best way to execute a regime change campaign these days? Here is my treatment of the subject in more detail, including the application of precision air and seapower to overthrow an onerous government.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

"Protip: Boats Can't Fly"

Haven't tried the game, but the trailer is awesome:
Haven

Shaping My Discussion Points

With the budget released and the first of the Congressional hearings out of the way, several topics have emerged as those most critical to the Navy in 2013. These are the topics that I have been spending my nights reading and researching. Expect most articles from me until at least June to discuss these topics.

1) When and if the Navy should make a concerted move away from current fleet design.

There are many competing schools: stay the course; stay the course, but improve ability to fight from range; submerge a greater portion of the fleet; demassify, creating larger numbers of smaller ships; prepare for the age of robotics, etc etc.

We all know Navy is in a state of great technological and fiscal flux. So, does Navy pull the trigger now? Choose a way forward and take early steps; pursue technologies that extend current design for a while? Does sequestration answer the question, or simply ask the question? Many ways to think about the issue.

2) Along those lines, should the Navy be asking Congress for alternative funding streams to pay for the SSBN(X)?

3) With directed energy, cyber, and electronic warfare emerging as high demand and desired capabilities for forward deployed naval forces today, is the R&D funding for these technologies sufficient to keep the Navy ahead of the curve of competitors?

4) Will a true debate over the nature of air-sea battle emerge in public, beyond much of the drivel one reads today?

5) What is the future of the amphibious fleet? Should it be optimized for amphib assault? Should it be optimized for global patrolling and crisis response? Should the Navy/Marine Corps team stay with stark delineation of grey and black hulls, or is it time to move to a more affordable mix?

6) Is naval aviation in tune or out of sync? UCAS-D, UCLASS--is it really heading toward a new dawn in aviation, or will bureaucratic and institutional inertia keep Navy from really making a concerted shift to carrier-based unmanned aviation? Is the issue the platforms deploying aircraft or the carrier air wing design, or both?

7) The LCS discussion is vibrant. Navy has spent around $12 billion so far on LCS. The JSF discussion is not vibrant. Navy has spent $50 billion on that program so far. Is Navy getting what is being paid for?