Links of Note...

Some thoughts on airpower over at the Diplomat:

A recent University Press of Kentucky edited volume, The Influence of Airpower Upon History, attempts to evaluate to impact of airpower since the beginning of manned, powered flight. The book largely avoids theorizing about airpower and instead examines how statesmen have used airpower as a policy instrument, and what the effects of this instrument have been. Although the book includes a chapter (by Andrew Erickson) on the development of Chinese airpower, it concentrates mostly on airpower’s impact on European and American great power politics. Given the role that airpower is playing in America’s Pacific pivot, it’s worth taking a moment to evaluate what transformative influences airpower has wrought on Asian politics since the beginning of flight.

• This looks just fascinating: US Battleship Conversion Projects 1942-1965 
• As does this: Project Terminated 
• Also, John Boyd!

Piracy, Privateering, and Para-Navies

Puntland’s pirate gangs have run out of luck lately with practically no successful attacks on the now well-defended merchants plying the Indian Ocean.  So like many of their free-booting predecessors who evolved by necessity when the hunting dried up, Somali pirates have shifted to the protection racket.  This opportunistic tactic has been part and parcel of pirates for hundreds of years. In the early 18th Century, pirates off America’s Gulf coast such as the Laffite brothers rotated frequently between piracy, smuggling, spying for profit, and privateering, sometimes playing states against each other while working multiple angles simultaneously depending what enterprise was most lucrative. 


Pirates, Para-Navy, or Activists?

Claude Berube and I recently wrote about another sort of maritime non-state actor which I’ve discussed here extensively - the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS).  SSCS’s “direct action” fleet has slowly increased in ships and tonnage each of the past several years, earning the title among its supporters of “Neptune’s Navy.”  Interestingly, a component of SSCS' environmental portfolio includes a fisheries enforcement "out-sourcing" function, which has proven a successful in Ecuador.  While maybe not as aggressive as SSCS, other maritime non-profits such as ShadowView (run by a former SSCS sailor) have begun to outsource their services.  Are these models much different than privateers or their more modern equivalents, maritime private security companies?  The discussion on our article among the online environmental activism and commercial shipping communities rather predictably aligns with the two polar reactions many seem to have towards SSCS: either savior of world’s cetaceans or scourge of the seas.  Perhaps a more useful perspective, at least from the naval point of view, is to study SSCS as a model that future more nefarious groups will likely emulate.

Claude and I contend that as navies around the world - including the United States Navy - shrink, these non-state maritime actors, or “para-navies” will expand to fill the vacuum at sea.  In some cases, such as Sea Shepherd, motives of non-state actors will appear noble, while other para-navies will be driven by rebellion, ideology, or simply greed.  All of them will challenge state navies and coast guards for the monopoly of violence on the water.  Much like their land-based terror and insurgent counter-parts, these entrepreneurial, adaptive organizations tend to confound traditional naval analysts who are more comfortable studying orders of battle and tactics similar to their own modern navies.  Accordingly, as we recommend in the Small Wars Journal article, organizations such as Sea Shepherd can provide a better lens through which emerging para-navies can be understood.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity.

Sinking an Entire Navy

David Axe has an interesting blog post up entitled How to Sink an Entire Navy on the War is Boring Blog.  It is a short read but full of information, and from it, a few things stand out to me:

Professor Jim Holmes at the Naval War College likes to say that Seapower is a conscious political choice.  Great Britain has chosen to devote an increasingly smaller share of its wealth to its Navy while devoting an increasing share of its wealth to domestic programs.  A similar situation exists in the United States.  While we begin from a position of great Naval strength, the trajectory is clear.  The U.K. has been able to make the defense decisions that it does because it enjoys a close relationship with a powerful nation sharing its language, its culture, a democratic tradition, and a similar view of law.  There is no analogous power for the United States as we begin our naval decline.  We are on our own.

Artist's rendering from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2137418/HMS-Queen-Elizabeth-Stern-Royal-Navys-new-3bn-aircraft-carrier-leaves-Portsmouth.html

Next, Axe lays out for us what the present Royal Navy looks like, including   "...two helicopter carriers, five other amphibious assault ships, six destroyers, 13 frigates, seven attack submarines and four ballistic-missile submarines."  Later he informs us that "...British officials are fast to highlight the new and improved ships planned for coming years, especially the two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and their F-35B stealth fighters, slated to enter service starting in 2018 to replace the current helicopter carriers."  What Axe does for us here is to succinctly lay out the RN's "Fleet Design", and low and behold, what does it look like?  Why a mini-U.S. Navy!  That's right; the RN has high end carrier based aircraft (or will), aircraft carriers, nuclear attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines, amphibious shipping, and surface combatants; or as some navalists like to say, they have a "balanced fleet" .  Like much of Europe (and now the United States), the "choose capability over capacity" mantra has been swallowed hook, line and sinker in the UK.  I think deeply engrained in the minds of defense planners in the UK (particularly naval force planners) is the sense that if  they just keep the basic architecture of a great fleet together, someday fortunes will change and they can simply add capacity to a vital, balanced fleet architecture.  In the meantime, considerable national treasure is spent on capabilities of dubious strategic value, and the fleet shrinks dramatically, reducing the UK's ability to actually BE a global navy capable of tending to its vast, far-flung interests.  I realize that it may sound odd coming from an unabashed supporter of US aircraft carriers, but it is difficult to reconcile the UK building two 60,000 ton aircraft carriers with Joint Strike Fighters while its escort fleet consists of 19 ships.  Adding insult to injury is the strategically questionable decision to replace its aging ballistic missile submarine force.  The UK is wasting billions of pounds clinging to notions of prestige and tradition, notions that may be out of synch with true strategic needs.

Finally, the resource driven decline of both the RN and the USN demonstrate need to align strategy and force structure.  If the United States wishes to remain a global superpower and prevent the rise of a regional hegemon elsewhere, it must allocate sufficient resources to the goal or change the goal and the force structure.  And if the RN wishes to be globally influential, it must cease to choose strategic options that limit its ability to do so. 

Bryan McGrath

Rep. Randy Forbes on why Conservatives should support Seapower

My boss, Congressman J. Randy Forbes, has a new piece out in RealClearDefense arguing that supporting American Seapower should be prioritized in a conservative defense agenda, similar to the support conservatives have leant missile defense over the past 30 years. 


Please check it out and, as always, feel free to send us your thoughts: [email protected]




The Conservative Case For American Seapower

RealClearDefense - July 24, 2024

By Rep. Randy Forbes

As the Republican Party continues the process of reflection and analysis to assess our nation’s direction, it is an appropriate time to ask what a conservative defense and national security agenda should look like going forward. If one surveys the next decade and considers the continued emergence of China on the world stage and its activity in the Near-Seas, Iran's nuclear ambitions and potential threat in the Strait of Hormuz, the global economy’s dependency on commercial and energy shipping, and other flash-points for instability like the Horn of Africa, it is not difficult to deduce the starkly maritime character of the future security environment. Given this, I believe the backbone of any conservative defense agenda should be the prioritization of American seapower.

Moreover, I believe seapower should be a defense priority for conservatives, whose advocacy should be as closely associated with the GOP as support for missile defense has been for the past 30 years. Without a strong Navy underpinning American grand strategy, the very basis for a conservative agenda - the protection of liberty, robust economic growth, and strong support for free trade - would become untenable. With 80% of global trade traveling by sea, the strength of the American economy is directly linked with the Navy’s ability to keep the world’s sea lanes open and secure. The U.S. Constitution gave clear deference to the United States Navy when it declared Congress’ authority “to provide and maintain a Navy”.  Whether it is combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa, preventing Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz to energy shipments, or upholding the bedrock principle of freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific, the Navy-Marine Corps team is essential to the health of the U.S. economy.

The primacy conservatives should accord seapower is rooted in the centrality of a strong Navy to the traditional goals and objectives of a conservative foreign policy. Through two world wars and a half-century of Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has focused on shaping the rise of another great power with aggressive ambitions. Whether Imperial Germany, the Third Reich, Japan or the Soviet Union, the United States has spent the last century guarding the equitable balance of power in key regions of the world. In every instance, it has been the U.S. Navy’s ability to command the seas where and when it chooses that allowed the U.S. and its allies to defeat or deter expansionist powers bent on dominating their neighbors. The American ascendancy to global naval dominance after World War II coincides directly with the decline in conflict between Great Powers. As with British naval predominance in the nineteenth century, a democratic superpower that can wield overwhelming seapower will generate a more stable, prosperous and peaceful international order.   

The benefits of embracing seapower as a core tenet of a conservative defense agenda extend across the spectrum of national security challenges. Strengthening alliances with key countries in the world’s most critical regions is facilitated by a preponderance of American naval power, giving prospective allies the confidence that the U.S. will not abandon them in a crisis. Defense of the U.S. homeland is buttressed by the presence of Navy surface vessels equipped with ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology. The most effective and survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear deterrent are the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines. American aircraft carriers remain the single most powerful instrument of power projection ever devised, bringing unparalleled military power to bear to deter adversaries in peacetime or contribute to victory in a time of conflict. And the amphibious fleet provides flexibility to project Marine combat power ashore or bring assistance during humanitarian crises. Indeed, the list of America’s international diplomatic and security objectives that are supported by seapower capabilities is virtually endless.

Prioritizing seapower is also the best means for conservatives to offer solutions to the challenges of the 21st century. The rise of China, both economically and militarily, is set to define this century. Due to the vast geography of the Asian-Pacific theater, the Sino-American competition promises to be maritime in nature. A renewed conservative emphasis on seapower is required to help steer the American relationship with China in a positive, peaceful direction. Only by resourcing a Navy capable of deterring aggression and reassuring American allies of our commitment to security in the Pacific can we hope for a positive result to the Sino-American rivalry.

Finally, the current state of the U.S. Navy offers conservatives an opportunity to advocate and prioritize seapower as part of a forward-looking defense agenda. Even before sequestration, the Fleet had atrophied from 568 ships in 1987 to just 285 today. By 2015, the administration is projecting a continued decline of navy forces to an abysmal 270 ships.  In key areas, including attack submarines and the amphibious vessels used to transport Marines around the world, the Navy will suffer serious shortfalls. Just as the investments made during the 1980s provided a powerful Navy that has benefited American interests in myriad ways for the last three decades, the choices made now will reverberate for decades to come. President Obama, who famously derided Mitt Romney’s farsighted vision for a revitalized Navy as harkening back to “horses and bayonets”, seems wholly uninterested in American seapower. The opportunity for conservative leadership on this subject could not be greater.

Historically, the Republican Party has been the most vigorous champion of American seapower. Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet symbolized the arrival of the United States as a great power at the turn of the 20th century and Ronald Reagan’s revitalization of the Fleet in the 1980s helped give the Soviet Union a final push onto the ash heap of history. It remains for the current generation of conservative leaders to establish seapower as the backbone of a defense policy dedicated to preserving the American-led global order.

Rep. J. Randy Forbes, R-Va., is chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee and Co-Chairman of the Navy-Marine Corps Caucus.

Eaglen and O'Hanlon on Military Entitlements

Mackenzie Eaglen of AEI and Michael O'Hanlon of Brookings are hardly ideological soulmates, but they agree here on the necessity of reforming compensation, healthcare and retirement in the military.  I provided some of my own thoughts on the subject during the talk I did in Norfolk.

Bryan McGrath

Lessons from a previous "Pivot to the Pacific"

HMS Prince of Wales

HMS Repulse

With all of the recent discussion on Air Sea battle and how it might affect a "pivot to the Pacific", it may be useful to examine the last attempt at such a strategy by a great power with major interests but few military forces in the region. That power was of course the British Empire. These two ships represent the end of that attempt. These photos show HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse leaving their forward base at Singapore on Dec. 8 1941 to intercept Japanese amphibious forces invading Malaya. Two days later they were both sunk with heavy loss of life by Japanese aircraft. Singapore itself fell to Japanese forces less than two months later. The British had been planning a "pivot to the Pacific" with just this sort of war in mind for over twenty years. Why did their effort fail?

Some background is in order. In 1919 with victory over the Central Powers at hand, Great Britain should have been looking forward to a period of peace. The Empire's immediate opponent, Imperial Germany was substantially crippled by the Peace of Versailles. Recent friends, but historical opponents like France and now Soviet Russia were exhausted by war and in no position to challenge the victorious Royal Navy at sea or attempt to conquer British imperial possessions. Instead the British warily eyed two friends and allies, the United States and the Empire of Japan as its next probable enemies. Although still the single biggest country for British investment, the United States had grown powerful and some American navalists demanded a navy "second to none" as a guarantee of safety against their former friends. Japan's naval forces had also grown during the war and while eager to take German colonial possessions in the Pacific, Japan had shown no interest in sending large formations of ground troops to die in the trenches of Europe or the deserts of the Middle East. Both powers were rising economies and the British may have been justified in feeling threatened.

Britain was in no position to wage a new naval race. Debts from the First World War, widespread disgust for all things military in the wake of the conflict and public demand for armaments reduction and social spending left the British no choice but to seek accommodation and defense reductions. If this was not bad enough, internal divisions in the British Empire essentially forced them to choose between the U.S. and Japan for the nation with which Britain would accept naval parity. The Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand wanted Britain to choose Japan for obvious geographic reasons while others like Winston Churchill (himself half American by birth) wanted a closer relationship with the United States. The British chose the Americans and in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 accepted naval parity in capital ships with the U.S. The Anglo-Japanese defense treaty, which had been in place since 1902, was allowed to lapse in 1923. In return for Commonwealth concerns and based on feelings by some British military and civilian leaders that Japan might some day be hostile, Britain conceived its own planned "pivot to the Pacific" in case of hostilities with Japan.

When first conceived by British military leaderships, war with Japan was still considered unlikely. Even Churchill doubted there would be a war with Japan in his own lifetime. While planning to transfer a significant part of its battle fleet and air forces to the Pacific, the British still proceeded throughout the 1920s to reduce military spending.  In the 1930s however, preparations became more serious. Japanese aggression against China and indifference to world condemnation spurred further British efforts in the Pacific. Singapore was re-constructed as a naval fortress. More troops and aircraft were dispatched to Malaya and British plans were revised to include updates in technology such as anti-submarine and anti-air defenses for the city.  The British naval effort to relieve its Pacific possessions entitled "Main Fleet to Singapore" was well planned and war gamed on par with the U.S. War Plan Orange strategy for war in the Pacific. All should have gone well. The British should have been able to relieve Singapore and at least successfully defend the Malaya peninsula against a Japanese invasion.

Sadly no war planning should be done in a vacuum. Britain was first confronted by a resurgent fascist Germany and Italy.  A successful defense of France and Western Europe might have allowed the British to send part of their fleet to the Far East, but France fell. U-boat and surface raider attacks in the Atlantic scattered the British fleet and losses in the Mediterranean subduing the Italian fleet and its German Air Force allies further sapped British strength. In addition, in late 1941 half of the British battle fleet and aircraft carriers were undergoing badly needed refits at home in Britain as well as the United States. The British had only begun to effectively increase military spending in 1937, and long-delayed refits of badly worn out ships were finally being completed. When the Japanese occupied former French colonial airfields in Indochina and Winston Churchill needed to send at least a deterrent force to the Far East, all he really had to send were Prince of Wales and Repulse.

As the U.S. contemplates its own "pivot to the Pacific", what lessons might be learned from the British experience? (1). Be mindful that a lot can happen in a mere twenty years. Many senior leaders are conditioned to a Cold War that went on for decades. The period from 1990 to the present may not have seen the same level of change that transpired between 1919 and 1939, but the world today is significantly changed from the end of the Cold War. (2). Do not conduct war planning in a vacuum. Yesterday's friend could be tomorrow's enemy. Today's weakened former opponent may quickly rise again in a decade or two, and provide sophisticated arms to a rising theocracy. All three could also be simultaneous opponents. Forces must be available to cover a wide range of threats. The British planned to have "just enough" forces to fight in the Far East. When that fight actually came they were already too stressed on multiple fronts to send enough quality forces to the Pacific. (3) The choices made by a nation and the risks it is willing to accept have consequences. The British gambled that Japan would not attack in the 25 years after the First World War. When they did, the results cost them their Pacific imperial possessions and influence. Australia and New Zealand sought closer ties with the U.S. and Indian Empire troops captured in Singapore eventually joined the Japanese as an anti-colonial army to free India. If the U.S. gambles and looses, the cost both in lost allies and economic relationships could be staggering by comparison with Britain' s defeat in 1941. (4) Finally, this time there is no safety net. When the British failed to preserve their Pacific possessions, the United States was able to step in and fight the Pacific war against Japan near singled handed until 1945. Unlike then, no great democratic power like ourselves will step in to save the United States from a failed Pacific pivot.

The United States can successfully conduct a Pacific pivot of its military forces provided it heeds these lessons from Britain's failure. In the end, it really comes down to what choices a nation makes and what level of risk it chooses to sustain in pursuit of a given strategy. China might remain a friend for the next 25+ years, but then again it might become more aggressive and hostile. The Russians might again become strategic competitors and Iran remains unpredictable and dangerous. The British took risks then that we now cannot afford to do. Hopefully own own Pacific pivot will take these lessons into account. We do not want to be left some day with only a USS Prince of Wales and USS Repulse to counter aggression in the Pacific.

China's Type 32 class submarine

We've known about this class for a while, but it has now been officially unveiled as shown in image below.



For those who don't know, this is the super class conventional submarine with a lot of lada/kilo influence that was launched in Wuchang shipyard back in 2010. At the time, we thought it might be a new conventional submarine class to replace Yuan. However, it turns out this is basically a one ship class that will be used to replace the old No. 200 Gulf Class ballistic missile test bed. This will likely be used to test out ballistic missiles as well as new vertical launch system. It is Chinese navy's new submarine test bed.

Some more information on this class:

• Program was established in Jan 2005, ship launched in September 2010, completed test run by September 2012
• Was handed over Oct 16th, 2012 and has already started to be used for testing.
• It is double hull, has length of 92.6 m, 10 m width, hydroplane width of 13 m and largest height of 17.2 m.
• It has draft of 6.85 m when surfaced with displacement of 3797 tons. Its submerged displacement is 6628 tons.
• It operates at 160 m depth with maximum dive of 200 m.
• Its maximum surfaced speed is 10 knots and maximum submerged speed is 14 knots.
• Can operate with 88 crew for 30 days without resupply, or 200 crew for 3 days.

ASB: T.X. Hammes Responds

I cross linked here last week to a piece I did at War on the Rocks about AirSea Battle, and T.X. Hammes figured prominently in it.

He has ably responded this morning with a piece of his own.  It is well worth the read.

Bryan McGrath

H.R. McMaster Sets His Sights On AirSea Battle

Major General H.R. McMaster is one of the smartest men in our military, the epitome of a warrior-scholar.  He has been famous since he was a Major and he is one of the few serving officers who can confidently have his work placed in the New York Times, which he did yesterday.  He is the most eloquent advocate for land power on the scene today, and he will invariably provide much of the Army's intellectual heft in the coming QDR and concomitant budget battles.  Read closely in his NYT piece and you see the Army's argument clearly.  That is, without even mentioning AirSea Battle, he has lumped it in with the Revolution in Military Affairs, Net Centricity, and Rumsfeld's reorganization ideas as fashionable passing fancies we must not follow again.  Instead, we must keep in high readiness a large powerful Army capable of combined arms maneuver AND the ability to occupy large portions of the earth's surface. 

If you think that I'm wrong, and that he's not arguing against AirSea Battle, then it is not worth your time to read on.  If you think he is or might be, then consider moving forward.

McMaster employs the straw-man technique of argument in this piece, defining for us "War" by three of its "age old truths" and by inference, pointing out the shortcomings of this shadowy approach that he does not name.  Additionally, he creates a ridiculously high bar over which "defense concepts" must hurdle, one that lards the full weight of the conduct of war upon constituent pieces thereof.  His first lesson:  " Be skeptical of concepts that divorce war from its political nature, particularly those that promise fast, cheap victory through technology."  So, we are to be skeptical of military concepts that do not take into consideration a full Clausewitzian approach to war?  How hamstrung will that leave us?  Why should concept development worry about the political nature of war?  Isn't this the purview of statesmen and politicians?  Is it not the job of military thinkers and planners to put together a menu of possibilities for civilian leadership to choose among, one aspect of which would be the political fall-out therefrom?  This line of operation is aimed squarely at the possibility that in a conflict with China, we might target mainland objectives.  "There go those irresponsible fools in the Navy and the Air Force, talking about mainland strikes.  Why this would lead to horrible escalation, probably nuclear war.  Why would we even consider these things?"  We consider them because they could be militarily useful, and because a commander might wish to utilize such an approach in an actual war, guided by the political instructions received  from civilian leadership.  It is not the job of military planners and thinkers to discard viable options because of their perception of the politics of the matter.  As for  "...fast, cheap victory...", I know of no one who thinks about an actual conflict with China who believes it would not be a conflict measured in YEARS, rather than months or weeks.  AirSea Battle is not a strategy, or a theory of victory; it is however, a concept through which a commander might regain access to the maneuver space necessary to project power. 

McMaster's next lesson is:  "Defense concepts must consider social, economic and historical factors that constitute the human dimension of war."  Really?  All of this is expected of a "defense concept?"  I beg to differ.  This is the realm of true strategy, existing several levels above the ideas which McMaster is criticizing in his veiled approach.  I'm sure this lesson garnered many "tut-tuts" and knowing nods from the readership of the New York Times, but McMaster is dangerously conflating strategy and operations in a manner that few military thinkers and planners would support.  Of COURSE war strategy must consider these factors; and McMaster is correct in pointing out where in the recent past these factors were not closely identified and considered.  But the whiff of suggestion that defense concepts need to be vetted through the humanities department at West Point (or Harvard) defies understanding.

His final lesson?  "American forces must cope with the political and human dynamics of war in complex, uncertain environments. Wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be waged remotely."  That's correct; wars which demand hundreds of thousands of ground troops for a decade or more, cannot be waged remotely.  This is apparently (for McMaster), the only kind of war there is.  And politicians should heed McMaster, in that should they wish to wage this type of war, there will be huge requirements.  But all war is not the same.  The United States effectively contained Saddam Hussein for more than a decade "remotely", yet McMaster does not see this use of military force as "war".  Presumably, then, Kosovo wasn't either. This is in fact, one of the most glaring weaknesses in McMaster's views--that war isn't "war" unless it involves large ground formations and extended occupation.  He actually tipped his hand to this view in the Army's 2010 "United States Army Operating Concept" (which he helped write) in paragraph 3.3 where it states:  "Succeeding in future armed conflict requires Army forces capable of combined arms maneuver and wide area security within the context of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts."  Success in ALL future conflict?  Requires both combined arms maneuver and wide area security?  All kept in a high state of active duty readiness?  The devil is in the details here, and a healthy, active QDR process should tease these details out. 

Look for more of these kinds of articles in the months to come.  Sequestration and declining budgets are actually beginning to threaten the cozy, least common denominator approach to strategy and budgeting that has dominated the Pentagon in the Goldwater Nichols era.  The gloves will come off, and perhaps we will have the debate this country has needed for two decades.  I for one welcome it, and I welcome the views of General McMaster. 

Bryan McGrath

Video of "If We Can't Afford the Navy We Need...."

Here is the video from my chat at the Navy Warfare Development Command yesterday.

I was a half-hour late due to some seriously poor planning on my part, and I am very sorry to those who attended but who had to leave due to my stupidity. 

Many thanks to the folks at Navy Warfare Development Command for their flexibility and patience. 

Bryan McGrath

Potentially False SCMR Logic

Colin Clark at Breaking Defense has a piece up entitled "SCMR Concludes Pacific Pivot Needs More Cash, Missions:  GEN Dempsey", after CJCS told the Senate Armed Services Committee that DOD would “further prioritize missions within the context of a continued rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.”  His conclusion?  "The next Pentagon budget will almost certainly include increased spending for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force to boost their presence and operations in the Asia-Pacific region."

While I would be all too happy if Mr. Clark's reading of those tea-leaves were true, he misses one other possibility; that the next budget would NOT in fact include INCREASED spending, but that the next budget would deal smaller CUTS to those services than it does to the Army.  This too, is a method of "prioritizing missions".

The proof will be in the PB15 budget pudding.

Bryan McGrath

India's Coming Carrier Force, Plus Sundry

A few links that may be of some interest:

• One of my co-bloggers at LGM writes about the Port Chicago Naval Magazine explosion, with related thoughts about race, labor, and military service.
• I have two columns on Indian naval aviation up at the Diplomat, both displaying some skepticism about the structure of the program.
• Also at the Diplomat see this good Zachary Keck post on the Golden Ratio between services in the U.S.
• Curious to see what people think of Dan Drezner's contribution on the value of military primacy.  I'm still formulating my own thoughts.
• Finally, Clayton Thyne and I exchanged some political sciency thoughts on the Egyptian coup.

"If We Can't Afford the Navy We Need, What Kind of Navy Should We Have?"

This coming Thursday morning (18 July), I am honored to appear as part of the Navy Warfare Development Command's Speaker Series, in which I'll take a stab at answering at least part of the question posed in the title of this post. 

If you're in the Hampton Roads area and can access the Naval Station, please RSVP and stop by.  My talk is from 0930 to 1030, with about 20-25 minutes of remarks, and the remainder for Q and A. 

NWDC will post the video on their Youtube site when available; I will post a link on this blog when it is up.

Hope to see you there.

Bryan McGrath

5 AirSea Battle Myths

I have posted a long-ish piece over at War on the Rocks about AirSea Battle that Information Dissemination Readers might find worthwhile.

Bryan McGrath

We Live in Interesting Times

A year ago the world watched as the Chinese landed an piloted aircraft on an aircraft carrier, a capability few in the world possess even in the early 21st century. On Wednesday the United States landed an unmanned vehicle moving at 145 knots autonomously piloted by software on a ship moving at over 20 knots. It is the most impressive thing an unmanned aviation vehicle has ever done.

The success of the X-47B delivers many choices to the Navy. Unmanned aviation is bigger than the evolution from propeller to jet engines, or the evolution from guns to missiles - both of which were natural technological evolutions for naval aviation. UCLASS brings disruptive change to naval aviation unlike anything else the community has seen in 100 years.

The decisions of the very near future will define the community for the next half century. We live in interesting times.

Why Afghanistan Continues to Matter

Afghanistan's "ring road roundabout provides many connections

   
     This week a number of papers have again trumpeted the headline that the U.S. govt. may yet again speed up its planned military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Continuing Taliban resistance, inability of the Afghans to rise to the challenge of self-governance, and the continuing costs of U.S. and NATO military involvement have all combined to sap the will of Western powers to finish the task of stabilizing the Afghan state. Before we again consign Afghanistan to the backwaters of our collective strategic mind, perhaps we should review some remote and recent Afghan history and consider its enduring strategic importance. Hardly a "graveyard of empires," Afghanistan has been and remains the vital strategic hub of central Asia whose importance will only grow in the 21st century.

     Afghanistan's geography has made it a virtual "roundabout" for transportation across the vast Eurasian continent. This unique feature (seen above in blue in the form of the Soviet-era ring road) has allowed overland communication for travelers, conquerers and kings since the time of the ancient Persian empire of the 6th century BC. It provided Alexander the Great access to the Indian subcontinent from the plains of Iran. It allowed travelers such as Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta free movement from the Mediterranean to China. It allowed an upstart Pashtun Afghan leader named Mahmud Khan to invade and depose the tottering Persian Safavid Empire in 1722. It served as a vital buffer state for the British Empire against Imperial Russian and Persian designs on India for nearly a century. In recent times the Afghan ring road started by U.S. builders (the Morrison Knudsen Company) in the 1950s and finished by the Soviets continues as a transportion system. It may yet serve as a maintenance road for an even more important highway of petroleum products in the near future.

     Just who controls this vital hub of Central Asia may become very important in the next century as the Central Asian hydrocarbons market seeks new customers and greater profits. The Chinese in the quest to fill their deepening industrial thirst for oil and natural gas have explored possibilities for overland pipelines (for both oil and natural gas) through Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan's unique geographic position would place it directly athwart a potential pipeline's path. Chinese tankers and liquid natural gas carriers could stop and discharge their cargoes at a port such as Gwadar in Pakistan rather than brave a potentially hostile Indian ocean and Malacca strait guarded by U.S. and other friendly nation seapower. Such a choice might enable China to undertake more aggressive action in its designated "First Island Chain" without regard for a distant maritime blockade.  These pipelines could also serve to tie potential U.S. competitors like China to friendly petroleum and natural gas  suppliers like Russia and Iran. Such a strong combination would inevitably become a powerful competitor against U.S. economic, financial and military interests. It could also de-stabilize the relationship between India and Pakistan. China is a strong supporter of the Pakistani military while India and China maintain a wary eye on each other over a fortified border on the old Silk road pass of Nathu La. Tensions flared there as late as May of this year over control of a set of bunkers. India takes pride in its place as the guardian of stability in the Indian Ocean littoral. A recent (2010) article in The American Interest by Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan advanced a concept of Indian strategic thinking more in line with early 20th century British Indian Viceroy Lord Curzon rather than Jawaharlal Nehru. Mohan envisions a more muscular India exerting power in Central Asia much as the British Empire once did through Indian Viceroys like Curzon.  How is India likely to respond to a China with a new northern overland energy route, out of range of most assets of Indian military power, and buffered by India's main rival Pakistan?

A stable Afghanistan is good for the Afghan people and the world in general, but just who provides this stability really matters. Two recent books directly examine the centrality of Afghanistan to Central Asia and the Eurasian continent. The Revenge of Geography by Robert Kaplan and The New Continentalism, Energy and Twenty First Century Eurasian Geopolitics by Kent Calder both address this issue as does Kaplan's earlier book Monsoon, The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. While Afghanistan may still seem to some as a useless backwater unworthy on continued Western stabilization efforts, it is actually a vital strategic hub on which many potential conflicts of this century may yet hang. Previous powers such as the Persian and British empires were able to successfully exercise significant influence in Afghanistan over long periods. While their use of financial support and occasional military action in favor of friendly Afghan rulers may seem corrupt or antiquarian to current western leaders, these methods remain the currency of choice in a divided and unstable Afghanistan. Western powers, most notably the United States must not precipitously withdraw military forces from Afghanistan without ensuring a peaceful pro-Westerm regime remains in control of the country. Any other result could later be disastrous to both Western economies and peace and stability in the region.

   

HASC Leaders on Fair-Share Budgeting

Who says bi-partisanship is dead?  In this piece, HASC members Randy Forbes (R-VA) and Rick Larsen (D-WA) argue eloquently for an approach to National Security resource allocation that derives primarily from strategic thinking rather than the annual arithmetic problem that guides how money is split among the Services.
 

People like to talk about a 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 split in the defense budget.  This is not now true, nor has it been true for some time.  Mostly because only about 80% of the defense budget actually gets split among the services, with OSD skimming off 19% or so for its growing fiefdoms.  What is true is that through multiple strategic reviews, National Military Strategies, QDR's and Bottom Up Reviews--the Department of the Navy, Air Force and Army get a remarkably consistent portion of the defense budget.  The Navy—with two services—gets about 29%, the Army about 25% and the Air Force about 27%.  That’s right.  No matter WHAT military strategy our nation has pursued since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we’ve split the base defense budget in essentially the same way.  

Forbes and Larsen could be taken to task (given their interests in Seapower and Strategic Forces) if this article had been simply vacuous advocacy for building more ships (the kind I write here).  But it isn't.  It is a call from two very influential members of the HASC to try and inject logic and realism into a process that has come to favor consensus purchased with inefficiency.

Bryan McGrath