On Syria

I have a post up over at my blog in which I ramble on a bit about Syria, nothing quite as well formed as Galrahn's effort yesterday. 

One thing I did not bring up for that audience is a fear I have as an avowed navalist and proponent of American Seapower; and that is, that the strikes the President is considering--which to this point sound limited and punishment oriented by design--will be used by critics to justify their view that naval power is limited and ineffective writ large.

Another point perhaps those here would find worth consideration is that the Syria scenario--and the U.S. Navy's large-scale abandonment of the Mediterranean in the 90's (in fact) and the 00's (in writing) is worth re-evaluating.  Obviously, I believe this calls for a larger fleet, but saving that, the F-35B (my favorite of all variants) operating off 11 big decks will provide considerably more combat power and flexibility to the combatant commanders.  Ultimately, the US Marine Corps is going to have to come to terms with its air arm becoming PRIMARILY an instrument of American Seapower, its historic reservation for ground combat support being a luxury we cannot afford, especially with a platform as capable as the F-35B.


Bryan McGrath

Syria: Sitrep

The answer from the beginning has been made clear: Bomb Syria. Now what are your important, intelligent questions?

Why would the US bomb Syria?

It began when it was revealed that Syrian government military forces used chemical weapons in Damascus during a military operation on August 21, 2013. According to NGO sources, at least 100 people died in the initial attack, and many more have died since. The attack appears to have exposed between 300 - 1000 people to chemical agents (depending upon source), overwhelming NGO health organizations working in Syria. The UN has not officially confirmed the use of chemical weapons, and Syria has not exactly been cooperative in helping the UN teams assess the situation.

Both President Obama and Secretary Kerry describe the evidence in the hands of the US intelligence services proving the use of chemical weapons as conclusive, but the intelligence with the most credibility that is accessible to the average American came from the Violations Documentation Center in Syria. This outstanding Foreign Policy story tells their story.

Activist Razan Zaitouneh, who runs the Violations Documentation Center in Syria, tells FP that her team sped to the Damascus suburb of Zamalka immediately after a chemical weapons attack was reported there on Aug. 21. The media staff of Zamalka's local coordination committee, which is responsible for filming videos in the area and uploading them to the world, also sped to the scene. According to Zaitouneh, all but one of them paid with their lives.

"The chemical attacks, on the first day of the massacre, claimed the lives of many media activists in Zamalka coordination because they inhaled the chemical toxic gases," Murad Abu Bilal, the sole survivor, told Zaitouneh in an interview uploaded to -- what else -- YouTube. "[T]hey went out to shoot and collect information about the chemical attack, but none of them came back."

The videos quickly removed any doubt for U.S. intelligence analysts that chemical weapons were used in the Aug. 21 attack. They showed children with constricted pupils who were twitching and having trouble breathing -- classic signs of exposure to sarin gas. They also showed the remnants of the rockets reportedly used to deliver the gas, which were largely intact. If they had delivered conventional explosive munitions, more of the rocket would have been destroyed on impact.

What does the US hope to achieve by bombing Syria?

The objective, goal, or "ends" of strategy for Syria is where the Obama administration has detoured into a ditch, because apparently the use of military power isn't the way the Obama administration will execute strategy, using military power - as in the action of using of military force - is the "ends" of the strategy itself... at least according to the New York Times.

The goal of the cruise missile strikes the United States is planning to carry out in Syria is to restore the smudged “red line” that President Obama drew a year ago against the use of poison gas.

If carried out effectively, the strikes may also send a signal to Iran that the White House is prepared to back up its words, no small consideration for an administration that has proclaimed that the use of military force remains an option if the leadership in Iran insists on fielding a nuclear weapon.

The Obama administration apparently plans on using military power in Syria so they can set a precedent for using military power next time someone uses chemical weapons, with a focus on Iran. I have no problem with any President of the United States using military power to follow through on a threat to use military power when a red line is crossed. The credibility of the President of the United States in foreign policy is the same thing as the credibility of the United States.

With that said, there is no question the reaction so far by the White House to the events in Syria have been mismanaged by national security leadership. It is impossible for me to imagine Tom Donilan, Hillary Clinton, and Leon Panetta allowing this situation to unfold like what we have seen this week with Susan Rice, John Kerry, and Chuck Hagel. It is also impossible for me to believe that Donilan would ever go along with a plan like this.

But the military strategy that the Obama administration is considering is not linked to its larger diplomatic strategy of persuading President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to yield power and join in negotiations that would end the bloody civil war.

Only someone as strategically inept as Susan Rice would think this is a good idea. Democrats have defended Susan Rice when the evidence has been overwhelming she really isn't qualified to be top National Security advisor, and her inexperience outside her foggy bubble is on parade right now. Partisans in the US keep making the same mistakes. They get caught up listening to what their political opponents say and don't pay enough attention to what the career oriented professionals say. The line of non-partisan career national security professionals who have deep respect for Susan Rice for her intellectual capacity of national security affairs is very short, and today may be invisible.

When the UK Parliament voted down Prime Minister Cameron's military participation in Syria on Thursday, that was a blatant sign of war fatigue by civilians in the UK (which also exists in the US). The last time the UK Parliament voted down a Prime Minister on matters of war and peace in the UK was regarding the Crimean War in 1855, meaning the events of Thursday was a once in a lifetime event as a political failure. Lord Aberdeen resigned the next day! Before 1855 the previous time was in 1782, when Parliament voted against further war against America. Lord North, Prime Minister at the time, resigned 3 weeks later!

I believe Susan Rice is partly accountable. She put Prime Minister Cameron in an impossible position and never saw his opposition coming. She is responsible for managing the national security political processes in defense of US National Interests, but her first move was to put the act of taking military action in Syria ahead of the facts that make a case for military action in Syria. Process is one of her primary responsibilities for the administration, and she is doing a terrible job. The first casualty of our National Security Policy to address Syria using chemical weapons on civilians was America's closest ally.

How will the US strike Syria?

The United States intends to use a limited set of military resources to conduct a limited military operation against a limited set of targets, so expectations for successful action should be for a limited achievement of objectives. That's the real problem here, the plan has a very low ceiling for success, but if you think about it, the floor for failure makes limited military action as suggested to date incredibly risky.

Four or five destroyers of the United States Navy are projecting power offshore of Syria, a role historically associated with battleships. Should a military operation be executed, it is unlikely the majority of the cruise missiles will come from those surface ships. The real "battleship" per se off the coast of Syria is the Ohio class SSGN that has probably been operating for months off the Syrian coast. While the destroyers probably will shoot off Tomahawk cruise missiles if a strike is ordered, the majority of cruise missiles will come from submarines.

These destroyers and submarines constitute the 6th Fleet, which is a shadow of what was once the most important fleet for the United States Navy in the cold war. From the 1950s through the 1980s, the US Navy operated at least two, and often three aircraft carrier strike groups in the Mediterranean Sea at all times. Credit should be given to Admiral Stavridis, Secretary Panetta, and Admiral Greenert for moving to base destroyers in Rota, Spain by 2015, because those folks worked very hard and had the strategic foresight to recognize the need for a sustained US naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea.

The United States will likely still be able to use the UK air base in Cyprus, and presumably air bases in Turkey. This should be enough for basing Air Force capabilities in support of a limited military strike.

The coalition to date consists primarily of the United States, France, Canada, Australia, Greece, and Turkey. The smaller the coalition, the more resources the US will have to bring to the table, and that truly is a problem. Count me among those who does not see sequestration as a deep budget cut. As a budget number, I do not see the size of the cut to defense as the problem, but what I do see is the sequestration process Congress has put in place as a very broad cut across defense, making the process enforcing what is otherwise a historically modest budget cut one of the least well thought out plans executed in Congressional history (which is really saying something). Because the budget cut, by law as designed through sequestration, must in fact be spread out broadly across the defense budget, it impacts virtually everything.

The effects of the broad sequestration cut across the whole of defense in the context of Syria means the United States has virtually no ready reserve should things not go according to plan. The CNO has a plan that I do not agree with, it basically commits all resources in the Navy to the next deployment while the US Navy continues to sustain a robust operating tempo. What that means is the Navy is sending as many ships as they can on deployment, and those ships have the resources to be ready. The ships working up for the next deployment are also resourced well. However, everything at home not scheduled for the next deployment, which is about half the fleet, is hollowed out. Those ships are far from being a ready reserve, and would take a great deal of money to get ready quickly. If those ships are needed, savings from sequestration aren't going to be savings at all, because it's going to be expensive to fix the slow rot taking place across the fleet under the current high tempo and reduced maintenance model.

So what is the plan for Syria?

We know the objective of military force is not regime change nor is it to establish a no-fly zone. The military action is intentionally limited, so whether it includes manned or unmanned aircraft in addition to cruise missiles is irreverent because air power alone cannot achieve most strategic objectives that would otherwise be worth achieving in Syria - like destroying all the chemical weapons in Syria.

While it is safe to assume target lists would include some of the air defense command and control in Syria, and probably SCUD missile launchers, the real question is whether the target list will also include Al Qaeda forces working with the rebels. Do not be surprised if the US bombs both Syrian military targets and Al Qaeda targets aligned with the rebel insurgency.

The US plan is to successfully strike several targets in Syria. That's it. The plan is successful if the US military strikes targets in Syria without obscene collateral damage. The plan is not successful if there is obscene collateral damage, if there is attrition by US military forces, or if the military strike results in regional escalation resulting in a major attack against Israel. Short of one of those three things happening, the US achieves success in pursuit of the demonstration that the policy is seeking.

Sounds easy, what could go wrong?

What part of the US response to the initial reports of confirmed chemical weapons use feels right so far? Because the US announced intent to conduct military strikes in Syria, it is a safe bet that when US cruise missiles pound the hell out of something important, there will be plenty of human shields ready to die to American weapons. The US has made no secret it desires to keep military activity to a minimum, in fact the US strategic objective of limited military action is more proclaimed to date by Obama administration officials than any actual US strategic objective of military action inside Syria. The arrogance and casual expectation by the Obama administration that assumes Syria will simply roll over in the face of limited US military power disturbs me. No matter which way events unfold, administration people have said way too much and it is very dangerous to military personnel.

So far things don't have the feel of events going well, but the US has yet to reveal any actual evidence the intelligence services supposedly have to convince the American people war is necessary, and we have a lot more intelligence than what has been reported in the news so far. For example, there are widespread reports that the US has taped recordings of high ranking Syrian Army officers discussing the use of chemical weapons. But... there are also reports that US intelligence strongly suspects the movement of Syrian military forces around Damascus implies another large chemical weapon attack on rebel strong positions may be imminent. Nobody expects that to happen, and yet, that may actually happen... so let's be careful with our starting assumptions that predict how this might unfold.

We presume Syria will play the part of a completely rational actor, and by rational actor we presume Syria will do exactly what we want Syria to do to insure our limited military campaign is completely successful for us. The thing is, I've studied Putin since the late 90s, and the way he looks at Russia in the Mediterranean Sea isn't always compatible with what the US interprets as a rational viewpoint.

When Russia deploys a Cruiser and destroyer off Syria, it isn't to make headlines. The Syrians are going to know where our ships in the 6th fleet are. Russia will provide Syria with technical support, and that technical support will include filling gaps in Syrian ISR at sea.

The US forces cannot take attrition in a military attack against Syria without suffering significant strategic consequences, and the reserve options at sea for the US Navy are extremely limited. If US warships in the Med are successfully attacked, there is a zero percent chance the first thing the US Navy is going to do is send an aircraft carrier through the Suez canal, because I assure you the overwhelming explosion in the Middle East of "f u usa" chants following US Navy attrition, particularly in Egypt, is going to make a Suez canal crossing under those conditions impossible.

So any scenario where warships suffer attrition, even with 100% solid evidence the Russians helped empower a Syrian attack achieve that objective, is going to put US policy in free fall with the Obama administration scrambling under a domestic pressure cooker and the US Navy week(s) away from being able to field a reserve capable of fighting due to sequestration cuts. Short of a direct attack by Russia against US military forces (extremely unlikely), Russia is in no danger of being attacked by the US for helping Syria.

So yeah, the number of things that can go wrong, in my opinion, greatly exceed the number of things that can go right. Susan Rice does not give me any confidence at all this will end well for core US national interests. With everything going on surrounding Syria this week, my faith in process and execution is solely with the professionals in the military who are on the front lines. Unless there is a brilliant plan that nobody has leaked, which is unlikely given the number of leaks we are seeing right now, my sense is this will come down to the individuals on the front line to make something useful out of the rotten pile of nonsense they are being handed by the administration.


And I hope no one forgets the policy with strategic "ends" defined as "bombing Syria" is taking place on General Dempsey's watch. Wake me up if that guy ever steps up, because the only thing every new challenge facing the military does is make me miss Admiral Mullen's leadership as the CJCS that much more.

Syria: One More Reason for a Return of Grand Strategy

General Donn A. Starry

Field Marshall Erich von Manstein

     Sun Tzu wrote, "Strategy without tactics is the slowest road to victory while tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat." The United States seems to be making a great deal of noise in its preparations for a possible attack on Syria. This latest operation is just another example of the U.S. slide away from strategy toward high operational art as practiced by such well known German generals as Field Marshall Erich von Manstein on the Soviet front in the Second World War. The U.S. initially adopted German-style operational art in the Cold War as officers like General Donn Starry grappled with the problem of countering massive Soviet armored formations with limited Western resources. U.S. Cold War operational efforts however were still under the overall aegis of the Containment strategy. Since the end of the Cold War however, in the absence of a post-Cold War strategy, the United States has for all intents and purposes adopted operational art as a substitute for strategic planning. A short review of history shows that for the U.S. this method is indeed Sun Tzu's "noise before defeat".
   At the outset of the Cold War Western military officers were desperate for tactics and procedures to counter the massive strength of the Soviet Army. They turned to the only group of people who had actually faced the Red Army in battle; the former Generals of the German Army. The German generals were all to happy to redeem themselves and gladly supplied their former enemies with their assessments of Soviet capabilities. More recent historians such as U.S. Army Colonel David Glantz have presented significant proof however that the Soviets were much more effective against the Germans, both operationally and tactically then the German generals ever admitted. German operational art however appeared to provide a very useful method of countering overwhelming Soviet numbers through technology, superior intelligence and communications and asymmetric attack. The inability to successfully link these factors for success in the Vietnam war further pushed Army and Air Force planners to successfully develop operational concepts like Air Land battle.
     The Cold War passed however and the United States never developed a successor to Containment as a global strategy for U.S. national security. Simultaneous with the end of the Cold War, the first Iraq War of 1991 appeared to confirm that operational art could indeed be employed as a war-winning strategy. Over the next twenty years and into the post 9/11 period the United States continued to substitute high operational art as "proved" by the first Iraq war as a substitute for real strategic thought and planning. Well-trained, technologically superior and rapidly deployable U.S. forces could easily defeat both large slow-moving Iraqi Army units and light, agile Afghan insurgents. Von Manstein performed similar feats in defensive engagements by cobbling together disparate German forces, welding them together with German operational concepts such as Auftragstaktik  and then attacking on multiple axes to stabilize weakened German positions.
     Now the U.S. prepares to strike Syria with a similar "cobbled-together" group of units, welded together through superior U.S. communications. As U.S. forces shrink due to budget cuts, it will become more difficult to assemble this war-winning combination for every crisis. The U.S. still stands an excellent chance at achieving its immediate objectives, but problems develop however when the inevitable question "what's next?" is asked? As General David Petraeus once said, "how does this end". Other than preventing the laudable goal of further deaths, what is the U.S / Western European objective in attacking Syria? How does it fit in with larger U.S./Western goals in the region? What are those goals for that matter? These strategic questions have not been answered. Vietnam, Iraq, Libya and now Syria have been cited together as military actions the U.S. began without a clear strategic goal. Operational Art only carries a nation so far in assuring its national security aims. The U.S. must articulate clear strategic goals for both Syria and the greater Middle East before embarking on military action. We have heard too often in the past the "tactical and operational noise" before strategic defeats.

Offshore Balancing In Action (or Inaction)

War on the Rocks Editor in Chief Ryan Evans and I have a piece up over at his site asserting that we no longer need to guess what America, the Great Power Offshore Balancer would look like; because that's what we are.

Book Review: Sierra Hotel

Sierra Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietnam, by C.R. Anderegg, covers the history of tactical air power (particularly fighter aircraft) from the Vietnam War until the early 1980s and beyond.  Sierra Hotel (slang, dontcha know) is a detailed account of what precisely went wrong with the Air Force in Vietnam, and how the fighter pilots of the USAF went about trying to remedy those problems in the post-war decade.

The USAF was not, in doctrinal, training, or equipment terms, prepared to fight the Vietnam War. The fault for these problems lay mainly with the service's continued obsession with strategic missions, including bombing and interception. Century-series fighters were designed either to kill Soviet bombers or deliver nuclear ordnance, not fight MiGs. Training did not emphasize dogfighting or other air superiority skills. US pilots were not trained to fight dissimilar opponents, and a MiG-21 looked and acted nothing like an F-100 or F-4. Equipment (including missiles) was designed for strategic rather than tactical missions.

The problems with missiles were multifold. The missiles were designed to hunt and kill not tiny MiG-21s and MiG-17s, but lumbering bombers that could not maneuver fast enough for evasion. Competent PAFVN pilots developed tactics to push the missiles beyond their fuel and maneuver limits. USAF pilots were not properly trained regarding the launching sequence of the missiles, or the tolerances under which the missiles could operate.

According to Andregg, training over-emphasized safety concerns at the expense of skill and readiness. There are always, of course, trade-offs between safety and realistic training, but Andregg makes a good case that the needle had drifted too far to the former. The "universally assignable pilot" policy, which held that any USAF pilot should (with sufficient training) be able to fly any USAF aircraft was also problematic. First, sufficient training (especially air-to-air) wasn't always available. Second, the aptitude of pilots for fighter aircraft varied (as it will in any given population), and dropping lower on the aptitude chart invariably reduced overall effectiveness.

It's easy to overstate the problems of the USAF in Vietnam, of course; it still achieved a positive kill-ratio against North Vietnamese forces, and conducted several exceptional tactical engagements (such as the trap, led by Robin Olds, that destroyed nearly half of the PAFVN's MiG-21 inventory). Nevertheless, given the material advantage that the USAF held over its opponents, and also given the relatively greater success enjoyed by USN aviators, the general sense from the early years of Vietnam was of tactical as well as strategic failure.

But only the first part of Andregg's story focuses on the experience of Vietnam. He's more concerned with what came after, as the USAF began to distill the lessons of the conflict. In the 1970s, the Air Force would introduce new air-to-air missiles, new air-to-ground ordnance, new aircraft (most notably the F-15, F-16, and A-10), and perhaps most importantly new, more realistic training procedures. Indeed, Anderegg gives a fantastic account of the differences between the F-15 and F-4, emphasizing not only the clear technical superiority of the former aircraft but also how tacit knowledge accumulated during the Vietnam era helped shape design priorities. Anderegg also gives careful, detailed accounts of the value of particular precision-guided munitions, discussing what exactly they could contribute to operations and how they changed the ways in which pilots flew.

Most interesting, perhaps, is Anderegg's discussion of the development of Red Flag, which introduced training intended to remedy many of the problems discovered in Vietnam. Red Flag concentrated (although not exclusively) on air-to-air engagements, most fought against dissimilar aircraft (either T-38 Talonsor F-5 Tigers). Later, captured or purchased MiGs would be introduced into the mix. The experience of Red Flag undoubtedly increased the air-to-air expertise of US fighter pilots. The introduction of bomber, attack, and SEAD missions to the mix also helped revolutionize doctrine in those areas.

Many good histories of the USAF abstract much of what happened during this period, covering the effects of the rise of the "Fighter Mafia" without detailing precisely what happened and why it happened. Anderegg produced a detailed history that is long on specifics but well written and readable for those with only a passing knowledge of the subject. For those interested in airpower history, Sierra Hotel is a critical part of the picture.

Cross-posted at LGM.

Did the Goldwater Nichols Act cripple the art of strategy?

Senator Barry M. Goldwater and
General David C. Jones

James Locher's
Victory on the Potomac

 The recent debate over potential U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region is a welcome change from the past 25 years of crisis management and technological solutions. The U.S. never really created a grand strategy to replace the varieties of Containment employed throughout the Cold War. From 1991 until 2008 the U.S. pursued a variety of policies without regard for geography and in many cases without financial restraint. Each new strategic crisis was met with an emergency expenditure in the U.S. military budget and new weapons and systems such as smart weapons and "network-centric warfare". Operational art and stage-managing a strategic operation along a specific timeline replaced strategic thinking and analysis. The benefits of being a "hyperpower" are many, but some sort of strategic planning is required to avoid overstretch and prepare for the emergence of the next peer/near-peer competitor.
     The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 was intended to refine President Reagan's early "rollback" version of containment strategy by streamlining the chain of command in order to fight a potential global war against the Soviet Union. Created and backed by an impressive array of civilian and military leaders including Senator Barry Goldwater (R/Az) and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General David C. Jones, who passed away this month, the legislation was heralded as a great victory over so-called "parochial" service bickering in favor of a more organized "joint" force. The Senate Armed Services Committee staffer James Locher, who played a key role in crafting the Senate version of the legislation wrote a book in 2002 hailing it as the "Victory on the Potomac". Despite these claims however, the Goldwater Nichols Act has instead done significant harm to the nation's long range military planning process by tying it to political and budgetary cycles even more tightly than in the 1980's and by further excluding the uniformed military from the business of grand strategy.
     To begin, the Goldwater Nichols Act was not a decisive victory, but in fact a draw between two competing systems of national security planning. The proponents of Goldwater Nichols wanted a much different military leadership system than what was finally agreed upon by Congress and the Reagan administration. In their initial scheme the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would be replaced by a board of retired officers and the CJCS would effectively become the senior commander of the nation's armed forces. The only uniformed member directly involved in the strategic decision-making process was the CJCS. Service Chiefs were excluded. They also desired the JCS to assume the role of a general staff that would conduct centralized strategic planning to be executed by the deployed Combatant Commanders (COCOM's).
    The opposition, led by Navy Secretary John Lehman, his deputy Seth Cropsey and many senior Navy and Marine Corps officers supported a more traditional, decentralized approach. In their view, the military services should support the COCOMs with strategic concepts and a mixed civil-military team was responsible for strategic military decisions. The result of the battle between these systems was a tie. Reform advocates got an empowered CJCS and pushed the individual military services out of what strategic planning work they retained. On the other hand, the JCS was not replaced by retired officers, the CJCS did not become a "generalissimo" and most importantly, the Joint Staff did not get the "red Prussian uniform stripe" of a full-fledged general staff.
     Where has that left the nation for the last 25+ years? Without a coalition of services or a supreme general staff to conduct strategic planning, political appointees and career Department of Defense employees have assumed more of the strategic planning work originally done by uniformed military officers. This process had been underway throughout the Cold War but accelerated after Goldwater Nichols. The process of creating strategy was once more flexible and only was put to the test of budget limitations after it was created and refined. Now strategy is so tightly linked to the political and budgetary cycle that it is frequently changed before its impact can be adequately assessed. Before 1986 the military services had produced such well-received strategic concepts as the Navy's 1980s version of the Maritime Strategy and the combined Army/Air Force "Air Land Battle".  Since then the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the more recent Joint Capabilities Integration System (JCIDS) have constrained the strategic thinking of the individual services by demanding each weapon, tactic and budget plan support all of the services. This equal division of resources was a problem Goldwater Nichols advocates sought to eliminate. Instead it has become even more institutionalized. If a pivot to the Pacific demands a preponderance in naval and air power, as opposed to ground forces, why is the Department of Defense threatening to cut the number of Navy carriers instead of further reducing the size of the Army?
     The advocates of Goldwater Nichols sought to make the military work better by relieving it of a broken "parochial" system of service competition for scant resources. They hoped that an empowered CJCS would restore order and that the Joint Staff would make unbiased strategic and financial decisions. The compromise political agreement however removed the bulk of the remaining uniformed military from strategic decision-making, leaving it more firmly in the hands of budgeteers and political appointees. Even now much of the current strategic discussion comes from quasi-govt. and private institutions such as RAND, CNA, and various think tanks. Politicians and budget analysts should be in the business of shaping and providing realism to military strategy. They should not be left to create it. Congress should seriously consider a long-overdue review of the Goldwater Nichols Act, whose provisions have remained largely unchanged since 1986.  It should fully restore the services' ability to create operational strategy, and with it the flexibility the nation needs to provide sound strategic concepts in a financially challenging environment.

AirSea Battle: Colby v. Hammes (Continued)

My friends Bridge Colby and T.X. Hammes are continuing to fight out their superbly argued sides on the AirSea Battle front, Colby making points similar to the one's I've made in this space but doing so more effectively and eloquently. 

It is hard for me to get around feeling that T.X. Hammes' "Offshore Control" strategy is a recipe for hastening the decline of U.S. power and influence in Asia.  If that's ok with you, then you won't find Hammes' approach questionable. 

Some may find it opportunistic for a guy who wrote the words "preventing wars is as important as winning wars", but too much emphasis on this debate is placed on the war-fighting capacity of ASB and too little is placed on the war-deterring aspects of the concept.  We need to continue to sustain the conditions under which the PLAN East Sea Fleet Commander wakes up every day and says "today is not the day" (hat-tip to VADM Joe Sestak, whose words those are).  AirSea Battle can be a critical part of an approach that leads him to that conclusion.

Bryan McGrath

Try This One Weird Trick to Cut Organizational Redundancy!

Over at Medium: War is Boring, I take another unhinged screed at the Air Force:

With the Iraq War over and the fighting in Afghanistan winding down,why does the United States need to maintain two large land armies, the Army and Marine Corps? The question seems perfectly reasonable given the apparent absence of large terrestrial threats, but it leads us down the wrong path. 

The United States military is all about redundancy; in addition to two armies, it also fields two navies — the Navy and the Coast Guard — and five or six air forces, depending on how you count the aerial arms of the various branches. 

The real problem isn’t that the Army is marginally more or less useful that it was 10 years ago, but rather that the institutions that were designed in 1947, when the Army and Air Force split, are insufficiently flexible to negotiate the modern security landscape.

This serves as a backdoor announcement that Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (in lieu of a webpage, I've set up a twitter feed), will be published this spring by University Press of Kentucky.  The introductory piece has generated a couple good responses, first from Michael Auslin:

The other services may indeed use their air arms to support their missions, but fulfilling the strategic objectives of the United States will depend ever more heavily on an independent Air Force that is able to exploit every advantage from the air domain, just as the Navy exploits every advantage from the sea. To expect global airpower without the Air Force is a fantasy, especially in today’s budget environment. If Mr. Farley wanted to be truly radical, he would have called for abolishing the Army and Navy’s air wings and folding them into the only airpower service that can make the full use of their ability.

And from Robert Goldich:

There are some very practical reasons why an independent Air Force is a good thing. First, not all airpower is used in support of operations over land or water. Strategic air and space power, whether with manned aircraft or missiles, most notably our strategic nuclear forces, can be employed in support of ground and naval operations, but need not be. Furthermore, strategic air and missile forces are projected from the continental United States, not from an overseas theater of operations. To assign the strategic airpower function to either the Army or the Navy would make no sense. Second, we need a central repository for doctrine to manage the air battle in a theater of operations. To assign that responsibility to aviation assets of the Army or Navy would create an unbalanced situation where the interests and concerns of one service outweighed the other.

At What Price, Another Round of Real Carrier Choices

Sea Control Ship

CVV medium carrier design

CVN-78 class

      It seems that whenever defense budgets shrink, the big deck aircraft carrier becomes a principle target of budget cutters and technological enthusiasts. Whether in late 1940s, the late 1970s, or today, a group of carrier critics has emerged, armed with budgetary and technological arguments forecasting the vulnerability and impending doom of the big flattop. With the shadows of continuing sequester and advanced anti-carrier weapons now darkening the late summer in Washington DC, another group of carrier critics in the tradition of Louis Johnson, Stuart Symington, and ADM Stansfield Turner have taken the stage to deride the big flattop in budgetary talks. They demand that it go the way of the battleship and make way for some cheaper, less vulnerable weapon system that will accomplish the same effects as the supercarrier. It is surprising to note that few, if any of these critics reference the last thought-provoking study done on the aircraft carrier as both a strategic platform and instrument of war at sea. Former Navy Secretary John Lehman's Aircraft Carriers, The Real Choices, which appeared in 1978 before his tenure as Secretary of the Navy asked the significant strategic questions that seem to elude today's carrier critics. In addition to budgetary and vulnerability concerns, Lehman sought to understand what the government expected carriers to do; could land-based aviation supplant any carrier roles; how many flattops were really required by the U.S. for peace and wartime operations, how big they should be and finally how technological advancements in aircraft such as vertical take off and landing (VSTOL) capabilities might change carrier missions and design. Whether the United States decides on big carriers, small carriers, a mix of types, or something else, the strategic needs of the nation, tempered by financial realities ought to drive the process and not the fear mongering of the latest group of carrier critics.
     Lehman's 1978 analysis on carrier choices is equally relevant in 2013 and while the technology of naval weapons, sensors, communications and avionics has significantly advanced since that time, the threats to the flattop, its strategic, operational and tactical uses, and the choices in shape and size of carrier remain remarkably constant. In the late 1970s's the threat of the Soviet combined cruise missile strike from air, surface and subsurface platforms was believed to be just as deadly to the U.S. carrier battle group as the Chinese-made DF-21(D) is today. Many experts then as now advocated smaller, less detectable carriers like the CVV and Sea Control Ship to augment or supplant the big carrier. Others recommended land-based aircraft and cruise missiles as less vulnerable and less costly substitutes for sea-based naval aviation.
      Lehman agreed that the big carrier was vulnerable and its steep construction and operating costs were good reason for at least augmenting the carrier fleet with smaller, less costly aviation-capable warships. The problem he discovered however was that if carriers were even fractionally smaller then the big flattops, the effectiveness of their airwing rapidly deceased, their vulnerability to mission-kill or loss exponentially increased, and their lifetime maintenance cost (primarily due to the smaller ships' dependence on fossil vice nuclear fuel) was much higher over 30+ years than that of the big deck nuclear-powered carrier. These factors have not appreciably changed. The price of fossils fuels remains problematic and maintenance costs have appreciable risen.
    While vulnerable to attack, the big deck carrier is still arguably one of the toughest ships to sink. The damage incurred to USS Forrestal in 1967 and that suffered by USS Enterprise in 1969 in accidental detonations of multiple pieces of ordnance testifies to the extreme survivability of the big carrier. The ex-USS America (CV-66) was recently sunk as a target and some open source accounts say the ship took a tremendous beating before being purposely sunk after the test. The Navy has also not rested in its drive to protect the carrier from emerging threats. U.S. carriers were indeed vulnerable to cruise missile attack in the late 1970s, but development and fielding of the Aegis system for air defense significantly improved the ability of the carrier battle group to defend itself against this threat. The U.S. has pursued an equally aggressive program to defend against ballistic missiles like the DF-21(D) and there is no reason to believe this threat cannot also be countered by a technological response.
     The size and composition of the carrier's air wing were important to Lehman in determining what missions the ship could legitimately accomplish. Sadly the longer-range assets of the carrier including strike aircraft like the A-6 Intruder, and the antisubmarine warfare S-3 Viking were retired and not replaced. The relative weakness of the current carrier air wing in long range strike is one of the carrier critics' strongest arguments against the bigger flattop. That point alone however is not enough to argue for the ship's replacement by submarines or surface ships as the principle strike asset. The potential of longer-ranged unmanned aircraft is enormous and could redress the balance lost with the retirement of longer-range manned platforms in the last two decades.
   Land based air has been popular and easy to use in U.S. conflicts since 1990, but the same vulnerabilities Lehman discovered remain. As during the Cold War, the U.S. can no longer assume conditions as it has possessed in both of the Iraq conflicts, Afghanistan, and most recently Libya. These past conflicts were characterized by a ring of near-invulnerable airbases encircling the opponent, little if any resistance from the adversary, and a focus on strike verses a more conventional wartime campaign to reduce opponents and protect friendly forces. Overseas U.S. airbases in future conflicts against peer or near-peer opponents would be subject to attack from a variety of means and friendly host nations could rapidly become potential adversaries as demonstrated by such recent events as the so-called "Arab spring." The U.S. Air Force's stable of long and medium range strike aircraft has also significantly declined in number since Lehman's time and if war or revolution prevent the use of airbases that support shorter-range strike aircraft, the carrier would quickly become the sole aviation asset in a region of conflict.
     The U.S. again needs to ask Lehman's big strategic questions before making any final choices on its carrier fleet. The aircraft carrier has been a controversial platform since its emergence nearly a century ago at the end of World War 1. It has always been vulnerable to attack, but remains capable of flexible, continuous delivery of high volumes of ordnance albeit at a shorter range then in the past. Previous threats to the carrier have been successfully managed through technological improvements in the carrier's construction and defenses. New threats such as antiship ballistic missiles need to be fully countered, but the carrier remains less threatened than any land base. This relative safety allows national command authority the ability to deploy significant striking power without placing U.S. aircraft at risk in bases outside U.S.sovereign control. The recent success of the X-47B offers the potential of large numbers of unmanned aircraft being deployed from carriers. Land-based air can still play a significant role in any campaign, but in the likely contested conflicts  of the future its regional bases could be threatened. The lack of medium range strike assets in the U.S. Air Force inventory place a further burden on carrier-based aviation to carry a contested campaign. No matter the final number or composition of the carrier fleet, it is vital that decision-makers determine what role carriers should play in the nation's national security and how many are needed to fulfill that requirement. Carrier critics have a role to play, but a review of history since 1945 shows they are not offering any new arguments. The mission for the last twenty years may have been strike, but twilight is descending on that period of history and the next conflicts the U.S. faces will require flexible weapon systems that offer decision makers maximum freedom of choice. A cruise missile launch platform does not meet this goal, but an aircraft carrier can and will continue to meet this requirement. Lehman bemoaned the "executive/legislative drift" on carrier choices in the late 1970s. The nation cannot now afford a similar delay.
    

21st Century Mahan

I recently had an opportunity to read 21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era by Benjamin Armstrong. Below is the official book description on Amazon.

Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Seapower upon History is well known to students of naval history and strategy, but his other writings are often dismissed as irrelevant to today's problems. This collection of five of Mahan's essays, along with Benjamin Armstrong's informative introductions, illustrates why Mahan's work remains relevant to the 21st century and how it can help develop our strategic thinking. People misunderstand Mahan, the editor argues, because they have read only what others say about him, not what Mahan wrote himself. Armstrong's analysis is derived directly from Mahan's own writings. From the challenges of bureaucratic organization and the pit falls of staff duty, to the development of global strategy and fleet composition, to illustrations of effective combat leadership, Armstrong demonstrates that Mahan's ideas continue to provide today's readers with a solid foundation to address the challenges of a rapidly globalizing world.

It is probably expected that as an American blogger on naval history and naval strategy, I would be a big fan of Alfred Thayer Mahan. The truth is, I am not. AT Mahan may be known as America's great strategist, but he takes subjects I love like naval history and naval strategy and does what I consider impossible - he makes the subjects boring to read. While reading most of his books, I'll find myself on paragraph seven and sentence ten on some various subject screaming at AT Mahan to "get to the f-in point already you long winded...". AT Mahan's style of writing books is one where he goes so far out of the way to be so precise in what he is saying that it's like driving from Maine to Montana to get to New Jersey. With that said, some of my favorite articles are written by AT Mahan, but in every single case those articles are for periodicals, not his books.

21st Century Mahan is a very clever book. The book combines five articles written by AT Mahan for periodicals specifically for public audiences, thus presenting AT Mahan in a way that is more approachable by those like me who can get annoyed by his difficult to read classical writing style. All five articles are very well written, but they are also relevant to the discussions surrounding the US Navy today. Benjamin Armstrong is a Lieutenant Commander in the US Navy today, so the author intentionally draws no conclusions from Mahan's work and applies them to current events. And yet, because of the presentation and delivery within the book, the reader can't help but think about Mahan in a 21st century context applicable today. I am not sure if that was how LCDR Armstrong intended to write the book, or how the USNI editors helped arrange the book, but it is very clever and works well.

I really enjoyed the book. It helped that I had never read any of the five AT Mahan essay's covered in the book, and it also helped that I enjoyed each of the essay's. In particular the way the chapter involving Naval Administration and Warfare, Some General Principles came together early in the book was so well done I had to read it again with my yellow marker I was so impressed. To give one a sense of just how much easier this book is to read on Alfred Thayer Mahan than most works of AT Mahan, my 18 year old daughter actually finished the book when I asked her to read it just for an opinion. I assure you, if this was a typical Mahan book, she would not have made it past chapter 2.

If you are looking for a book with a strong authors opinion that draws conclusions for you in applying AT Mahan to the 21st century, this is not the right book for you. This book asks readers to draw their own conclusions. That detail actually defines the style of the book better than any other detail of the book, because the author doesn't tell the reader what to think, rather asks the reader to think for themselves.

Final note on this book. Availability of this book at Amazon for the paper copy has been hit and miss, but the electronic versions are always available. I note this because I have purchased two copies of this book since its release in late June and both copies arrived over 2 weeks later, so if you are expecting this book to be a last second quick gift idea, my experience suggests you should expect delays. With that said, there does appear to be copies available on Amazon again today.

Foreign Entanglements: The Myths of AirSea Battle

On this week's episode of Foreign Entanglements, Bryan and I spoke about his recent War on the Rocks post about AirSea Battle:

In particular, we give attention to whether ASB should be regarded as an anti-Army power play, whether it would increase the chances of war with China, whether it demands a particular strategic outlook, and whether the United States could afford ASB.