HASC Seapower Chairman and ID Contributor on the Marine Corps

Representative Randy Forbes (R-VA) and I have an Op-Ed at the San Diego Union Tribune site on the centrality of a strong Marine Corps to American Seapower. The text is below:

Marines’ role cannot be shortchanged

Guest perspective: Corps must be placed squarely within rubric of U.S. sea power

As we continue to plunge headlong into shortsighted military unpreparedness driven by a strong case of strategic blindness, fiscal uncertainty and political timidity, it is worth considering the critical role played by the U.S. Marine Corps in protecting and sustaining national interests far from our shores.

In order to do so properly, the Marine Corps must be placed squarely within the rubric of American sea power, the most flexible, ready and present component of U.S. military power. Alongside the other elements of American sea power — the dominant surface and submarine forces, and the world’s most mobile and lethal form of air power (carrier aviation) — the Marines represent a middleweight land force designed to project land power from the sea.

The Marine Corps is not a second land army, although its employment since 2001 has caused it to be viewed like one. Marine leaders have been rightfully vocal about the naval roots of their service in recent years, and it is this aspect of its existence that guarantees the continuing relevance — no, the criticality — of the Marine Corps.

We believe that in light of the drawdown from the land wars of the past decade and in order to implement President Barack Obama’s “rebalance” toward Asia-Pacific, the importance of American sea power in the guise of the Navy-Marine Corps team will only increase. Geography may not be destiny, but it certainly helps define strategy.

The United States is thousands of miles across the Pacific Ocean from five treaty partners and a considerable mass of American national interest. The appetite for permanently garrisoned forces in the region seems to be on the wane, even as friends and allies look to the United States for assurance against destabilizing and persistent Chinese actions.

If we hope to remain a Pacific power with the ability to assure friends, deter threats and preserve access to the global commons that tie our economies together, the logic proceeds that we will need to rely more heavily on the Navy-Marine Corps team for sea-based power projection.

It is difficult to think of a future crisis in East Asia that would lack a critical role for the Marine Corps. While the Pacific Theater is maritime in nature, there is a considerable amount of land that retains strategic value, some of which is under the sovereignty of nations with whom we have mutual defense treaties.

A desire to avoid “land wars in Asia” should not blind us to the reality that in order to protect our interests, we may very well have to conduct “land operations” throughout East Asia and Oceania.

For instance, small islands throughout the First Island Chain (the Japan-Taiwan-Philippines archipelago) could become a mechanism for either China or the United States and its allies to contest the local sea by controlling the land. Such operations are the natural purview of a force designed for amphibious employment, and that force is the Marine Corps.

To be prepared, we must take the following actions:

• We must build more ships. Specifically, we must build more amphibious ships.

The Marine Corps has a war-fighting requirement for 38 amphibious ships, while the geographic combatant commanders’ peacetime presence requirement is similar. Neither is met by the nation’s current shipbuilding plan, which provides for about 30 until well into the next decade and eventually 33.

The utility of these ships is apparent, providing for transport and power projection in time of war and crisis, and disaster response capability in peacetime. However, there is at least a $4 billion average annual gap in funding for the Navy’s planned shipbuilding budget in the decades ahead. But filling this gap and resourcing the current shipbuilding plan does not require a large shift in Defense Department resources, according to Ron O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Service, but instead just 1.1 percent to 1.5 percent more of the department’s current average annual budget.

•  The Navy and Marine Corps must become more integrated. Forward-deployed American sea power is poised to provide for a “bubble” of diplomacy, influence and power of a definable range, within which naval forces execute multidomain dominance.

This is not a war-winning force, and it does not operate without critical support from the Joint Force. It is, however, powerful, flexible, mobile and fully integrated, capable of providing continuous conventional deterrence and crisis response to the vast majority of cases in which military power might be called upon.

Command and control stovepipes within the task organizations of the Navy and Marine Corps must be dismantled, with a common command structure implemented that sees the land power of the Marine Corps as one of its several primary tools. With the fielding of the VSTOL variant of the F-35B, Marine tactical aviation must necessarily evolve from its singular focus on ground support to a broader mission in support of the Seapower Task Force.

The Department of the Navy should consider a variant of the littoral combat ship in which a detachment of Marines provides for maritime security missions while Marine attack helicopters neutralize targets at sea and ashore. The bottom line is that the Marine Corps must fully return to its roots and provide this nation with flexible combat power from the sea.

• We must properly size the Marine Corps. Pressures to draw down the force as a result of defense sequestration cuts should not exert undue influence on the size of the Marine Corps, which must be maintained as America’s force in readiness. The nation can and should provide for a Marine Corps at a minimum 180,000 Marines.

While no one can predict the future with clarity, one must make informed choices about future trends in order to manage current resources. Some call this strategy. We see a limited appetite among the American people for the occupation and administration of foreign lands, even as we understand the desire of the American people to remain powerful and influential wherever our interests lie.

The U.S. Marine Corps, operating as a critical component of forward-deployed American sea power, will play an increasingly important role in ensuring Americans that we can and will carry out their expectations.

Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., is chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee. He is co-leading a bipartisan Asia-Pacific Oversight Series for the House Armed Services Committee.  Bryan McGrath is assistant director of the Hudson Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute, and is managing director of the FerryBridge Group.

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"The Navy's Amazing Ocean-Powered Underwater Drone," by Mark Thompson (Time Magazine, 12/22/13)

"USS Little Rock, From Light to Guided Missile Cruiser: Lessons for the Littoral Combat Ship," by Norman Friedman (Breaking Defense, 12/23/13)

"Navy: UCLASS Will Be Stealthy and 'Tomcat Size'," by Dave Majumdar and Sam LaGrone (USNI News, 12/23/13)

"Air-Sea Battle to Cost $524.5 Billion Through 2023," by Zachary Keck (The Diplomat, 12/24/13)

"2013 Chinese Naval Review," by Feng (Information Dissemination, 12/25/13)

"Top 5 Battleships of All Time," by James R. Holmes (The National Interest, 12/26/13)

"Sea Power: The Battle for Innovation," by James R. Holmes (The Diplomat, 12/26/13)

Bryan McGrath

What to Do With a Problem Like the F-35?

At the National Interest I have some ruminations on the future of the F-35:

What are we to make of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)? Over the past several months, several pieces of good news about the program have emerged. The Royal Netherlands Air Force just became the second partner organization to operate the F-35. While new reports note a deal is not finalized, a South Korean purchase of the plane looks likely and with Japan already committed the plane looks set to soar in Asian skies. Indeed, while several partners have reduced their commitment over the last year, none have backed out fully. The F-35 Lightning II will, eventually, fly in the service of around a dozen major allied air forces.

2013 Chinese Air Force Review

This was the year when many of China's new military aviation projects appeared, so it was very exciting to all of the PLAAF followers. Although there weren't as many news coming out this year about J-20 and J-31, many other projects really came out and took center stage. So this entry will try to look at them.

Y-20 - Although we started see pictures of Y-20 performing low speed taxiing late last year, it did not make it's maiden flight until late January of this year. The second Y-20 prototype made its maiden flight very recently. It looks like this program is progressing well so far. PLAAF is desperate for something like Y-20 to not only do the role of strategic transport but also as the platform for next generation AWACS (and other C4ISR roles), large aerial tanker and airborne laser platform. It has been forced to purchase a number of refurbished IL-76s from Russia in the past couple of years as a stop gap until Y-20 comes into service in 3 to 5 years. I think there is a chance that they will also purchase some new built IL-476 since the production rate for Y-20 is likely to be low in the beginning. In my opinion, this is the most important aviation project for PLA.

J-20/J-31 - It has been a less eventful year for the 5th generation projects. Many of us expect the prototype 2003 to come out this year, but we were disappointed for most of the year (although there is some recent photo that indicate 2003 might be ready). It looks like major improvements are to be made in this third prototype, whereas the first 2 are probably more like technology demonstrators. J-31 has been making some more test flights, but it's not known at the moment what exact role it will have for PLAAF. Similar to J-20, this first prototype is probably more like a technology demonstrator while 601 Institute works on creating a prototype that satisifies all of PLAAF requirements.

Flanker family - While rumours about Su-35 purchase continues unabated, we do know that J-15 project has moved to production stage this year. We are still waiting to see production version of J-15 to appear on CV-16. That will probably happen next year. It looks like J-16 project is also moving toward a first pre-production batch. J-11B/S production has continued this year, but will probably be replaced by J-16 very soon. At which point, J-15 will be produced for the naval aviation and J-16 will be for the air force. J-16 and J-10B are likely to be the main multirole fighters in PLAAF until the 5th generation aircraft enters service.

J-10 family - The production of J-10A finally came to close this year with the 7th batch. Most recently, we saw the last J-10A regiment with the 124th brigade. Earlier this year, we saw J-10A with the 12th division. The 124th brigade maybe all J-10As or a mix with J-10Bs. We now have 10 regiments (FTTC, 44th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 24th, 9th, 15th, 12th, 124th brigade) in service with PLAAF, 1 regiment (4th division 12th regiment) in service with PLANAF in addition to 12 in service with August first flight demonstration squad. That will total to over 300 single and twin-seated versions of J-10As, which is a very healthy production run. We have already seen the first production version of J-10B in the air fields of CAC, so they should join service next year. In many ways, J-10B's flight tests lasted a lot longer (5 years) than all of us had estimated. That's probably a combination of 611 Institute/132 factory devoting most of their resources to the J-20 project and the complexity of changes from J-10A to J-10B. It will be the first fighter jet in PLAAF to have AESA radar and a whole host of new generation avionics. There are rumours of a J-10C variant under development, but it's unlikely to have anywhere near the level of changes from J-10A to J-10B. By that time, the production of both the hi (J-20) and lo (J-31) 5th generation fighter jet will both have already started.

Helicopter projects - Most recently, the much speculated Z-20 (the 10-ton general purpose helicopters) made its maiden flight. We can tell from the photos that it is heavily inspired (or cloned) from S-70 blackhawk series of helicopters. As shown with S-70 and NH-90, this class of helicopter can be used for a wide variety of roles for both the army and the navy. One would imagine Z-20 would be very popular in PLA too. It can replace Mi-17 and Z-8B in most of the transport and SAR roles, while serving as the primary SAR/ASW helicopter for medium sized PLAN surface combatants. The other project that will be very important is the Z-15 project. The first Chinese version using WZ-16 engine should be flying next year. Similar to Z-20, it should be a tremendous help for both the army and navy. It can replace many roles currently handled by the undersized Z-9 series of helicopter. Up to this point, the main problem with Chinese helicopter industry is the lack of helicopters between the 4-ton class Z-9 and the 13-ton class Z-8. Z-10 has now filled the space of 6-ton attack helicopter, but Z-15 and Z-20 will now fill the space of 7-ton and 10-ton helicopter to finally provide PLA with a full compliment of domestic helicopters.

UAVs - Two major UAV projects took step forward this year. The first is the X-47B like Lijian (Sharp Sword) UCAV from 601 Institute and Hongdu. It had it's maiden flight in November and really gives China a stealthy UCAV that can perform a variety of attacking roles. Going forward, much work needs to be done (like getting a new engine that fits the engine nozzle) to actually bring this into service, but looks like PLAAF is really putting a lot of resources in this area. The other major project is the "second generation" of Soaring Dragon. The first demonstrator version came out in 2011. After 2 years of relative inactivity, we saw it again this year with numerous modifications. It should eventually join PLAAF as a HALE UAV similar to RQ-4. Outside of these two developments, we also saw Wing Loong (similar to MQ-1 UCAV) joining service with PLAAF and numerous other UAV projects like CH-4 that are being developed for both export market and PLA.

Bomber/fighter-bomber - We continue to see the H-6K bomber entering service with PLAAF this year. I don't expect a large production run of this bomber, but it can serve as a bomb truck until a more advanced bomber (which is currently under development) comes into service. That is something I don't expect until later this decade. After much speculation, we've finally seen the maiden flight of JH-7B recently. Contrary to earlier speculations, JH-7B has very few external modifications from JH-7A. The changes are the inclusion of a retractable IFR, strengthening of wing/fuselage to carry larger/heavier missiles and a new generation of avionics. JH-7B is likely to be developed for naval aviation since PLAAF is likely to purchase J-16 in the role of fighter-bomber.

As a whole, this has been a very busy year for Chinese military aviation. The appearances of Z-20, the second Y-20 and first JH-7B have been very exciting to PLAAF followers. At the same time, it's great to see J-10B production finally starting. J-10B and J-16 should be the main fighter jet for PLAAF until the end of this decade. The biggest things to look for next year will be the changes in the third prototype of J-20, the appearance of a next generation bomber and the development of new UAVs.

2013 Chinese Naval Review

2013 was another interesting year to look back on for the Chinese Navy, even if we did not see the commissioning of CV-16 or the launching of 052D. Here are some of the progress of the major projects and the anticipated launching for next year.

Carrier Project - For much of the first half of the year, CV-16 rested in Qingdao while China continue to study what it learnt from 2012. As you will be able to find on this SDF thread and this link containing recent Jane's Article, China has built a naval aviation training facility with multiple take-off and landing strips along with hangars for J-15s, trainers and helicopters. By June, we finally had the second round of flight tests from sea trials for CV-16. After which, 5 pilots have been certified for carrier operation. So far, we have only seen prototype No. 552, 553 and 554 conducting test flights off CV-16. Hopefully as we go forward over the next year, we will see production versions of J-15s and more pilots join flight operations. We have also seen J-15 conducting flights with payload like YJ-83, AAMs, bombs and buddy store. This is still a very early stage of flight operations for PLAN. We should see continued expansion in flight envelope and scale of flight operations over the next couple of years. Without help from existing carrier operators, PLAN have to proceed slowly to learn all of the lessons of carrier operations.

The other part this project is the construction of new carrier. Whereas CV-16 has the designation Type 001, the first domestic carrier is already given the designation of Type 001A. By all account, it should be a STOBAR carrier similar to CV-16. The question at this point is what kind of changes we will see from the not so well designed Admiral K class. Work for this type 001A class has reported been started in the second half of this year in Dalian shipyard (which did the refitting work for CV-16). We saw modules earlier in both Dalian and JiangNan shipyard, but those may just be demonstration modules. Over 2014, we should see more pictures of the modules taking shape. We may see both Dalian and JiangNan build 1 Type 001A carrier.

Submarine Program - I've written extensively this year about China's nuclear submarine program. We finally saw a newly launched Type 093B + newly launched Type 094 from the GE photos. Based on Kanwa's measurement, the Type 094 is also modified based on the location of the hump relative to the bow. Based on all that we have heard, a lot of improvements are needed in the upcoming boats before they can really become the deterrent that China needs.

The conventional submarine program was also quite active, but a lot more under the radar. The type 032 testbed was unveiled in July, whereas the type 039B production continued. It looks like the first 8 to 10 039A/039B have now replaced the Song submarines in the 22nd flotilla at Daxiedao and the newer 039B submarines (2 to 4) are going to the 12th flotilla at Lushun. We have also seen a new submarine launched at WC shipyard that's either a new modified version of Yuan (Type 039C or a new designation). In 2014, it will be interesting to see what this new boat looks like.

052C/052D - Over the past year, we've seen the 3rd and 4th 052C join service. The 5th and 6th should join service sometimes next year. The progression of this batch of 052Cs hasn't been as fast as expected. We've seen them numerous times in sea trials and at naval bases before they were commissioned. The time from launching to commissioning is over 2 years compared to about 1 year for 054A. The first 052D went on sea trials this year. We saw that it is still using the Type 517H long range radar as 052C. Seems like Chinese navy really likes the anti-stealth quality of this radar vs the possible benefits of a more modern volume search radar like S1850M. Outside of that, it seems like Dalian shipyard has also started building 052D. I think this class will eventually reach 8 units, although there are speculations this might reach 12. Type 055 might be on hold as they are really ramping up type 052D production next year.

054A - The production of 054A has continued this year with 3 more units launching. We saw some changes on the 10th 054A from HD shipyard equipped with a new generation of variable depth sonar (also seen on Type 052D ships). By this point next year, we should have 20 054As + 2 054s in service. Not sure if that will be the end of 054A production finally, but this has definitely turned out to be the most successful of Chinese naval projects in the past 10 years.
>br/> 056 - This program has a chance to compete with Type 054 series in success. We have already seen 18 of these ships joining service, in sea trials or launched less than 2 years after the first launching. Most recently with the 5th 056 from HD shipyard, we saw a new large variable depth sonar installed in the back. This might mark a new ASW variant of Type 056 intended to replace the Type 037 sub-chasers. Other Type 056s are probably going to replace the other versions of Type 037s in service. This class may end up with 40 units by the end of its production run. At which time, all of the older patrols boats should be retired from active service.

AOR (Type 903A) - This year, the 2 Type 903A AORs in sea trials from Guangzhou and HD shipyard both joined service with East and North Sea Fleet respectively. That gives them a total of 4 Type 903 AORs. Most recently in November, we saw a new AOR under construction at Guangzhou. We will find out in 2014 if this continues to be a Type 903 or a new class of ships.

Zubr - There has not been much movement in the construction of new Type 071 or LHD, so the main amphibious project this year has been the import and domestic construction of Zubr hovercraft. In June, the first Ukrainian built Zubr arrived at Guangzhou. At the same time, the first domestic Zubr has been building at a brisk pace in HP shipyard and now looks to be ready to be launched. The second domestic Zubr looks to have started construction too. The original contract called for 2 to be built in Ukraine and 2 in China. I would not be surprised if more are built in China. It is quite possible that they will only end up taking one from Ukraine and end up with more than 4 Zubr. While I don't think the current threat environment calls for many Zubrs, it certainly would not be a suprise to see a production of 8 to 10 of them. We will find next year if that will be the case.

Looking back now on this past year, it did not unveil as many new platforms as 2012, but was still a very productive year in terms of newly launched and commissioned ships. Looking forward to 2014, I expect more new classes of ships to be unveiled. It would be interesting to see what that newly launched conventional submarine look like. I expect Type 001A pictures to start coming out. Works on a new LHD will probably start in HD shipyard and same with new AOR from Guangzhou shipyard. The pace of maritime cutters construction will continue unabated in the various shipyards around the country. One visible fruit of this modernization is the growth in the export of naval ships to other countries. Most recently, 2 Type 035 submarines were purchased by Bangladesh. With all of this optimism, one still needs to curtail some of the enthusiasm. A lot of sailors need to be trained to use all of the new hardware. The results of training all of the sailors to new ships and technology will determine the success of Chinese naval modernization programs. Although we don't hear as much like we do with USN programs like LCS, there have also been many issues with certain PLAN programs like 051C. Overall, that's to be expected out of such a comprehensive modernization effort.

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"Five Ships of the Chinese Navy You Really Ought to Know About," by Kyle Mizokami (War is Boring, 12/16/13)

"Of Destroyers and Doctrine: An Evaluation of Israel's Decision to Invest in Larger Hulls," by Ray Pritchett (Information Dissemination, 12/16/13)

"Deterrence by Denial: How to Prevent China from Using Force," by Andrew Erickson (National Interest, 12/16/13)

"China Ascendant: Is Conflict Inevitable?" by Rajan Menon (National Interest, 12/17/13)

"China's Trying to Shove the U.S. Navy Right Out of the South China Sea," by David Axe (War is Boring, 12/17/13)

"China Can Win Big in the Pacific by Backing Down," by Sydney Freedberg (Breaking Defense, 12/17/13)

"How to Measure an Aircraft Carrier's Worth," by James Holmes (The Diplomat, 12/17/13)

"Reading Abe's National Security Strategy," by Michael Green (Lowy Institute, 12/18/13)

"How the US Lost the South China Sea Standoff," by James Holmes (The Diplomat, 12/19/13)

"LCSs of Both Types Hit the Water," by Chris Cavas (Defense News, 12/19/13)

"Is the USN Ready to Go Shoulder-to-Shoulder with the PLAN?" by Craig Hooper (Next Navy, 12/20/13)

Bryan McGrath

Lincoln Paine Thinks The Navy Has Lost Its Way

My inbox was alive this morning with discussion of an online Foreign Affairs piece entitled, "What's a Navy For:  How the Navy Lost Its Way Without an Anchor" by Lincoln Paine.  My first reaction was to shake my fists and wonder how yet another person I've never heard of managed to get a naval piece published in Foreign Affairs.   My second reaction was to read the piece.  My third reaction was to read it again, because I was unable in the first reading to discern just how the Navy had "lost its way." 

The problem with Paine's piece is that there are glimmers of insight, enough to trick the uninitiated into thinking that this was an authoritative piece.  He appropriately identifies the strategic communications difficulty that the US Navy has, and the challenges of explaining to policy makers (and the public) why it should maintain such a powerful and globally deployed force.  Every generation of Navy leaders faces this question and it has ground down some very good thinkers.  What seems self-evident to some represents unprovable assertions to others.  

Additionally, he cites a number of very positive things about the Navy, which in some fashion comprise at least part of a good argument for maintaining one, including this little gem that points to the flexibility of aircraft carriers:  "When the United States attacked Afghanistan in 2001, for instance, the lack of available airbases within striking distance of the landlocked country led the army to use aircraft carriers as forward bases for its helicopters."

The meat of his argument (presumably the "lost its way" part) rests on two main thrusts.  The first is that if our Navy is designed to protect our merchant fleet, it hasn't done a particularly good job of it; and the second is what seems to be his discomfort with the Navy engaging in humanitarian and disaster relief missions.

"Early advocates for a U.S. Navy considered protection of the nation’s foreign trade as the primary rationale for such a force, and so do their modern counterparts. Yet today, this close identification of naval strategy with maritime trade has changed beyond all recognition. Foreign-flag ships carry 98 percent of U.S. imports and exports. Moreover, the U.S. merchant marine -- the nation’s commercial shipping fleet -- usually fares poorly in major wars, in large part because protecting the nation’s trade is not foremost in the navy’s thinking."  

Where to begin...while a properly sized American flag merchant marine is in our interests, the fact that our trade moves on ships flagged by other nations in no way diminishes the requirement that it be protected.  Freedom of the seas is the aim, so that our goods and the goods of others can move unmolested from place to place.  The second assertion, that the U.S. merchant marine usually "fares poorly" in major wars, is supported by the following statistics: 

"Things did not improve much in World War I, when the United States lost 197 merchant ships but only 97 warships" and "Worst of all, however, was the horrendous loss of merchant ships during World War II. The United States lost more than 1,500 freighters and passenger ships, but less than half as many warships."

There are lies, damnable lies, and statistics, and I frankly cannot make sense of this one.  That in the two World Wars, the enemy preferred to attack lightly or unarmed merchants as opposed to armed warships by a two-to-one margin, seems to me to be more of an indication of the sensibility of the opponent than the disregard of the US Navy for our merchant Fleet. It is also perhaps, a reflection of the target density.  It is not however, indicative of something more sinister.

As for the discussion of the Navy's role in humanitarian relief efforts, Paine does a good job of defining the benefits of the mission as seen by Navy officials:

"There is little doubt that the navy is often well positioned to assist littoral states facing emergencies, and that its organizational skills enable the rapid deployment of precious resources in difficult situations. This humanitarian role is considered good for the morale of active duty personnel and, to the extent that they are aware of it, the general public. Supporters of the program cite practical benefits such as improved operational preparedness, a heightened appreciation of U.S. intentions among foreign nationals, and the opportunity to work with military counterparts in other countries."

Paine however, takes us in a different direction, asking, "If the United States wants a forward-deployed humanitarian assistance program, why doesn’t it develop one under civilian control and with disaster relief and humanitarian assistance as its actual priorities? Blurring the lines between military preparedness, “soft-power” diplomacy, and humanitarianism may “improve foreign opinion of the United States” on the ground, but it is unlikely to influence a government’s policy objectives. On the domestic side, this mission creep is indicative of a growing tendency to militarize and centralize U.S. foreign policy. 

If his fear is the "growing tendency to militarize...U.S. foreign policy", I don't think he would get much of an argument these days.  We hear the same kinds of things from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others who argue vocally for sufficient resources for diplomacy and development.  But if his argument is that we should develop some kind of civilian run entity with the "...organizational skills" to "...enable the rapid deployment of precious resources in difficult situations....", then I would ask him just from where those resources would come?  Would he duplicate some portion of Navy force structure to enable this new organization?  This would prove prohibitively expensive.  Would he cut the Navy's budget in order to fund this activity?  He would find that very little of the Navy's budget actually funds these activities, as they are carried out by forces already forward deployed with the primary mission of credible combat response. Would he turn over Navy force structure to this new civilian organization?  He would diminish the nation's security posture.

Mr. Paine can't seem to figure out what he wants from the Navy, and in writing about it, he unknowingly raises the bigger and more important point that many of us wrestle with every day, that of clearly and coherently articulating the value of American Seapower.  Mr. Paine's piece does not advance this goal.

Bryan McGrath

 

Of Destroyers and Doctrine: An Evaluation of Israel’s Decision to Invest in Larger Hulls

The German Navy frigate Hamburg (F220) underway in the Mediterranean Sea as part of the U.S. Navy Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group.

The following contribution is from Jacob Stoil, a DPhil candidate at Worcester College, University of Oxford specializing in military history and strategic studies.

Recent reports have appeared in both the Israeli and German media that Israel will be buying two destroyers from Germany at a cost of over two billion euros. The destroyers appear to be a part of a general plan to upgrade Israeli naval capabilities and increase the Israel Naval Service’s (INS) ability to protect Israel’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), especially the newly discovered hydrocarbon resources. The purchases represent a major break with INS doctrine and are the wrong purchases for Israel’s purposes.

Israel has a number of maritime challenges and spending significant money on an upgrade of maritime security capabilities is certainly a positive step in addressing the issue, but destroyers do not provide an answer to these challenges and may be a liability. There is often a ‘supersize-me’ impulse in naval procurement, an assumption that bigger is better and so a destroyer would naturally be better than a missile boat or corvette,an assumption which is fundamentally untrue. The doctrine of the INS has traditionally rejected this logic in favour of a doctrine built around smaller, faster, and harder to detect vessels with advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and significant offensive armament. This doctrine has served Israel well and has proved itself time and again, including during the 1973 war. Despite the success of the doctrine, a drive to supersize - of which the destroyers represent the latest iteration - has crept into the INS. Each generation of missile boats in the INS fleet has grown in size. The Sa’ar 5 is around 700 tons larger than the Sa’ar 4.5, which is 40 tons larger than the Sa’ar 4. The Sa’ar 4 itself is 200 tons larger than its predecessor. The destroyers would not be a simple continuation of this trend, they be an exponential increase in size (especially given that the smallest German frigate, a smaller class than a destroyer, is three times the tonnage of the Sa’ar 5). The additional tonnage might make for slower vessels but would definitely mean more identifiable targets, with more crew to lose if something goes wrong.

Given the cost and the break with a successful doctrinal concept,this all begs the question why destroyer? Larger ships are traditionally associated with greater power, but to what end? Naval power is not an end in itself. Israel clearly does not intend to use naval power to support land operations or develop independent strategic operations from the sea in a serious way. All of their naval procurement and training decisions over the last more than twenty years have made that impossible. This leaves several other possible motivations: controlling sea lines of communication (SLOCs), interdicting hostile SLOCs, enforcing a blockade, coastal protection, protecting the EEZ, and finally denying the use of the sea to an opponent. In the first case, Israel's primary SLOCs flow through the Mediterranean and in the past, with a less advanced fleet than the INS currently boasts, Israel has been able to protect them beyond Malta. Although destroyers could accomplish this, multiple corvettes and missile boats could cover more area simultaneously and for less money. An expanded submarine, corvette, and missile boat force can similarly accomplish the objectives of interdicting the SLOCs of potential regional rivals, including Iran, and denying them use of the sea.

Given current operational requirements (Gaza blockade, oil field protection, rapid deployment against local adversaries, etc.) there is much to recommend an expanded force of smaller vessels over larger destroyers. A ship, no matter its size, can only be in one place,meaning it can only fulfill one of these requirements at a given time. Additional smaller vessels would give the force additional flexibility in a wider variety of roles, including having spare vessels in reserve for unforeseen contingencies. Additionally, the type of threats that Israel is likely to face to its EEZ are largely irregular in their nature. Such irregular threats have in the past consisted of small craft attempting to enter an area surreptitiously before carrying out an operation.The employment of destroyers to respond to such threats would be overkill. Small vessels have proven highly effective at addressing such threats. An important aspect of the response to this type of irregular threat is fast response and frequent patrolling. As such, small fast craft provide a better response to such threats than a single larger craft. More numerous smaller craft can cover a greater physical area than one destroyer covers and therefore not only have a greater deterrent value but also respond more swiftly to threats as they develop.

There is a further factor to consider. Anti-ship missile technology has evolved significantly in the past few decades.  A direct hit by the new generation of missiles, such as the Russian 3M-54 Klub,is just as likely to disable a large vessel as a small one. While a larger vessel could theoretically contain more anti-missile capabilities, Israel has created an integrated package of missile defense capabilities optimized for smaller hulls. Additionally, if a larger vessel was lost, the impact on the INS would be more operationally significant than the loss of a smaller vessel. It is worth noting that the experience of such a loss (the INS Eilat) helped create the Israeli doctrine of investing in small, fast, high-tech, and well-armed vessels.

The addition of destroyers to the Israeli fleet is both expensive and unnecessary.  For the price of two destroyers, the INS could expand its flotillas of corvettes, missile boats, or submarines. Israel developed a successful doctrine based on such ships after unsatisfactory experiences with larger hulls. An expanded version of its current fleet would be able to continue to fulfil current operational requirements and do a better job than two destroyers of protecting the EEZ while maintaining the capability to react to unexpected contingencies and prevent regional opponents from exploiting the sea. It would accomplish this more cheaply and with less risk than two destroyers could. In short, destroyers are the wrong investment at the wrong time. Israel would do better to stick to a successful doctrine of smaller but highly capable vessels than invest in expensive destroyers that do not fulfill operational requirements.  In this case, bigger is not better but more might just be merrier.



Jacob Stoil is a DPhil candidate at Worcester College, University of Oxford specializing in military history and strategic studies.  His dissertation explores indigenous forces in the Middle East and Horn of Africa during the Second World War.  As part of his DPhil research Jacob conducted fieldwork in Somaliland, Israel, Ethiopia, and the West Bank.

Prior to his Dphil Jacob completed his MA and BA at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies.  His recent publications include, ‘Martial Race and Indigenous Forces’ in The British Indian Army: Virtue and Necessity published by Cambridge Scholars Press and ‘Structures of Cooperation and Conflict - Local Forces in Mandatory Palestine’ published in Ex Historia.  Jacob’s research interests include irregular forces, peripheral campaigns, military adaptation in the developing world, and Middle Eastern military history.  Jacob is a member of the British Empire at War and Second World War Military Operations Research Groups as well as the Society for Military History.