A few years ago, someone brought to my attention a Georgetown MA thesis on resurrecting some of the imaginative things we did during the Cold War on the Electronic Warfare front. I found the writing to be superb and the thinking first rate. I shared the thesis with several folks who were better positioned to act on some of the recommendations than I. But I didn't forget the author.
Last month (or it may have been the month before), he (Jonathan Solomon) sent me a link to some of his latest work, a piece that somehow escaped my attention. Entitled "Demystifying Conventional Deterrence: Great-Power Conflict and East Asian Peace" . I set it aside, thinking I would get to it over the holidays. Other work intervened, and I have only this morning digested it.
Please read this piece. It is not short, but it is straightforward and clear. It is one of the best bits of writing and thinking I have encountered, well, since the last thing I read that Mr. Solomon wrote.
The only (slight) quibble I have with Mr. Solomon's argument is his belief in the effectiveness of diplomatic outreach with China as a means of reinforcing our deterrent posture, removing some of the fog and doubt, and building confidence. My view is that these kinds of negotiations/diplomatic overtures are MOST effective when the parties believe themselves to be evenly or near evenly matched. As active as the PLA has been in the last few years, my sense is that they are not yet sufficiently incentivized to negotiate. While I agree that we should and MUST continue to pursue these measures, I am not confident in their effectiveness.
Bryan McGrath
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