AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Read Board

"Growler Advocates Outline Stealth Vulnerabilities," by Amy Butler (Aviation Week, 03/24/14)

"Why Aircraft Carrier Workers Deserve a Better Plan from the Pentagon," by Rick Giannini and Darrell Grow (Defense One, 03/24/14)

"How to Avoid a Naval War with China," by William J. Parker III and Micah Zenko (Foreign Policy, 03/24/14)

"Requirements Debate Continues to Delay UCLASS RFP," by Dave Majumdar (USNI News, 03/24/14)

"Navy Spots an Arctic Future, but Struggles to Plot a Course," by Steven Beardsley (Stars & Stripes, 03/24/14)

"Iran's Two Navies Bring Mixture of Threats," by Awad Mustafa (Defense News, 03/24/14)

"China, Time and Rebalancing," by Gary Roughead (Hoover Institution, 03/25/14)

"This is What Assumption of Additional Risk Looks Like," by Bryan McGrath (Information Dissemination, 03/25/14)

"'If It's Not Survivable, We Don't Care': HAC-D's Peter Visclosky on Littoral Combat Ship," by Otto Kreisher (Breaking Defense, 03/25/14)

"Why the Navy Really Wants 22 More Growlers," by Colin Clark (Breaking Defense, 03/26/14)

"We're Losing Our Military Edge Over China. Here's How to Get it Back," by J. Randy Forbes and Elbridge Colby (National Interest, 03/27/14)

"Upgrading the Classic FFG for Modern Combat," by Chris Cavas (Defense News, 03/27/14)

Bryan McGrath

Sevastopol(s)

Over at War is Boring, I take the RFS Sevastopol analogy one step farther:

Until the invasion of Crimea, Russia expected to take into service in 2016 RFS Sevastopol, a 21,000-ton-displacement, French-built amphibious assault ship. The choice of name was odd, given that—until recently—the city of Sevastopol lay outside the borders of Russia. 

France may cancel the deal in light of Moscow’s aggression. But the soon-perhaps-not-to-be Sevastopol was not the first ship named for the great Russian naval base on the Crimean peninsula. In fact, Russian naval history is an intricate web of politics, geography and foreign influence. Moscow has long struggled with the problems of maintaining four distinct, unsupportable fleets—and of an unreliable shipbuilding industry.

The More Things Change, the More They Change

This week's column at the Diplomat takes at how the relative expense of different weapon systems has changed over time, and tries to draw out some operational and strategic implications of those changes.

In 1944, the relative costs of fighters, bombers, and aircraft carriers ran very roughly as follows: 

F6F Hellcat: $35,000 

B-29 Superfortress: $700,000 

Essex-class aircraft carrier $70,000,000 

An aircraft carrier was worth 100 heavy bombers, each of which cost roughly as much as 20 carrier-borne fighters. These are (roughly) the expected cost numbers for the next generation of fighter, bomber, and aircraft carrier for the United States 

F-35: $150 million 

LRS-B: $810 million 

CVN-78: $12.8 billion 

The ordinal relationship remains the same, but the ratios have changed; an aircraft carrier costs 15.8 bombers, while a bomber cost 5.4 fighters.

This is What Assumption of Additional Risk Looks Like

For a defense planner provided with limited resources to distribute among numerous priorities, risk calculations must be made.  This is the process at the heart of the entire defense budgeting system.  In times of plenty, the decisions are somewhat easier, though resources are always "scarce" to some degree.

In the present environment, those resources are particularly scarce.  This statement causes many a jaw to drop, what with a base budget in the neighborhood of $500B and contingency funding atop that.  Readers of this blog are less likely to stare agape at the screen, as you recognize that even with all that money being spent, the military requirements of the world's leading democratic power are considerable.

With the release of the FY15 Defense Budget earlier this month, we get a much better understanding of what assuming additional risk looks like. The case in point is the Navy's Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) program.  First brought to my attention by the reporting of the estimable Chris Cavas, it seems that the TLAM program will acquire 100 additional missiles in FY 15, and then no more.  From Cavas' article:

"Weapons procurement showed striking reductions from last year’s plans. Then, the Navy planned to buy 980 Tactical Tomahawks, the primary cruise missile in use throughout the fleet. The new plan shows only 100 missiles in 2015 and none thereafter. The reduction reflects shifting investment to a new next-generation land attack weapon, said Lt. Caroline Hutcheson, a Navy spokeswoman at the Pentagon, who also noted that the current inventory of Block IV Tactical Tomahawks exceeds combat requirements. A recertification line for existing missiles will be established to retain effectiveness of current TacToms, she added."

When this piece came out in the first week of March, a logical conclusion would have been that the "next generation land attack weapon" would be found in some other procurement line item, and that its acquisition would pick up where the TLAM left off.  This sort of thing happens, it is part of the sturm and drang of the defense industry.  A successful system or weapon has a certain program life, and then is replaced by updated technology.   But this is not the case. THIS is the case (from the Budget Request and Inside the Navy (behind firewall):

“Funding is provided for a Next Generation Land Attack Weapon, a weapons system that is long-range, survivable and can be launched from multiple surface and submarine platforms,” states the budget request. “NGLAW will incorporate evaluated existing and emergent technologies to support an improved strike capability with an initial operational capability no later than 2024.”
The Navy plans to begin an analysis of alternatives for the Tomahawk follow-on capability in FY-15, with a goal of awarding a technology demonstration contract -- or contracts -- during the second quarter of FY-16, according to the budget. The program would begin engineering and manufacturing development during the first quarter of FY-18."   

This is what assuming additional risk looks like.  This is what hard working planners must do when faced with scarce resources.  One year ago--in the FY14 Budget submission--these planners believed we needed 980 more TLAMS over the course of the FYDP.  One year later, they had to choose differently.  In order to create the funding necessary to design, compete and build a follow-on land attack weapon, the Navy must cease production years early of one of its most important, useful, flexible, and responsive offensive weapons.  In doing so, funds are "created" that can then be applied to the research and development of the follow on.  A hard decision made by smart people when presented with no good options.  The decision is made somewhat less ugly by the fact that there is an inventory of these weapons built up after years of production (and expenditure).  That number is of course, classified, as it should be.  But starting in 2016 through 2024, that inventory will diminish each time a missile is fired.  This is risk.

So why am I writing about this.  First, to make sure readers know the kinds of least bad decisions that people in the Pentagon have to make--on a daily basis.  Many of you already know it, but perhaps some don't get to drill down like this.  I know the people who work these issues--they are really smart and in most cases, they wish they had better options.

Secondly, I think this is an unwise decision as a matter of strategy.  

I believe that the country needs to put additional energy toward deterring the war it cannot afford to fight, and that is a war with China, Russia, or China and Russia.  In order to best deter such a war, it must be well-prepared to wage it.  Calculations of risk that involve diminishing stocks of precision guided munitions without the industrial capacity to quickly replace them should be viewed with concern.  It is not 1939.  We do not have endless untapped industrial capacity that will build 50,000 airplanes and 6000 ships and boats.  We have limited production lines in incredibly high-tech factories that rely on a precious supply of skilled workers who are not reproducible overnight.  Any war with another major power will expend PGM's at a rate our industrial base will strain to replace.  Steady peacetime procurement of these specialized weapons not only makes the US better prepared to wage war--should it come--but it sends powerful signals of readiness and will that serve to deter war in the first place.  

At some point we must recognize that the height of national strategy is NOT the pursuit of the most efficient allocation of resources.  It is the advancement and sustainment of national interest.  In taking on this additional near-term risk, the United States efficiently allocates resources while sending yet another message of quiescence in the face of an increasingly troubled world.

Bryan McGrath




                        

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"The Navy's Plan to Beam Down Energy from Orbiting Solar Panels," by Allen McDuffee (Wired, 03/17/14)

"Hospital Ships to Be Counted in U.S. Combat Fleet," by Seth Cropsey (Weekly Standard, 03/17/14)

"Navy Launches Plans on New Amphib Design," by Kris Osborn (DoD Buzz, 03/17/14)

"What Does It Take to Win in the Littoral?" by Edward Lundquist (Maritime Executive, 03/17/14)

"Why SSC Evolution Portends a Further Decline in Fleet Numbers," by Bryan McGrath (Information Dissemination, 03/18/14)

"Pentagon Steps Up Plan for Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile," by Ray Locker (USA Today, 03/18/14)

"LCS Alternative Task Force Named," by Chris Cavas (Navy Times, 03/18/14)

"A Better Fleet: Scrap LCS, Double Virginia Sub Buy & Move Design Back to Navy," by Kirk Lippold (Breaking Defense, 03/20/14)

"America's Incredible Shrinking Navy," by Steve Cohen (Wall Street Journal, 03/20/14)

China's military expenditure

China's annual announcement of its military expenditure is often met with a lot of alarm. The question has often been why China needs to be constantly increasing its military expenditure so much. Here is a chart showing China's military expenditure vs treasury income vs GDP from 1999 to 2013.



Over this period, the military expenditure has generally been between 1.2% to 1.5% of the GDP and 9.5% to 5.5% of the treasury income. so in real RMB terms, military expenditure has not gone up as a percentage of GDP. In comparison to the treasury income, military expenditure has decreased a lot due to improved tax collection in China. The question is why the military expenditure has remained steady when the reported year to year increased is greater than GDP growth. The answer seems to be that GDP is inflation adjusted whereas military expenditure is not. There are 3 other charts similar to this which shows military expenditures going back to 1950. Seems like China maintained higher military expenditure % (4.5% to 9%) up until when Deng Xiaoping took over in 1978. After which, PLA saw its spending vs GDP drop all the way to 1% in the mid 90s. Now, China's definition of military expenditure can be different from that of the west, so there is no reason to compare China to Japan or US here. The important take away here is that China is not in any kind of expansion mode when it comes to military expenditure.

The commissioning of the lead ship of 052D class

Yesterday, China officially commissioned the lead ship in its new class of destroyers. From this article, you can see that this first Type 052D class ship is named after the city of Kunming and given the hull number 172. The ceremony was attended to by Chinese Navy commander Wu Shengli. Videos of the commissioning can be found on youtube.

I have covered Type 052D in numerous entries like this before. In some ways, it represents the final step in the modernization of China's surface combatant. Starting from the early 90s when Type 052 was launched until today, the Chinese naval destroyers have incrementally improved with Type 051B, Type 052B and Type 052C before finally reaching Type 052D. It is equipped with China's first universal VLS capable of launching HHQ-9 series of long range SAM, quad packed medium SAM, YJ-18 anti-ship missiles, LACM and Yu-8 (or similar ASROC). It is also carrying PJ-38 130 mm main gun, 24-cell version of HQ-10 CIWS and PJ-12 7-barreled 30 mm CIWS. A lot of the radar, ESM suite, communication antenna and other electronic installations look like the ones we have seen on 052C, but it is carrying a flat second generation multifunctional radar given the designation Type 346A and a new type of variable depth sonar at back. Whereas Type 052C placed heavy emphasis on AAW as China's first area air defense ship, Type 052D not only improves in that area, but should also become capable in ASW (with the long range anti submarine missile + improved sonar), ASuW, long range missile strikes and amphibious landing support. As the hull of 052D has already been "maxed" out, the next generation of Chinese destroyer would be larger and equipped with more advanced propulsion unit. Here are some of the photos.






The commissioning of No. 172 was surprising for many followers even after its hull number was recently painted. The last 2 052Cs, which were launched before No. 172 have yet to be commissioned. The recent batch of 052Cs have generally taken over 2 years to be commissioned after launching. It appears that the Chinese naval brass rushed No. 172 into service so that it can participate in its 65th anniversary celebration at Qingdao on April 23rd. Now that it has been commissioned into the South Sea Fleet, they can start the process of training and developing tactics for this new class of ships. At present, we have 3 052D launched with a 4th that looks to soon be launched. The production run is likely to reach 12 ships with JiangNan shipyard building 8 of them and Dalian shipyard building the remaining.

The SOFification of Maritime Activism

Claude Berube and I have written quite a bit about maritime non-state actors; in particular on Sea Shepherd Conservation Society’s growing para-navy.  Most non-state actors, be they maritime activists or Salafist jihadists, will undergo a rather predictable life cycle, where the level of violence in their operations continually escalates in order to compete with one another for attention and funding.  Eventually, the organizations will splinter, with more hard-core and entrepreneurial members going their own way to build an organization that reflects their level of energy or ideology.  The cycle has happened over and over in al Qaeda’s affiliates, from Iraq to the Maghreb.  And this sort of spin-off is exactly how SSCS was formed in 1977 when Captain Paul Watson broke away from Greenpeace.

Throughout history, but especially in the latter half of the 20^th Century, various militaries around the world formed dedicated units who were selected, trained, and equipped at a higher standard than their conventional forces.  These elite teams are relied on to perform complex missions generally requiring discrete operational footprints to include surgical raids or special warfare.  Today, we’re seeing the same progression in maritime activism. Two spin-off groups from Sea Shepherd have recently demonstrated a rather remarkable evolution in eco-activism. In the trailer for his new television show, Pete Bethune, who is infamous for skippering the trimaran that was cut in half by a Japanese Whaler, leads his group of former military Earthrace Conservation volunteers performing “direct action” missions on behalf of wildlife around the world. 

 
Although I’m sure there is quite a bit of marketing hyperbole in the trailer, the way the team is kitted out, from the multi-cams to the use of small tactical unmanned air systems, rebreathers, and night vision demonstrates that they are attempting to emulate a naval special operations force. Now don’t get me wrong, a considerable gap in capability exists between Earthrace and say our own SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant Crewman. But they are clearly a more specialized and elite organization than SSCS which resembles a small state-sponsored naval fleet.

Perhaps an even more interesting development occurred 15 March, when former Dutch policeman and SSCS sailor Laurens de Groot’s Shadowview UAV operations team assisted rangers in Kruger National Park South Africa in tracking and killing a rhino poacher.  This type of operation is representative of the pinnacle of foreign internal defense missions to US special operators.  The exact same sort of high-end advise and assist missions where US technical assistance and ISR support enables our foreign partners to capture or kill terrorists are the ultimate objective of many of USSOCOM’s current activities.

What is driving this sort of sophisticated maritime activism? First, there is a vacuum in wildlife protection and law enforcement capability all over the world.  On the maritime side, illegal fishing is taking a huge toll not only in the marine ecosystem, but in the economies of coastal countries, especially in Africa. Africa’s coasts are, for the most part wild and ungoverned places.  Governments there are either too poor, too corrupt, or too complacent to police their own waters.  As an aside, there is an expanding nexus between wild-life poaching in Africa and violent extremist, insurgent, and criminal groups.  For example, it is fairly commonly accepted that Josephy Kony’s LRA guerrillas are sustained in some part by the ivory trade.  More specific to the marine environment are rumors of a trade-based money laundering scheme taking place between illegal shark-finners and narcotics precursors moving into Southern Africa from China.  Back on point, the emergence of specialized private activist groups to fill the gap or assist African countries in protecting their wildlife is as natural as the emergence of embarked armed private security contractors who were hired by shipping companies when multi-national naval forces failed to adequately neutralize Somali piracy. 

Approximately 73 million sharks are killed each year
exclusively for their fins. Photo: Gunther Deichmann

The second factor enabling a SOF-like capability in maritime non-state actors is simply the availability and affordability of dual-use technology. “Drones” providing an airborne reconnaissance capability that only a decade ago would have required manned aircraft and highly trained pilots costing hundreds of thousands of dollars are now available widely and cheaply online.  Regardless of the lower barriers of entry into military-quality surveillance tools, the skill and dedication of groups like Shadowview should not be over-looked and plays the lion’s share in their success. The same dynamics driving maritime activists to become more SOF-like will support the continued development of much more elite and dangerous violent extremists groups and transnational criminal organizations. We ignore them at our peril. 

The opinions in this post are the author's alone, and not representative of the US Navy or any other organization.

A Poor Strategic Decision

 This week the United States made a decision completely at odds with the nation’s long term strategic planning. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of the Crimea and the missing Malaysian Airlines flight 370 largely overshadowed the decision by the U.S. Commerce Department to relinquish its last official oversight of the internet. This authority has been held, via a contract, with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN intends to turn it over management of the internet to a “global governance body”, whose form and function have not yet been determined. The United States has always been committed to the concept of free trade, and since 1945 has been the principal shield of maritime and aviation trade routes. The cyber-trade routes that course through the internet have become as important to the strategic and economic health and well-being of the U.S. as the physical air and sea routes of commerce. Complete U.S. divestment from oversight of internet domain naming conventions is a serious strategic mistake. Similar global systems created in the past were never completely abandoned as the U.S. intends to act in regard to the internet. Better options for continued U.S. monitoring and support exist. The U.S. Commerce Department is making a serious mistake in turning over this vital aspect of internet oversight to a not yet fully organized “global governance” entity.

      The United States essentially “created” the internet over the course of several decades as a method for exchanging information between distant academics working on the same projects. Since its humble beginnings the internet has morphed into a communications, business, entertainment and information source “light years” beyond its origins. The privatization of this vast system from strict U.S. government control to international governance began early in the internet’s history with the 1998 creation of ICANN to oversee many internet activities formerly performed by the United States government. The follow-on 2006 agreement established full ICANN internet management with limited monitoring from U.S. government authority. Both agreements were in keeping with the very generous U.S. intent to make the internet available to all peoples without restriction. Unfortunately, complaints related to reported internet spying from U.S. intelligence agencies, or budget cuts have prompted the current U.S. administration to accelerate its abandonment of all internet oversight by September 2015. This is a serious strategic mistake. While this action may seem perfectly reasonable now, history shows that such large-scale abandonments often lead to poor future outcomes for the nation that gives up a key strategic system. Better examples of access for all with continued U.S. oversight exist as models for the internet.

          

There are good historical examples of governments creating large-scale economic and communication systems, and then making them available to a global customer base. Great Britain funded the a vast system of submarine cables in the late 19^th and early 20^th century in order to provide secure communications throughout its Empire. Although this system, the All Red Line,  was later expanded to include cables funded or owned by other nations, Great Britain frequently eavesdropped on communications in defense of its own national interests. Thanks to their retention of this capability, the British were able to inform the United States that the German Empire planned to give Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to the Mexican government if it declared war on the U.S. Had the British not retained this capability, this message, the Zimmerman telegram, might have gone unnoticed. More recently the United States opened use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) to a wide civilian and international user base while retaining its ability to use the system for national security applications. 

    

     Finally, the United States has greatly benefitted from the current configuration of the internet. By retaining (through ICANN), the ability to influence what top level domains (.com, .net, .gov, .mil etc) are approved, the U.S. continued a near three century hold by the English language on international system nomenclature. The best early navigation charts were provided by the British Admiralty, whose wide ranging exploration efforts charted the world’s oceans, starting with the voyages of Captain James Cook in the late 1700’s. Thanks to their efforts and Royal Navy's control of the world’s oceans, English was and remains the language of Marine communication throughout the world. U.S. and British sponsorship of pioneering aviation activities and commercial air routes before and just after World War 2 made English the first language of world air travel. The internet, also born under U.S. auspices, has retained an English base in its domain structure. There are already concerns that opening upper level domains to wide international control will create a fragmented internet that will no longer be “world wide”. English speaking internet users could quickly find themselves marginalized on the net if there is an explosion of domain names with Cyrillic or Hanzi characters that are inaccessible by English speakers.

     Criticism of U.S. intelligence community surveillance activities may be pushing this decision faster than is prudent. It might be useful to remind such critics that every nation with the ability to do so conducts espionage activities. Commercial entities and private individuals sift the web for email, purchase, and consumer data on individuals and groups. As for the great critics of U.S. security efforts, Edward Snowden hides under the auspices of former KGB officer and Europe’s number one authoritarian thug, Vladimir Putin, who is hardly an advocate of human rights. Wikileaks hero Julian Assange too has benefited from Russian associations. His 2012 television and internet talk show, “World Tomorrow” was created and produced by state-controlled Russia TV, a company founded by Vladimir Putin’s former media minister Mikhail Yuriyevich Lesin.

    The U.S. cannot afford to completely divorce itself from its creation. Time and again, “international governance”, whether through the United Nations or other international body, leads to  inefficient and corrupt management. The U.S. transfer of authority and responsibility for internet management to ICANN since 1998 has been a well planned process. Cutting all ability to oversee and affect a system created by the United States government and used so extensively by U.S. citizens in the public and private spheres, is a serious error in strategic judgment. The U.S. should suspend a complete severing of ability to monitor and oversee ICANN until Congress can adequately investigate the second and third order effects on U.S. security, the U.S. business and financial community and on ordinary U.S. citizens’ ability to use the internet.

Some Unsolicited Input on the Small Surface Combatant

Having to this point, not been asked to do so elsewhere, I figured I might as well put down a few thoughts about the future of the Small Surface Combatant, 52 of which are required by the Navy's 2012 Force Structure Assessment, with 32 of that likely to be made up of the two variants as the LCS as we know it.  Stressing survivability and lethality, OSD has directed the Navy to cease further contract negotiations after 32 hulls of the LCS, and to study a multi-mission frigate-like vessel which presumably would possess both to a greater degree.  As I wrote the other day, it seems difficult to comprehend how such a vessel would not represent a considerably higher per/hull cost than the LCS, laying additional claim upon an already insufficient shipbuilding budget.  The requirement to field multi-mission capability will drive significant cost increases. The direction to the Navy was to assess clean sheet designs, existing designs, and variants of the LCS. 

Up front, I will freely admit to being inexact with my language here, as I will likely mix "capabilities" and "requirements".  But here are a few attributes/capabilities/requirements that I believe are worthy of consideration by the Small Surface Combatant Task Force.  It is clearly not intended to be all-encompassing:

GENERAL:  The first 10 ships must be built SOLELY with technology that is at least IOC level of maturity on the date of the release of the RFP.  Any exceptions to this must be approved by the Secretary of the Navy (I know ASN/RD&A is Acquisition Executive, but I would like the highest level attention paid to eliminating requirements creep), along with design changes with estimated cost in excess of $100,000. 

PRIMARY MISSIONS:  ASW (passive and active) ASuW (Shipboard missiles and helo launched missiles. Gun)  AAW (self-defense out to 25nm)

SERVICE LIFE:  25 Years

SURVIVABILITY:  Level II- (no Countermeasure Washdown, limited CPS, limited shock hardening)

COST: The third and subsequent ships must cost less than $750M (2014 Dollars).


MANNING: 150-175

ENDURANCE:  The ship must have endurance equal to or greater than that of the baseline FFG, which my trusty Wikipedia tells me is 4500nm at 20 kts.

SPEED:  Top speed of not less than 28 knots

POWER:  The ship must be capable of generating 300% of the expected electrical load while at maximal combat readiness.

COMBAT SYSTEM:  The combat system must 1) Already exist and already be operating in the US Fleet 2) optimize open-ness and government defined data and physical interfaces,  and minimize integration costs

SENSORS AND WEAPONS

• Surveillance
• 3D Air Search Radar
• Surface Search/Periscope Detection Radar
• At least 2 SH-60 sized aircraft, or mix of manned and unmanned aircraft with similar footprint
• Electronic Warfare Suite (ES/EP/EA)

•  Weapons (magazine capacity
• Surface to Air Missiles--25nm range
• ASuW Gun--5nm range
• Surface to Surface Missiles--150nm range
• Crew-served and heavy caliber deck mounted weapons

• ASW
• LCS ASW Mission Module Capabilities (VDS/MFTA/SQQ 89 Processing)
• Torpedo Countermeasures
• Helo employed Torpedoes
• Surface Ship Torpedoes

•  Battle Networking
• CEC
• Link 16 

 The idea behind this ship is that costs will be contained by leveraging in service and proven technology, while relying on networking through CEC/Link 16 to allow tradespace in embarked sensors.  "Survivability" will be increased over that of the LCS, but not to the level of the FFG.  Speed is sacrificed in favor of endurance, and the propulsion and electrical systems are up to the ship designers as long as they meet the standards set forth here.  

Ten ships will be built exactly alike, with hull 11 incorporating such capability enhancements are as efficiently realized through the use of defined computer and physical interfaces. 

The ship will have no role in land attack. 

Bryan McGrath

Why Do Air Force Movies Fail?

This is the question I ask in my latest at War is Boring:

Air power should, and occasionally does, sell at the box office. But Officer and a Gentleman, Top Gun, Flight of the Intruder and Rescue Dawn all depicted Navy pilots. In Independence Day, Marine aviator Will Smith saves the world, alternating between a Marine Corps F/A-18 and an alien snubfighter. 

The Air Force gets Iron Eagle, in which a teenager with a tape recorder fills in for Maverick and Goose. More recently, Red Tails flopped with audiences and critics. Only Pearl Harbor stands as partial exception. Hated by critics, historians and all right-thinking people, director Michael Bay’s depiction of Army Air Force aviators challenging the Japanese grossed $197 million domestically.

My answer: Part bad luck, part inability to convey a strategic concept for the service. Read the whole thing, lemme know what you think. Also, let my apologize for my long-running failure to restart the Seapower in Culture series. I do plan to return to it, but haven't had time recently.

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (NAVY) Weekly Read Board

"The Navy Moves Toward Smarter Shipbuilding," by George Sawyer and Bryan McGrath (National Interest, 03/10/14)

"CNO Predicts Steady Manning Levels, Outlines Plans to Shelve Some Ships," by Sam Fellman (Navy Times, 03/10/14)

"America's Navy Needs Twelve Carriers and Three Hubs," by Mackenzie Eaglen and Bryan McGrath (Real Clear Defense, 03/11/14)

"Carriers, Cruisers and LCS: CNO Speaks," by Sydney Freedberg (Breaking Defense, 03/11/14)

"Navy and Marine Power From the Sea: The Nation's 'Perfect Blend'" by Robert Holzer (War on the Rocks, 03/11/14)

"Interview: Rep. Randy Forbes," by Chris Cavas and John Bennett (Defense News, 03/11/14)

"New US Navy Counting Rules Add Up to More Ships," by Chris Cavas (Defense News, 03/11/14)

"Obama, Navy Lying to Congress on Carriers: Seapower Chair Rep. Forbes," by Sydney Freedberg (Breaking Defense, 03/12/14)

"Why the Navy Wants More Growlers," by Dave Majumdar (USNI News, 03/12/14)

"CNO Tells Congress the U.S. Needs 450-Ship Navy," by Kris Osborn (Military.com, 03/12/14)

"Air-Sea Battle Defined," by Harry Kazianis (National Interest, 03/13/14)

"Why Are Navy Helos Getting Marginalized?" by Craig Hooper (Next Navy, 03/13/14)

Bryan McGrath