"Offshoring" the Flotilla Combatant

     

Pacific Patrol Boat operated by the Solomon Islands

Cuts in the total number of  littoral combat ships (LCS) to be purchased and the proposal for a new class of frigate would seem to indicate that the U.S. Navy is not interested in purchasing a large force of corvette-sized combatants. Despite this, it is not inconceivable that the U.S. might eventually be called on to provide either an offshore patrol or regional strike capability in littoral regions. If strategy dictates a stronger presence in littoral waters, why should the U.S. be the only provider of such forces when other solutions are present? The U.S. need not own the flotilla, but instead support and coordinate a U.S. built and trained small combatant force. Such an example of this concept has been successfully operated by the Australians for nearly 30 years in support of the archipelagic Pacific nations. The U.S. could adopt the Australian Pacific Patrol Boat Program to provide tailored small combatant forces to regions where such a capability is desired.

     The Australian government’s Pacific Patrol Boat has provided 22 patrol boats to 12 Pacific Island nations since the mid 1980s. Twenty two boats were delivered between 1987 and 1992 at an initial cost of 155.25 million Australian dollars. Continuing costs have been budgeted at 12.5 million Australian dollars per year, but fuel and operational costs has pushed this figure to 51 million in at least two years. A 350 million (Australian) dollar service life extension program will extend the service life of the boats to 2027.

Scope of the Australian-funded and support program

     These 100 foot craft have an endurance of 2500 nautical miles at 12 knots and can be configured for a variety of missions. They generally serve as offshore patrol vessels but can also mount small weapons up to and including a 20mm cannon. The Australian govt. provides most of the funds to build the ships, and train the crews, but they are operated and routinely maintained by the nations whose interests they serve. Australian naval observers often operate with these ships. This arrangement gives Australia a greater strategic presence in the South and Central Pacific at a very low cost compared with a deployment of Australian warships to the area.

     The U.S. could adopt a similar program to build littoral patrol/missile craft and train recipient-nation crews for service in West African, Middle Eastern, and Western Pacific waters. Individual flotillas could be tailored to the region/nations for which they are destined to serve. A West African flotilla vessel might look very much like the Australian Pacific Patrol boat, while a Western Pacific flotilla combatant might be much more heavily armed like the old Soviet-designed OSA missile boat, or the larger and more capable Ambassador MK III class that has been proposed as a U.S. flotilla combatant by New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) advocates. Proponents of small missile combatants suggest they could be built for U.S. service at 80 million U.S. dollars per copy.  A very simple flotilla combatant built to commercial standards for other nations might be constructed for even less, especially in purchased in large numbers.

OSA type missile combatant

     This program would bring navies from those nations receiving flotilla ships into closer contact with the U.S. Navy, and allow for sustained multilateral operations. Recipient- nation crews would be regionally knowledgeable and more effective than deploying U.S. Navy assets (large or small) in achieving success in littoral missions. Enduring, regular U.S. support to this mission could be regionally provided by an amphibious warfare ship outfitted as a station ship along the lines of those employed for Africa Partnership Station (APS). This unit would provide classroom, and repair, and support for flotilla combatants. It could be substantially crewed by Military Sealift Command CIVAMRS in a format similar to that of the experimental seabase USS Ponce in order to further reduce costs to the mission. Additional support might be provided by one or more Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) deployed in the role of “flotilla leader(s). LCS, with its extensive helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capability and communications/control systems might support and coordinate the activities of U.S. funded flotillas in the event of wartime operations. This capability could be regularly exercised through peacetime deployments and pay great dividends in combat at sea. Most importantly, the U.S. government would not have to pay the crews or many of the immediate operating costs of those vessels.

    

     There is no need to divert thousands of relatively expensive U.S. sailors to littoral missions when those who live and operate in the region can be enabled by the U.S. to conduct that mission. Creating Pacific, West African, and Middle Eastern flotilla groups tailored to the needs of and threats residing in each region can free U.S. to pursue the construction of globally-deployable ships necessary for its own unique strategic needs. The close association these flotillas would have with U.S. naval forces would make them a powerful tool in gathering regional intelligence in peacetime, and useful force multipliers in actual combat operations. A U.S. flotilla combatant program would obviously be significantly more expensive than its Australian counterpart. Such a formation however could still significantly augment U.S. regional engagement efforts and ought to be seriously considered as a means of delivering the benefits offered by the NNFM without its most significant costs in personnel, fuel, and regular maintenance.